American Legion Joins VFW in Call for Congressional Investigation of Israel's Attack on USS Liberty

[cnm]

Can you tell me what markings on a ship's hull identify the nationality of the vessel.

Are you telling me the ship's number is not in a registry?

 

[depotoo]

Survivors were interviewed through the years for the many investigations, if you read the transcripts. Why have their stories changed?

No, no avoidance from me. The avoidance comes from the one that refuses to look at all information.

You have not gone to the archives and listened to or read the transcripts and all other available info from the multiple investigations. You only hear what you want to hear. Even if you did, something tells me that still would not satisfy you, because of your hatred for Israel. Sadly, part of the fault for the accident rests on our shoulders.

I told you I researched it myself. They are all in the archives, for you, if you really want an informed decision. But I suspect you don’t. You are just an anti Semitic.

I just gave you a detailed point by point rebuttal to your "research." None of which you have addressed. So what you mean is you aren't interested in the truth just in repeating yourself and name calling. That means you lose, but thanks for playing.

Still avoiding the facts?

- Israeli close recon for 9 hours throughout morning, two large flags flying in perfect breeze
- fresh painted US markings on hull
- recon planes on slow lazy passes, waved at US sailors in uniform
- state of art intelligence ship unmistakable for Egyptian horse transport
- radio traffic confirms before, during, and after attack that Israelis knew ship was American.
- even machine gunned lifeboats, a war crime, intending no survivors.

Israeli recon pass, source: Survivor's website: http://www.ussliberty.org/00/0044.htm

The Day Israel Attacked America, survivors speak

Why do you dismiss what the actual survivors have to say?

Is your love for Israel that much greater than for your own service members?

 

[depotoo]

Your government? Wow.

I just reviewed some sources and this resolution was passed in August 2018, so what has happened in 5 months since?

I dunno. Go to their Facebook. They'll talk to anyone. Ernie's in charge now. USS Liberty Facebook

You don't know and just don't care! Got it! I am a member of the American Legion and I can tell you exactly what has happened. Nada!

By the way, when are you getting rid of that photoshopped avatar? It allows people to prejudge that you are a dumbass!

I am a member of the American Legion and I can tell you exactly what is happening, you do not know what the fuck you are talking about and are just covering up for your government.

 

[depotoo]

Can you tell me what markings on a ship's hull identify the nationality of the vessel.

Are you telling me the ship's number is not in a registry?

Once the Israeli’s were told, after the fact, the ship number, the Israeli’s were finally able to verify it by helicopter. But it was too late.

It was also not under a normal Naval chain of command, due to it being an NSA mission. There were others aboard that were not Naval involved in its Command.

The Israeli’s were told by US, there would be no Naval ships within the area. What the US NSA/Navy forgot to do was make sure the USS Liberty got the messages they were to change course and stay outside of the area by 100 miles. Yet they told the Israeli’s there would be no US ship within that 100 miles. They goofed. They also goofed, since it was an NSA mission in disguise, to include Israeli linguists on board. They did have Russian linguists on board.

 

[Pilot1]

Once the Israeli’s were told, after the fact, the ship number, the Israeli’s were finally able to verify it by helicopter. But it was too late.


The Israeli’s were told by US, there would be no Naval ships within the area. What the US NSA/Navy forgot to do was make sure the USS Liberty got the messages they were to change course and stay outside of the area by 100 miles. Yet they told the Israeli’s there would be no US ship within that 100 miles. They goofed. They also goofed, since it was an NSA mission in disguise, to include Israeli linguists on board. They did have Russian linguists on board.

The Israeli Mirage jets visually saw the American FLAG, and markings. They still decided to shoot. Why? They wanted to make a statement. We should have spanked Israel hard. They need us more than we needed them, and I am a big supporter of Israel.

 

[mikegriffith1]

Oh, for heaven's sake, let it go. Israel apologized and paid sizable compensation to the survivors and to the families of those killed.

 

[Kondor3]

It's all part of a Worldwide Jooooo-ish Kornspiracy, I tellz ya !!!

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Israel is the new bulwark against Militant Islam in the Middle East, a role formerly performed by the Eastern Empire...

As such, they get as much support from the US as we can manage... rightfully so.

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They screwed-up with respect to the USS Liberty.

We screwed-up with respect to the USS Liberty.

God rest those lost souls, and God comfort those survivors and families who suffered afterwards.

Bad shit happens in war... including outcomes resulting from bad decisions by both field commanders and higher-echelon command.

Both sides have done what they can do "make good" on this bad situation.

The only people still ragging on this are (a) Jew-haters and (b) those easily manipulated into supporting an anti-Israel tactic.

It was more than a half-century ago, it's all been said before, and nothing new is going to come of any new initiative.

Reopening such old wounds will do far more harm than good; there is nothing more of a practical nature to be gained by this.

Time to let it go.

 

[Indeependent]

Six Day War and the US stops Israel from conquering it’s 5 enemies and costs Israel thousands of lives and billions of dollars.

 

[depotoo]

I am going to post for you info that will help clear that up, if indeed you are open to such, such as you find this info further down-

“Following the first Israeli reconnaissance morning flight by the flying boxcar (a Noratlas) at 080600 (local), the Liberty crew notices its flag is fouled. Besides, the flag was "dark with soot and badly tattered." It was replaced sometime after 080720 (local), well after this Noratlas reconnoitered the Liberty. The ship was barely in international waters (see Ennes, pp. 50-51).”

Now on to all of it here-


Dr. Marvin Nowicki was the US Navy supervisor on the EC-121 aircraft who heard the actual Israel Air Force radio transmissions, in Hebrew, on 8 June 1967 and thereafter listened to the tapes in Hebrew (Nowicki was an NSA/Navy trained Hebrew linguist). Nowicki sent an e-mail to James Bamford with five enclosures on 20 March 2000.

Bamford claims the Nowicki letter told him that the tapes establish that the Israelis knew they were attacking a US ship. Read the Nowicki e-mail and decide if you agree with Bamford's interpretation. Dr. Nowicki did not agree with Bamford's interpretation. He wrote a letter to the Wall Street Journal, summarized below, in which he explicitly stated the tapes proved the attack was made in error.
The Liberty Incident: E-mail sent to James Bamford (3 March 2000)
E-mail sent to James Bamford (3 March 2000)

Dear Jim,

As a followup to our e-mail and telephone exchanges, I am enclosing sensitive information about U.S. intelligence collection techniques that I engaged in during a career in the U.S. Navy spanning over 20 years. Like you, I am interested in preserving certain historical events surrounding SIGINT collection. I believe it is important that future generations understand and appreciate the efforts of the Cold War warriors.

In this correspondence, I am concentrating on a single event that involved the USS Liberty in June 1967. As you know, Jim Ennes and members of the Liberty crew are on record stating the ship was deliberately attacked by the Israelis. I think otherwise. I have first hand information, which I am sharing with you. I was present on that day, along with members of an aircrew in a COMFAIRAIRRECONRON TWO (VQ-2) EC-121M aircraft flying some 15,000 feet above the incident. As I recall, we recorded most, if not all, of the attack. Further, our intercepts, never before made public, showed the attack to be an accident on the part of the Israelis. [emphasis added]

To support my claim, I am forwarding four enclosures of information. My story is over 30 years old but there are certain events that are embedded in my memory, including a scary night flight into the battle zone and the attack on the Liberty. Enclosure 1 begins with a narrative entitled, "Assault on the Liberty: The untold story from SIGINT." Enclosure 2 provides a postscript to the attack in the years that followed. Enclosure 3 gives my views of additional evidence of a mistaken attack by the Israelis, contradicting Jim Ennes in his book. Enclosure 4 discusses Ennes' cover-up conundrum, asks who was ultimately responsible, and why the presence of our VQ mission was never revealed.

