Walter Cronkite's Ridiculous Spin on the 1968 Tet Offensive in South Vietnam

[mikegriffith1]

That talking point is objective and factual. You can't get over it. It was the American rebellion played out in southeast Asia.

Well, again, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong sources refute your talking point. These sources confirm that the Hanoi Politburo were terrified of B-52 bombings after Linebacker II, and that they would not have escalated their attacks on South Vietnam if we had responded to the first major attack with a similar bombing campaign. This is why a slim Politburo majority actually blocked Le Duan's attempt to markedly escalate the fighting in the several months following the Paris Peace Accords in 1973. I've already cited several sources that document this fact.

And this fact is just one of the problems with the myth that the war was unwinnable.

 

[mikegriffith1]

Dr. Michael Kort on Congress's slashing of our aid to South Vietnam:

Congress made these cuts despite the continued requests for higher levels of support by Nixon and, after he had to resign in August 1974 because of Watergate, his successor Gerald Ford. As a result of congressional cuts, US military aid to South Vietnam decreased drastically between 1973 and 1975: from $2.3 billion in fiscal year 1973 to just over $1.1 billion in 1974 to only $700 million authorized for 1975, a year in which the Ford administration requested $1.5 billion. Meanwhile, price increases and other factors such as shipping costs ate away at what that money could buy, to the point where the $700 million authorized for 1975 could purchase only one-fifth of the material provided to the South Vietnamese armed forces in previous years. (The Vietnam War Reexamined, Cambridge University Press. 2018, p. 200)

 

[John Edgar Slow Horses]

No, Mike, "not just once more." The outcome and other results of the war rebuke your conclusions.

Now go try to save Micronesia from raising waters.

 

[mikegriffith1]

No, Mike, "not just once more." The outcome and other results of the war rebuke your conclusions.

This is grade-school logic. You seem incapable of grasping the simple point that the outcome of the war could and would have been different if leftist Democrats had not placed insane restrictions on our military operations and had not slashed aid to South Vietnam after the Paris Peace Accords.

What kind of Vietnam veteran would make the childish argument that "since we lost the war, this proves we could not have won the war"?

And I repeat again that North Vietnamese and Viet Cong sources refute your leftist talking point that the war was unwinnable.

 

[John Edgar Slow Horses]

My logic is succinct and precise to the point.

The evidence says MikeGriffith1 is wrong.

 

[mikegriffith1]

My logic is succinct and precise to the point.

Your logic is downright comical and silly; it's something a grade-schooler would say. According to your logic, we could say that the SF 49ers could not have won the Super Bowl because they lost the Super Bowl, that Hillary could not have won the 2016 election because she lost the 2016 election.

The evidence says MikeGriffith1 is wrong.

This is more comedy. I again invite you to produce a single source (1) that denies what I've said about what the North Vietnamese sources state regarding the Hanoi Politburo's rejection of Le Duan's proposal for resuming full-scale warfare based on their strong fear of another B-52 bombing campaign in early 1973 after the Linebacker II bombing campaign of late 1972, and (2) that denies what I've said about the aid levels for North Vietnam and South Vietnam.

Regarding Congress’s shameful slashing of our aid to South Vietnam, I quote from Dr. George Jay Veith’s book Black April: The Fall of South Vietnam, 1973-1975:

In late July [1974], the joint House-Senate conference again voted to reduce the amount of aid to Vietnam, this time from $1.126 billion to just $1 billion. More important, the legislation concerning the new aid ceiling had other damaging provisions. To solve the perennial accounting confusion regarding Vietnam, Senator John Stennis (D., Miss.), the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, decided to consolidate all money for Vietnam into one fund, called the Defense Assistance Vietnam (DAV) program.

The legislation was quite specific as to what the military could and could not do with Vietnam aid money. Everything was to be allocated to the DAV. All costs, including many not previously charged for, such as the packing and crating of ammunition and the DAO’s [the Defense Attache Office’s] operating costs, would henceforth be expensed to the DAV. A rider also was attached stipulating a 10 percent cut in civilian contractors in South Vietnam. Another one limited food money.

The grim aid situation grew progressively worse. In early August, the House voted to appropriate only $700 million of the $1 billion authorized. And since all costs were to be charged to the DAV, including the cost of the DAO, the $700 million was in practical effect lowered to only $500 million. This was below [DAO chief] Murray’s cut-off level at which the South Vietnamese could sustain an adequate defense. With $500 million, Saigon could barely afford ammunition and fuel, let alone other critical supplies. Worse, three price increases for ammunition totaling 72 percent further reduced the number of shells the South Vietnamese could purchase. The DAO predicted that by the end of FY75 (30 June 1975), ARVN would be almost out of fuel and down to a thirty-day supply of ammunition. (pp. 61-62)

 

[mikegriffith1]

