How Al Qaeda Sizes up a Target

[Bonnie]

A trip from Nairobi, Kenya to the Kenyan coast, a boat trip to a pleasure island, operational guidance on how to enlist tribes in the jihad and comments on how to kill a Belgian– a Belgian soldier in Somalia. A Short Report on the Trip from Nairobi to Cape Kambooni and the Situation in the Southern Region makes for fascinating reading –(via the West Point Combating Terrorism Center Harmony documents site).

This document is short — six pages. It was translated on March 20, 2002, so it has been in US possession at least four years. A fair bet it was captured in Afghanistan. The man who wrote the scout report for Al Qaeda is identified as Omar al-Sumali (aka Saif al-Adl).

The trip report has tactical and operational details. Omar analyzes routes, local security, and assesses potential recruits. He makes operational recommendations. He’s a spy with diplomatic finesse.

Here’s part of the executive summary:

The notes made in the first section represent a terrorist scouting report for the Kenyan coast popular with tourists. Special attention is given to the areas where tourists congregate, and the patrols conducted by the police. Tactics for avoiding police detection are described as well as navigational details for moving by ship along the coast.

The second part of the document begins with ethnographic information about Bajuni, Ogaden, and Jal Jaal people of coastal northern Kenya and Somalia. Political programs were established with all three to promote their cooperation with Al-Qa’ida.

Operational requirements for the region are established, and the results of two operations analyzed.

Lamu is a vacation spot off the Kenyan coast. Excerpts by the scout:

We left Mombassa for a city called Malindi which is ___ km away, and then to (cape)
Ngomeni which is ___ km away from Malindi. The boat that goes to Mombassa is
located in Ngomeni.
The sea trip is of two stages, first from Ngomeni ____ km by land, and ____ km (___ hrs)
by sea to the vacation island of Lamu. This is the dangerous stage because of the sea
conditions (roughness) of the Indian Ocean, and due to the presence of the Kenyan
Coastguard, which, thanks be to God, we did not encounter. The sea was rough and the
waves were high, as if we were riding a camel or a fast horse, and we were all wet.
The second stage of our trip was from Lamu to Kambooni. There are two sea lanes for
this trip; the first is right through the Indian Ocean, which can be rough, and the second is
among the Indian Ocean islands, where the conditions are normally calm. The overland
distance between Lamu and Kambooni is ___ km, and the distance by sea is ___ km.
During the last 1 ½ hours of the trip from Kionga to Kambooni, I piloted the boat, which
is an easy operation if you know the sea lane.

His operational recommendation is chilling:
Opinion: Need to buy that boat even if the price is $ ____. This is very important.

Omar’s trip comments:

Mombassa: An island that teems with foreigners who stroll all over the place. It is said
that the American army soldiers take their R&R there. Mombassa’s security situation is
terrible.
Kilifi: A small city favored by tourists who often share the local bus with the natives to
reach it.
Malindi: Another small city ___ km from Mombassa, favored by tourists because of its
lovely beach.
Ngomeni: An Italian satellite communications project named ‘San Marco’ is in that
small city near the pier, where our boat is ___ meters away.
It is an odd thing that tourists come to this place, where they rent the sailboats to go to a
nearby deserted island ___ km away, where they isolate themselves for a day or two.
Lamu: A small, beautiful island, a tourist haven, exquisite. ___ . km away from
Mombassa.

Poor security in Mombassa, an Italian target near the pier.

He reports on several tribes in the region (primarily Somalia) and includes this report on his diplomatic contact with the Jal Jaal:

Jal Jaal

A branch of the Hawiya tribes that entered into an alliance with the Ogaden tribe, and
joined in their fight.
This is a coastal tribe located in the area between Kismaayo and Kambooni. They are
nomads and herders. They are not willing to join in any fighting because they are very
poor, and the few weapons they have are used for defense. The chief of this tribe is
ready to cooperate with us. We met him during our stay in Kambooni, through which
his caravans pass on their way to Kenya. We will visit with this tribe soon, and Sheikh
Hassan will introduce our movement. We will leave one of our (Muslim) scholars
with them.

The plans for northern Kenya and southern Somalia:

3- Schedule of Work for the Next Phase
a) A political campaign directed at the region’s population
b) Military movements, security sorties and sentry location.
c) A military operation against the worshipers of cows (might be a code word?) or any
other UN force.
d) A proper administrative set-up is badly needed. Small cars are needed.
e) Establish and equip Ras Kambooni to become the first headquarters for the Jihad
movement here.

The “worshipers of cows” are probably Hindus, and India had peacekeepers in Somalia.

Omar describes operations against a Belgian peacekeeping unit in Somalia. He also describes actions involving Indian peacekeepers as well. The Belgian ops:

Some Examples of Already Executed Operations:
a) Quick ambush – Belgium patrol.
On the way to our camp, our brothers heard the engine noise of a Belgium patrol car,
stopped the car and shot one of them in the head. The car was surrounded, another
was shot in the leg, and a third was also shot.
Scanned page: 5/7
When brother Noor examined the site, he said that a lot of bullets were used and there
was a lot of blood shed.
b) A double operation
Two groups were sent, one with Nooruddin al-Bahhar, to Dubli to meet brother Jaafar
and proceed against the Belgium soldiers.
The second was sent with brother Usama, accompanied with Mohammad, also to
attack the Belgium soldiers.
However, in view of the above operation, the Belgium contingency decided to
withdraw, and we heard the sound of their plane as they departed.
Thank God, we drove the Belgium contingency out of Somalia.
c) Bols Quqani Operation.
After The Belgium soldiers withdrew from Dubli, Noor and Jaafar, accompanied by a
Somali and Sheikh Abdulaziz (aide to Sheikh Hassan) left towards Bols Quqani where
the Indian contingency is stationed. Noor, Sheikh Abdulaziz, along with the driver
Ibrahim and Jaafar, decided to stay behind.
The leader of the team, claiming that he was suffering from an earache, entered and
observed the interior of the Indian camp, and came back.
Our people were divided into two groups. At 9:00 PM, at the agreed upon signal, one
of the brothers approached four of the guards and tossed a hand grenade “cook-off”
style. They were killed, and our group opened up fire from all sides and launched
RPGs. One vehicle and many tents were set on fire. There was a lot of shouting and
sobbing in the Indian camp. The Indians returned fire and we withdrew. A helicopter
was called to locate us, but to no avail.

His assessment:

The above record of simple operations proves without any doubt that the men in charge
here, unlike the people of Gedo, are serious believers in what they do and are a thousand
times better than those of Mogadishu who operated, and ceased to operate, by orders of
Aideed.
We should remain here with them. They sought and killed the Belgium and Indian
soldiers, and now many Muslim youth from the surrounding cities want to join up with
them.

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