http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2007/92066.htmR. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
September 13, 2007
I will visit Ankara and Istanbul soon to bring a strong and clear message from our leadership -- the United States is committed to revitalize this critical partnership.
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It is indeed time to rejuvenate and restore America's relationship with Turkey.
The Turkish people have just concluded important, even historic elections. These elections demonstrated the strong health of Turkey's democracy, the most impressive in the Moslem world.
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We look to Turkey, with its 160-year legacy of modernizing reform, as the most successful example in the world today of a secular democracy within a Muslim society that can inspire reformers in the greater Middle East and beyond.
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Turkey's importance to the United States is even more pronounced at a time when the Middle East in the 21st century has replaced Europe in the 20th century as the most critical region for America's core national security interests. Turkey is the only country in the region that can work effectively with all of the others in the Middle East. Turkey's influence is substantial and unique. In this very important sense, Turkey is an indispensable partner to the United States in the Middle East.
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Our history of close relations, shared interests, and common values makes Turkey one of the most important Allies of the United States anywhere in the world. That is not to say that our relationship has been perfect: we have certainly endured our share of difficulties, misunderstandings, and miscommunications in recent years. From our perspective, 2002-2005 were particularly difficult, but we believe we have turned the corner together with the Turkish leadership. We now have a moment of opportunity to build stronger ties at all levels between our governments.
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One glance at the map demonstrates why it is so important to strengthen the ties between our two countries. Turkey is influential in the Balkans, in the Black Sea, the Caucasus, and in the greater Middle East. In this vitally important arc of countries where so much of our foreign policy attention now lies, Turkey is the vital link for the United States and our European allies in addressing common economic, security, and political challenges and opportunities in these critical regions.
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And, Turkey is playing a regional leadership role in the Middle East. Turkey's common borders with Iraq, Iran, and Syria provide an opportunity to advance peace and stability, fight proliferation of nuclear weapons, and defeat terrorists in a region that is now the epicenter of U.S. foreign policy. Turkey can help deepen our understanding of strategic trends in the Middle East, while reinforcing our efforts to advance political and economic freedom and fight terror to advance peace and prosperity.
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In the Middle East, Turkey can play a regional leadership role that could help the U.S. achieve some of its most pressing foreign policy goals, but which will require careful coordination to prevent our two countries from operating at cross-purposes.
At the top of the list is Iraq. Our decision to liberate Iraq from Saddam Hussein's brutality triggered an unprecedented wave of anti-Americanism in Turkey. Our official relations have recovered from the low-point of the Turkish Parliament's vote on March 1, 2003 to reject our request to move U.S. forces into Iraq via Turkey. Since then, Ankara has been a strong supporter of our efforts to stabilize Iraq, and has asked us not to abandon our goals, particularly safeguarding Iraq's territorial integrity. Turkey represents a critical logistical lifeline for our troops in Iraq and has made important contributions to Coalition operations there.
Turkey is similarly helpful in diplomatic efforts to bolster support for Iraq among its neighbors. The United States appreciates Turkey's willingness to host the next Extended neighbors ministerial in October, an important follow-up to the work begun at Sharm el-Sheikh last May. Secretary Rice announced this week that she plans to attend this meeting in Istanbul.
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Turkey and the United States also face a challenge in Iran. We have worked well together to support of the clear international consensus demanding that Iran cease its nuclear weapons development programs. Turkey has also proven to be strong partner in countering Iran's support for terrorists in the Middle East.
But the United States and Turkey still need to work out some tactical differences in handling Iran. We understand that Iran is a neighbor of Turkey and key trading partner, which sends over a million tourists to Turkey each year. Turkey's recent conclusion of a memorandum on energy cooperation with Iran, however, is troubling. Now is not the time for business as usual with Iran. We urge all of our friends and allies, including Turkey, to not reward Iran by investing in its oil and gas sector, while Iran continues to defy the United Nations Security Council by continuing its nuclear research for a weapons capability
The United States and Turkey share a common interest in working toward a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. President Bush's vision is of two democratic states, Israel and Palestine, living side-by-side in peace and security. The Palestinian Authority under President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad is the most capable Palestinian government since Oslo and is committed to being a partner for peace. As we work to develop the economy and institutions of governance that will form the foundation of a Palestinian state, Turkey understandably can see opportunities to draw on its historical experience from the Ottoman era and its modern economic might to help restore prosperity to the Palestinian people, while drawing on its more recent experience in forging a close security partnership with Israel.