In addition, I am enclosing personal information about my 24-year career in the and Naval Security Group. I am doing this for the purpose of helping you see how I might assist you with other aspects of your historical account of SIGINT. You may, for example, be interested in stories how we hunted Soviet TU-95 Bears [Soviet turbo prop reconnaissance aircraft] in the Atlantic and searched for SA-2 [missile] sites in southern Algeria during flights into the Sahara. A chronology of my duty stations and professional experience is found in Enclosure 5.

Finally, on a cautionary note I would appreciate it if you would cull any information that crosses the bar of national security, in addition to the names of colleagues cited herein. I do not have permission to use their names. If you have any questions or need clarification, please do not hesitate to contact me. Thank you and good luck with your book.

Sincerely,
Marvin E. Nowicki, Ph.D.
The Liberty Incident: Assault on the Liberty: The untold story from SIGINT
Assault on the Liberty: The untold story from SIGINT

In June 1967, on the day of the Israeli surprise attack on its Arab neighbors, the USS Liberty was nearing her station in the waters off the coasts of Israel and Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean. Five days before, the naval vessel had pulled into Port Rota, Spain, for technical support, replenishment, and embarkation of Arab linguists from NSA and NSG. During the port call, a number of CT personnel from NAVSECGRUDEPT Rota visited the ship. Some dependents including my six-year old son (years later to become a naval aviator) were given a tour of the ship. Little did I know, that a few days afterward I would fly over the ship in a VQ-2 EC121M aircraft as the Liberty was being attacked by Israeli aircraft and motor torpedo boats on June 8.
The Liberty Incident: Nowicki's Duty Stations
On June 5, the Israelis began all-out attacks on her Arab neighbors in Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. Early that morning, our aircrew from VQ-2 and NAVSECGRUDEPT Rota received emergency tasking orders to proceed to the scene of hostilities in the Middle East. Within several hours of the tasking message, our VQ-2 EC121M was airborne en route to Athens, Greece, where we would stage missions into the East Med. Our logistical and SIGINT support would come from a temporary US Air Force base set up at the Athens airport. Although only the day before I had returned from TAD aboard a VQ-2 EA3B aircraft from the Norwegian Sea, and much to chagrin of my wife, I and four other CTIs were ordered to Athens aboard the EC121M. Nobody in our crew knew anything about the disposition of the USS Liberty, which had begun conducting SIGINT operations off the coast of Israel.

The usual complement of VQ aircrew members was on board our lumbering "Willy Victor." Although slow, it was capable of sustained flight of 12 to 18 hours, depending on such factors as weather, fuel, altitude, intercept activity, and crew fatigue. We might, for example, hold orbit during a mission for an extra period of time if SIGINT activity proved particularly fruitful.

Our aircraft crew consisted of the front-end crew of pilot (mission commander), co-pilot, navigator, engineer, and radio-operator. In those days, VQ-2 had no secure air-ground communication capability (this would come later in the early 1970s with KY8 and KW6 communication equipment). The back-end crew was made up of the Evaluator (senior ELINT officer), a junior ELINT officer or two, three or four AT (avionics technician) ELINT operators, and three CTT ELINT operators. A couple of aircraft maintenance technicians flew with us; they would maintain the aircraft and remain on the ground in Athens. In addition, we five "spook" linguists were from NAVSECGRUDEPT Rota to intercept VHF/UHF radio-telephone signals. As I remember, our spook crew consisted of me (a CTIC dual-trained in Russian-Hebrew languages and senior CT), two junior CTI petty officers trained in Hebrew ([deleted] and [deleted]), and two junior CTI petty officers trained in Arabic (I don't remember their names). When we took-off from Rota, we had no idea how long the deployment would last, so we packed for a long trip--30 days.

The transit flight to Athens from Rota took about eight hours. Most of the crew rested in the bunk beds in the rear of the aircraft and ate chow cooked in the plane's galley. Usually, the junior VQ-2 enlisted personnel were responsible for in-flight cooking duties. On occasion, we enjoyed hot, delicious chow. Other times we ate cold "horse-cock" sandwiches. Crew members took turns resting in the relief bunks.

In my usual workaholic fashion, as soon as we cleared Rota with "wheels in the well" and heading east over the Mediterranean, I pulled the security curtains around the spook intercept positions and turned on my receiving equipment. The security curtains ostensibly shielded our work from uncleared VQ crewmembers, of which there were always a few on board. Of course, these people had a pretty good idea what we were doing but such were the security regulations of that day. My intercept position consisted of one VHF receiver, one UHF/VHF receiver with a spectrum analyzer, and a four-track voice recorder. The other four COMINT positions were similarly outfitted with voice recorders and twin receivers; they, however, lacked spectrum analyzers. The spectrum analyzer gave me at the "supervisor's position" a visual view of radio activity in the form of "spikes" between 100-150 MHz and 200 and 500 MHz. It was a handy tool to spot new signals.

It was my habit to search for Russian voice activity anytime I was airborne with VQ-2. On this such flights, our tracks to Athens took us within VHF intercept range of several Russian naval anchorages but well outside range of radio activity from the Middle East. I worked virtually the entire flight and did manage to record several VHF voice signals from Russian vessels emanating from the Soviet Fifth Eskadra in their anchorages.

The usual operating procedure that we spooks adhered to included activating the recording system (four track tapes) with time dubs and frequency notations, while manually writing down gists of voice activity on logs, and notifying the Evaluator of what we were recording. The Evaluator in turn would direct his operators to conduct an ELINT search for corresponding radar activity. Reciprocally, ELINT might intercept a radar signal from an unfriendly target and tip us off to search for correlating voice activity. After a flight was over, the Evaluator and senior spook (others could be involved) would sit-down and compare notes for the fusion report, called the PMFR (post-mission flight report). The Evaluator was responsible for releasing this TOP SECRET Codeword message into the SPINTCOMM system after landing.

On this particular transit flight, our intercepts were sparse so that we decided not to issue a report. Also, on non-tasked transit flights such as this one, PMFRs were not required to be transmitted to our consumers: DIRNSA, COMSIXTHFLT, CINCUSNAVEUR, CIA, JCS, to name a few (the list of addresses was about one page long). PMFRs were sent by SPINTCOMM ordinarily at immediate precedence to action addressees and priority to information addressees.

Upon landing at the international airport in Athens late that afternoon and after servicing the aircraft for the next take-off, the majority of the crew boarded USAF transit buses to go to our "semi" contracted hotel, the Hotel Seville, in Iraklion, a suburb of Athens, not too far from the airport. We always stayed at the Hotel Seville; it was managed by a friendly Australian by the name of [deleted], along with a very friendly female, [deleted], a local Greek. The place was clean, fairly comfortable, with a kitchen and bar open virtually all the time. While the crew was getting settled in, we--the Evaluator, one or two VQ officers, and I--were still on the base, having made our way to the USA-512J compound to stow mission materials and receive an intelligence update from the US Air Force.

