The Nanking Massacre and Iris Chang's Book The Rape of Nanking

[JoeB131]

Nice fiction. The only truth was that Russia had been knocked out of the war. Germany had already squandered the troops moved from the eastern front in the Spring Offensive that cost Germany just shy of eight hundred thousand irreplaceable troops to gain ground that was retaken three months later costing Germany still more troops. The “mutiny” you claim happened was just a refusal to make any more suicidal frontal attacks. The troops remained under arms and obeyed all other orders from their superiors.

The fact that they revolted at all was the problem.

Everyone in 1918 was teetering on the edge of revolution.

It's why the Allies were so keen to agree to an armisitice when the revolutionaries offered one.

Then they turned around, screwed Germany on the peace deal, and when Germans looked at who got them into that mess, they noticed, 'Hey, a lot of those guys are Jews!!!!"

 

[mikegriffith1]

Yeah, that's your [AZrailwhale's] story.

LOL! Umm, that actually happens to be well-known, well-documented history.

The reality is everyone was on the verge of mutiny or collapse. The Germans were in the process of deploying hundreds of thousands of troops from the Eastern Front, and most of the western Democracies were sick of the war. The French Army had already mutinied in 1917. Russia had been taken out of the war by the Bolsheviks. In the US, Woody Wilson (Second worst President after Trump, IMO) was arresting Americans for protesting the war and antagonizing German Americans (the largest ethnic group in the US at that time.)

The Revolutionaries got Germany to blink first, and the Allies bent them over and (&^& them in the ^&^%$%. That's how they ended up with Hitler.

Oh. My. Word. Folks, this is the Nazi version of history! No kidding. This is what the Nazis claimed about why Germany lost WWI. Yikes, what a schizophrenic wingnut this guy is--he peddles Nazi propaganda about WWI and Hitler and the Jews, but he also peddles Communist Chinese propaganda about the Sino-Japanese War and Mao Tse-Tung.

And I see JoeB131 still has not admitted deliberately trying to mislead readers about General Fakui, his relationship with Chiang Kai-Shek, and the fact that the Japanese were not the aggressors in the Battle of Shanghai.

 

[JoeB131]

LOL! Umm, that actually happens to be well-known, well-documented history.

History is the lie everyone agrees upon. I don't think even you are trying to claim how WWI ended was ideal, are you? if Germany had been given a just peace, if the Jewish Revolutionaries hadn't acquiesced to every awful thing the French wanted to do to Germany, Hitler never would have happened.

Oh. My. Word. Folks, this is the Nazi version of history! No kidding. This is what the Nazis claimed about why Germany lost WWI. Yikes, what a schizophrenic wingnut this guy is--he peddles Nazi propaganda about WWI and Hitler and the Jews, but he also peddles Communist Chinese propaganda about the Sino-Japanese War and Mao Tse-Tung.

Actually, here's the thing. The Nazis had no problem peddling it because people saw it in real time. The Nazis didn't have to tell Germans the Jews stabbed them in the back, that was evident to them in 1919, before there was a Nazi Party. This was also the position of Hindenburg.

GHDI - Document

von Hindenburg: The intentions of the command could no longer be executed. Our repeated proposals for strict discipline and strict legislation were not adopted. Thus did our operations necessarily miscarry; the collapse was inevitable; the revolution only provided the keystone.

(Commotion and shouting.)

An English general said with justice: “The German army was stabbed in the back.” No guilt applies to the good core of the army. Its achievements are just as admirable as those of the officer corps. Where the guilt lies has clearly been demonstrated. If it needed more proof, then it would be found in the quoted statement of the English general and in the boundless astonishment of our enemies at their victory.

That is the general trajectory of the tragic development of the war for Germany, after a series of brilliant, unsurpassed successes on many fronts, following an accomplishment by the army and the people for which no praise is high enough. This trajectory had to be established so that the military measures for which we are responsible could be correctly evaluated.

And I see JoeB131 still has not admitted deliberately trying to mislead readers about General Fakui, his relationship with Chiang Kai-Shek, and the fact that the Japanese were not the aggressors in the Battle of Shanghai.

How the fuck were the Japanese not the aggressors? They had invaded China a month before the battle of Shanghai!

