Red line in the sand.... Obama painting a red target on all of us now with iranian Deal!

[healthmyths]

As it is with any thing Obama does it is half assed and never well thought out!
Now these idiots that have given Obama the Iranian deal don't seem to recognize how totally incompetent and dangerous this "deal" will be for the rest of the world...including me!

See Zucker's film as it totally dismantles Obama's stupid "deal"!
New David Zucker Video Lambastes Iran Deal

 

[healthmyths]

A group of nearly 200 retired generals and admirals sent a letter to Congress on Wednesday urging lawmakers to reject the Iran nuclear agreement, which they say threatens national security.

Retired generals and admirals urge Congress to reject Iran nuclear deal

 

[The Irish Ram]

Korea is thrilled with the deal. They have nukes and need money. Iran has money but needs nukes. Yay Obama!

 

[healthmyths]

The 200 retired military officers letter

25 August, 2015


Hon. John A. Boehner
Speaker of the House
United States House of Representatives 1011 Longworth House Office Building Washington, D.C. 20515-3508

Hon. Nancy Pelosi
Minority Leader
United States House of Representatives 233 Cannon House Office Building Washington, D.C. 20515-0512

Hon. Mitch McConnell
Majority Leader
United States Senate
317 Russell Senate Office Building Washington, D.C. 20510-1702

Hon. Harry Reid
Minority Leader
United States Senate
522 Hart Senate Office Building Washington, D.C. 20510-2803


Dear Representatives Boehner and Pelosi and Senators McConnell and Reid:

As you know, on July 14, 2015, the United States and five other nations announced that a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) has been reached with Iran to prevent it from developing nuclear weapons. In our judgment as former senior military officers, the agreement will not have that effect. Removing sanctions on Iran and releasing billions of dollars to its regime over the next ten years is inimical to the security of Israel and the Middle East. There is no credibility within JCPOA’s inspection process or the ability to snap back sanctions once lifted, should Iran violate the agreement. In this and other respects, the JCPOA would threaten the national security and vital interests of the United States and, therefore, should be disapproved by the Congress.

The agreement as constructed does not “cut off every pathway” for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. To the contrary, it actually provides Iran with a legitimate path to doing that simply by abiding by the deal. JCPOA allows all the infrastructure the Iranians need for a nuclear bomb to be preserved and enhanced. Notably, Iran is allowed to: continue to enrich uranium; develop and test advanced centrifuges; and continue work on its Arak heavy-water plutonium reactor. Collectively, these concessions afford the Iranians, at worst, a ready breakout option and, at best, an incipient nuclear weapons capability a decade from now.

The agreement is unverifiable. Under the terms of the JCPOA and a secret side deal (to which the United States is not privy), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be responsible for inspections under such severe limitations as to prevent them from reliably detecting Iranian cheating. For example, if Iran and the inspectors are unable to reach an accommodation with respect to a given site, the result could be at least a 24-day delay in IAEA access. The agreement also requires inspectors to inform Iran in writing as to the basis for its concerns about an undeclared site, thus further delaying access. Most importantly, these inspections do not allow access to Iranian military facilities, the most likely location of their nuclear weapons development efforts. In the JCPOA process, there is substantial risk of U.S. intelligence being compromised, since the IAEA often relies on our sensitive data with respect to suspicious and/or prohibited activity.

While failing to assure prevention of Iran’s nuclear weapons development capabilities, the agreement provides by some estimates $150 billion dollars or more to Iran in the form of sanctions relief.
As military officers, we find it unconscionable that such a windfall could be given to a regime that even the Obama administration has acknowledged will use a portion of such funds to continue to support terrorism in Israel, throughout the Middle East and globally, whether directly or through proxies.
These actions will be made all the more deadly since the JCPOA will lift international embargoes on Iran’s access to advanced conventional weapons and ballistic missile technology.

In summary, this agreement will enable Iran to become far more dangerous, render the Mideast still more unstable and introduce new threats to American interests as well as our allies. In our professional opinion, far from being an alternative to war, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action makes it likely that the war the Iranian regime has waged against us since 1979 will continue, with far higher risks to our national security interests. Accordingly, we urge the Congress to reject this defective accord.