USA-512J was a US Air Force Security Service (AFSS) station set-up in 1966 in conjunction with DIRNSA on the Greek Air Force side of the Athens international airport to process, at least preliminarily, the SIGINT collected from USAF ACRP C130 and US Navy VQ-2 EC121M and EA3B aircraft operating in the East Med. The USA-512J site was a temporary facility consisting of a secure fenced-in compound patrolled by Security Police. Several special mobile vans were parked in the compound, including one for SPINTCOMM, one for maintenance, one for administration, and one or two for operations (voice transcription positions, an ELINT read-out position, and various research data banks and file cabinets). All vans were heated and air conditioned.

Our individual security clearances had been sent ahead of us via SPINTCOMM by our parent commands in Rota, giving SI cleared members of the aircrew immediate access to the compound and its facilities. The USA-512J briefers told us they did not know much about what was going on in the Middle East that day, except for what was being reported in the press. The ACRP platform had not returned yet from its Mideast mission that day. Later, we would find out that the ACRP brought back practically complete coverage of the Israelis attacks on June 5, although the Hebrew voice materials were not processed for another day or two. The ACRPs had no Hebrew linguists in those days, and a linguistic support team of NSA civilians would not to arrive for another 24 hours.

After completing business at the 512J compound, we too proceeded to the Hotel Seville, where we gathered our aircrew together, telling them in whispers what little we knew about the situation. We advised them to remain in the hotel in case we received emergency tasking. Actually, we expected to receive orders to fly the next day, but surprise, surprise! A phone tip to the Mission Commander told us we were to get airborne as soon as possible. We were in disbelief and mystified. Surely, our taskers did not expect us to fly into the combat zone in the dead of the night! Oh, but they did!

Within a few hours, we were airborne from Athens en route to the coasts of Egypt and Israel. The transit flight usually took about three hours to get to the track some 25-50 miles off the coasts. Egypt claimed territorial limits of 12 miles out to sea, while Israel claimed six miles, and we always remained well beyond those lines of demarcation. While in the past we had used several variations of a basic flight path over international waters, the normal track pattern consisted of a dogleg after we joined the track northeast of Alexandria, Egypt. We would then fly eastward off Port Said and the Sinai to a point north of El Arish, and then dogleg northeast along the Israeli coast to a point west of Beirut, Lebanon. The track was then reversed and repeated as needed for the duration of the 12 plus hour mission. Ordinarily we flew the tracks at altitudes ranging from 12,000 to 18,000 feet with the EC121M. The EA3B, which wasn't used too often on these East Med missions, flew considerably higher, above 30-35,000 feet. The track profile, paralleling the Egyptian and Israeli coasts although not terribly important for intercepting VHF/UHF voice activity, was very important to sorting out and locating Egyptian and Israeli radars in ELINT through ADF. In addition to regular ADF, the EC121M aircraft was equipped with a special piece of intercept equipment called "Big Look." With Big Look, it was possible to intercept, emulate, identify, and reverse-locate the source of radar signals. So a parallel track to the coasts was very advantageous.

En route to the track this night, our mission commander reassessed our situation in the dark as we headed toward the area of hostilities. I vividly recall this night being pitch black, no stars, no moon, no nothing. The mission commander considered the precariousness of our flight. He thought it more prudent to avoid the usual track. If we headed east off the coast of Egypt toward Israel, we would look on radar to the Israelis like an incoming attack aircraft from Egypt. Then assuming the Israelis did not attack us, when we reversed course, we would then appear on Egyptian radar like Israeli attack aircraft inbound. It, indeed, was a very dangerous and precarious situation.

But our mission commander had the good sense to adjust our flight into the combat zone. The new approach called for us to proceed between Crete and Cyprus and then fly diagonally toward El Arish in the Sinai along an established civilian air corridor. Upon reaching a point some 25 NM northeast of El Arish, we would reverse course and hold orbit wherever desired. This is the same southeasterly/northwesterly track that the ACRP C130s ordinarily flew, because the civilian air corridor at least partially masked the flights. While this diagonal track is not good for ELINT purposes and Big Look, it certainly appeared to be a lot safer than the dogleg along the coasts in the middle of the night. That was nuts!

When we arrived on station after midnight, needless to say the "pucker factor" was high; the crew was on high, nervous alert. Nobody slept in the relief bunks on that flight. The night remained pitch black. What in the devil were we doing out here in the middle of a war zone was a question I asked myself several times over and over during the flight. The adrenalin flowed.

As it turned out, though, the flight was uneventful, except for a few radio checks from the belligerents. The Israelis were home rearming and reloading for the next day's attacks, while the Arabs were bracing themselves for the next onslaught come daylight and contemplating some kind of counter-attack. Eerily, our COMINT AND ELINT positions were quiet.

As dawn broke, that changed; our receivers came alive with signals mostly from the Israelis as they began their second day of attacks. We spooks furiously gisted voice activity mostly from the Israeli pilots, while the Evaluator married up that activity with airborne radars intercepted from the ELINT positions. The Egyptians launched an abortive air attack on an advancing Israeli armored brigade in the northern Sinai but their aircraft were shot out of the sky by IAF Mirage aircraft. We monitored as much as we could but soon had to head for Athens because of low fuel. We were glad to get the heck out of there.

En route to Athens, the Evaluator and I wrote as much of the PMFR as we could, but some of our spook tapes required replaying at USA-512J. When we arrived in the compound, our tasking for next several days awaited us. Happily, the taskers realized we needed rest, and so our next flight would not be until the morning of June 7, followed by another morning flight on June 8. That was okay with us because the ACRP had already taken off to provide SIGINT coverage of June 6.

Other good news awaited us. We were informed that three civilian Hebrew linguists from DIRNSA were arriving to help process the Israeli intercept materials. USAFSS had many linguists for the ACRP flights at 512J, all qualified in Arabic and Russian languages, but not a single Hebrew linguist. As it turns out, the ACRPs were blindly copying any voice signal that sounded Hebrew. They were like vacuum cleaners, sucking every signal onto their recorders, with the intercept operators not having a clue as to what the activity represented. Much of the Israeli air activity always stood out like a sore thumb, though, compared to the Arabs. The Israeli aircraft used mostly UHF transceivers, while the Arabs only used VHF transceivers of Soviet origin.

Following a review of our tapes and confirming the shootdown of Egyptian Sukhoi-7 aircraft (this was the first time I ever heard a real, live shootdown), we released the PMFR and headed for the Hotel Seville and a well-deserved rest. We were all beat; it had been a long time since some of us last slept. I turned in right away but several of the VQ airedales, known for partying particularly after fate-tempting flights drank beer, rolled the dice for more beer, and pinched the hotel barmaids before finally collapsing for the night.

The next day, June 7, we launched about mid-morning so that we would have little overlap with the ACRP, which was on station at dawn. Our flight was filled with reams of intercept activity showing Israeli attacks on the Arabs all day long. In reality, I do not recall much of the nature of the attacks, except that we got reels and reels of tape showing Israeli tank attacks in the Sinai and air battles between Israeli Mirages and Egyptian Migs. I think we had intercepts of the Israelis doing battle with the Jordanians and Syrian as well. We returned to Athens after dusk.

On returning to the 512J compound to refine and release the PMFR, I recall the presence of the NSA civilians toiling away on the many backlogged tapes from our and ACRP flights. I recognized two of three civilians from earlier NSG and NSA duty assignments at Ft. Meade, Maryland. With the NSA civilians in place and the USAF Arab/Russian linguists and traffic analysts providing technical support, we would be able to take the guess work out of our work in the sky. They gave us callsigns, frequencies, unit identities, and other technical data to better cover the war with our intercept equipment.