Turkey is unique in its dual identity as both a Middle Eastern and European country. We thus face important challenges in U.S.-Turkish relations with regard to deepening Turkey's integration in Euroatlantic institutions.
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We have weathered a difficult period over the past four years. We now stand at the edge of a potentially new era in Turkish politics that offers a chance to restore a sense of strategic partnership in U.S.-Turkish relations.
I will be traveling to Ankara soon to bring this message to the new government personally. The United States is determined to seize this opportunity to renew and strengthen our strategic partnership with Turkey. We look forward to working together with Turkish leaders who share this vision and determination to build this strong, vital and irreplaceable Turkish-American alliance for the 21st century.
For me and the political analysts of my trust, USA is admitting to be in deep shit.
USA is planning for Post-Iraq era. I think it should be common sense, that Turkey will implement its influence and interests in areas of Iraq after USA has left. This is outcome of a clinical assesment of our power and our neighbours' power or even flyflyflyfly-weights as Kurds in Iraq.
Time is on our side. It is a question of 6-20 months until Turkey gets what it wants in Iraq. Simply by USA "redeploying" and Turkey projecting power with all avaible to there, what is currently by USA presence for different reasons not wholly possible as Turkey wants to do.
And Turkey does not half things, as it would be the case whilst USA is in Iraq.
The question where USA is in deep shit is about Iran.
USA does not want Iran-Turkey gas agreements and mutually built natural gas electricity stations and Hydro-power dams.
Also USA does not want Turkey to cooperate with Iran in Iraq after USA has left to the disadvantage of US allies like Jordan and Saudi-Arabia.
If we trust "Stratfor", which i trust as credible and comply to my assumption of things from outside USA, USA does also need someone to counterbalance Iran, and Turkey is the biggest leverage which USA has knocked its door. This assumption bases on USA not attacking Iran.
http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=293204&selected=AnalysesThe assumption we have consistently made is that, absent the United States, Iran would become the dominant regional power and would be in a position, in the long term, to dominate the Arabian Peninsula, shifting not only the regional balance of power but also potentially the global balance as well.
That analysis assumes that Turkey will play the role it has played since World War I -- an insular, defensive power that is cautious about making alliances and then cautious within alliances. In that role, Turkey is capable of limited assertiveness, as against the Greeks in Cyprus, but is not inclined to become too deeply entangled in the chaos of the Middle Eastern equation -- and when it does become involved, it is in the context of its alliance with the United States.
That is not Turkey's traditional role. Until the fall of the Ottomans at the end of World War I, and for centuries before then, Turkey was both the dominant Muslim power and a major power in North Africa, Southeastern Europe and the Middle East. Turkey was the hub of a multinational empire that as far back as the 15th century dominated the Mediterranean and Black seas. It was the economic pivot of three continents, facilitating and controlling the trading system of much of the Eastern Hemisphere.
Turkey's contraction over the past 90 years or so is not the normal pattern in the region, and had to do with the internal crisis in Turkey since the fall of the Ottomans, the emergence of French and British power in the Middle East, followed by American power and the Cold War, which locked Turkey into place. During the Cold War, Turkey was trapped between the Americans and Soviets, and expansion of its power was unthinkable. Since then, Turkey has been slowly emerging as a key power.
One of the main drivers in this has been the significant growth of the Turkish economy. In 2006, Turkey had the 18th highest gross domestic product (GDP) in the world, and it has been growing at between 5 percent and 8 percent a year for more than five years. It ranks just behind Belgium and ahead of Sweden in GDP. It has the largest economy of any Muslim country -- including Saudi Arabia. And it has done this in spite of, or perhaps because of, not having been admitted to the European Union. While per capita GDP lags, it is total GDP that measures weight in the international system. China, for example, is 109th in per capita GDP. Its international power rests on it being fourth in total GDP.