1. Admiral David Architzel, US Navy, Retired
   
   
2. Admiral Stanley R. Arthur, US Navy, Retired
   
   
3. General William Begert, US Air Force, Retired
   
   
4. General J.B. Davis, US Air Force, Retired
   
   
5. Admiral William A. Doughert, US Navy, Retired
   
   
6. Admiral Leon A. “Bud” Edney, US Navy, Retired
   
   
7. General Alfred G. Hansen US Air Force, Retired
   
   
8. Admiral Thomas Hayward, US Navy, Retired
   
   
9. Admiral James Hogg, US Navy, Retired
   
   
10. Admiral Jerome Johnson, US Navy, Retired
    
    
11. Admiral Timothy J. Keating, US Navy, Retired
    
    
12. Admiral Robert J. Kelly, US Navy, Retired
    
    
13. Admiral Thomas Joseph Lopez, US Navy, Retired
    

14. Admiral James A. “Ace” Lyons, US Navy, Retired 15. Admiral Richard Macke, US Navy, Retired
16. Admiral Henry Mauz, US Navy, Retired
17. General Lance Smith, US Air Force, Retired

18. Admiral Leighton Smith, US Navy, Retired
19. Admiral William D. Smith, US Navy, Retired 20. General Louis C. Wagner, Jr., US Army, Retired 21. Admiral Steve White, US Navy, Retired
22. General Ronald W. Yates, US Air Force, Retired

23. Lieutenant General Teddy G. Allen, US Army, Retired
24. Lieutenant General Edward G. Anderson, III, US Army, Retired
25. Lieutenant General Marcus A. Anderson, US Air Force, Retired
26. Lieutenant General Spence M. Armstrong, US Air Force, Retired
27. Lieutenant General Harold W. Blot, US Marine Corps, Retired
28. Vice Admiral Michael Bowman, US Navy, Retired
29. Lieutenant General William G. “Jerry” Boykin, US Army, Retired
30. Vice Admiral Edward S. Briggs, US Navy, Retired
31. Lieutenant General Richard E. “Tex” Brown III, US Air Force, Retired 32. Lieutenant General William J. Campbell, US Air Force, Retired
33. Vice Admiral Edward Clexton, US Navy, Retired
34. Vice Admiral Daniel L. Cooper, US Navy, Retired
35. Vice Admiral William A. Dougherty, US Navy, Retired
36. Lieutenant General Brett Dula, US Air Force, Retired
37. Lieutenant General Gordon E. Fornell, US Air Force, Retired
38. Lieutenant General Thomas B. Goslin, US Air Force, Retired
39. Lieutenant General Earl Hailston, US Marine Corps, Retired
40. Vice Admiral Bernard M. Kauderer, US Navy, Retired
41. Lieutenant General Timothy A. Kinnan, US Air Force, Retired
42. Vice Admiral J. B . LaPlante, US Navy, Retired
43. Vice Admiral Tony Less, US Navy, Retired
44. Lieutenant General Bennett L. Lewis, US Army, Retired
45. Vice Admiral Michael Malone, US Navy, Retired
46. Vice Admiral John Mazach, US Navy, Retired
47. Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney, US Air Force, Retired
48. Lieutenant General Fred McCorkle, US Marine Corps, Retired
49. Vice Admiral Robert Monroe, US Navy, Retired
50. Vice Admiral Jimmy Pappas, US Navy, Retired
51. Vice Admiral J. Theodore Parker, US Navy, Retired
52. Lieutenant General Garry L. Parks, US Marine Corps, Retired
53. Lieutenant General Everett Pratt, US Air Force, Retired
54. Vice Admiral John Poindexter, US Navy, Retired
55. Lieutenant General Clifford "Ted" Rees, Jr., US Air Force, Retired
56. Vice Admiral William Rowden, US Navy, Retired
57. Vice Admiral Robert F. Schoultz, US Navy, Retired
58. Lieutenant General E.G. “Buck” Shuler, Jr., US Air Force, Retired
59. Lieutenant General Hubert 'Hugh" G. Smith, US Army, Retired

60. Vice Admiral Edward M. Straw, US Navy, Retired
61. Lieutenant General David J. Teal, US Air Force, Retired
62. Vice Admiral D.C. "Deese" Thompson, US Coast Guard, Retired
63. Lieutenant General William E. Thurman, US Air Force, Retired
64. Lieutenant General Billy Tomas, US Army, Retired
65. Vice Admiral John Totushek, US Navy, Retired
66. Vice Admiral Jerry Tuttle, US Navy, Retired
67. Vice Admiral Jerry Unruh, US Navy, Retired
68. Vice Admiral Timothy W. Wright, US Navy, Retired