On June 8, the day of the attack on the Liberty, our track profile was almost the same as our first flight in the night. We were "wheels in the well" from Athens about mid-morning, arriving on the track at noontime, flying from Crete/Cyprus diagonally to El Arish and reverse. When we arrived within intercept range of the battles already in progress, it was apparent that the Israelis were pounding the Syrians on the Golan Heights. Soon all our recorders were going full blast, with each position intercepting signals on both receivers. The Evaluator called out many airborne intercepts from Arab and Israeli aircraft. We were going crazy trying to cope with the heavy activity.

After a couple of hours of hard work, I received a heated call on the secure intercom from Hebrew linguist [deleted]. [deleted]excitedly proclaimed something to the effect, "Hey, Chief, I've got really odd activity on UHF. They mentioned an American flag. I don't know what's going on." I asked him for the frequency and rolled up to it. Sure, as the devil, Israeli aircraft were completing an attack on some object. I alerted the Eval, giving him sparse details, adding that we had no idea what was taking place. The activity subsided. After some time passed, Petty Officer [deleted] called me again. He told me about new activity and that the American flag is being mentioned again. I had the frequency but for some strange reason, despite seeing it on my spectrum analyzer, couldn't hear it on my receiver, so I left my position to join him to listen at his position. I heard a couple of references to the flag during an apparent attack. The attackers weren't aircraft; they had to be surface units (we later found out at USA-512J it was the Israeli motor torpedo boats attacking the Liberty). Neither [deleted] nor I had ever heard MTB attacks in voice before, so we had no idea what was occurring below us. I advised the Eval; he was as mystified as we were.

We continued recording voice activity for another two hours. All the while, the Israelis sustained their attacks on the Arab targets. Finally, it was time to return to Athens. We recorded voice activity en route home until the intercepts finally faded. On the way home, the Eval and I got together to try to figure out what we copied. Despite replaying portions of the tapes, we still did not have a complete understanding of what transpired except for the likelihood that a ship flying the American flag was being attacked by Israeli air and surface forces.

By the time we arrived at the USA-512J compound, collateral reports were coming in to the station about the attack on the USS Liberty. The first question we were asked us, did we get any of the activity? Yes, we dared to say we did. The NSA civilians took our tapes and began transcribing. It was pretty clear that Israeli aircraft and motor torpedo boats attacked a ship in the East Med. Although the attackers never gave a name or a hull number, the ship was identified as flying an American flag. We logically concluded that the ship was the USS Liberty, although we had no idea she was even in the area and could become the object of such an attack. Our intercepts further showed that perhaps the attack was a mistake.

We next deliberated on what to do with our information. Should we issue a CRITIC or simply put the information in our PMFR? After much deliberation, we decided against the CRITIC because our information was already hours old (to meet CRITIC criteria, information should be within 15 minutes of the event). Beside there was the question of VQ-2 properly introducing such a report into the CRITICOMM system, since there was neither national authority nor any precedent to do so. Instead, we finally issued the PMFR with appropriate highlighted information to all our addresses at either flash or immediate precedence. I don't recall.

It had been quite a day and other days remained before us. We returned to the Hotel Seville for rest and relaxation, feeling a sense of exhilaration but not comprehending the chaos and calamity taking place on the Liberty at that very moment as she struggled to leave the attack area.

The next morning, on June 9th, when we arrived at USA-512J for the pre-mission briefing we found out the NSA civilians had transcribed most of our intercept and were sending the raw information back to DIRNSA via SPINTCOMM. Later that day, the civilians were informed to pack up the tapes to be couriered to Ft. Meade as soon as possible. (This would be the last I would see the tapes and transcripts until I received orders to NSA over a year later, discussed below.)

The next East Med missions are now a blur in mind. I know we covered the remainder of the Six Day War, which ended on June 10, 1967. The Syrians retreated from the Golan Heights area; their military if not destroyed was seriously degraded. The Egyptians lost the Sinai while suffering severe losses of personnel and equipment. Perhaps the Jordanians lost the most to the Israelis. In addition to losing a significant amount of personnel and military gear, they had to cede Jerusalem and the West Bank.

Probably about two weeks after the Six Day War we were relieved by another aircrew from Rota. The NSA civilians remained in Athens for a couple of more weeks and then returned home to Ft. Meade.

While the Six Day War was by far the most memorable and exciting time of my tour of duty in Rota, I had other unforgettable flights aboard VQ-2 aircraft on numerous missions. On average VQ-2 would fly six to twelve missions per month against Israel and Arab Mid East targets, unless higher priority Soviet targets were the order of the day (e.g., Soviet Fleet Exercises in the Mediterranean or Norwegian Sea). There were many of those. By the time I left Rota in July 1968, I had accumulated over 2,000 hours in the air in VQ-2 aircraft
(Thought of breaking this up, but posts from others could end up in between)
The Liberty Incident: Postscript to the attack on the Liberty
Postscript to the attack on the Liberty

As mentioned in Enclosure 1, the next time I saw those voice tapes collected by our VQ-2 platform revealing the attack on the Liberty was over a year later when I was ordered to NSA for duty in 1968. I was assigned to G643, which was the organization responsible for the Israeli military problem. By this time, the tapes had been completely re-transcribed by a senior Hebrew linguist in the section. One of my first orders of business on reporting to G643 was to reread the complete transcripts. Up to this point, I always felt the evidence we collected showed the Israelis attacked the Liberty by mistake in the heat of battle. All my conversations with colleagues in G643 and reading of the voice transcript confirmed as much to me. Further, I assumed that NSA had shared this evidence with senior government officials who inquired into the attack on the ship. I certainly assumed that the Liberty's CO, her cleared officers, and CT personnel knew about the tapes and the fact they were collected by an airborne platform. I continued to make this assumption, but by the time I arrived at NSA a year later it was no longer a burning issue with anyone. The tapes and transcripts were simply filed away in the bottom of a desk drawer in G643. Nobody seemed to be interested in hearing about the USS Liberty any longer.

And so for the next dozen years, not much was said about the USS Liberty incident. The American public was told the attack was an accident. Only the Liberty crew was making rumblings about the attack being intentional while floating the idea of a grand conspiracy by the US government in collusion with the Israelis. I started thinking about that VQ flight again, feeling it should be made public. None of the senior officers with whom I was associated, however, was interested or concerned. Several months before I retired in 1979, I even wrote a personal letter to the Commander of the Naval Security Group, Rear Admiral Eugene Ince, saying I thought it was time to make the information public. Admiral Ince surely knew about the VQ-2 tapes because he was the senior NSG officer on the staff of CINCUSNAVEUR in 1967 during the attack on the Liberty. I received no reply from him.

I retired on July 1, 1979 with nothing further said about the tapes, which incidentally I last sighted during a TAD trip to NSA in the late 1970s. The tapes and transcripts were still in the bottom of a desk drawer in the Israeli military section in G643.

Forward 20 years, during which time Jim Ennes writes his book and the crew from the USS Liberty gets organized, subsequently going on record with strong words that the Israelis intentionally attacked the ship and that senior US authorities helped cover up the fact.

As we know, the world-wide-web and computers are wonderful technologies. It was through this medium that an old friend of mine from service in Kami Seya, Japan in the 1950s accidentally surfaced. After communicating with each other by e-mail for almost a year, a reference to the USS Liberty cropped up between [deleted] and me. [deleted] mentioned that he was on the Liberty and was wounded. My response, with sorrow and regrets, was that indeed it was a small world because I was above him that terrible day. I could tell by the tone in his reply that he was still upset (and rightfully so). He was really troubled when I told him my view of events. He wasn't buying the accident-pitch at all.

