Eloy, et al,
This is not totally accurate; at least from a certain perspective. Like signing on to the Rome Statutes (2015), the there is a serious question as to competence. There is a trickle down adverse impact if the "
Tinmore Hypothesis"
(pertaining to ratification) (Posting #83) were proven to be correct.
Indeed, there is an item on the table that is hardly a minor detail: The Palestinian Liberation Organization did not ratify the Oslo Accords after Arafat and Abbas signed the agreement on the White House lawn...
So you agree that agreements made with Palestinian "leadership" isn't worth the paper it is written on? I'll be sure to reference that fact in the future. Thanks.
It is the same as the US president who signs a treaty with other countries having to get subsequent senate approval for the terms of the treaty to take effect.
(COMMENT)
Treaty ratification in the US is a matter of "domestic law"
(Article 2, Section 2, US Constitution). But there are many countries that do not have such a law. You will be very hard pressed to find such a similar corollary in the
2003 Amended Basic Law (current); of course the Oslo Accords were signed long before the Palestinian Basic Laws were created. In the days of the Oslo Accords, the Arab League and the Greater World At Large, considered the Palestinian Liberation Organization to be the sole representative of the Palestinians. So I suppose that the authority to enter into such an agreement met the basic requirements set forth in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Article 14 or Article 15). While the Law of Treaties makes allowances for Ratification, Acceptance or Approval; as well as, consent to be Bound by Accession, it does not require it unless the domestic law requires it as a matter of authority and competence. Certainly no major objection was ever ushered forward then; and no competent offers and objection new. There was not legal obstructions in 1993 and 1995.
In the Oslo Accord era, the PLO had no body to formally implement the ratification process; even if they has one. When in 2015, Palestine began signing treaties, the PA President was faced with the choice to either postpone the implementation process or implement the treaties by presidential decree. By signing treaties, the political ploy was to strengthens Palestine’s claim for statehood through recognition, which in turn increases pressure for independence on Israel as an occupation force.
HOWEVER, you and our friend "SAYIT" are correct (
Posting #80). IF it were to be determined that the Oslo Accords were never sound and valid
(however unlikely) (meaning invalid) then the political impact would work in reverse. It would be a very strong indication that the PLO/PA had not reach the status of "statehood."
That is not taking into account the civil restitution of claims involved. And of course the question of age! Just how far back can an Arab Palestinian claim that an agreement was not properly handled domestically. The Oslo Accords have stood unchallenged in the dispute process for more than two decades. And if the Oslo Accords are successfully nullified, who is the culpable party? Who owes who damages and compensation?
Most Respectfully,
R