Were the Chinese just supposed to leave them alone in Shanghai while fighting them on the Manchurian border? That seems... tactically unsound to leave your enemy in charge of your largest port city

But as long as you want to talk about Zhang's relationship with Chiang, there's this little nugget. (Please note that Zhang Fakui is the Pinyin spelling, while Chang Fa-Kuei is the Wades-Giles spelling.)

The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia: Chang Fa-kuei

Chang retired in 1927, but came out of retirement to brutally suppress the Communist uprising in Canton in December of that year. In 1929 he unsuccessfully tried to break with Chiang himself. He was rehabilitated in July 1937 and commanded the Chinese forces at Shanghai, which resisted the Japanese for four months, taking 60% casualties before being outflanked by amphibious landings and routed.

By the time of Pearl Harbor, Chang was in command of the 4 War Area. Dorn (1974) claims that Chang took this command, which covered Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces, because this was as far from the Japanese as he could get. By this time, he had little loyalty left to Chiang and had gone soft, becoming personally corrupt. Dorn's attitude probably reflects that of Stilwell, who referred to Chang as "Fish-head" in his diaries (Romanus and Sunderland 1953). However, Chang rejected overtures from Wang Ching-wei to join the collaborationist Nanking government in 1938. His forces were soundly defeated during the 1944 Ichi-go offensive. Cut off from Chungking in southeast China, Chang attempted to establish his own government with Hsueh Yueh but could garner no U.S. support.

Chiang naturally never trusted Chang again, and although Chang was recalled to active duty during the Chinese civil war, he played no important role and retired after fleeing the mainland.

 

[mikegriffith1]

Moving on for a while from JoeB131's fringe, uneducated rants, it might be helpful to newcomers to this subject to get some information on Japan's involvement in China and the Sino-Japanese War. A few points:

-- Going back to the early 1900s, even the League of Nations' Lytton Commission acknowledged that Japan had valid interests in northeastern China/Manchuria and credible reasons for securing a foothold in that region. Japan was rightly worried about Soviet influence in Manchuria and Soviet designs on Manchuria. The Lytton Commission did a pretty good job of explaining Japan's concerns about Soviet influence in Manchuria. Japan was also worried that the instability caused by the frequent fighting between the Nationalists and the war lords would spill over into Manchuria.

Specifically, the Lytton Commission acknowledged that Japan was concerned that the fighting between the Nationalists and Manchuria’s war lord Chang Tso-lin would spill over into Manchuria and that the Japanese, understandably enough, wanted to avoid this:

In the spring of 1928, when the Nationalist armies of China were marching on
Peking in an effort to drive out the forces of [Manchuria’s war lord] Chang Tso-lin,
the Japanese Government, under the premiership of Baron Tanaka, issued a
declaration that, on account of her "special position" in Manchuria, Japan would
maintain peace and order in that region. When it seemed possible that the Nationalist armies might carry the civil war north of the Great Wall, the Japanese Government, on May 28th, sent to the leading Chinese generals a communication which said:

"The Japanese Government attaches the utmost importance to the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria, and is prepared to do all it can to prevent the occurrence of any such state of affairs as may disturb that peace and order, or constitute the probable cause of such a disturbance.

"In these circumstances, should disturbances develop further in the direction of Peking and Tientsin, and the situation become so menacing as to threaten the peace and order of Manchuria, Japan may possibly be constrained to take appropriate effective steps for the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria."

At the same time, Baron Tanaka issued a more definite statement, that the Japanese Government would prevent "defeated troops or those in pursuit of them" from entering Manchuria. (Lytton Commission 41-42)

These frequent clashes between the Nationalists and the Manchurians and the instability and tensions caused by Nationalist anti-Japanese activities in Manchuria were two of the main reasons the Japanese decided they needed to establish a state in Manchuria and needed a buffer zone between Manchuria and China.

-- The Japanese invested huge sums of money in their state of Manchukuo in Manchuria, attracting laborers from all over China who were seeking stability and better economic conditions.

-- Even some hostile Western newspapers acknowledged that the Japanese state of Manchukuo was a substantial improvement over the combination of warlord-run and partially/nominally Nationalist-run areas that had formerly composed Manchuria, and that Manchukuo's economy was doing well and was attracting workers from China.

-- Japan acquired Manchukuo in much the same way that Chinese warlords obtained and held the areas they controlled, and in much the same way that the Nationalists obtained numerous warlord-controlled areas, and in much the same way that the Communists obtained all of China.

