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http://toledoblade.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060218/COLUMNIST14/602180351/-1/NEWS01
Article published Saturday, February 18, 2006
The suppression of Able Danger
"WE were sitting on the north coast watching the fighters come in, and we couldn't do anything about it," Eric Kleinsmith told the House Armed Services Committee Wednesday.
The allusion Mr. Kleinsmith made was to the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941, but he was speaking of the more devastating surprise attack which took place on Sept. 11, 2001.
Mr. Kleinsmith and the two colleagues who testified with him in open session are convinced that had the information they developed been acted on, not only 9/11, but also the October, 2000, attack on the destroyer USS Cole in which 17 sailors died could have been prevented.
In 1999 and 2000 then-Maj. Kleinsmith was the chief of intelligence for the Army's Land Information Warfare Activity at Ft. Belvoir, Va. LIWA was using the then-novel capabilities of data mining to help a top secret unit of Special Operations Command locate al-Qaeda cells around the world. The unit had the code name "Able Danger."
Through computer scanning of some 2.5 terabytes of classified and unclassified data, the Able Danger team identified five "nodes" of al-Qaeda activity. One was in Brooklyn, N.Y. Another was in the port of Aden in Yemen, where the USS Cole was attacked.
Able Danger linked Mohamed Atta and three other 9/11 hijackers to the Brooklyn cell, said Lt. Col. Tony Shaffer, who was the liaison between the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Able Danger team.
"It shocked us how entrenched a presence al-Qaeda had in the United States," Mr. Kleinsmith said.
Colonel Shaffer testified he tried three times to have Able Danger data on the Brooklyn cell presented to the FBI, but that on each occasion Pentagon lawyers forbade the meeting.
In a commentary in the Wall Journal last November, Louis Freeh, who was FBI director at the time, said that if he had been told about what Able Danger had learned, 9/11 likely would have been prevented.
In March, 2000, Mr. Kleinsmith was ordered to stop all work on Able Danger, and, later, to delete all the information collected.
Special Operations Command didn't want to lose the capability, so it transferred Able Danger to a private contractor, Raytheon, at its Garland, Texas, facility.
A subcontractor for Raytheon at Garland was the Orion Corp., which made charts of the linkages the data miners identified. J.T. Smith worked for Orion on the project. Mr. Smith told the committee he acquired through an Arab source in Los Angeles a grainy photograph of Mohamed Atta to illustrate a chart on the Brooklyn cell.
"I'm absolutely certain [it was Atta]," Mr. Smith said. "I used to look at [the chart] every morning."
Stephen Cambone, undersecretary of defense for intelligence, told the committee his office was unable to find a copy of the chart or any other evidence supporting the claims of Colonel Shaffer and Mr. Smith.
The thoroughness of his "investigation" was called into question when neither Mr. Cambone nor the three underlings he had with him could name the man who ran Able Danger during its Garland phase.
That embarrassing admission was elicited by U.S. Rep. Curt Weldon, a Philadelphia-area Republican.
When Colonel Shaffer was interviewing to become an intelligence officer, he admitted that at age 13, he had taken a box of pens from the embassy where his father worked. After he went public, the Defense Intelligence Agency tried to use that, $180 in disputed travel expenses, and $67 in disputed telephone charges, as grounds for firing him.
Mr. Smith testified he'd lost two jobs since coming forward. Because of what's happened to Colonel Shaffer and Mr. Smith, other witnesses insisted on testifying behind closed doors, so they would be protected from retaliation from superiors whose negligence kept Able Danger's findings from the FBI and the captain of the Cole.
It's unclear why the Bush Administration is covering up, since the suppression of Able Danger occurred on President Clinton's watch. But it is clear there is a cover-up. One would think a Washington press corps obsessing about a hunting accident in Texas would be more curious about it.
Jack Kelly is a member of The Blades national bureau.
» E-mail him at [email protected]
» Read more Jack Kelly columns at www.toledoblade.com/jackkelly
The Bush Isle of Thanatos
Easier access to our cities once seaports are in foreign hands
Kathleen Parker, Tribune Media Services
February 23, 2006
The Greeks and Sigmund Freud had a name for what may ail President Bush: Thanatos. The death wish.
