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On October 11, 2002, the day Hillary Clinton and others in the Senate voted on the
Iraq war resolution, certain things were known, and other things were not known.
On October 11, 2002, everyone knew:
1. The text of the resolution, which stated that prior to any military action the President must first determine that reliance on peaceful means will not protect the security of the US, or enforcement of UN Security Council Resolutions,
2. The US and its allies were negotiating a UN Security Council resolution to compel new intrusive inspections in Iraq,
3. The publicly disclosed Key Judgments from the
National Intelligence Estimate, and
4. That the neocons were talking about regime change and disparaging the idea of inspections.
On October 11, 2002 almost no one knew:
5. The extent to which George Bush was or was not bluffing about regime change,
6. That Colin Powell's power and authority would be neutralized by Cheney and Rumsfeld,
7. The extent to which Cheney and Rumsfeld had short-circuited the institutional integrity of the Pentagon and the CIA, and
8. The extent to which the NIE was based on cooked intelligence
In other words, almost no one knew the extent to which the Bush administration was undercutting all of our administrative and constitutional checks and balances. Even today, we don't know the extent of it.
So on October 11, 2002, almost no one could be expected to foresee that:
9. Bush would flagrantly abuse the discretion afforded him under terms of the joint resolution, specifically, his refusal to attempt to reconcile the inspectors' intelligence with the NIE, prior to the invasion, and
10. Bush's agreement to proceed with the inspections process was a sham from the beginning.
And what was Hillary Clinton saying during the months after her vote?
"Hillary Clinton tells Irish TV she is against war with Iraq," Irish Times, February 8, 2003
"Hillary Clinton prefers 'peaceful solution' in Iraq," Associated Press March 3, 2003
"[Clinton said the US] should continue its attempts to build an international alliance rather than going to war quickly with Iraq...
nspection is preferable to war, if it works, the New York Democrat said."
On March 18, 2003, everyone (who was willing to look) knew with substantial certainty that:
11. UN inspections had discredited the NIE,
12. The White House made no effort to reconcile the inspectors findings with their prior intelligence assumptions,
13. The White House offered nothing substantive to refute the inspectors' findings,
14. Hans Blix said the inspectors, who found nothing that presented even a remote danger to the US or Europe, could complete their work in a matter of months,
15. George Bush had promised to call for another Security Council vote to invade, ("Everyone will show their cards,") and totally disregarded that promise a few days later,
16. Bill Clinton, Hillary Clinton, John Kerry and others said their was insufficient basis for launching a war at that time,
17. Most of our allies were - including Britain - also advocating more time for the inspections to be completed, and
18. Mainstream media never seriously considered or reported Numbers 11 through 16 above.
Put another way, Number 18 meant that, at a time in the world when a journalist's professionalism and integrity counted most, Helen Thomas stood virtually alone in the Beltway press corps, courageously asking hard questions while surrounded by cowards. Tim Russert's sycophancy stands out because he repeatedly lied about the inspectors.
To this day, Chris Matthews forgets about the elephant in the room. He interviewed White House speech writer Michael Gerson, John McCain, and George Tenet, each of whom repeated the canard that they believed at the time of the invasion that Saddam had WMD. Matthews never referenced the reports by Blix and ElBaradei, which prove that their "beliefs" were based on a reckless indifference to the truth.