In a period of a week or two we exchanged e-mails at a furious pace, trying to gauge what each other knew about the attack. First assuring him I am not an Israeli hawk, only a former CTI who was trained in Hebrew and who worked the Israeli military problem for several years, I told him the attack was a mistake. Did he know a VQ-2 EC121M aircraft was there that day? No, he didn't know that, and didn't think anyone else knew of it either. He ostensibly contacted Jim Ennes, who likewise said he did not know of our presence. I asked [deleted] how did the Liberty crew know the Israelis attacked them intentionally. His reply: "the Israelis saw our flag." How did you know that, [deleted]? Well, someone in the CT crew heard the Israelis talking on their radios about the American flag. But [deleted], I reminded him, the Liberty had no Hebrew linguists aboard (she embarked only NSG and NSA Arabic linguists in Rota), so how did you know the Israeli aircraft and boats were discussing the American flag? He didn't know, so again he asked Ennes. Ennes responded that it was his understanding the Israelis used English during their attacks. My rejoinder to [deleted] was: this could not be the case; in all my years of working the Israeli air problem, their military personnel spoke only Hebrew. The only time the Israelis ever (repeat ever) used English was after they started receiving American F4 and A4 aircraft in 1969/70 (well after the Six Day War), and those conversations were limited to maintenance check-flights probably when American advisors were nearby. English was never used in combat situations involving those aircraft or any others to my knowledge. Besides, our VQ tapes and voice transcripts showed only Hebrew spoken that day during the attack.

At one point in our conversation, [deleted] urged that if I felt so strongly about this I should go public with my information. My riposte was that, while I would be willing to do so, I would want to be certain those voice tapes and transcripts were still existed at NSA. I doubted they were but who knows; they still could be in the desk drawer in G6. I, however, do not have the wherewithal to check for them.

On a final note, I can identify several NSG and NSA personnel who could vouch for my version of the attack. Besides I believe there is other evidence to support a case of a mistaken attack, discussed in the next Enclosure 3.
The Liberty Incident: Exculpatory evidence supporting a mistaken attack
Exculpatory evidence supporting a mistaken attack

In addition to the VQ2 voice materials that I contend support a case for a mistaken attack on the USS Liberty by Israeli forces on June 8, 1967, the following discussion is germane to my argument that the erroneous attack was carried out by the Israelis in the heat of battle. Much of my counter-argument is based on the Jim Ennes' narrative in his book, Assault on the Liberty (Random House, NY, 1979), and my experience that includes 20 years of naval service. Ennes says he and the Liberty crew are convinced the Israelis deliberately attacked the ship. He further argues that certain high-level US Government officials colluded with the Israelis to hide the intentional attack. His argument does not hold up to scrutiny.

First, to defend my hypothesis of an accidental attack one must consider the psychological frame of mind of the Israeli warriors. For most of them this was their first real test in war. Their fathers before them craved out the State of Israel under constant wartime pressure from the Arab states before and after 1948. Now the sons were being challenged to defend the nation. Apparently, they could expect no help from the United States, if Israel initiated the attacks. President Johnson said as much (see Ennes, p. 210).

For weeks and months before June 1967, the leaders of the Arab states in Cairo, Damascus, and Amman publicly threatened coordinated annihilation of Israel. By May 1967, taking the threats seriously, the Israeli leaders devised a battle plan that incorporated a preemptive attack to wipe out the Arab military forces in Egypt in one felt swoop, with subsequent follow-on attacks on the Syrians and Jordanians. Everything depended on this new generation, "sabra," the youth of Israel. The sabras must defend their nation, they were told. This was a war of survival. Their very lives and the lives of their families and the future of Israel depended on them!

Add to the above picture, the Israelis now being in their third day of war when the hapless Liberty arrives in the East Med. The sabras were attacking every Arab military target in their gunsights, and were doing a complete job. Along comes a slow moving ship toward the Israeli coast from the direction of Port Said, Egypt. An early morning Israeli airborne reconnaissance mission (Noratlas aircraft discussed below) is flown over the ship. As it turns out, the Liberty is not identified by the Israelis as she continues to steam toward Israel (see reasons discussed below).

Nobody knew the identity and function of this mystery ship, and that includes some US naval authorities in the Mediterranean. For example, senior officials on the USS Saratoga, operating near Crete, referred to the Liberty as the USNS Liberty, a civilian-manned contract ship (see Ennes, p. 75, footnote 4). Further, those authorities who knew did not know the precise location of the Liberty in the war zone off the coast of El Arish, Egypt. Additionally, our VQ crew had no idea of the Liberty's presence that fateful day.

The track of the USS Liberty in the battle zone had to look ominous to the planners in the Israeli war room and the "pumped up" Israeli sabras. Just as our VQ2 mission commander was concerned about our safety on an ominous track on the June 5/6 night flight, the approach of the Liberty to El Arish must have appeared ominous to the Israelis as the vessel came toward them from Egypt. Moreover, as the Liberty passed Port Said close-in shore during the night of June 7/8 heading easterly, the crew reported seeing the sky around the city filled with smoke and fire. The Liberty was very close to the shore that morning, so close that a "little prop plane" could be seen every few moments skimming the sand dunes on the beach (see Ennes, p. 50).

Following the first Israeli reconnaissance morning flight by the flying boxcar (a Noratlas) at 080600 (local), the Liberty crew notices its flag is fouled. Besides, the flag was "dark with soot and badly tattered." It was replaced sometime after 080720 (local), well after this Noratlas reconnoitered the Liberty. The ship was barely in international waters (see Ennes, pp. 50-51).

One or more Israeli Noratlas aircraft overfly the Liberty at least six times between 081030 and 11245 (local) (see Ennes' narrative and sequence of events inside the cover of his book). After the overflight at 0600, the next overflight occurs at 1030. It was made at near masthead level, reminiscent of our VQ2 low level flights (explained below).

While I will concede it is likely this Noratlas crew observed the American flag, we have no way of actually knowing that fact, nor if identified, when the information reached the war room in Tel Aviv. We on the VQ2 EC121M did not hear any such reporting by radio; only later in the afternoon did we hear references to flag during the attacks.

Therefore, I must conclude that the report to Tel Aviv authorities was probably passed to the war room post facto. We have no idea what time any of the Noratlases recovered at home nor the time the intelligence information about the American flag was made available in the war room. I think it was probably during the MTB attack because the torpedo boats halted their attacks when they could have finished off the Liberty.

According to Ennes, the three MTBs left the port of Ashdod at 1200 local, some 125 miles away, heading for the Liberty at 35 plus knots. They commenced a machine gun attack and launched torpedos at 1435 local. Three minutes later, the sabras mysteriously broke off the engagement. If the boat commanders had wanted to sink the Liberty, they could have done so at this time. Instead, they ceased fire and retreated, returning later to offer assistance to the stricken Liberty. I contend it was during the attack the identification of the American ship became known to the Israeli war planners. I also believe our VQ-2 voice intercepts showed this identification causing the cease-fire.