Thanatos was the Greek personification of death, which Freud later expanded to describe man's "death instinct," or the unconscious wish to abandon life's struggles and return to a state of quiet repose.
That would be the grave, as Freud envisioned man's endpoint. But for Bush, perhaps the metaphor extends only as far as a nice, quiet ranch in Crawford, Texas, where, as Yeats once put it, "peace comes dropping slow."
How else to explain this administration's inexorable march toward political death?
The final throes of Bush's journey toward self-destruction may have found expression with the apparent sale of operational rights to six of our nation's largest ports to a company owned by the United Arab Emirates. Approved by the Bush administration against all reason, the $6.8 billion sale includes the ports of New York, New Jersey, Baltimore, New Orleans, Miami and Philadelphia.
Despite bipartisan condemnation, the Bush administration has defended the sale to Dubai Ports World as not only safe, but prudent. The UAE, which incidentally served as a financial and operational base for the Sept. 11, 2001, hijackers, is an important ally in the fight against terror, we're told.
Of course they are. And Colombia is an important ally in the war against drugs. And Mexico is an important ally in the fight against illegal immigration. Perhaps, given that much of our illegal drug supply and immigrant population come from Colombia and Mexico, respectively, we should reconsider our strategy.
Meanwhile, is this our new bombs-to-butter ploy in the Middle East? Instead of blocking the sale, which might have suggested American distrust of Arabs and/or Muslim nations, we give them the keys to our houses. Clever.
In the parallel universe we affectionately call Planet Earth, insanity seems the better word.
Let's assume that the UAE is, indeed, a power player in the game against terrorists. There's reason to hope, as supporters of the sale have suggested, that the UAE has a vested interest in port security. It's a business deal, after all, and what's good for jihad isn't necessarily good for business.
Plus, as others have noted, the ports themselves are unionized and staffed by "Archie Bunker-kind of Americans," in the words of Stephen E. Flynn, of the New York-based Council on Foreign Relations. Which is to say, Baltimore's waterfront isn't suddenly going to be swarming with red-checkered keffiyehs.
Speaking seriously for a moment, it's hardly reasonable to condemn or fear an entire nation--or a federation of emirates--on the basis of a few random acts by a tiny percentage of the world's 1.25 billion Muslims. When weird Christians misbehave, we don't expect the world to stop doing business with Alabama.
But, politically, handing over our ports to a part of the world where the U.S. is not currently beloved is tantamount to taking arsenic to treat acne. Baltimore Mayor Martin O'Malley aptly summarized sentiments on both sides of the political aisle when he said, "President Bush's decision to turn over the operations of any American port is reckless. It is outrageous and it is irresponsible. We are not going to turn over the port of Baltimore to a foreign government. It's not going to happen."
Granting a fantastically elastic benefit of the doubt, perhaps the president was merely seeking a novel way to bridge our divided nation. For the first time in a long while, Democrats and Republicans--from Democratic Sen. Hillary Clinton to Republican New York Gov. George Pataki--are united, this time in opposition to the sale of our ports to a foreign entity.
In the more likely event that Thanatos truly is at the helm of our ship of state at this titanic moment, we can't afford to let Bush's death instinct subsume the national imperative to survive.
Survival now depends on fitter minds.
NATO AIR said:The ports issue doesn't mind me so much anymore now that I've seen a lot more detail..
Still a political blunder but Pres. Bush is in the right.
Able danger once again makes me wonder what the hell is going on in Congress and the White House.
Kathianne said:Able Danger has always made me wonder wtf is up. So too does the lack of traction the Saddam tapes have made. So too does the failure to release and get transcribed all the intel papers found in Iraq/Afghanistan. None of this is making sense.
I disagree about the ports, but not only on the context of UAE, but foreign control/workers at all ports of entry. Considering Bush's record on borders in general, I'm not reassured about the 'due diligence' claims.
When one is asked to suspend common sense, because the president hands the foreign nation a 'race card' to play, I just don't feel compelled to go along.
At the same time, finally they are getting the idea that they need to explain what they are trying to do, which again does not equal being correct.
tsk, tsk how completely disloyal you are. How dare anyone criticize the party you 'care about.' Don't you know that 'goose stepping' is the way to show we care.rtwngAvngr said:Only nixon could got to china. only the republicans could be trusted to hand america to islamists on a platter. Welcome to the new world order.
