Tomorrow, 6/30/26 our Supreme Court will hand down its decision in Trump v. Barbara (No. 25-365), evaluating the constitutionality of Trump’s executive order Protecting The Meaning And Value Of American Citizenship, which changes existing policy recognizing birthright citizenship for children born to illegal entrant foreign nationals born on American soil, or temporary visa holders.
Some fundamental questions which arise are:
Is the case, Wong Kim Ark, 1898, applicable to citizenship for children born to illegal entrant foreign nationals born on American soil, or temporary visa holders? It is essential to note the circumstances of Wong Kim Ark’s parents’ presents in the U.S. at the time of Wong’s birth do not match those of children who are today born to illegal entrant foreign nationals born on American soil, or temporary visa holders.
It is also important to note in 1898 when Wong was decided, there was no such thing as illegal entrant foreign nationals, nor U.S. temporary visa holders. If any restrictions on immigration existed, it was regulated by State authority. These facts lead to a conclusion that the Wong case is not applicable to children born to illegal entrant foreign nationals on American soil, or temporary visa holders.
The above facts also confirm the 39th Congress never took up the political question of birthright citizenship as applied to illegal entrant foreign nationals or temporary visa holders, as neither existed during the debates which framed the 14th Amendment, and thus, granting such citizenship, which is a policy making decision, by the terms of our Constitution is left to the States under Article V, or to the people’s elected representatives . . . Congress or the President, and apparently beyond the purview of our unelected S.C. members.
It is also important to note there is a qualifying phrase in the 14th Amendment ‘. . . and subject to the jurisdiction thereof . . . “, which must be meet to receive the priceless privilege of U.S. citizenship.
It is currently established that the following do not meet the qualifier:
Individuals born to foreign ambassadors or ministers who possess diplomatic immunity.
Tribal members who owed allegiance to their independent tribal nations. This exclusion was solidified in the 1884 Supreme Court case Elk v. Wilkins but was later modified when Congress exercised it legislative authority and granted them statutory citizenship via the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924.
Children born to a hostile invading force.
Children born aboard foreign state-owned ships (such as warships) while temporarily in U.S. territorial waters.
Finally, another fundamental question arises which involves the very nature of our system requiring consent of the governed. Since there is no S.C. case or statutory law acknowledging the offspring of illegal entrants born on American soil are granted U.S. citizenship, or such citizenship is granted to temporary visa holders, and by the terms of the Constitution policy making decisions of such nature are left to the States under article V, or to the people’s elected representatives (Congress or President), it is hard to imagine our S.C. handing down a majority opinion which, out of thin air, would henceforth recognize natural born birthright citizenship to a new identifiable group of persons (children born to illegal entrant foreign nationals born on American soil, or temporary visa holders).
Considering the above stated facts, it seems obvious that our Supreme Court members, in accordance with their oath of office to support and defend our Constitution and our system’s separation of powers, must apply the reasoned approach in Luther v. Borden, and affirm that a power to decide what turns out to be a political question, is not within the judiciaries delegated authority, and must be decide by the people’s elected representatives . . . their Legislature and/or President.
If the President’s newly adopted policy found in his E.O. Protecting The Meaning And Value Of American Citizenship is found to be objectionable by Congress, Congress is authorized under Section V of the 14th Amendment to overrule that policy.
Some fundamental questions which arise are:
Is the case, Wong Kim Ark, 1898, applicable to citizenship for children born to illegal entrant foreign nationals born on American soil, or temporary visa holders? It is essential to note the circumstances of Wong Kim Ark’s parents’ presents in the U.S. at the time of Wong’s birth do not match those of children who are today born to illegal entrant foreign nationals born on American soil, or temporary visa holders.
It is also important to note in 1898 when Wong was decided, there was no such thing as illegal entrant foreign nationals, nor U.S. temporary visa holders. If any restrictions on immigration existed, it was regulated by State authority. These facts lead to a conclusion that the Wong case is not applicable to children born to illegal entrant foreign nationals on American soil, or temporary visa holders.
The above facts also confirm the 39th Congress never took up the political question of birthright citizenship as applied to illegal entrant foreign nationals or temporary visa holders, as neither existed during the debates which framed the 14th Amendment, and thus, granting such citizenship, which is a policy making decision, by the terms of our Constitution is left to the States under Article V, or to the people’s elected representatives . . . Congress or the President, and apparently beyond the purview of our unelected S.C. members.
It is also important to note there is a qualifying phrase in the 14th Amendment ‘. . . and subject to the jurisdiction thereof . . . “, which must be meet to receive the priceless privilege of U.S. citizenship.
It is currently established that the following do not meet the qualifier:
Individuals born to foreign ambassadors or ministers who possess diplomatic immunity.
Tribal members who owed allegiance to their independent tribal nations. This exclusion was solidified in the 1884 Supreme Court case Elk v. Wilkins but was later modified when Congress exercised it legislative authority and granted them statutory citizenship via the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924.
Children born to a hostile invading force.
Children born aboard foreign state-owned ships (such as warships) while temporarily in U.S. territorial waters.
Finally, another fundamental question arises which involves the very nature of our system requiring consent of the governed. Since there is no S.C. case or statutory law acknowledging the offspring of illegal entrants born on American soil are granted U.S. citizenship, or such citizenship is granted to temporary visa holders, and by the terms of the Constitution policy making decisions of such nature are left to the States under article V, or to the people’s elected representatives (Congress or President), it is hard to imagine our S.C. handing down a majority opinion which, out of thin air, would henceforth recognize natural born birthright citizenship to a new identifiable group of persons (children born to illegal entrant foreign nationals born on American soil, or temporary visa holders).
Considering the above stated facts, it seems obvious that our Supreme Court members, in accordance with their oath of office to support and defend our Constitution and our system’s separation of powers, must apply the reasoned approach in Luther v. Borden, and affirm that a power to decide what turns out to be a political question, is not within the judiciaries delegated authority, and must be decide by the people’s elected representatives . . . their Legislature and/or President.
If the President’s newly adopted policy found in his E.O. Protecting The Meaning And Value Of American Citizenship is found to be objectionable by Congress, Congress is authorized under Section V of the 14th Amendment to overrule that policy.
