Historically, military forces abroad enjoyed complete sovereign immunity and were subject to local criminal or civil liability only with the consent of their government. In essence, the “law of the flag” they served under followed these forces at all times. When, however, long-term peacetime presence of armed forces in foreign territory became the norm following World War II, this traditional exclusive jurisdiction model evolved to accommodate the legitimate interests of both the “sending” and “receiving” states to respond to criminal misconduct based on both nationality and territorial principles. Status of Force Agreements (SOFAs) emerged as the framework to balance these competing assertions of criminal jurisdiction (and many other issues related to the long-term presence of foreign armed forces within the territory of another state).
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) SOFA, negotiated between the alliance states in 1951, is representative of typical jurisdictional arrangements. It recognizes exclusive jurisdiction on the part of the parent nation (sending state) for service-unique offenses such as desertion or disobedience of orders, as well as for conduct which is only a crime under the law of the sending state. Conversely, it recognizes exclusive jurisdiction of the host nation (receiving state) over offenses which violate its laws, but not the law of the sending state. Most offenses committed by service-members, however, fall into a category of concurrent jurisdiction: they violate both U.S. military law (and sometimes federal civilian law), and host nation law. Criminal homicide by a U.S. service-member is such an offense. In these cases, SOFAs establish a framework for allocating primary jurisdiction over the offender. The NATO SOFA addresses this overlapping authority by assigning primary jurisdiction to the sending state in cases involving offences against its security, property, or its own nationals; as well as offences arising out of acts “done in the performance of official duty.” The receiving state is given the primary right to exercise jurisdiction in all other cases.
However, even when the receiving state is granted primary concurrent jurisdiction, U.S. policy is to maximize the exercise of jurisdiction over U.S. personnel. Accordingly, the U.S. routinely requests waiver of receiving state primary concurrent jurisdiction. These requests are routinely granted in locations where the U.S. military maintains a long-term presence (such as Germany, South Korea, and Japan). These waiver requests and jurisdiction negotiations are normally conducted between JAG officers supporting the U.S. command and host-nation prosecutorial authorities. In many cases, the host-nation initiates the waiver process, considering the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction preferable to prosecuting U.S. personnel in its own courts.