In reconstruction of the attack, the Liberty crew makes much of flying the American flag, as if it would somehow protect them in harm's way (see Ennes, p. 152). Little does the crew appreciate the difficulty of identifying a ship from an aircraft merely on the basis of a flag or even a hull number (GTR 5 displayed by the Liberty). Based on my experience of flying many "low and slow" reconnaissance flights over ships in the Med and Atlantic with VQ2, unless the flights are almost overhead, target identification is virtually impossible. High-powered binoculars are not much good in a bouncing low-level aircraft. Even post facto photos do not always reveal identification. See, for example, Ennes' photo of the ship on page 146. This crisp overhead photo does not clearly show the identity of the American ship. So how could the attacking Israeli forces conclude this was a friendly ship?

Additionally, in an interesting commentary Mr. Ennes takes Captain McGonagle to task about identifying flags. The MTBs were flying the Israeli flag prior to the torpedo attack (pp. 148-148). Ennes says his captain must have erred (Ennes' emphasis) during the Naval Court of Inquiry; because "it would have been practically impossible to identify a tiny and wildly fluttering Star of David [flag] a mile away..." Mr. Ennes also doesn't understand why the Israeli MTB's did not recognize the hull number, GTR 5, in their July 6, 1967 account (pp. 171-173). He claims the Israeli sailors had to understand the significance of GTR 5. I would challenge him; I believe I know American sailors who could not decipher such a hull number.

I point out the above in the interest of showing the difficulty of identifying vessels by flags and hull numbers in the heat of battle. Further, identification of a ship's flag by high-performance jet fighters would be even more difficult. Consider that the Israeli pilots are engaged in a war situation, flying combat air patrols (CAPs) and flying to and from the front. They could hardly be expected to identify a small fluttering flag on a ship far below them. My son, an ex-Navy F18 pilot, confirms my contention. While the Liberty crew thinks these pilots were intent on identifying them, in fact the pilots were probably engaged in more pressing activity to protect their country.

At 1400, when the Israeli aircraft commenced their attack, the Liberty crew had no idea who the attackers were, even mis-identifying them as Arab MIGs (pp. 69, 75, 97).

At 1430 or so, as the Israeli MTBs approached the Liberty, the senior boat commander may have tried to ascertain the true identity of the ship. Captain McGonagle of the Liberty reported seeing a flashing light from the middle boat. He told his gunners to hold their fire while he attempted to communicate with the MTBs by a hand-held Aldis lamp. One Liberty gunner evidently did hear the captain and opened up with a burst of machine-gun fire. Near simultaneously, the rear gun mount opened fire, "blanketing the center boat." The captain called for all gunners to cease fire but by this time the MTBs returned fire and shortly thereafter launched torpedoes (p. 81). The attack was abbreviated, lasting only three minutes from 1435 to 1438 local. It was during this attack that the Israelis finally identified the American ship. Without such identification, the MTBs would surely have sunk the Liberty.

Less than two hours later, at 1614 local, the American Embassy in Tel Aviv announced in a Flash precedence message to all concerned American authorities that the Israelis erroneously attacked a "may be Navy" ship and apologized for their misdeed (p. 99).

Even the Liberty did not know who her attackers were. According to Liberty log, approximately 15 minutes later, at 1632 local, the crew finally identified the nationality as Israeli as the MTBs returned again, this time to offer assistance to the listing Liberty.

In conclusion, even without taking into account the VQ intercepts, I think Jim Ennes's book makes a strong case the Israelis mistakenly attacked the USS Liberty. The main reason is because they mistook her for an enemy ship. Consequently, I agree with Ennes's citation on page 154. He says the Naval Attachè in Tel Aviv evaluated the attack as "...erroneous attack from trigger happy eagerness to glean some portion of the great victory being shared by IDF Army and Air Force and which the Navy was not sharing." The sabras carried out their duty. Other evidence of a mistaken attack follows in the next enclosure.
The Liberty Incident: Cover-up conundrum, Who was responsible, Why VQ flight never divulged
Cover-up conundrum, Who was responsible, Why VQ flight never divulged

In his book, Ennes discusses the initial struggle US government officials faced trying to rationalize the presence of the USS Liberty off the coasts of Israel and Egypt following the attack (pp. 125-126). Should the US admit that the Liberty was an intelligence-gathering ship sent to eavesdrop on radio conversations? Surely, the countries would be offended. So to stall for time until there was forthcoming clarification about the attacks, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in the Pentagon issued a press release confirming Liberty was in the East Med and the target of an erroneous attack admitted by the Israelis. The press release informed (falsely) that the mission of the Liberty was to "assure communications between U.S. Government posts in the Middle East and to assist in relaying information concerning the evacuation of American dependents and other American citizens from the countries in the Middle East."

US Navy commands subsequently issued their own conflicting versions of the Liberty's presence, some true, some false. One officer on board the USS America stated (accurately), "...[the Liberty] was there to spy for us. Russia does the same thing. We moved in close to monitor the communications of both Egypt and Israel. We have to. We must be informed of what's going on in a matter of seconds." Vice Admiral Martin, COMSIXTHFLT, said (falsely), "I emphatically deny she was a spy ship" (p. 130).

Two days after the attack on June 10, US military officials in the Pentagon, quoted in a UPI wire-service story, said they were satisfied the Israeli attack on the Liberty was a tragic mistake of warfare. Due to security constraints, the story did not divulge the source of the confirmation. By this time, NSA (and others) would have received our PMFR and the field reports from the NSA civilians in Athens. NSA was also trying to rationalize why the Liberty was there in the first place. In their report, Walter Deeley, Frank Raven, Jane Brewer, and two Navy officers gave the technical reasons for sending the Liberty to the East Med. One reason was to provide VHF and UHF communication coverage (p. 132).

Mr. Ennes appears to bask in the (inaccurate) report of the Shreveport Times editorial some weeks after the incident, that the Liberty was attacked to stop her from exposing Israeli preparations for the Syrian invasion (pp. 142-143). Mr. Ennes, of course, knew the Liberty had no such capability; she had no Hebrew linguists. In addition, Mr. Ennes places credence in a report that the Naval Court of Inquiry received during the time the court was in session (p. 152). Admiral Kidd, the senior Court Officer, stated he received a Top Secret report that showed Israeli aircraft identifying a ship displaying an American flag. I will believe that the source was possibly our VQ-2 platform.

About a submarine in the area Mr. Ennes and other members of the crew believe that a US sub was in the area, recording and photographing all events (pp. 64, 206, 218). While I cannot discount this possibility, I can eliminate the mystery submarine being the USS Amberjack, operating in the East Med at that time. A colleague of mine on TAD from Rota, [deleted] was aboard the Amberjack. He stated to me on several occasions the sub was not his unit, as they operated in the Alexandria area during the Liberty attack. (Note: On a USS Liberty's webpage (www.halcyon.com/jim/ussliberty/cyanide.htm) a suggestion is made that the submarine was possibly the Amberjack.)

In several passages of his book Mr. Ennes says the Israelis must have known of the identity and presence of the intelligence-gathering Liberty. He credits the Israelis with having one of the best intelligence services in the world (p. 211). If that is correct, why didn't the Israelis know that the Liberty had no capability against Israeli targets? With no linguistic capability, the ship could not possibly discredit an Israeli concocted story of self-defense or a scheduled surprise attack on Syria on June 8 (delayed 24 hours because of the Liberty's presence, according to Mr. Ennes' supposition). Moreover, as we know, NSG and NSA linguists were embarked in Rota. According to Mr. Ennes' logic, the Israeli intelligence service surely knew of the identity of these linguists who were only Arabic-qualified. I think Mr. Ennes gives too much credit to Israeli intelligence and has little understanding of the complexity of intelligence systems supporting tactical forces.