-- Manchuria was far more prosperous under Japanese control than under Communist control.

-- The Chinese attack on Japanese forces/the Japanese sector of Shanghai in 1937 was the battle that sparked the Sino-Japanese War. This foolish blunder gave the Japanese militarists the perfect excuse to seek to vastly expand Japanese influence and control in China.

Until then, there was every indication that the Japanese were not going to move farther south but were going to be content with consolidating their dominion in Manchuria. The Japanese moderates had begun to reestablish their control over Japan's foreign policy, but when the Chinese launched their massive attack on Japanese forces and treaty-granted territory in Shanghai, this tipped the balance of power in the Japanese government back to the militarists.

-- After the Sino-Japanese War began, the Japanese were the aggressors in most cases.

-- Throughout the Sino-Japanese War, Japanese moderates sought to restrain the Japanese army in China and to bring an end to the fighting in a fair, equitable way.

-- Eventually, as a result of pressure from Japanese moderates and unexpectedly fierce Chinese resistance, even most of the Japanese militarists were prepared to withdraw from all of China except for a small area just south of Manchuria (in order to provide a buffer zone of safety for their state in Manchukuo). Furthermore, the buffer zone would not be permanent but would end when it was clear that the Chinese would not try to destabilize Manchukuo.

The Japanese actually offered this peace deal to Chiang Kai-Shek. Many of Chiang's generals wanted to accept it, but Chiang, urged on by FDR and the British, rejected it.

-- Generally speaking, the Japanese army in China usually ignored the standard rules of war, and sometimes engaged in barbaric tactics, including several massacres. However, Chinese forces--both Nationalist and Communist--often ignored the rules of war as well. The Japanese were worse than the Nationalists, but not by much.

-- A sizable portion of the Chinese population preferred Japanese rule to Nationalist or Communist rule--not a majority of the population, but a sizable portion. The substantial majority of Chinese, probably around 70-75%, did not want Japanese rule but preferred Nationalist or Communist rule.

 

[JoeB131]

Moving on for a while from JoeB131's fringe, uneducated rants, it might be helpful to newcomers to this subject to get some information on Japan's involvement in China and the Sino-Japanese War. A few points:

-- Going back to the early 1900s, even the League of Nations' Lytton Commission acknowledged that Japan had valid interests in northeastern China/Manchuria and credible reasons for securing a foothold in that region. Japan was rightly worried about Soviet influence in Manchuria and Soviet designs on Manchuria. The Lytton Commission did a pretty good job of explaining Japan's concerns about Soviet influence in Manchuria. Japan was also worried that the instability caused by the frequent fighting between the Nationalists and the war lords would spill over into Manchuria.

Specifically, the Lytton Commission acknowledged that Japan was concerned that the fighting between the Nationalists and Manchuria’s war lord Chang Tso-lin would spill over into Manchuria and that the Japanese, understandably enough, wanted to avoid this:

You're being selective, Axis Mikey..

The five-member commission, headed by British politician the Earl of Lytton, announced its conclusions in October 1932. It stated that the Empire of Japan must withdraw from Manchuria, recognized Chinese sovereignty of Manchuria, and refused to recognize the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo. The League of Nations General Assembly adopted the report, and Japan quit the League. The recommendations went into effect after Japan surrendered in World War II in 1945.

-- The Japanese invested huge sums of money in their state of Manchukuo in Manchuria, attracting laborers from all over China who were seeking stability and better economic conditions.

So what? It still wasn't their territory. You invest in someone else's country, you take the risk that they have to safeguard your interests.

the Warlords were a problem because the OTHER powers kept arming them.

Mikey is the kind of guy who would to a Rape Crisis Center and tell those women they shouldn't have dressed like sluts.

-- Even some hostile Western newspapers acknowledged that the Japanese state of Manchukuo was a substantial improvement over the combination of warlord-run and partially/nominally Nationalist-run areas that had formerly composed Manchuria, and that Manchukuo's economy was doing well and was attracting workers from China.

Actually, nobody thought that. The Japanese were looting Manchuria for everything that wasn't nailed down, and they kept Puyi a prisoner in his own palace.

-- A sizable portion of the Chinese population preferred Japanese rule to Nationalist or Communist rule--not a majority of the population, but a sizable portion. The substantial majority of Chinese, probably around 70-75%, did not want Japanese rule but preferred Nationalist or Communist rule.