69. Rear Admiral William V. Alford, Jr., US Navy, Retired
70. Major General Thurman E. Anderson, US Army, Retired
71. Major General Joseph T. Anderson, US Marine Corps, Retired
72. Rear Admiral Philip Anselmo, US Navy, Retired
73. Major General Joe Arbuckle, US Army, Retired
74. Rear Admiral James W. Austin, US Navy, Retired
75. Rear Admiral John R. Batzler, US Navy, Retired
76. Rear Admiral John Bayless, US Navy, Retired
77. Major General John Bianchi, US Army, Retired
78. Rear Admiral Donald Vaux Boecker, US Navy, Retired
79. Rear Admiral Jerry C. Breast, US Navy, Retired
80. Rear Admiral Bruce B. Bremner, US Navy, Retired
81. Major General Edward M. Browne, US Army, Retired
82. Rear Admiral Thomas F. Brown III, US Navy, Retired
83. Rear Admiral Lyle Bull, US Navy, Retired
84. Major General Bobby G. Butcher, US Marine Corps, Retired
85. Rear Admiral Jay A. Campbell, US Navy, Retired
86. Major General Henry D. Canterbury, US Air Force, Retired
87. Major General Carroll D. Childers, US Army, Retired
88. Rear Admiral Ronald L. Christenson, US Navy, Retired
89. Major General John R.D. Cleland, US Army, Retired
90. Major General Richard L. Comer, US Air Force, Retired
91. Rear Admiral Jack Dantone, US Navy, Retired
92. Major General William B. Davitte, US Air Force, Retired
93. Major General James D. Delk, US Army, Retired
94. Major General Felix Dupre, US Air Force, Retired
95. Rear Admiral Philip A. Dur, US Navy, Retired
96. Major General Neil L. Eddins, US Air Force, Retired
97. Rear Admiral Paul Engel, US Navy, Retired
98. Major General Vince Falter, US Army, Retired
99. Rear Admiral James H. Flatley, US Navy, Retired

1. Major General Bobby O. Floyd, US Air Force, Retired
   
   
2. Major General Paul Fratarangelo, US Marine Corps, Retired
   
   
3. Rear Admiral Veronica "Ronne" Froman, US Navy, Retired
   
   
4. Rear Admiral R. Byron Fuller, US Navy, Retired
   
   
5. Rear Admiral Frank Gallo, US Navy, Retired
   
   
6. Rear Admiral Albert A. Gallotta, Jr., US Navy, Retired
   
   
7. Rear Admiral James Mac Gleim, US Navy, Retired
   
   
8. Rear Admiral Robert H. Gormley, US Navy, Retired
   
   
9. Rear Admiral William Gureck, US Navy, Retired
   
   
10. Major General Gary L. Harrell, US Army, Retired
    
    
11. Rear Admiral Donald Hickman, US Navy, Retired
    
    
12. Major General Geoffrey Higginbotham, US Marine Corps, Retired
    
    
13. Major General Kent H. Hillhouse, US Army, Retired
    
    
14. Rear Admiral Tim Hinkle, US Navy, Retired
    
    
15. Major General Victor Joseph Hugo, US Army, Retired
    
    
16. Major General James P. Hunt, US Air Force, Retired
    
    
17. Rear Admiral Grady L. Jackson, US Navy, Retired
    
    
18. Major General William K. James, US Air Force, Retired
    
    
19. Rear Admiral John M. “Carlos” Johnson, US Navy, Retired
    
    
20. Rear Admiral Pierce J. Johnson, US Navy, Retired
    
    
21. Rear Admiral Steven B. Kantrowitz, US Navy, Retired
    
    
22. Major General Maurice W. Kendall, US Army, Retired
    
    
23. Rear Admiral Charles R. Kubic, US Navy, Retired
    
    
24. Rear Admiral Frederick L. Lewis, US Navy, Retired
    
    
25. Major General John D. Logeman, Jr., US Air Force, Retired
    
    
26. Major General Homer S. Long, Jr., US Army, Retired
    
    
27. Major General Robert M. Marquette, US Air Force, Retired
    
    
28. Rear Admiral Robert B. McClinton, US Navy, Retired
    
    
29. Rear Admiral W. J. McDaniel, MD, US Navy, Retired
    
    
30. Major General Keith W. Meurlin, US Air Force, Retired
    
    
31. Rear Admiral Terrence McKnight, US Navy, Retired
    
    
32. Major General John F. Miller, Jr., US Air Force, Retired
    
    
33. Major General Burton R. Moore, US Air Force, Retired
    
    
34. Rear Admiral David R. Morris, US Navy, Retired
    
    
35. Rear Admiral Ed Nelson, Jr., US Coast Guard, Retired
    
    
36. Major General George W. "Nordie" Norwood, US Air Force, Retired
    
    
37. Major General Everett G. Odgers, US Air Force, Retired
    
    Rear Admiral Phillip R. Olson, US Navy, Retired

1. 
   
