eagle1462010, et al,
This is (IMO) closer to the track of the discussion -- where it should be.
(COMMENT)
Q1: Does the agreement deny Iran a nuclear weapons capability — the longstanding declared goal of the United States and the international community?
A1: Even the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) does not deny any country Nuclear Weapons (NW). At best it can delay it. Under Article X each party to the NPT has the right to withdraw if it decides that the agreement jeopardizes the their individual national security interests. Any party can withdrawal at any time given a 90 day notice (3 months). Iran is no exception. Iran is not likely to accept any deal that does not have a similar escape clause. While the NPT, which entered into force in 1970 --- has been extended indefinitely (Decision 3 --- 1995 NPT Review Conference), there is a review conferences required every five years; with the last one held in last month (May 2015). The NPT is 45 years old.
Q2: Does the agreement, once the constraints expire, prevent Iran from building a nuclear weapon in a short amount of time?
A2: This new agreement seems to prevent Iran from building a Heavy Water (HW) facility or accumulating Heavy Water for a 15 year period (2030). This only delays the production of of weapons grade plutonium based on the one technology. I'm not sure how confident we should be that other technologies will not become available in that interval. The current Arak HW Reactor is not currently fueled. Under the new agreement, Iran agrees to re-engineer the Arak Reactor such that it cannot be used to general the useable fuel rods. All spent fuel will be shipped to a disposal program outside Iran; for as long as the Arak Reactor exists. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) will cut the centrifuges use by about 75% (least efficient models) and Iran will limit their enrichment process to less than 5% (3%-4% concentration of U-235). It appears the the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will pickup surveillance. The language used was a "extraordinary and robust monitoring, verification, and inspection." Apparently Iran has agreed to implement the additional Protocols relative to the Safeguards Agreement.
Q3: Does the agreement extend the breakout time in a meaningful way?
A3: Break-out Time is related to the factors that constrain the development of plutonium at the 90% enrichment level. By reducing the number of centrifuges to about 25% of their current numbers and retaining the least efficient models; as well as preventing enrichment beyond the 5% level, the break-out period will be approximately 45 days to generate weapons grade material in the quantity required to make the first weapon after the termination of the agreement.
Q4: Is the agreement effectively verifiable?
A4: I'm not sure the question can be answered. However, the production, logistics, storage and maintenance of a warhead is very expensive under normal security conditions. The necessary covert and clandestine activities associated with and necessary to defeat IAEA Inspection Protocols would be huge. Even in Iran, it might become cost prohibitive.
Q5: And is there a meaningful phased relief of sanctions and are there guaranteed snap-back provisions?
A5: "Snap-Back refers to the UN approved sanctions/embargoes mechanisms, once lifted, to be re-introduced and put back in place. As extensive as the provisions are, it might take 3-to-6 months to get a majority in place, while some --- may never get back in place.
(COMMENT)
Maybe. Certainly I know a number of knowledgeable people that would agree with some of this criticism. Having said that, the establishment of a NW Program is an expensive proposition for any nation; superpowers on down --- let alone Iran. And it is a weapons system that Iran is not likely to ever use. Any nation that would attempt to use such a weapon, or provide it to some hostile non-state actor, or a state actor supporting some radical or jihadist movement, runs the risk of being significantly harmed by one or more of the superpowers. The idea of sanctions is to induce the sanctioned party to the negotiations table and act in good faith. And importantly enough, it is the need to steer research and development in the direction of high energy commercial projects; as opposed to, weapons programs.
It is almost impossible to tell the actual motivation
(political, diplomatic, militarily, economically, industrially and cultural legacy) behind the US involvement in the P5+1
(US, UK, France, China and Russia plus Germany) sponsorship of these negotiations. It is likely that while there are some commonalities shared in the effort, some of the parties are interested in some future advantage this might hold for them in the future.
I think (IMO) it is a bit too early to cheer or criticize the outcomes. We simply do not have enough information on the subject.
Most Respectfully,
R