shockedcanadian
Diamond Member
- Aug 6, 2012
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BBC wrote an article today about the fact that America NOT counting the votes in one night is dangerous to their reputation. Most certainly, you are asking a hell of a lot for ANY citizen, anywhere, to trust you to defend and be honest with votes, days after they cast it. Especially in this hyper-partisan political time. People will assume, new, added votes, DAYS after the election. It's insane.
The dangers are obvious. Going further, too many issues we have seen are in line with how Hugo Chavez operated. This article outlines a few vital issues. All of this was present without mail out voting. It's a real danger, and I hope you all figure it out because the long term implications are difficult to measure.
The Chávez Strategy, Step 4: Prevail on Election Day
On October 7, as much as 80 percent of the roughly 18 million registered voters will visit 14,035 polling centers and 38,500 polling stations, many in districts that are deeply loyal to Chávez. Also on October 7, the regime will deploy its final set of measures.
Winning Over the Electoral Tribunal. The five-member Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) is dominated by pro-Chávez members who have managed to salvage a partial reputation for neutrality and objectivity.[57] The CNE is credited for overseeing the referendum that Chávez lost in December 2007 and not altering the strong showing of the opposition in the 2010 legislative elections. Despite that, however, its impartiality is in question. Critics maintain that the CNE bends far too easily to the will of the president. In a close contest, it is far from certain that the CNE would be able to resist pressure applied by Chávez and his supporters.
Presuming Victory. The Chávez propaganda machine consistently claims that Chávez’s polling lead is insurmountable. In June, Chávez forecast a win with 60 percent of the vote.[58] On August 15, Chávez proclaimed that “it would be easier for 100 camels to pass through the eye of a needle than for [the capitalist class] to win the election” and later claimed he will win by 70 percent.[59] Supporters touted an August poll prepared by Jesse Chacon, an associate and former minister under Chávez, claiming that the incumbent leads with 56 percent among those with the intention to vote, as opposed to 29 percent for Capriles.[60] With campaign messaging, a number of friendly polls, and extensive media influence, Chávez seeks to project a confident air of electoral invincibility all the way to October 7.
Questioning Secrecy of the Vote. The Venezuelan system of electronic voting, according to the country’s electoral specialists, is protected against tampering. But voting machines are connected to an anti-fraud authentication system that requires a registered fingerprint to activate. Many Venezuelans harbor concerns about the system and the privacy of their ballots. Doubts about the secrecy of the ballot could scare voters, especially opposition voters, away from the polls.
Limiting Electoral Observation. Following the 2006 presidential election, Venezuela ended serious electoral observation missions by the OAS, the European Union, and other groups, such as the Carter Center in the U.S. The CNE now allows only electoral “companions” invited primarily from friendly groups such as the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), which is currently led by a Venezuelan chavista, Alí Rodriguez Araque. Since these companions arrive mere days before elections and take tours of polling places escorted by Venezuelan authorities who are also charged with preapproving their statements or reports, the electoral companions lack international credibility.[61] On October 7, allegations of voting improprieties or fraud will lack validation by impartial external observers.
Cheating and Disenfranchising Voters. Opposition experts have expressed concerns about the lack of a comprehensive audit of the voting register and about the ease with which voter identifications have been issued, possibly resulting in duplicate voter documents and noncitizens being able to vote. On October 7, the geographic distribution of polling stations—with higher numbers in pro-Chávez strongholds—and overcrowding and inefficiency in processing registered voters will affect voting. Obstructionism by Chávez-friendly officials and potential intimidation by pro-Chávez bullies could slow or negate votes in many districts.
Venezuela permits voting overseas in embassies and consulates. However, following the expulsion of Venezuela’s consul general in Miami in January 2012, Chávez ordered the consulate closed. Despite appeals, he has refused to reopen it in order to punish the Venezuelan diaspora—as many as 20,000—in Florida. To exercise their right to vote, they must travel to the nearest open consulate in New Orleans.
Promoting Disinformation.The Chávez regime plants stories about alleged opposition plans to contest the election outcome and disrupt the post-electoral civil order. On August 9, Chávez announced that a “mercenary” carrying a U.S. passport had been arrested in Venezuela, adding matter of factly that “a group of the bourgeoisie is preparing to reject the people’s triumph…and [will] try to plunge the country into a political crisis and fill the country with violence.”[62]
October Surprise. Despite the four-step Chávez strategy outlined above, opposition candidate Capriles, the MUD, and millions of Venezuelans sincerely believe that they still have a real opportunity to win and alter the course of Venezuelan history. The hopes of the opposition have recently been bolstered by reputable polling data that place Capriles either ahead of or closing the gap between himself and Chávez.[63] Emergent crises such as the August PDVSA refinery fire, the collapse of key bridges, and restiveness in some labor unions have also tarnished the aura of triumph that Chávez had aimed to project.[64]
The dangers are obvious. Going further, too many issues we have seen are in line with how Hugo Chavez operated. This article outlines a few vital issues. All of this was present without mail out voting. It's a real danger, and I hope you all figure it out because the long term implications are difficult to measure.