NO, they didn't. Very few Chinese signed up to fight for Wang Jingwei's "Reformed Republic of China"

During its existence, the Reorganized National Government of the Republic of China fielded a force that was estimated by Western sources to have been between 300,000 and 500,000 strong. Wang Jingwei initially planned to raise a force of twelve divisions under his personal command, although most Nanjing Government troops were only under his nominal control throughout the war. All military matters were theoretically managed by the Central Military Commission, but in reality the body was largely symbolic and had little authority. The Nanjing Army commanders were able to operate without much interference from Wang's government and in many cases were former warlords or officers of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Army. Wang initially recruited his troops from former Nationalist soldiers and the collaborationist troops that had previously served the Provisional and Reformed Governments, which were both united under Wang's command. In the "Japan–China Military Affairs Agreement" signed by Japan and the Reorganized National Government, the Japanese agreed to train and equip an unspecified number of divisions for the Nanjing Army. They were provided with mostly captured Nationalist equipment along with small amounts of Japanese weapons.

Here's the reality... When the Japanese surrendered, their puppet governments in China immediately collapsed, because no one was willing to fight for them.

Wang got lucky. He died of cancer before Mao or Chiang could get a hold of him.

As for Puyi, well, we've all seen The Last Emperor, which gave the guy a lot more sympathy than he deserved.

BUt you are right, a sizeable majority DID want Communist Rule. That's why Mao won.

 

[mikegriffith1]

I am of two minds about Chiang Kai-Shek. On the one hand, I think that far too often he violated the rules of war when he fought against the Japanese and also against rival Chinese, though the Japanese were admittedly worse in some cases. I also think Chiang blundered when he refused several fair Japanese peace offers. He rejected the offers at the urging of FDR and the British, even though many of his own generals viewed the offers as very reasonable and wanted to accept them. If he had accepted them, he may well have retained control over most of China after the war.

On the other hand, Chiang created Free China on Taiwan, officially known as the Republic of China, and Taiwan soon became an economic miracle, far outpacing Red China's stagnant economy under Mao's brutal repression. Chiang was no pluralistic populist by any stretch, but he was far less repressive than Mao Tse-Tung. The Chinese on Taiwan enjoyed far more freedom and rights, and better living conditions, than did the Chinese in Red China.

One of the best and most balanced biographies of Chiang is The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China, by Harvard University Asia scholar Jay Taylor.

Here is part of a good online article about Chiang published last year by Andrew Wright:

However, many negative perceptions of Chiang Kai-shek have been exposed as myths, thanks to decades of scholarship via books like The Generalissimo by Jay Taylor, Forgotten Ally by Rana Mitter, and China at War by Hans van de Ven.

Rather than being corrupt Chiang ate and drank simply, lived a Spartan lifestyle, and constantly criticized unscrupulous subordinates. Often dismissed as incompetent Chiang made great strides towards modernizing China during the Nanking Decade, scored diplomatic triumphs that put China back among the great powers, paved the road to Chinese unity, and kept China together during 8 years of fighting Japan in World War 2. Accused of prioritizing the fight against the Chinese Communists (the CCP), rather than Japan during the war, it was the other way. Mao let Chiang’s forces do the lion-share of fighting, and dying, while the CCP laid low and built up strength for the postwar showdown with Chiang’s Nationalist regime (the KMT).

Chastised by America for supposedly doing little with the Lend-Lease it provided him, in reality China received a tiny amount of it compared to Britain and Russia. Meanwhile, American promises to China were watered down, or broken from Pearl Harbor to Yalta, where America undermined Chinese interests in Manchuria to get Stalin to attack Japan. Westerners from General Joseph Stilwell, Margaret Tuchman, fellow travellers, and useful idiots, have tried discrediting Chiang’s reputation for decades with much success. By contrast inconvenient truths like America giving Japan more weapons and resources than to China in the first half of World War 2, or the arrogant attitude of American officials, including President Roosevelt, towards China are mostly forgotten.

Perhaps best known as “the man who lost China,” Chiang’s critics often suggest he had countless advantages he bungled to lose China, and then fled to Taiwan to live out the rest of his life in ignominy. A more objective analysis suggests Chiang Kai-shek had too many enemies to fight, and too many problems to tackle. Chinese warlords always challenged his authority, and Japan attacked his regime often, then tried conquering China outright. Mao’s communist ideology (utopian in theory, dystopian in practice) undermined Chiang’s relatively benign form of enlightened authoritarianism, and offered a misguided alternate path for China’s future.