Kathianne said:tsk, tsk how completely disloyal you are. How dare anyone criticize the party you 'care about.' Don't you know that 'goose stepping' is the way to show we care.
The adminstration making mistakes does not create security minded democrats, rather it's handed them an opportunity which so far they have been taking advantage of. It doesn't help that they are making the right noises.rtwngAvngr said:Yeah. So now are democrats going to really be the party of security now? Or just on this port deal, then back to appeasement. This all sucks bad.
Kathianne said:The adminstration making mistakes does not create security minded democrats, rather it's handed them an opportunity which so far they have been taking advantage of. It doesn't help that they are making the right noises.
Yep, if it's an 'ok' idea, why the rush? 30-45 days to take a breath and explain didn't sound unreasonable.rtwngAvngr said:Sounds about right. I can't believe B*sh brought out the veto on the first go round. Jesus h.
Kathianne said:Yep, if it's an 'ok' idea, why the rush? 30-45 days to take a breath and explain didn't sound unreasonable.
My mom always told me, "It takes...", oh never mind!rtwngAvngr said:BTW, Orwell's a dumbass. :teeth:
Kathianne said:My mom always told me, "It takes...", oh never mind!
The Army intel team described in the link wasNATO AIR said:This thing stinks worse than the cigar Clinton "shared" with Monica.
Someone asked earlier why some conservatives are beginning to have doubts about Pres. Bush's real allegiances to fighting the WOT. Here is just more evidence;
Kathianne said:Considering Bush's record on borders in general, I'm not reassured about the 'due diligence' claims.
02/28/2006
Legal debate hobbled Able Danger
By: KEITH PHUCAS , Times Herald Staff
NORRISTOWN - Just as "Able Danger" was uncovering startling links to al-Qaida in the United States and abroad in 2000, the data mining effort was suddenly ordered to cease operating that April.
For three months, a 24-member project team had culled data from thousands of Internet sites and compiled hundreds of names and locations linked to suspected terrorists. According to testimony from data analysts who worked on the program, Pentagon lawyers threw up red flags after learning that the data mining team was downloading information from Internet Web sites run by Islamic groups.
Their Internet access was sharply curtailed after attorneys raised concerns about the group's practice of collecting personal information on "U.S. persons," said Erik Kleinsmith, who as the Army's chief of intelligence at the Land Information Warfare Center (LIWA), in Ft. Belvoir, Va., supervised the computer analysis.
As a result, the "Able Danger" effort was effectively shut down for six months. For Kleinsmith, those months would be the longest of his professional life.
"The most frustrating thing me for me was I needed to ask for permission in writing to use the Internet," he said in an interview Friday.
Though the "Able Danger" team never claimed it located any of the Sept. 11 terrorists in the U.S., the group would learn after the attacks that its cutting-edge techniques had identified key al-Qaida members and their U.S. affiliates - including future hijackers Mohamed Atta, Marwan al Shehhi, Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar, who were associated with a "Brooklyn Cell," according to Congressman Curt Weldon.
Weldon has been the program's champion on Capitol Hill since June 2005, and his zeal led to two congressional hearings on the matter. The congressman has criticized the Pentagon for allowing agency officials to retaliate against Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, a Defense Intelligence Agency employee, after he went public with "Able Danger" controversy.
During the work stoppage, the group lost valuable time in its search for al-Qaida, according testimony from "Able Danger" teammates Kleinsmith and James D. Smith's at a Feb. 15 congressional hearing, while computer analysts argued with military lawyers over legal questions governing intelligence gathering and retention.
Shaffer and Smith testified they saw LIWA chart with Atta's picture more than a year before the Sept. 11 attacks.
Shaffer tried to solicit the FBI to target al-Qaida in the U.S., but his efforts were blocked repeatedly by Defense Department attorneys, he said.
Lawyers overseeing the data mining questioned the legality of downloading and retaining Web sites information and Internet protocol, or "IP," addresses connected with "U.S. persons," defined not only as American citizens but also foreigners in the country legally. At that time, this would have applied to anyone in the country on a current U.S. visa - including suspected terrorists.
