montelatici, P F Timore, et al,
Don't you think that this is a bit of over simplification.
...The Zionists gave the West Bank to Jordan. So where is the beef?
No beef.
The dumbass Jordanians chose to attack the Jews again in 1967, after Israel pleaded with them not to.
Then they go their asses kicked by the Jews, and lost it again.
When ya start fights, then lose, you pay a price.
Jordan paid with the West Bank for its stupidity in 1967.
Vae victus.
But it was Israel that attacked in the 1967 War. Israel started the fight. Why do you post nonsense?
"Helms was awakened at 3:00 in the morning on 5 June by a call from the CIA Operations Center. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service had picked up reports that Israel had launched its attack. (OCI soon concluded that the Israelis— contrary to their claims—had fired first.) "
CIA Analysis of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War Central Intelligence Agency
(COMMENT)
There were probably three central cause that provoked Israel into the preemptive strike.
Egypt ordered the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to completely withdraw --- quickly from their buffer positions in the Sinai.
5. 2000 hours GMT (2200 hours, Gaza local time). A message from General Fawzy, Chief of Staff of the United Arab Republic Armed Forces, was received by the Commander of UNEF, Major-General Rikhye, requesting withdrawal of "all UN troops which install observation posts along our borders". Brigadier Mokhtar, who handed General Fawzy's letter to the Commander of UNEF, told General Rikhye at the time that he must order the immediate withdrawal of United Nations troops from El Sabha and Sharm el Sheikh on the night of 16 May since United Arab Republic armed forces must gain control of these two places that very night.
The decision of the Government of the United Arab Republic to restrict Israeli shipping in the Strait of Tiran, and the nationalization of the Straits. The United Arab Republic (UAR --- AKA Egypt) considered the Straits to be Egyptian territorial waters.
The size of the UAR Force moving into close proximity of Israeli Forces in late May, or early June.
First, the CIA OPCEN Call to Director Helms was "raw intel" at that moment. The CIA had no real boots on the ground to tell which side fired first; although it probably was the IDF on the Egyptian build-up. It would appear that early on 5 June, the Israeli Air Forces preemptively engaged and destroyed Egypt’s air force on the ground; and later that day, struck Jordanian and Syrian air assets as well.
9. During my (UN Secretary-General) stay in Cairo I had discussions with President Gamal Abdel Nasser and Mr. Mahmoud Riad, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. They explained to me the position of the Government of the United Arab Republic, which is substantially as set forth in the speech given by President Nasser to the United Arab Republic Air Force Advance Command on 22 May 1967 which has been reported fully in the Press. President Nasser and Foreign Minister Riad assured me that the United Arab Republic would not initiate offensive action against Israel. Their general aim, as stated to me, was for a return to the conditions prevailing prior to 1956 and to full observance by both parties of the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel.
10. The decision of the Government of the United Arab Republic to restrict shipping in the Strait of Tiran, of which I learned while en route to Cairo, has created a new situation. Free passage through the Strait is one of the questions which the Government of Israel considers most vital to her interests. The position of the Government of the United Arab Republic is that the Strait is territorial waters in which it has a right to control shipping. The Government of Israel contests this position and asserts the right of innocent passage through the Strait. The Government of Israel has further declared that Israel will regard the closing of the Strait of Tiran to Israel flag ships and any restriction on cargoes of ships of other flags proceeding to Israel as a
casus belli. While in Cairo, I called to the attention of the Government of the United Arab Republic the dangerous consequences which could ensue from restricting innocent passage of ships in the Strait of Tiran. I expressed my deep concern in this regard and my hope that no precipitate action would be taken.
29. On the afternoon of 22 May, the Secretary-General departed from New York, arriving in Cairo on the afternoon of 23 May. He left Cairo on the afternoon of 25 May, arriving back in New York on 26 May. While en route to Cairo during a stop in Paris, the Secretary-General learned that on this day President Nasser had announced his intention to reinstitute the blockade against Israel in the Strait of Tiran.
36. It has been said that the decision to withdraw UNEF precipitated other consequences such as the reinstitution of the blockade against Israel in the Strait of Tiran. As can be seen from the chronology, the UNEF positions at Sharm el Sheikh on the Strait of Tiran (manned by thirty-two men in all) were in fact rendered ineffective by United Arab Republic troops before the request for withdrawal was received. It is also pertinent to note that in response to a query from the Secretary-General as to why the United Arab Republic had announced its reinstitution of the blockade in the Strait of Tiran while the Secretary-General was actually en route to Cairo on 22 May, President Nasser explained that his Government's decision to resume the blockade had been taken some time before U Thant's departure and it was considered preferable to make the announcement before rather than after the Secretary-General's visit to Cairo.
Report of the Secretary-General on the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force
The question becomes, much like the situation in Crimea, when the Russians rapidly moved and deployed forces in support of the annexation. So it is that had the guarantors (US/UK) of Ukrainian Integrity reacted more preemptively, they might have persuaded the Russian to back away. When is it better to preemptively intervene then allow a huge threatening force in the border to stage for an assault? That is what Israel had to decide.
Most Respectfully,
R