At a 2010 conference sponsored by the U.S. State Department, Dr. Stephen Morris, a scholar at John Hopkins University's Foreign Policy Institute who specializes in the Vietnam War, discussed the status of the Viet Cong insurgency after 1968 and what Communist sources tell us about the Hanoi Politburo's reaction to the failure of the 1972 Easter Offensive and the massive Linebacker I bombing campaign from June to October 1972. He pointed out that the staggering and unexpected losses that North Vietnam incurred during the Easter Offensive, coupled with the bombing of Hanoi, caused a majority of the Politburo to abandon their support of full-scale warfare and to side with Pham Van Dong against Le Duan in October 1972:

Now, it’s widely accepted that the Viet Cong insurgency was fundamentally defeated between 1969 and 1971. That is why Hanoi felt compelled to launch a conventional military offensive in 1972. But it is also true that Nixon inflicted massive damage upon the North Vietnamese conventional war-making capacity in 1972, so much so that I will argue he had found the Hanoi leadership’s breaking point.

Now, some of the most compelling evidence of the breaking point argument comes from the archives of the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This evidence includes not only the Soviet Union’s own secret evaluations of the military and political situation in North Vietnam but also secret speeches of Vietnamese Communist Party leaders, which have not been published but which were -– and I tell this to the Vietnamese friends here -– they were covertly acquired by Soviet military intelligence operatives in Vietnam during the war. In other words, your Soviet friends were engaged in espionage activities against you and they got a lot of very interesting information as a result of that. So this is some of the material that I have been looking at. . . .

Just in a nutshell, the North Vietnamese launched the biggest offensive of the war in 1972 on three fronts, coming down from the North through the Demilitarized Zone, from the northwest of Saigon into Binh Long Province and toward the provincial capital of Xuan Loc, and thirdly, into the central highlands. These battles of the 1972 Easter Offensive were the bloodiest of the war, and they ultimately resulted in massive losses, not only for the South Vietnamese, but more important, for the North Vietnamese – bloody losses which they did not anticipate.

Secondly, the United States began a bombing campaign of North Vietnam and a mining of Haiphong Harbor. . . . The bombing of North Vietnam, however, was devastating. The B-52 was the most potent piece of artillery that the United States possessed, and it had not only an effect on the physical capabilities of the North Vietnamese but also psychologically upon the soldiers. . . .

Now, how do we know that this bombing had a success on the North Vietnamese position? Largely by result of their diplomatic position. First of all, I’ve read two speeches by General Tran Van Quang, one on June 26th to the Politburo in Hanoi. First, on June 26, 1972, General Quang indicated that the North Vietnamese were surprised at the U.S. reaction to the Easter Offensive. He said we knew the Americans would resume the bombings, but felt that they would not lay strikes north of the 20th parallel. In fact, it turned out the Americans attacked Hanoi. "At first this was unexpected by us." Secondly, he went on to talk about the success of the bombing on their military targets. . . .

Now, he went on to say that what the relationship was between fighting and diplomacy. At the present time, he said -– General –- I’m quoting from General Quang: “At present time, the central issue is the Paris peace accords on Vietnam. Nixon and Laird are seeking a means for the creation of favorable conditions on the fronts in order to have a durable position at the peace talks. Nixon wants to resolve the Vietnam issue by means of peace negotiations.” And then he goes on to say, “In reaction, we’re preparing for the liberation of Hue. The liberation of Hue, following the liberation of Quang Tri, shall have a major political significance. It can facilitate Nixon’s loss during the upcoming elections. Therefore, we must liberate Hue prior to the presidential elections at any price, despite any difficulties.” Now this -– and he also pointed out that the beginning of the operations for the liberation of Hue is set for September of 1972.

Now, when I look at the second speech by General Quang in September of 1972, on September 15th, a document which became famous when I gave it to the New York Times in April of 1993, you’ll find that General Quang was no longer talking about the liberation of Hue. This had been -– was no longer an objective. . . .

And by looking at the Soviet archives, I’ve been able to discover that the North Vietnamese leadership was basically in internal conflict over what happened in the war and what the political consequences would be. And a struggle took place between elements in the Politburo over whether the war could be won by primarily military means.

The key person in all of these discussions was Pham Van Dong. And Pham Van Dong was somebody who believed that, ultimately, the war ought to be won by primarily political and diplomatic means, not by primarily military means. That was not the position of the majority of the Politburo until the end of September, early October of 1972. At an extraordinary plenum of the Central –- of the Politburo in October of 1972, a majority of the Politburo came to Pham Van Dong’s position, and interestingly Le Duan, the General Secretary, was in a minority.

So as a result, we see the basic background for the concessions that Le Duc Tho was willing to make to Dr. Kissinger. They came about as a result of a debate within the Vietnamese Communist Party, and that debate within the Vietnamese Communist Party was the result of enormous losses which were suffered in the Easter Offensive, losses that went beyond what they anticipated and were willing to accept for the future. ("Fighting While Negotiating: Force and Diplomacy in the Vietnam War," U.S. State Department: Office of the Historian, September 30, 2010, Fighting While Negotiating: Force and Diplomacy in the Vietnam War - Southeast Asia Conference - Conferences - Office of the Historian)

Now, mind you, this Politburo shift, dramatic as it was, was not as great as the shift that occurred after the devastating Linebacker II bombing campaign in December 1972. Linebacker II so terrified a majority of the Politburo that in early 1973 they rejected Le Duan's call for a resumption of full-scale warfare after the Paris Peace Accords and instead voted to focus on the reconstruction of North Vietnam, authorizing only limited/harassing warfare in the south.