On another Liberty webpage (www.halcyon.com/jim/uissliberty/summary.txt), Mr. Ennes boldly proclaims in "Assault on the Liberty: A summary" that "The [Israeli] reconnaissance pilots were heard by intercept operators in Germany and in Lebanon reporting to their headquarters that they could see an American flag and men sunbathing on deck." I challenge this statement. VHF and UHF communications are normally limited to short range. It is rare these communications can be intercepted by ground stations more than 100 miles from the source. My personal experience, for instance, aboard the USS Little Rock in 1966, when [deleted], [deleted] and I conducted hearability tests from the Little Rock during a voyage from Beirut, Lebanon across the East Med (close to Cyprus) suggests the improbability of VHF/UHF intercept from Lebanon, much less Germany. From Beirut to the location of the Liberty, it is over 200 miles, about the limit of airborne (e.g., VQ, ACRP) intercepts (and this was before the days of satellite intercepts).

So finally remains the real question: who was at fault for the Liberty incident? At the risk of sounding pretentious and arrogant, I want to offer my views about where to put the onus. I consider several key players: NSA, Pentagon, Naval Commanders, Liberty's CO, NSG officers, the Israelis, all with some manner of culpability.

But who was most responsible? At the risk of being despised by the Liberty crew, I can overlook the Israelis for their part. The young sabras were determined to save a fragile nation in a time of war. Complicating matters for them, they possessed imperfect intelligence information on this mystery ship in their waters.

Second, NSA, Pentagon, and U.S. Navy and Theater Commanders (including LANFLT, NAVEUR, and SIXTHFLT) all shared much responsibility. After all, it was they who put the ship in harm's way. But, after sending the ship's tasking and attempting to move the ship away from the battle zone, their ability to control the ship was limited by an inefficient communication system that plagued this era of the Cold War. These were the days before the advent of efficient communications systems with computers and satellites. Anyone who had spent any time in a Comm Center (General Service or SPINTCOMM) was aware of gigantic problems in these facilities, especially the relay centers on which the Liberty relied for the bulk of her communications support. The problems of sending key messages to the Liberty by naval authorities (see Appendix A, pp. 225-233 and Appendix N, pp. 269-275) were also compound by an inoperative Liberty TRSSCOMM system (which seemed to be down much of the time).

Third, Mr. Ennes and his CT crew must bear some responsibility. Had they spent some time in Division 333 (NAVSECGRUDEPT Rota) with division head, [deleted], during the Rota port call, they might have been aware of the VQ and ACRP missions in the East Med. While their Rota indoctrination may not have done any good in the end, Mr. Ennes and crew might have better advised the CO on the unfolding dangerous events.

Finally, having said the above, it leaves only one real responsible person: the CO, Captain McGonagle. In the Navy, every CO and commander of a naval unit understands responsibility for the safety of personnel and equipment entrusted to him. If not explicit, it is implicitly understood. Captain McGonagle failed in this responsibility. If, for example, he had acted like our VQ-2 mission commander who instinctively changed our track on that June 5/6 night flight, Captain McGonagle might have averted the tragedy by altering the ship's track on his own initiative. Moreover, the captain failed to take into account a key failing of human behavior in dealing with seniors, which simply goes like this: "out of sight, out of mind." Translated, this axiom means when the task begins military commanders are invariably on their own. Indeed, Captain McGonagle alone was ultimately responsible for the safety of his ship and crew.

Now, returning to the last issue at hand: why for 33 years--until now did the VQ-2 flight remain unknown to the American public? I have no idea. I suppose it was due to a myriad of circumstances including national security considerations. It could be because of the reluctance of government officials to acknowledge US airborne platforms eavesdropping on comrades, especially a friend like Israel. Or, it could be due to an incomplete inquiry. Jim Ennes talks about the post facto investigation on pages 163 and 215. The investigators did not enjoy all the facts. He states the Department of Defense, under Walter Deeley, conducted a full-blown investigation into the incident, with the DOD and JCS even sending a Major General to head-up a fact-finding team in the Mediterranean. Their job was for an on-the-spot inquiry, including a review of the mishandled of communications. Why didn't the investigative team pursue me and my colleagues at NAVSECGRUDEPT Rota and VQ2? Ennes also stated the Liberty's Lieutenant Bennett was subsequently assigned to NSA, where he tried to gain access to CIA files (there is no mention of NSA files or the tapes). Why didn't LT Bennett contact G6, especially [deleted] and his Hebrew linguists in the Israeli military section in G643?

On a last note, like Mr. Ennes, who writes his book because the story "cries out to be told" and because he feels he is uniquely qualified to tell all, I too feel qualified with a story to be told. Unfortunately our stories contradict. While Mr. Ennes and the Liberty crew had the misfortune of enduring the consequences of the attack, they did not know their attackers. I did.
The Liberty Incident: Nowicki's Duty Stations
Chronology of Marvin Nowicki's Duty Stations (1955 - 1979)

Jan 1955 - Fresh off the farm and out of high school in southern Illinois, joined the US Navy. Attended boot camp at Great Lakes, IL

Jun 1955 - Graduated from Class A Teleman School in San Diego, CA

Dec 1955 - Advanced to CTSN

July 1957 - Completed two years and half of duty in Japan. Advanced to CT3 and then CT2

July 1958 - Advanced to CT1

Dec 1961 - Completed three-year tour of duty at NSA

July 1962 - Finished 24 weeks of Russian language training at Anacostia Naval Station in DC.

Oct 1962 - Completed 12 weeks of advanced Russian R/T training

Feb 1965 - Completed three-year tour of duty at NAVCOMMSTA, Sidi Yahia, Morocco

Apr 1966 - Spent 30-day TAD to VQ-2 in Rota, Spain

July 1968 - Completed two plus years of duty at Rota, Spain. A lot of time TAD with VQ-2

Dec 1971 - Finished three-year tour of duty at NSA. Advanced to Chief Warrant Officer (CWO-2) and then Lieutenant Junior Grade in the Limited Duty Officer (LDO) program

Aug 1975 - Completed four-year assignment at Rota, Spain. Advanced to Lieutenant (LDO)

June 1979 - Completed a four year tour of duty as the first Officer in Charge of NAVSECGRUDET Brunswick, ME. Retired from the US Navy to private business in southern Illinois

Jan 1990 - Joined academe at Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, IL, working and studying. Earned a Ph.D in political science in May 1998. Spent two years teaching public administration in the ex-Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan, once as a Civic Education Project (Yale University) fellow in 1996/96 and once as a Fulbright scholar in 1998/99

Feb 2000 - Retired from SIUC. Presently working in a part-time teaching position at a local community college. Also undergoing training with the University of Phoenix to teach Online classes using the World Wide Web, a fairly new concept in higher education.
The Liberty Incident: Nowicki's letter to the Wall Street Journal

Nowicki's letter to the Wall Street Journal

Letter from Marvin E. Nowicki, Ph.D., published in The Wall Street Journal, Wednesday, May 16, 2001, page A-23:

Tragic "Gross Error" In a 1967 Attack

In regard to Timothy Naftali's review of James Bamford's book "Body of Secrets" (Leisure & Arts, May 9): Mr. Naftali doesn't quite have it right concerning the book portion dealing with the Israeli attack on the USS Liberty in 1967. I know because I am the person to whom Mr. Natfali [sic] refers as the "chief Hebrew-language analyst" aboard the U.S. Navy (not Air Force) EC121 aircraft. He says that I recall one of my teammates telling me of hearing references to "a U.S. flag" from Israeli pilots.