2. Rear Admiral Robert S. Owens, US Navy, Retired
   
   
3. Rear Admiral Robert O. Passmore, US Navy, Retired
   
   
4. Major General Richard E. Perraut, Jr., US Air Force, Retired
   
   
5. Rear Admiral W.W. Pickavance, Jr., US Navy, Retired
   
   
6. Rear Admiral L.F. Picotte, US Navy, Retired
   
   
7. Rear Admiral Thomas J. Porter, US Navy, Retired
   
   
8. Major General H. Douglas Robertson, US Army, Retired
   
   
9. Rear Admiral W.J. Ryan, US Navy, Retired
   
   
10. Rear Admiral Norman Saunders, US Coast Guard, Retired
    
    
11. Major General John P. Schoeppner, Jr., US Air Force, Retired
    
    
12. Major General Edison E. Scholes, US Army, Retired
    
    
13. Rear Admiral Hugh P. Scott, US Navy, Retired
    
    
14. Major General Richard Secord, US Air Force, Retired
    
    
15. Rear Admiral James M. Seely, US Navy, Retired
    
    
16. Major General Sidney Shachnow, US Army, Retired
    
    
17. Rear Admiral William H. Shawcross, US Navy, Retired
    
    
18. Rear Admiral Bob Shumaker, US Navy, Retired
    
    
19. Major General Willie Studer, US Air Force, Retired
    
    
20. Major General Larry Taylor, US Marine Corps, Retired
    
    
21. Rear Admiral Jeremy Taylor, US Navy, Retired
    
    
22. Major General Richard L. Testa, US Air Force, Retired
    
    
23. Rear Admiral Robert P. Tiernan, US Navy, Retired
    
    
24. Major General Paul E. Vallely, US Army, Retired
    
    
25. Major General Kenneth W. Weir, US Marine Corps, Retired
    
    
26. Major General John Welde, US Air Force, Retired
    
    
27. Rear Admiral James B. Whittaker, US Navy, Retired
    
    
28. Major General Geoffrey P. Wiedeman, Jr., MD, US Air Force, Retired
    
    
29. Rear Admiral H. Denny Wisely, US Navy, Retired
    
    
30. Brigadier General John R. Allen, Jr., US Air Force, Retired
    
    
31. Brigadier General John C. Arick, US Marine Corps, Retired
    
    
32. Brigadier General Loring R. Astorino, US Air Force, Retired
    
    
33. Rear Admiral Robert E. Besal, US Navy, Retired
    
    
34. Brigadier General William Bloomer, US Marine Corps, Retired
    
    
35. Brigadier General George P. Cole, Jr., US Air Force, Retired
    
    
36. Brigadier General Richard A. Coleman, US Air Force, Retired
    
    
37. Brigadier General James L. Crouch, US Air Force, Retired
    
    
38. Rear Admiral Marianne B. Drew, US Navy, Retired
    
    
39. Brigadier General Philip M. Drew, US Air Force, Retired
    
    
40. Brigadier General Larry K. Grundhauser, US Air Force, Retired
    
    
41. Brigadier General Thomas W. Honeywill, US Air Force, Retired
    
    
42. 6
43. 
    
44. Brigadier General Gary M. Jones, US Army, Retired
    
    
45. Brigadier General Stephen Lanning, US Air Force, Retired
    
    
46. Brigadier General Thomas J. Lennon, US Air Force, Retired
    
    
47. Rear Admiral Bobby C. Lee, US Navy, Retired
    
    
48. Brigadier General Robert F. Peksens, US Air Force, Retired
    
    
49. Brigadier General Joe Shaefer, US Air Force, Retired
    
    
50. Brigadier General Graham E. Shirley, US Air Force, Retired
    
    
51. Brigadier General Stanley O. Smith, US Air Force, Retired
    
    
52. Brigadier General Hugh B. Tant III, US Army, Retired
    
    
53. Brigadier General Michael Joseph Tashjian, US Air Force, Retired
    
    
54. Brigadier General William Tiernan, US Marine Corps, Retired
    
    
55. Brigadier General Roger W. Scearce, US Army, Retired
    
    
56. Brigadier General Robert V. Woods, US Air Force, Retired
    

 

[guno]

Thankfully the President doesn't make decision based on senile old military people or the opinions of rightwing depends wearing buffoons on the internet

 

[occupied]

Oh no! It's almost like we do not have the most powerful military in the world and can destroy all military and infrastructure targets in Iran in a matter of days. What a bunch of cowards you spineless jellyfish conservatives are. If Iran gets a nuke and starts waving it around they are fucked everyone seems to know that but republicans.

 

[RedTeamTex]

Here's the thing...President Obama was desperate to push this problem off into the future when he wouldn't be in the big chair. President Clinton made a big ballyhooed agreement with North Korea--which lasted as long as newspaper ink and then Bush dealt with it successfully with insistence on six party talks. I doubt there's much chance Obama thinks this agreement is any more enduring than Clinton's. We're going to have to deal with this for real in the future.