However, when the U.S. failed to respond to North Vietnam's small-scale/harassment attacks in South Vietnam, the Politburo began to lean toward escalation in the fall of 1973, sensing that the U.S. would not renew B-52 bombing raids. Then, when the U.S. failed to respond to North Vietnam's invasion and seizure of Phuoc Long Province in 1974, the Politburo saw that as a bright green light to launch a full-scale invasion of South Vietnam, which they did in early 1975.

 

[mikegriffith1]

I agree with most of these points and with your overall thrust. Just a few caveats:

Even when the mines were cleared from Haiphong Harbor, the port's capacity was still well below pre-mining levels due to the extensive damage caused by our Linebacker II bombing. As a result, Soviet aid received through the port in 1973 was only partially restored after the mines were gone.

Therefore, Chinese aid to North Vietnam actually eclipsed Soviet aid in 1973, even though China reduced its aid that year compared to 1972. In 1972, Chinese aid to North Vietnam was $2.23 billion, but in 1973 it was $1.55 billion. Soviet aid to North Vietnam in 1973 was $1.0 billion.

Haiphong Harbor's port capacity was finally restored in 1974. As a result, Soviet aid overtook Chinese aid in 1974, with Soviet aid rising to $1.7 billion that year, which amounted to a 70% increase over the previous year.

Soviet and Chinese aid to North Vietnam in 1973 ($2.55 billion) was 14% higher than our aid to South Vietnam in 1973 ($2.2 billion), and the disparity grew larger in 1974 and 1975, thanks to the back-stabbing anti-war majority in the U.S. Congress.

Congress slashed our aid to South Vietnam for 1974 and 1975, cutting aid from $2.2 billion in 1973 to $1.1 billion in 1974 and then to $700 million in 1975. When Congress passed the first cut in aid in 1973--for fiscal year 1974--the news naturally hurt morale in South Vietnam and boosted morale in Hanoi.

Another relevant fact is that the Soviets agreed to train leading North Vietnamese commanders in combined-arms tactics in Moscow in 1973, while we were forbidden from providing additional training to ARVN by the Paris Peace Accords. This crucial form of aid was never counted as part of the dollar value of Soviet aid. Dr. Michael Kort:

One of the key reasons the Easter Offensive failed is that General Giap did not understand h ow to coordinate what is known as combined arms operations: that is, the simultaneous use of different military arms–such as infantry, armor, and artillery– in an operation. This is essential in modern warfare given the great variety of available weapons, and after 1972 , as Veith notes, the PAVN “needed to become a modern army, and only the Soviets could train it in this type of warfare.” Therefore, in the fall of 1973, by which time the Paris Accords precluded the United States from providing any additional advising to the South Vietnamese, several leading North Vietnamese commanders went to the Soviet Union to train in this kind of warfare. Not coincidentally, this was only a few months after the North Vietnamese Politburo had voted to resume full-scale warfare to conquer the South. There is no way to measure the value of this aid in dollars; it does not appear on any ledger. What one can say given the conventional invasion Hanoi launched against South Vietnam in late 1974–an invasion spearheaded by armor, the “key to victory” according to Veith–is that this particular form of Soviet aid was invaluable. (The Vietnam War Reexamined, Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 207)

For more information on Soviet and Chinese aid to North Vietnam, I recommend Russian scholar Ilya V. Gaiduk's book The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee Publisher, 1996) and Chinese scholar Xiaobing Li's book The Dragon in the Jungle: The Chinese Army in the Vietnam War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020). Both are available on Amazon.

These two important studies, based on previously unavailable materials from Soviet and Chinese archives, detail the massive extent and nature of Soviet and Chinese aid to the Hanoi regime.

In the '60s and '70s, anti-war activists ardently denied that Russia and China were providing extensive military and economic aid to the North Vietnamese. They insisted that conservatives were grossly exaggerating the amount and importance of that aid.

The fact that Soviet and Chinese aid to North Vietnam was both massive and essential was clear long before Gaiduk's and Li's books were published, but their books provide important additional information on the subject.

A good online source on China's aid to North Vietnam during the war is Andrew Wheeler's article "Chinese Involvement in The Vietnam War 1950-1975," published on the Modern Military History website:

Chinese Involvement in The Vietnam War 1950-1975

By Andrew Wheeler The conflict in Vietnam from 1950-1975 defined the cold war and has since served as an epitome example of proxy conflict. The western backed South Vietnamese fought against the co…

modernmilitaryhistory.com