Happy Custer Day!

[mikegriffith1]

If you were a serious scholar you would present a range of views. However you just present stuff to back up your prejudice. It undercuts your credibility and renders you superflous as a commentator.

Yeah. Uh-huh. You bet. FYI, every single book on the battle written by a professional historian or by a recognized Custer scholar in the last 25 years exonerates Custer, blames Reno and Benteen, and rejects the 19th-century Republican version of the battle. You can still find plenty of amateurs on the Internet who repeat the old Republican-Benteen-Reno version of the battle, but very few, if any, professional historians support that version.

Moving on. . . .

In the spring of 1878, just two years after the Little Big Horn battle, Gen. Nelson Miles, a famous Indian fighter in his own right, conducted a reconstruction of the battle with the help of 25 Indians who had participated in it. The things the Indians told him and his reconstruction findings are presented in chapter 22 of his book Personal Recollections and Observations of General Nelson A. Miles, Vol. 1 (University of Nebraska Press, 1992, reprint of 1896 edition, pp. 288-293). Some of the points from Nelson's Little Big Horn chapter:

* The Indians told Miles that only part of the village was initially aware that the village was being attacked.

* The Indians told Miles that Reno's decision to leave the timber was a terrible mistake.

* The Indians told Miles that just as they had followed Reno's command up the bluffs, the alarm was raised that "other troops were attacking the center of the village."

* The Indians told Miles that the Cheyennes were camped "at the extreme lower end of the village" and did not get up in time to participate in the pursuit of Reno's troops.

* The Indians told Miles that "for some time" the fight with Custer "was an even contest."

* The Indians told Miles that the fight with Custer "lasted at least two hours."

* The Indians told Miles that after they massed on the left of Custer's command and made a charge that turned the left of his line, the fight turned into a rout.

* The Indians told Miles that about 40 men "on the extreme right of the line" made a run "toward the timber" but that they were quickly cut down.

* Miles said that the distance between Reno's first position, "where Custer undoubtedly expected him to remain," and the position where Custer fought and died "is not more than two miles" and that "one is in plain sight of the other."

* The Indians told Miles that if Reno had not left the timber, they would have eventually fled so as to avoid being caught in a crossfire.

* Miles said that "the distance from where the running Reno halted and kept seven troops and the reserve ammunition to the extreme right of Custer's command was about four miles," that one of his (Miles') cavalry horses walked that distance in 58 minutes, and that at a "smart trot or gallop" it would have only taken 15 minutes to reach Custer. "This we proved," said Miles, "on that same ground by the actual test of moving our horses over it, and timing them by the watch."

 

[mikegriffith1]

A few more points should be made:

-- Many scholars have pointed out that Custer's written order to Benteen, penned by his adjutant (W. W. Cooke) in his presence, did not say to bring the whole pack train but to "bring packs." Custer wanted Benteen to get to him as quickly as possible and to bring as much ammo as he could in the process. Benteen surely knew that Custer knew that Benteen could not "be quick" if he tried to bring the slow-moving pack train with him.

Here is what historian Dr. T. J. Stiles says about Benteen's failure to obey Custer's "come on . . . be quick" order in his Pulitzer Prize-winning book Custer's Trials:

Resentful of any imposition, he declined to take any responsibility beyond his official sphere, despite the importance of the order. “About a mile after that, I met trumpeter Martin who brought a written order.... It says, ‘Benteen. Come on. Big village. Be quick. Bring packs. W. W. Cooke. P. bring pacs.'”

It was an unequivocal, positive command to join Custer, and an insistent demand for ammunition and supplies. The order was in keeping with Custer’s tactics that day; he divided his regiment for a reconnaissance in force, apparently intending to consolidate upon contact with the enemy. But Benteen moved without urgency, and declined to hurry along the pack train. He did not go in search of Custer, though his commander’s battalion left a clear trail toward the right bank of the river, along with the main Lakota trail that Benteen himself stressed was so critically important.