The Army's guide for intelligence gathering, AR 381-10, says analysts must make a determination within 90 days about whether they can legally retain data collected on U.S. persons. If not, information must be purged from computer systems. The large amounts of data the project swept up, however, made the 90-day requirement nearly impossible to meet.
There was lively debate at LIWA about an exception in the Army guide that legally allowed "collection" of publicly available information. If so, why couldn't data be kept indefinitely?
According to the 9/11 Commission, Atta first arrived in the U.S. on June 3, 2000. The commission's July 2004 report gave no indication that the U.S. government knew of his existence before then. Several European publications, however, claim Atta was under surveillance by U.S. intelligence while he was in Germany from January to May 2000 and was observed purchasing chemicals that could be used to make explosives.
According to Shaffer's Feb. 15 testimony, LIWA linked Atta to the El Farouq mosque in Brooklyn, New York, by February 2000. The mosque, a hotbed of anti-American sentiment, was frequented by "Blind Sheik" Omar Ahmed Abdul Rahman at that time. He was convicted in 1995 of plotting to bomb New York City landmarks.
Kleinsmith does not recall seeing Atta's picture on any chart, but what he does remember is more unsettling.
"The more important point is that our team was tracking hundreds of names and creating dozens of charts for (Special Operations Command)," he testified. "And while most of these charts contained information and intelligence that needed further analytical vetting, we were still able to identify a significant worldwide (al-Qaida) footprint with a surprisingly large presence within the United States."
From April until September 2000, his team tried to restart work, but found it next to impossible. All the analysts could do was watch-troubling hints of terrorist activities online.
"We were getting restriction after restriction," he said. "We were watching the next threat, but we couldn't take the battlefield."
China syndrome
In the summer of 1999, the first test data mining project at LIWA searched for links to high technology transfers to China. The effort was a smashing success as the information dragnet pulled in a mother lode of names, places and hardware descriptions. But once that information made its way to Capitol Hill in November 1999, government officials got nervous, according to Center for Cooperative Research (cooperativeresearch.org).
Next, federal marshals showed up at LIWA with subpoenas issued from Congressman Dan Burton's office, Kleinsmith said. Government officials wanted copies of the data mining results.
According to the Center for Cooperative Research, the data included former Secretary of Defense William Perry and then Stanford University provost, Condoleezza Rice, among others. Other reports identified then Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen and former Democratic National Committee chairman, Steve Grossman.
"I spent the weekend making 30,000 pages of copies," Kleinsmith said. He said his group stored two copies in a safe and sent six boxes of material to the Pentagon's Office of General Counsel and a congressional liaison office.
With the data mining capability declared a success, LIWA closed out the test project.
Able Danger dashed
In December 1999, Kleinsmith got a visit from Special Operations Command (SOCOM) officers interested in the program. By February 2000, the effort was in full swing.
Some traditional intelligence officials, however, seemed either skeptical or jealous of LIWA's capability. At one conference, "Able Danger" analysts identified four major al-Qaida hubs - the Middle East, East Africa, Balkans and the Far East - in about 90 minutes.
"Because we weren't an intelligence organization, we got a lot of bad press," he said. "Folks thought we were running fast and loose with the data."
By April, the "Able Danger" team was told to end its support of SOCOM. During the month's long work stoppage, SOCOM's patience ran out, and the military command transferred the work to a Raytheon facility in Garland, Texas, and continued the effort.
One of the million-dollar questions in Washington is who ordered the shut down.
"Nobody will admit sending down the order to do it," he said. "It came from somewhere up in the Pentagon."
Many speculated that Richard Shiffrin, the Pentagon's deputy general counsel at the time, was to blame for the decision. Shaffer's testimony claims Army lawyer Tom Taylor cut off Army support for the project.
Critics speculate that politics played a role in the death of "Able Danger" because of fallout from the China study. Others, including Shaffer, blame it on shortsighted Pentagon bureaucrats.
In the end, it didn't much matter. An obedient Army officer, Kleinsmith grudgingly followed his orders and destroyed enough "Able Danger" data to fill a portion of the Library of Congress.
While he had deep misgivings about getting rid all of the group's impressive work, an army of shadowy figures that emerged equally haunted him from the mountains of data.
"There was stuff that disturbed us, and we were losing sleep," he said.