If President Obama doesn't want to have to deal with it, then I don't want him to either. Let O have his "agreement" and we'll wait until a better president is in office to mop it up.

 

[toxicmedia]

As it is with any thing Obama does it is half assed and never well thought out!
Now these idiots that have given Obama the Iranian deal don't seem to recognize how totally incompetent and dangerous this "deal" will be for the rest of the world...including me!

See Zucker's film as it totally dismantles Obama's stupid "deal"!
New David Zucker Video Lambastes Iran Deal

View attachment 50209

David Zucker is not an expert. He's just a conservative, and all of you are lambasting the Ian deal, and know absolutely nothing about the details.

Try and tell me what's wrong with it, using specifics. If you even understand what all this means

Here is the text from the agreement, in summary:

The nuclear-related provisions of the agreement will extend the amount of time that Iran would need to produce enough weapons-grade HEU for one nuclear weapon to a minimum of one year, for a duration of at least 10 years.
38 In addition to the restrictions on activities related to fissile material production, the JCPOA prohibits Iranian "activities which could contribute to the design and development of a nuclear explosive device," including research and diagnostic activities.
The JCPOA sets out specific limitations on Iran’s enrichment of uranium for fixed durations. Iran must be reported by the IAEA to have completed most of the tasks below before qualifying for sanctions relief specified on Implementation Day.
·
Centrifuge Limitation. Tehran is to use no more than 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges to enrich uranium for 10 years, and to install only IR-1 centrifuges in the facility.
All excess centrifuges are to be used only as replacements for operating centrifuges and equipment.

·Level of Enrichment Limitation. Iran has agreed to refrain from producing enriched uranium containing more than 3.67% uranium-235 for at least 15 years.

·Facility Limitation. Iran has agreed to enrich uranium only at the Natanz commercial-scale facility for 15 years and to refrain during that time from building any new enrichment facilities.
·
LEU Stockpile Limitation. Iran has agreed to reduce its LEU stockpile to no more than 300 kilograms of LEU containing 3.67% uranium-235 for a 15 year period. Tehran has three options for disposing of the remaining portion of its current LEU stockpile: diluting the material so that it contains the same levels of uranium-235 found in natural uranium; selling the LEU to another country; or selling it to an international LEU bank recently established by the IAEA. Iran’s LEU containing between 5% and 20% uranium-235 is to be "fabricated into fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor or transferred, based on a commercial transaction, outside of Iran or diluted" so that it contains a maximum of 3.67% uranium-235. Iran is to export LEU that cannot be fabricated into fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor or dilute that LEU so that it contains a maximum of 3.67% uranium-235.

·Fordow Conversion. Iran has agreed to convert its Fordow enrichment facility into "a nuclear, physics, and technology centre." For 15 years, Iran will maintain no more than 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges at the facility, and will not conduct uranium enrichment or related research and development (R&D) there. The facility, which will not contain any nuclear material. 348 of the IR-1 centrifuges may be used to produce stable nuclear isotopes for medical and industrial uses.

· Centrifuge Production. With regard to centrifuge manufacturing, Iran for 10 years is to use the excess IR-1 centrifuges from the Natanz and Fordow facilities "for the replacement of failed or damaged machines." Tehran may resume producing IR-1 centrifuges if its stock of replacement centrifuges "falls to 500 or below." After eight years, Iran can begin to manufacture two types of advanced centrifuges; after 10 years, Iran can produce complete versions of those centrifuges and store them under IAEA monitoring "until they are needed for final assembly."
·
Centrifuge R&D. The JCPOA also contains detailed restrictions on centrifuge R&D which last for at least 10 years. Moreover, Iran is to refrain for 10 years from pursuing R&D on any technologies other than gas centrifuge enrichment.

 

[occupied]

Thankfully the President doesn't make decision based on senile old military people or the opinions of rightwing depends wearing buffoons on the internet

These people will never forgive Obama for cheating them out of the Iran war they have wanted for thirty years and the profit it would have brought.

 

[Obiwan]

Thankfully the President doesn't make decision based on senile old military people or the opinions of rightwing depends wearing buffoons on the internet

No, he bases his opinions on the attitudes of leftwing nuts too cowardly to put on a uniform...

If the balloon goes up, I will be the first one to volunteer to serve you and yours with a draft notice, put you on the bus, put you through the roughest training you have ever seen, and send you in with the first wave...

Welcome to the barbecue...

 

[occupied]

As it is with any thing Obama does it is half assed and never well thought out!
Now these idiots that have given Obama the Iranian deal don't seem to recognize how totally incompetent and dangerous this "deal" will be for the rest of the world...including me!