In the witness chair, he made contradictory excuses for his refusal to follow Custer’s clear instructions. (Custer’s Trials, pp. 452-453)

Custer correctly assumed that Benteen was with or near the pack train and that Benteen could grab considerable ammo before heading toward Custer's position. The main point of Custer's order was that Benteen had to get to Custer as soon as possible, but Benteen flagrantly disobeyed this order.

Many scholars have noted that Benteen could have gone straight to Custer with a fair amount of ammo packs without bringing the pack train with him.

Many scholars have also explained that Reno and Benteen could have reached Custer with considerable ammo packs without waiting for the entire pack train (as Reno later claimed he wanted to do).

-- Even the Indians said Reno should have stayed in the timber. The Indians tried to set the timber on fire to get the soldiers to leave, but that didn't work. As General Nelson Miles noted later, the timber formed a natural rifle pit and offered excellent cover and concealment. If Reno had stayed in the timber, he would have kept a huge force of Indians pinned to his position, since Reno's force threatened the village from that location.

Contrary to Reno's bogus claim at his court of inquiry, the timber most certainly was not "untenable." Reno did not lose a single man there until he began to pull some of them into the clearing in the center of the timber to prepare for his disastrous flight to Reno Hill. Even Benteen said the timber was an excellent defensive position.

Over a dozen men who got left behind in the timber managed to survive and later joined Reno's command on Reno Hill many hours later. Previous battles had shown that a group of soldiers in defensive positions that were not even quite as good as the timber could hold off an Indian force many times their number.

Even Dr. Charles Kuhlman, who bent over backwards to be fair to Reno, says that Custer attacked when he did in order to take the pressure off Reno. On the other hand, as many scholars have noted, Custer also surely expected Reno to stay in the timber so he could threaten the village and force the Indians to keep a sizable force there to protect the village.

-- Reno Hill was not a good defensive position, especially compared to the timber. Dr. Kuhlman observed that the Indians were able to "pour" gunfire into Reno Hill and that part of the hilltop made the men "a perfect target" for the Indians to the north and northeast (Legend Into History, p. 135). Kuhlman further noted that General Gibbon thought Reno Hill was an "extremely weak" position because the surrounding area provided the Indians with "perfect cover" (Legend Into History, p. 124). "To this may be added," said Kuhlman, "that it was impossible to cover the whole position without exposing large sections of the line to long-distance crossfire" (Legend Into History, p. 124).

Reno Hill was a bad choice. It wasn't even the highest ground in the area, which enabled the Indians to shoot down into the position, causing considerable death and injury. As many Indians themselves noted, Reno would have been much wiser to stay in the timber.

In contrast, the timber offered great cover and concealment. Again, until Reno foolishly began to order some soldiers to leave their timber positions to form up in the center clearing for his disastrous retreat, he had not lost a single man in the timber.

 

[mikegriffith1]

A brief review of the historiography of Custer's Last Stand might be helpful.

President Ulysses S. Grant, a stalwart Republican, disliked Custer because Custer had been exposing corruption in Grant's administration, including corruption by Grant's brother, and because Custer had criticized Radical Reconstruction.

Grant immediately blamed the massacre all on Custer, before any kind of formal investigation had been done. Republican newspapers across the country also blamed the loss exclusively on Custer. Republicans even produced a doctored version of General Terry's orders in order to claim that Custer had disobeyed Terry's orders and that Custer would not have even been at the Little Big Horn in the first place if he had just followed Terry's orders.

However, Democratic newspapers, sparked by the efforts of Libby Custer to clear her husband's name, began to raise telling questions about the Republican narrative and about Reno and Benteen's conduct during the battle.

From 1877 through the 1930s, most historians followed the Republican anti-Custer narrative. This began to change in the 1940s. By the 1990s, there was a definite shift among historians in favor of Custer and critical of Reno and Benteen. That trend has continued to this day. All of the books on Custer's Last Stand written by professional historians in the last 20 years or so have defended Custer and faulted Reno and Benteen.