Turkey is not China, but in becoming the largest Muslim economy, as well as the largest economy in the eastern Mediterranean, Southeastern Europe, the Middle East, the Caucasus and east to the Hindu Kush, Turkey is moving to regain its traditional position of primacy in the region. Its growth is still fragile and can be disrupted, but there is no question that it has become the leading regional economy, as well as one of the most dynamic. Additionally, Turkey's geographic position greatly enables it to become Europe's primary transit hub for energy supplies, especially at a time when Europe is trying to reduce its dependence on Russia.
This obviously has increased its regional influence. In the Balkans, for example, where Turkey historically has been a dominant power, the Turks have again emerged as a major influence over the region's two Muslim states -- and have managed to carve out for themselves a prominent position as regards other countries in the region as well. The country's economic dynamism has helped reorient some of the region away from Europe, toward Turkey. Similarly, Turkish economic influence can be felt elsewhere in the region, particularly as a supplement to its strategic relationship with Israel.
Turkey's problem is that in every direction it faces, its economic expansion is blocked by politico-military friction. So, for example, its influence in the Balkans is blocked by its long-standing friction with Greece. In the Caucasus, its friction with Armenia limits its ability to influence events. Tensions with Syria and Iraq block Syrian influence to the south. To the east, a wary Iran that is ideologically opposed to Turkey blocks Ankara's influence.
As Turkey grows, an interesting imbalance has to develop. The ability of Greece, Armenia, Syria, Iraq and Iran to remain hostile to Turkey decreases as the Turkish economy grows. Ideology and history are very real things, but so is the economic power of a dynamic economy. As important, Turkey's willingness to accept its highly constrained role indefinitely, while its economic -- and therefore political -- influence grows, is limited. Turkey's economic power, coupled with its substantial regional military power, will over time change the balance of power in each of the regions Turkey faces.
Not only does Turkey interface with an extraordinary number of regions, but its economy also is the major one in each of those regions, while Turkish military power usually is pre-eminent as well. When Turkey develops economically, it develops militarily. It then becomes the leading power -- in many regions. That is what it means to be a pivotal power.
In 2003, the United States was cautious with Turkey, though in the final analysis it was indifferent. It no longer can be indifferent. The United States is now in the process of planning the post-Iraq war era, and even if it does retain permanent bases in Iraq -- dubious for a number of reasons -- it will have to have a regional power to counterbalance Iran. Iran has always been aware of and cautious with Turkey, but never as much as now -- while Turkey is growing economically and doing the heavy lifting on the Kurds. Iran does not want to antagonize the Turks.
The United States and Iran have been talking -- just recently engaging in seven hours of formal discussions. But Iran, betting that the United States will withdraw from Iraq, is not taking the talks as seriously as it might. The United States has few levers to use against Iran. It is therefore not surprising that it has reached out to the biggest lever.
In the short run, Turkey, if it works with the United States, represents a counterweight to Iran, not only in general, but also specifically in Iraq. From the American point of view, a Turkish invasion of northern Iraq would introduce a major force native to the region that certainly would give Iran pause in its behavior in Iraq. This would mean the destruction of Kurdish hopes for independence, though the United States has on several past occasions raised and then dashed Kurdish hopes. In this sense, Novak's article makes a great deal of sense. The PKK would provide a reasonable excuse for a Turkish intervention in Iraq, both in the region and in Turkey. Anything that blocks the Kurds will be acceptable to the Turkish public, and even to Iran.
It is the longer run that is becoming interesting, however. If the United States is not going to continue counterbalancing Iran in the region, then it is in Turkey's interest to do so. It also is increasingly within Turkey's reach. But it must be understood that, given geography, the growth of Turkish power will not be confined to one direction. A powerful and self-confident Turkey has a geographical position that inevitably reflects all the regions that pivot around it.