See Zucker's film as it totally dismantles Obama's stupid "deal"!
New David Zucker Video Lambastes Iran Deal

View attachment 50209

David Zucker is not an expert. He's just a conservative, and all of you are lambasting the Ian deal, and know absolutely nothing about the details.

Try and tell me what's wrong with it, using specifics. If you even understand what all this means

Here is the text from the agreement, in summary:

The nuclear-related provisions of the agreement will extend the amount of time that Iran would need to produce enough weapons-grade HEU for one nuclear weapon to a minimum of one year, for a duration of at least 10 years.
38 In addition to the restrictions on activities related to fissile material production, the JCPOA prohibits Iranian "activities which could contribute to the design and development of a nuclear explosive device," including research and diagnostic activities.
The JCPOA sets out specific limitations on Iran’s enrichment of uranium for fixed durations. Iran must be reported by the IAEA to have completed most of the tasks below before qualifying for sanctions relief specified on Implementation Day.
·
Centrifuge Limitation. Tehran is to use no more than 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges to enrich uranium for 10 years, and to install only IR-1 centrifuges in the facility.
All excess centrifuges are to be used only as replacements for operating centrifuges and equipment.

·Level of Enrichment Limitation. Iran has agreed to refrain from producing enriched uranium containing more than 3.67% uranium-235 for at least 15 years.

·Facility Limitation. Iran has agreed to enrich uranium only at the Natanz commercial-scale facility for 15 years and to refrain during that time from building any new enrichment facilities.
·
LEU Stockpile Limitation. Iran has agreed to reduce its LEU stockpile to no more than 300 kilograms of LEU containing 3.67% uranium-235 for a 15 year period. Tehran has three options for disposing of the remaining portion of its current LEU stockpile: diluting the material so that it contains the same levels of uranium-235 found in natural uranium; selling the LEU to another country; or selling it to an international LEU bank recently established by the IAEA. Iran’s LEU containing between 5% and 20% uranium-235 is to be "fabricated into fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor or transferred, based on a commercial transaction, outside of Iran or diluted" so that it contains a maximum of 3.67% uranium-235. Iran is to export LEU that cannot be fabricated into fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor or dilute that LEU so that it contains a maximum of 3.67% uranium-235.

·Fordow Conversion. Iran has agreed to convert its Fordow enrichment facility into "a nuclear, physics, and technology centre." For 15 years, Iran will maintain no more than 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges at the facility, and will not conduct uranium enrichment or related research and development (R&D) there. The facility, which will not contain any nuclear material. 348 of the IR-1 centrifuges may be used to produce stable nuclear isotopes for medical and industrial uses.

· Centrifuge Production. With regard to centrifuge manufacturing, Iran for 10 years is to use the excess IR-1 centrifuges from the Natanz and Fordow facilities "for the replacement of failed or damaged machines." Tehran may resume producing IR-1 centrifuges if its stock of replacement centrifuges "falls to 500 or below." After eight years, Iran can begin to manufacture two types of advanced centrifuges; after 10 years, Iran can produce complete versions of those centrifuges and store them under IAEA monitoring "until they are needed for final assembly."
·
Centrifuge R&D. The JCPOA also contains detailed restrictions on centrifuge R&D which last for at least 10 years. Moreover, Iran is to refrain for 10 years from pursuing R&D on any technologies other than gas centrifuge enrichment.

The only detail these people care about is that Obama wants it and so in their tiny minds it must be bad and must be stopped. The terms are plenty restrictive enough to put off a Nuke for years, they cannot hide anything of consequence from inspectors and if they bar inspectors the deal is off and sanctions stay.

 

[The Irish Ram]

As it is with any thing Obama does it is half assed and never well thought out!
Now these idiots that have given Obama the Iranian deal don't seem to recognize how totally incompetent and dangerous this "deal" will be for the rest of the world...including me!

See Zucker's film as it totally dismantles Obama's stupid "deal"!
New David Zucker Video Lambastes Iran Deal

View attachment 50209

David Zucker is not an expert. He's just a conservative, and all of you are lambasting the Ian deal, and know absolutely nothing about the details.

Try and tell me what's wrong with it, using specifics. If you even understand what all this means

Here is the text from the agreement, in summary:

The nuclear-related provisions of the agreement will extend the amount of time that Iran would need to produce enough weapons-grade HEU for one nuclear weapon to a minimum of one year, for a duration of at least 10 years.
38 In addition to the restrictions on activities related to fissile material production, the JCPOA prohibits Iranian "activities which could contribute to the design and development of a nuclear explosive device," including research and diagnostic activities.
The JCPOA sets out specific limitations on Iran’s enrichment of uranium for fixed durations. Iran must be reported by the IAEA to have completed most of the tasks below before qualifying for sanctions relief specified on Implementation Day.
·
Centrifuge Limitation. Tehran is to use no more than 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges to enrich uranium for 10 years, and to install only IR-1 centrifuges in the facility.
All excess centrifuges are to be used only as replacements for operating centrifuges and equipment.