Hollywood is a different story. Hollywood's first major movie on the battle was the 1941 movie They Died with Their Boots On, a strongly pro-Custer film. But, when Hollywood veered sharply leftward in the 1970s, it began to produce movies that followed, if not exceeded, the Republican anti-Custer narrative, e.g., the absurd movie Little Big Man. To this day, in most cases--not all, but in most cases--when Custer is portrayed in Hollywood movies, he is usually portrayed as reckless, obsessed with glory, egotistical, and even cruel, with the 1991 movie Son of the Morning Star being a noteworthy exception.

 

[mikegriffith1]

If you have not read at least one of the six most recent scholarly books on Custer and the Little Big Horn, you really have no business commenting on the subject. Those books are as follows:

Death at the Little Bighorn: A New Look at Custer, His Tactics, and the Tragic Decisions Made at the Last Stand (2021), by Phillip Thomas Tucker.

The Fights on the Little Horn: Unveiling the Mysteries of Custer's Last Stand (2017), by Gordon Harper.

Custer’s Trials: A Life on the Frontier of a New America (2016), by T. J. Stiles (the book won the Pulitzer Prize).

The Last Stand: Custer, Sitting Bull, and the Battle of the Little Bighorn (2011), by Nathan Philbrick.

G. A. Custer to the Little Big Horn (2011), by Steve Alexander.

A Terrible Glory: Custer and the Little Bighorn (2009), by James Donovan.

Tucker’s, Harper’s, and Donovan’s books are the most detailed analyses of the Little Big Horn battle, but Stiles’, Philbrick’s, and Alexander’s books are also informative and very worthwhile. All of them make the case that Custer’s tactics were sound, that Reno and Benteen caused the defeat by failing to obey orders and failing to do their moral duty as officers, and that a politically motivated cover-up ensued to falsely place all the blame on Custer.

If you haven’t read at least one of these books, what is your basis for your conclusions about Custer and the battle? Don’t you think you should read the most recent research written by recognized, award-winning experts on the subject?

Of course, some people are biased against Custer for political reasons and have no interest in learning that the old Republican anti-Custer version of the battle is false and was debunked decades ago. They post erroneous anti-Custer stuff on forums but then fall silent when confronted by people who know the facts about Custer and the battle.

 

[mikegriffith1]

Notice that the leftist Custer bashers have fallen silent, after being caught inexcusably repeating bogus arguments that have been debunked for decades by numerous scholars. Yet, I'd bet good money that these Custer haters comment in another discussion on Custer, they will repeat the same erroneous arguments they've floated in this thread. This seems to be their pattern.

 

[mikegriffith1]

Notice that the leftist Custer bashers have fallen silent, after being caught repeating bogus arguments that have been debunked for decades by numerous scholars. Yet, I'd bet good money that these Custer haters comment in another discussion on Custer, they will repeat the same erroneous arguments they've floated in this thread. This seems to be their pattern.

I should clarify some things about Custer Hill as a defensive position. We need to understand that Custer did not choose Custer Hill as a defensive position. He chose it as a place from which to launch his next move. He was expecting Benteen's battalion to arrive very soon, and he deployed some of his troops to facilitate Benteen's arrival.

Speaking purely defensively, Custer Hill was a high elevation (3K feet high), so it offered a good view of the surrounding area and required any attacker to move upward for nearly a mile. It also contained a number of ravines, which Custer could have used as rifle pits if he had combined his force and had been joined by Benteen's battalion.

However, since Custer believed that Benteen would soon arrive, he kept his force divided and, as mentioned, deployed part of his force to facilitate Benteen's expected arrival. Thus, he did not have enough men with him to take advantage of the ravines, which enabled the Indians to use them to get close to his troops.

If Custer had known that Benteen was betraying him and was not coming, he would have surely united his force on Custer Hill, or Calhoun Hill, and then headed east and then southwest to rejoin the rest of his regiment.