House Votes to Approve Warrantless Spying on Americans

[The Duke]

I hope this doesn't make it through the Senate, and it very well may not. Not all elected Democrats are that against the fourth Amendment, gotta watch out for the turtle and any other NeoCon holdovers there, too.

 

[j-mac]

Not sure why you’d pass an amendment to require a warrant for spying which can’t occur.

INTEL - FISA Section 702

In 2008, Congress enacted Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), a critical intelligence collection authority that enables t...

www.intel.gov

Section 702 only permits the targeting of non-United States persons who are reasonably believed to be located outside the United States. United States persons and anyone in the United States may not be targeted under Section 702. Section 702 also prohibits “reverse targeting”—the IC may not target a non-U.S. person located outside the U.S. if the purpose of the collection is to collect information about a United States person or anyone located in the United States.

Carter page?

 

[Marener]

Carter page?

Different law.

 

[j-mac]

Carter page?

Statement of Michael E. Horowitz Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Crime and Federal Government Surveillance concerning “Fixing FISA: How a Law Designed

oig.justice.gov

 

[Rigby5]

Section 702 doesn’t apply to Americans.

It does and has been applied to US citizens who communicate with foreign nationals being spied on.

 

[Rigby5]

Not sure why you’d pass an amendment to require a warrant for spying which can’t occur.

INTEL - FISA Section 702

In 2008, Congress enacted Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), a critical intelligence collection authority that enables t...

www.intel.gov

Section 702 only permits the targeting of non-United States persons who are reasonably believed to be located outside the United States. United States persons and anyone in the United States may not be targeted under Section 702. Section 702 also prohibits “reverse targeting”—the IC may not target a non-U.S. person located outside the U.S. if the purpose of the collection is to collect information about a United States person or anyone located in the United States.

Wrong.
They reverse targeted often.

 

[Rigby5]

Section 702 only permits the targeting of non-United States persons who are reasonably believed to be located outside the United States. United States persons and anyone in the United States may not be targeted under Section 702

seems rather cut/dry Marener

~S~

Wrong.
Since no judge is required, the reality is they spy on whomever they want.

 

[Rigby5]

Section 702 doesn’t apply to domestic wiretaps.

Yes it does and did often.
While technically illegal to apply to domestic wiretaps, once you allow them to bypass the judge, they will and did abuse citizens in the US.

 

[Rigby5]

Different law.

Wrong.
Same law, FISA.

{...
In December 2019, the DOJ OIG released our review of certain actions by the FBI and the Department during an FBI investigation, known as “Crossfire Hurricane,” into whether individuals associated with the Donald J. Trump for President Campaign were coordinating, wittingly or unwittingly, with the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Among other issues, our review assessed four applications filed with the FISC in 2016 and 2017 to conduct FISA surveillance targeting Carter Page, who had been a Trump campaign official prior to the FISA surveillance. The applications to surveil Carter Page were sought pursuant to Title I of FISA, which requires the Department to file an application with the FISC to authorize the electronic surveillance of a telephone number, email account, or other “facility.” In its application, the government must show probable cause to believe that the proposed target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.

Our review of the Department’s applications to authorize FISA surveillance of Carter Page found that FBI personnel fell far short of the requirement in FBI policy that they ensure that all factual statements in a FISA application are "scrupulously accurate." We identified multiple instances in which factual assertions relied upon by the FISC in the FISA applications were inaccurate, incomplete, or unsupported by appropriate documentation, based upon information the FBI had in its possession at the time the applications were filed. We found that the problems we identified were primarily caused by the FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane team failing to share all relevant information with the NSD and, consequently, the information was not considered by the Department decision makers who ultimately decided to support the applications. We identified 17 significant inaccuracies and omissions in the four applications -- 7 in the first FISA application and a total of 17 by the time of the final renewal application in 2017.
...}

 

[the watcher]

Another brick in the wall. NSA ’just days from taking over the internet’ warns Edward Snowden