·Level of Enrichment Limitation. Iran has agreed to refrain from producing enriched uranium containing more than 3.67% uranium-235 for at least 15 years.

·Facility Limitation. Iran has agreed to enrich uranium only at the Natanz commercial-scale facility for 15 years and to refrain during that time from building any new enrichment facilities.
·
LEU Stockpile Limitation. Iran has agreed to reduce its LEU stockpile to no more than 300 kilograms of LEU containing 3.67% uranium-235 for a 15 year period. Tehran has three options for disposing of the remaining portion of its current LEU stockpile: diluting the material so that it contains the same levels of uranium-235 found in natural uranium; selling the LEU to another country; or selling it to an international LEU bank recently established by the IAEA. Iran’s LEU containing between 5% and 20% uranium-235 is to be "fabricated into fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor or transferred, based on a commercial transaction, outside of Iran or diluted" so that it contains a maximum of 3.67% uranium-235. Iran is to export LEU that cannot be fabricated into fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor or dilute that LEU so that it contains a maximum of 3.67% uranium-235.

·Fordow Conversion. Iran has agreed to convert its Fordow enrichment facility into "a nuclear, physics, and technology centre." For 15 years, Iran will maintain no more than 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges at the facility, and will not conduct uranium enrichment or related research and development (R&D) there. The facility, which will not contain any nuclear material. 348 of the IR-1 centrifuges may be used to produce stable nuclear isotopes for medical and industrial uses.

· Centrifuge Production. With regard to centrifuge manufacturing, Iran for 10 years is to use the excess IR-1 centrifuges from the Natanz and Fordow facilities "for the replacement of failed or damaged machines." Tehran may resume producing IR-1 centrifuges if its stock of replacement centrifuges "falls to 500 or below." After eight years, Iran can begin to manufacture two types of advanced centrifuges; after 10 years, Iran can produce complete versions of those centrifuges and store them under IAEA monitoring "until they are needed for final assembly."
·
Centrifuge R&D. The JCPOA also contains detailed restrictions on centrifuge R&D which last for at least 10 years. Moreover, Iran is to refrain for 10 years from pursuing R&D on any technologies other than gas centrifuge enrichment.

Oddly similar to the Korean deal. That you think Iran is somehow more trustworthy than Korea was is so cute...

 

[occupied]

As it is with any thing Obama does it is half assed and never well thought out!
Now these idiots that have given Obama the Iranian deal don't seem to recognize how totally incompetent and dangerous this "deal" will be for the rest of the world...including me!

See Zucker's film as it totally dismantles Obama's stupid "deal"!
New David Zucker Video Lambastes Iran Deal

View attachment 50209

David Zucker is not an expert. He's just a conservative, and all of you are lambasting the Ian deal, and know absolutely nothing about the details.

Try and tell me what's wrong with it, using specifics. If you even understand what all this means

Here is the text from the agreement, in summary:

The nuclear-related provisions of the agreement will extend the amount of time that Iran would need to produce enough weapons-grade HEU for one nuclear weapon to a minimum of one year, for a duration of at least 10 years.
38 In addition to the restrictions on activities related to fissile material production, the JCPOA prohibits Iranian "activities which could contribute to the design and development of a nuclear explosive device," including research and diagnostic activities.
The JCPOA sets out specific limitations on Iran’s enrichment of uranium for fixed durations. Iran must be reported by the IAEA to have completed most of the tasks below before qualifying for sanctions relief specified on Implementation Day.
·
Centrifuge Limitation. Tehran is to use no more than 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges to enrich uranium for 10 years, and to install only IR-1 centrifuges in the facility.
All excess centrifuges are to be used only as replacements for operating centrifuges and equipment.

·Level of Enrichment Limitation. Iran has agreed to refrain from producing enriched uranium containing more than 3.67% uranium-235 for at least 15 years.

·Facility Limitation. Iran has agreed to enrich uranium only at the Natanz commercial-scale facility for 15 years and to refrain during that time from building any new enrichment facilities.
·
LEU Stockpile Limitation. Iran has agreed to reduce its LEU stockpile to no more than 300 kilograms of LEU containing 3.67% uranium-235 for a 15 year period. Tehran has three options for disposing of the remaining portion of its current LEU stockpile: diluting the material so that it contains the same levels of uranium-235 found in natural uranium; selling the LEU to another country; or selling it to an international LEU bank recently established by the IAEA. Iran’s LEU containing between 5% and 20% uranium-235 is to be "fabricated into fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor or transferred, based on a commercial transaction, outside of Iran or diluted" so that it contains a maximum of 3.67% uranium-235. Iran is to export LEU that cannot be fabricated into fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor or dilute that LEU so that it contains a maximum of 3.67% uranium-235.