Other nations weren’t more accommodating. To say Stalin’s policy towards China was cynical would be an understatement. Russia backed the KMT in the early 1920s, switched support to the CCP in the Nanking Decade, then gave weapons to Chiang Kai-shek in the first half of World War 2 to keep Japan distracted. Then it cut off this support in early 1941, after signing a non-aggression pact with Japan, and hedged its bets after World War 2 by signing a peace treaty with Chiang and also providing support for the CCP! (A Brief Biography of Chiang Kai-shek: The Misunderstood Nationalist Leader of China)

Here is another online article about Chiang published in Taiwan Today in 1962:

https://taiwantoday.tw/Politics/Taiwan-Review/7320/A-Great-Patriot-and-Inspiring-Leader

EXCERPT:

Chiang then turned to face the formidable armies of Sun Chuan-fang, warlord of Kiangsu, Chekiang, Fukien, Anhwei and Kiangsi. Sun .had 160,000 men, exclusive of reserves. The dauntless Revolutionary Army, greatly outnumbered, fought valiantly and routed Sun in February of 1927. Chekiang fell to Chiang.

Next on Chiang's list was Chang Tsung-chang, who took over Kiangsu and Anhwei from Sun Chuan-fang. On March 5,1927, the Revolutionary Army started and all-out assault against Chang and won a swift victory. Nanking was taken on March 24.

Amid the confusion following the street battles, Chiang encountered the viciousness of international Communists. At that time the Kuomintang was infiltrated by Communist elements. Among Revolutionary Army personnel entering Nanking was leftist Lin Tsu-han, who took orders from the Russian advisor Michael Borodin and the Communists at Hankow. Hoping to injure Chiang's already immense prestige, they tried to discredit him at Nanking.

At Lin's instigation, a number of foreigners were killed by soldiers. Systematic looting began early in the morning of March 24 and continued throughout the day. Foreigners retreated to a Standard Oil Company oil installation atop an isolated hill, where they were protected by barrages from American and British warships in the Yangtze River.

Chiang was on a gunboat heading for Nanking when he learned of this treacherous Communist attempt to discredit him. Anticipating the next move, he did not stop at Nanking, but proceeded to Shanghai, arriving there on March 26 just in time to nip another Communist plot. For the Communists had planned to touch off disorders in Shanghai with a great Sunday rally. Chiang's unexpected arrival turned the rally into a tumultuous ovation for him.

Chiang assured foreigners that swift action would be taken against the Nanking instigators. Gathering an expeditionary force of unquestionably loyal troops, he cut the railroad near Nanking, thus isolating the three divisions that were under Communist leaders. In a brief encounter, in which only 30 or 40 were killed, he disarmed the divisions. Soldiers responsible for the outrages were executed. Their leader, Lin Tsu-han, succeeded in escaping to Kiangsi.

 

[JoeB131]

I am of two minds about Chiang Kai-Shek. On the one hand, I think that far too often he violated the rules of war when he fought against the Japanese and also against rival Chinese, though the Japanese were admittedly worse in some cases. I also think Chiang blundered when he refused several fair Japanese peace offers. He rejected the offers at the urging of FDR and the British, even though many of his own generals viewed the offers as very reasonable and wanted to accept them. If he had accepted them, he may well have retained control over most of China after the war.

So the problem is, you like him more than Mao (who is respected by most Chinese today) but less than your cuddle-buddies, the Japanese. Got it.

There was no fair Japanese Peace offer other than the one that the end of the war brought. China got back all it's territory and the Japanese had to pay an indemnity. Chiang was supposed to send troops to occupy post-war Japan, but he was too busy fighting for his own life.

On the other hand, Chiang created Free China on Taiwan, officially known as the Republic of China, and Taiwan soon became an economic miracle, far outpacing Red China's stagnant economy under Mao's brutal repression. Chiang was no pluralistic populist by any stretch, but he was far less repressive than Mao Tse-Tung. The Chinese on Taiwan enjoyed far more freedom and rights, and better living conditions, than did the Chinese in Red China.

First, Taiwan was not "Free" under his reign. Chiang was just another series of nasty dictators we supported around the world during the Cold War, which is why America is hated around much of the world. (Although your boy Trump isn't helping much.)