For the record, we (my teammate and I) both heard and recorded the references to the U.S. flag made by the pilots and captains of the motor torpedo boats. My personal recollection remains after 34 years that the aircraft and MTBs prosecuted the Liberty until their operators had an opportunity to get close-in and see the flag, hence the references to the flag.

My position, which is opposite of Mr. Bamford's, is that the attack, though terrible and tragic especially to the crew members and their families on that ill-fated day in June 1967, was a gross error. How can I prove it? I can't unless the transcripts/tapes are found and released to the public. I last saw them in a desk drawer at NSA in the late 1970s before I left the service.

MARVIN E. NOWICKI, PH.D.
Ashley, Ill.

Once the Israeli’s were told, after the fact, the ship number, the Israeli’s were finally able to verify it by helicopter. But it was too late.


The Israeli’s were told by US, there would be no Naval ships within the area. What the US NSA/Navy forgot to do was make sure the USS Liberty got the messages they were to change course and stay outside of the area by 100 miles. Yet they told the Israeli’s there would be no US ship within that 100 miles. They goofed. They also goofed, since it was an NSA mission in disguise, to include Israeli linguists on board. They did have Russian linguists on board.

The Israeli Mirage jets visually saw the American FLAG, and markings. They still decided to shoot. Why? They wanted to make a statement. We should have spanked Israel hard. They need us more than we needed them, and I am a big supporter of Israel.

 

[depotoo]

Aljazeera is even one of the ones that has been pushing this conspiracy theory.

It's all part of a Worldwide Jooooo-ish Kornspiracy, I tellz ya !!!

-----------

Israel is the new bulwark against Militant Islam in the Middle East, a role formerly performed by the Eastern Empire...

As such, the get as much support from the US as we can manage... rightfully so.

They screwed-up with respect to the USS Liberty.

We screwed-up with respect to the USS Liberty.

 

[Admiral Rockwell Tory]

Once the Israeli’s were told, after the fact, the ship number, the Israeli’s were finally able to verify it by helicopter. But it was too late.


The Israeli’s were told by US, there would be no Naval ships within the area. What the US NSA/Navy forgot to do was make sure the USS Liberty got the messages they were to change course and stay outside of the area by 100 miles. Yet they told the Israeli’s there would be no US ship within that 100 miles. They goofed. They also goofed, since it was an NSA mission in disguise, to include Israeli linguists on board. They did have Russian linguists on board.

The Israeli Mirage jets visually saw the American FLAG, and markings. They still decided to shoot. Why? They wanted to make a statement. We should have spanked Israel hard. They need us more than we needed them, and I am a big supporter of Israel.

I guess you never heard of a false flag either.

You are on a ship in combat and don't want the enemy to attack, so you raise the flag of an ally.

We would play war games with two identical ships playing on opposite sides. Put a guy with a bucket of paint over the side and change the hull number to the opposing force. They can sneak right into the formation if no one knows.

 

[Kondor3]

Aljazeera is even one of the ones that has been pushing this conspiracy theory...

Al Jazeera? Yeppers... yeah... there's "objectivity" for ya, right?

 

[Pilot1]

I guess you never heard of a false flag either.

You are on a ship in combat and don't want the enemy to attack, so you raise the flag of an ally.

We would play war games with two identical ships playing on opposite sides. Put a guy with a bucket of paint over the side and change the hull number to the opposing force. They can sneak right into the formation if no one knows.

Yes, I've heard of a false flag. However, the Israelis had PLENTY of time to verify the identity of the ship through proper channels. I mean how many knots can those ships make? It wasn't going anywhere fast, so the Mirage pilots had plenty of time to figure out if it was a false flag or not.

 

[depotoo]

You must be anti-Semitic. Admit it.

I guess you never heard of a false flag either.

You are on a ship in combat and don't want the enemy to attack, so you raise the flag of an ally.

We would play war games with two identical ships playing on opposite sides. Put a guy with a bucket of paint over the side and change the hull number to the opposing force. They can sneak right into the formation if no one knows.

Yes, I've heard of a false flag. However, the Israelis had PLENTY of time to verify the identity of the ship through proper channels. I mean how many knots can those ships make? It wasn't going anywhere fast, so the Mirage pilots had plenty of time to figure out if it was a false flag or not.

 

[Admiral Rockwell Tory]

I guess you never heard of a false flag either.

You are on a ship in combat and don't want the enemy to attack, so you raise the flag of an ally.

We would play war games with two identical ships playing on opposite sides. Put a guy with a bucket of paint over the side and change the hull number to the opposing force. They can sneak right into the formation if no one knows.

Yes, I've heard of a false flag. However, the Israelis had PLENTY of time to verify the identity of the ship through proper channels. I mean how many knots can those ships make? It wasn't going anywhere fast, so the Mirage pilots had plenty of time to figure out if it was a false flag or not.

Exactly how would they do that?

 

[Pilot1]

Exactly how would they do that?

Radio.

 

[Admiral Rockwell Tory]

Exactly how would they do that?

Radio.

Exactly who were they going to call, dumbass?

 

[Pilot1]

Exactly who were they going to call, dumbass?

So, the Israeli military hierarchy did not communicate with the U.S. at all? They were not our ally at the time? So, a pilot operates under certain ROE. Firing on a ship is a big deal, typically they would call up their base, and ask for positive I.D. before firing unless they were being fired upon. The senior guys would contact the U.S. liaison, and ask the question. Pretty obvious, and I'm the dumbass?

 

[Admiral Rockwell Tory]

Exactly who were they going to call, dumbass?

So, the Israeli military hierarchy did not communicate with the U.S. at all? They were not our ally at the time? So, a pilot operates under certain ROE. Firing on a ship is a big deal, typically they would call up their base, and ask for positive I.D. before firing unless they were being fired upon. The senior guys would contact the U.S. liaison, and ask the question. Pretty obvious, and I'm the dumbass?

Yes, you are the dumbass. Israel was in the middle of an all-out war. Put yourself in the pilot's shoes. An possibly hostile ship is down there, plus you have limited communications with your command structure, who in the hell are you going to ask?

No one in the Israeli government knew the Liberty was there, and apparently neither did the US Navy, who though the ship would be much further west.

Imagine the conversation if it were to have taken place as you suppose:

"Israeli Air Command, this is Ghostrider 101. I am out here over the Med and I see a ship I cannot identify. It may be flying an American flag, but it doesn't look like anything I have ever seen before. Request permission to engage"

"Ghostrider 101, this is Israeli Air Command. How the hell should we know who it is? It may be that Egyptian ship we were tracking earlier. Get it over with and get your ass back here. We have other targets!"

I find it ironic that your username is Pilot1, What do you fly? A Cessna 150 or Piper Cub?

 

[Pilot1]

I find it ironic that your username is Pilot1, What do you fly? A Cessna 150 or Piper Cub?

The Liberty was an Intelligence gathering ship not an offensive ship that cold do physical damage like an aircraft carrier, cruiser, destroyer or even a PT Boat. It was NO IMMEDIATE THREAT, or any type of physical THREAT to Israeli forces. They had all the time in the world to call up whomever, and ask. What do these ships make at standard speed? 15 - 20 knots? The Mirage III has a max speed of Mach 1.8 - 2.2 depending on variant. I just plainly disagree with you on this one.

I own and fly a Grumman AA5B "Tiger".