The Chávez Plan to Steal Venezuela's Presidential Election: What Obama Should Do
Abstract: On October 7, 2012, Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez will stand for re-election against opposition candidate Henrique Capriles. The Venezuelan presidential election matters to the U.S.: Venezuela is a major oil supplier to the U.S.; Chávez’s anti-American worldview has led to alliances with...
www.heritage.org
The Chávez Strategy, Step 4: Prevail on Election Day
On October 7, as much as 80 percent of the roughly 18 million registered voters will visit 14,035 polling centers and 38,500 polling stations, many in districts that are deeply loyal to Chávez. Also on October 7, the regime will deploy its final set of measures.
Winning Over the Electoral Tribunal. The five-member Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) is dominated by pro-Chávez members who have managed to salvage a partial reputation for neutrality and objectivity.[57] The CNE is credited for overseeing the referendum that Chávez lost in December 2007 and not altering the strong showing of the opposition in the 2010 legislative elections. Despite that, however, its impartiality is in question. Critics maintain that the CNE bends far too easily to the will of the president. In a close contest, it is far from certain that the CNE would be able to resist pressure applied by Chávez and his supporters.
Presuming Victory. The Chávez propaganda machine consistently claims that Chávez’s polling lead is insurmountable. In June, Chávez forecast a win with 60 percent of the vote.[58] On August 15, Chávez proclaimed that “it would be easier for 100 camels to pass through the eye of a needle than for [the capitalist class] to win the election” and later claimed he will win by 70 percent.[59] Supporters touted an August poll prepared by Jesse Chacon, an associate and former minister under Chávez, claiming that the incumbent leads with 56 percent among those with the intention to vote, as opposed to 29 percent for Capriles.[60] With campaign messaging, a number of friendly polls, and extensive media influence, Chávez seeks to project a confident air of electoral invincibility all the way to October 7.
Questioning Secrecy of the Vote. The Venezuelan system of electronic voting, according to the country’s electoral specialists, is protected against tampering. But voting machines are connected to an anti-fraud authentication system that requires a registered fingerprint to activate. Many Venezuelans harbor concerns about the system and the privacy of their ballots. Doubts about the secrecy of the ballot could scare voters, especially opposition voters, away from the polls.
Limiting Electoral Observation. Following the 2006 presidential election, Venezuela ended serious electoral observation missions by the OAS, the European Union, and other groups, such as the Carter Center in the U.S. The CNE now allows only electoral “companions” invited primarily from friendly groups such as the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), which is currently led by a Venezuelan chavista, Alí Rodriguez Araque. Since these companions arrive mere days before elections and take tours of polling places escorted by Venezuelan authorities who are also charged with preapproving their statements or reports, the electoral companions lack international credibility.[61] On October 7, allegations of voting improprieties or fraud will lack validation by impartial external observers.
Cheating and Disenfranchising Voters. Opposition experts have expressed concerns about the lack of a comprehensive audit of the voting register and about the ease with which voter identifications have been issued, possibly resulting in duplicate voter documents and noncitizens being able to vote. On October 7, the geographic distribution of polling stations—with higher numbers in pro-Chávez strongholds—and overcrowding and inefficiency in processing registered voters will affect voting. Obstructionism by Chávez-friendly officials and potential intimidation by pro-Chávez bullies could slow or negate votes in many districts.
Venezuela permits voting overseas in embassies and consulates. However, following the expulsion of Venezuela’s consul general in Miami in January 2012, Chávez ordered the consulate closed. Despite appeals, he has refused to reopen it in order to punish the Venezuelan diaspora—as many as 20,000—in Florida. To exercise their right to vote, they must travel to the nearest open consulate in New Orleans.
Promoting Disinformation.The Chávez regime plants stories about alleged opposition plans to contest the election outcome and disrupt the post-electoral civil order. On August 9, Chávez announced that a “mercenary” carrying a U.S. passport had been arrested in Venezuela, adding matter of factly that “a group of the bourgeoisie is preparing to reject the people’s triumph…and [will] try to plunge the country into a political crisis and fill the country with violence.”[62]
October Surprise. Despite the four-step Chávez strategy outlined above, opposition candidate Capriles, the MUD, and millions of Venezuelans sincerely believe that they still have a real opportunity to win and alter the course of Venezuelan history. The hopes of the opposition have recently been bolstered by reputable polling data that place Capriles either ahead of or closing the gap between himself and Chávez.[63] Emergent crises such as the August PDVSA refinery fire, the collapse of key bridges, and restiveness in some labor unions have also tarnished the aura of triumph that Chávez had aimed to project.[64]
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