For the past 90 years, Turkey has not played its historic role. Now, however, economic and politico-military indicators point to Turkey's slow reclamation of that role. The rumors about Turkish action against the PKK have much broader significance. They point to a changing role for Turkey -- and that will mean massive regional changes over time.
There is the question of what USA has to offer for Turkey, which Turkey can not achieve byitself in the region after USA has redeployed and the region is open to Turkey like a women after an cesarean cut, and by this move the action area for other neighbours dramatically narrows in regions where Turkey acts.
Iran therefore wants to ensure, that Turkey will not project power behind North-Iraq and taht Turkey restricts itself to North-Iraq.
Iran giving licence to 2 Turkish oil-firms to drill in biggest natural gas field of world, "South-Pars", going to Joint-Veture with Turkey to transport Iranian gas 50/50 to Europe and opening Iranian electricity monopol sector for Turkish Electricity Firms to make major bucks there, is an investment by Iran which will pay for them in long-term. Iranian thinking is possibly to ensure, that Iran can expand into its influence areas in South-Iraq and Lebanon and Turkey has nothing to fear from economical terms by this expansion as Turkey therefore expands directly into Iran.
Deals with Turkey are economically maybe not rational but by strategic thinking they are from view of Iran.
Against Arabs, Iran will be possible to force its power projection over them. The only obstacle is Turkey, in case of Turkey not restricting itself to North-Iraq and whirl-pooling Iranian plans. Turkey is another calibre then Saudi-Arabia and in an multiparty open conflict, what would be the case if Turkey expands into Middle and South Iraq would still be the horse to bet on.
To be honest, i think not that Turkey has an interest in exhausting its ressources to counterbalance anyone in areas which are not primarily our interest areas and an expansion by Iran is not against our primary interests.
Countries in the region will seek to arrange with Turkey rather then conflicting Turkey. And these arrangements are not negative for Turkey's interest, as by these arrangements the other side offers Turkey more then Turkey offers.
Of course Lebanon, South-Iraq we also have interests but these are more of economical nature of Soft-Power.
In the end there live Arabs and not ethnic relatives of Turkey and if we can export our goods there, then it is not really the case who rules there officially or inofficially.
And Iran extending its influence to these regions? Not that kind of problem for Turkey to exhaust its ressources to stop that Iranian expansion. Allthough stopping Iran is in Turkey's reach.
In the region no neighbour will try to piss Turkey in areas of Turkish interest, as this will trigger Turkey to act against them and they are then in deep shit like USA is currently generally speaking in reliance to Iraq and Iran.
Now my questions:
Do you share my assumptions, that USA needs a counterbalanceing force for Iran after USA "redeploys" completely or frequentially and the only option is Turkey?
Ans is in this context Nicholas Burns' statements related?
And what from American view Turkey has to gain by confronting Iran directly and indirectly in the region?
Confronting is not always military related, the fact to be there and show flag can whirlpool already plans and stop Iranian expansion, which is in Turkey's ability like stratfor correctly analyses.
From Turkish view exhausting ressources like military substance, economic growth, economic interests for anyones (USA's) interests is not that kind of status we want to be. We would in the end-effect be USA's dog like Israel, Egypt and Saudi-Arabia is and this is against Turkish self-confident interests to project power rekated to our interests in the region and not those of USA.
Our whole economic opportunities within Iran would be damaged, TPAO will only produce 20 billion m³ natural gas in Iran where Turkish total consumption is between 28-30 billion m³.
In the end-effect, Turkey would exhaust its ressources and bind its focus totally on Iran whilst Turkish focus is not only in Mid-East, and USA, Israel and Sunnite Arabs will laugh about finding dumb Turks doing the work for them.
If USA reaches to Turkey with such motive of counterbalanceing Iran, USA must know this, that Turkey knows all this i wrote.
And the last thing:
USA's new weapons subvention to Middle-East dogs will not block Iran. It will only force Iran to exhaust more ressources in its strategies.