The only reason why Taiwan was economically successful was that the US pumped tons of money into it to keep China's UN vote out of Mao's hands. Even after a certain point, even Tricky Dick couldn't go along with that charade anymore.

Her grandpa fought old Chiang Kai-shek
That no-good low-down dirty rat
Who used to order his troops
To fire on women and children
Imagine that, imagine that
And in the spring of '48
Mao Tse-tung got quite irate
And he kicked that old dictator Chiang
Out of the state of China
Chiang Kai-shek came down in Formosa
And they armed the island of Quemoy
And the shells were flying across the China Sea
And they turned Formosa into a shoe factory Called Taiwan

Roger Waters - Amused to Death, "Watching TV"

One of the best and most balanced biographies of Chiang is The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China, by Harvard University Asia scholar Jay Taylor.

Here is part of a good online article about Chiang published last year by Andrew Wright:

OOOOOOH, more White Guys telling Asians how they should feel about stuff!!! You tell us, Mr. White Man.

Rather than being corrupt Chiang ate and drank simply, lived a Spartan lifestyle, and constantly criticized unscrupulous subordinates.

Um, only a Mormon would consider that a virtue. Hitler didn't smoke or drink and he was a vegetarian. on the other hand, Winston Churchill Drank, smoked, womanized, and was an all around fun dude when he wasn't saving Western Civilization from its own fecklessness.

Often dismissed as incompetent Chiang made great strides towards modernizing China during the Nanking Decade, scored diplomatic triumphs that put China back among the great powers, paved the road to Chinese unity, and kept China together during 8 years of fighting Japan in World War 2. Accused of prioritizing the fight against the Chinese Communists (the CCP), rather than Japan during the war, it was the other way. Mao let Chiang’s forces do the lion-share of fighting, and dying, while the CCP laid low and built up strength for the postwar showdown with Chiang’s Nationalist regime (the KMT).

Except China wasn't anywhere near the "Great Powers" guy. It was still pretty much at the tail end of the "Century of Humiliation". There's a reason why the CCP won the Civil War, because they were well regarded and Chiang wasn't.

Chastised by America for supposedly doing little with the Lend-Lease it provided him, in reality China received a tiny amount of it compared to Britain and Russia. Meanwhile, American promises to China were watered down, or broken from Pearl Harbor to Yalta, where America undermined Chinese interests in Manchuria to get Stalin to attack Japan. Westerners from General Joseph Stilwell, Margaret Tuchman, fellow travellers, and useful idiots, have tried discrediting Chiang’s reputation for decades with much success. By contrast inconvenient truths like America giving Japan more weapons and resources than to China in the first half of World War 2, or the arrogant attitude of American officials, including President Roosevelt, towards China are mostly forgotten.

Yeah, this is a lot of bircher shit... Um, noting the highlighted sentence, we were giving more weapons and resources to Japan? Really? When did this happen. You got on this very thread and argued that the Japanese were justified in Bombing Pearl Harbor because FDR cut off the spigot of oil and resources to Japan.

Here was the thing. Before Japan joined the Axis in 1940, there were a lot of people in Nazi Germany who looked at Chiang as a possible Axis member. He was pretty much a fucking fascist, and he could have acted as a counter to the USSR. Then the Nazis realized he was fucking incompetent and would just fuck up any task he was given.

The allies quickly came to the same conclusion, but they were stuck with him.

Perhaps best known as “the man who lost China,” Chiang’s critics often suggest he had countless advantages he bungled to lose China, and then fled to Taiwan to live out the rest of his life in ignominy. A more objective analysis suggests Chiang Kai-shek had too many enemies to fight, and too many problems to tackle. Chinese warlords always challenged his authority, and Japan attacked his regime often, then tried conquering China outright. Mao’s communist ideology (utopian in theory, dystopian in practice) undermined Chiang’s relatively benign form of enlightened authoritarianism, and offered a misguided alternate path for China’s future.

Okay, but here was the problem. It wasn't that he had too many enemies; it was that he made the wrong enemies. The only enemy SHOULD have been the Japanese. Instead, he focused on trying to destroy Mao or various warlords who didn't toe the line.

A REAL leader would have unified his people against the common foe.

Here is another online article about Chiang published in Taiwan Today in 1962:

Oh, an article posted under Chiang's Fascist Dictatorship.