·Fordow Conversion. Iran has agreed to convert its Fordow enrichment facility into "a nuclear, physics, and technology centre." For 15 years, Iran will maintain no more than 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges at the facility, and will not conduct uranium enrichment or related research and development (R&D) there. The facility, which will not contain any nuclear material. 348 of the IR-1 centrifuges may be used to produce stable nuclear isotopes for medical and industrial uses.

· Centrifuge Production. With regard to centrifuge manufacturing, Iran for 10 years is to use the excess IR-1 centrifuges from the Natanz and Fordow facilities "for the replacement of failed or damaged machines." Tehran may resume producing IR-1 centrifuges if its stock of replacement centrifuges "falls to 500 or below." After eight years, Iran can begin to manufacture two types of advanced centrifuges; after 10 years, Iran can produce complete versions of those centrifuges and store them under IAEA monitoring "until they are needed for final assembly."
·
Centrifuge R&D. The JCPOA also contains detailed restrictions on centrifuge R&D which last for at least 10 years. Moreover, Iran is to refrain for 10 years from pursuing R&D on any technologies other than gas centrifuge enrichment.

Oddly similar to the Korean deal. That you think Iran is somehow more trustworthy than Korea was is so cute...

Iran is different than NKorea in one very important detail, they came to the negotiating table because they were getting very worried that the next round of civil unrest would be the end of them. NKorea can apparently starve it's people to death just to defy the west, Iran is getting restless just because the economy sucks and no one can do business.

 

[RedTeamTex]

North Korea has China on the other end of its leash to yank them into on the straight and narrow when the Chinese wish.

Iran has on the other ends of its leash Russian supplies, European business interest, and Indian demand for its natural gas. Not very good geometry for a stable deal dissuading a run for nuclear weaponry.

 

[occupied]

North Korea has China on the other end of its leash to yank them into on the straight and narrow when the Chinese wish.

Iran has on the other ends of its leash Russian supplies, European business interest, and Indian demand for its natural gas. Not very good geometry for a stable deal dissuading a run for nuclear weaponry.

I do not think Iran really wants a nuclear weapons program anymore, what they really want is to make some cash and not succumb to the unrest that is plaguing the other nations in the region. The terms of the deal are much better than I expected they would settle for. Add to that the easing of social restrictions and their own fight against ISIS and I see a major shift in their focus. Being a rogue nation is no longer benefiting their power structure as much as international trade would. It seems the sanctions worked.

 

[g5000]

New David Zucker Video Lambastes Iran Deal

Contains every glass of piss chugged down by the rubes. And you keep lining up for refills. Awesome.

So much bullshit, so little time.

 

[g5000]

First cup of piss: All sanctions removed.

Facts: Before the sanctions are lifted, Iran must destroy 98 percent of its enriched uranium, and all of its 5 to 20 percent enriched uranium, end all enrichment at Fordow, and remove more than two thirds of their centrifuges, including all their advanced centrifuges will "facilitate and accelerate" Iran's nuclear weapons program.


Full text of the Iran nuclear deal

There is the full text of the agreement. Read it instead of drinking the piss poured for you by your hack partisan media masters. Stop being mindless parrots of lies.

Here are all the things Iran must do before EU, UN, and US sanctions can be lifted:

Iran will implement the nuclear-related measures as specified in Annex I:
15. Paragraphs 3 and 10 from Section B on "Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor";
15. Paragraphs 14 and 15 from Section C on "Heavy Water Production Plant";
15. Paragraphs 27, 28, 29, 29.1 and 29.2 from Section F on "Enrichment Capacity";
15. Paragraphs 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 and 42 from Section G on "Centrifuges Research and Development";
15. Paragraphs 45, 46, 46.1, 46.2, 47.1, 48.1 from Section H on "Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant";
15. Paragraphs 52, 54 and 55 from Section I on "Other Aspects of Enrichment";
15. Paragraphs 57 and 58 from Section J on "Uranium Stocks and Fuels";
15. Paragraph 62 from Section K on "Centrifuge Manufacturing";
15. Complete the modalities and facilities-specific arrangements to allow the IAEA to implement all transparency measures provided for in Annex I;
15. Paragraphs 64 and 65 from Section L on "Additional Protocol and Modified Code 3.1";
15. Paragraphs 80.1 and 80.2 from Section R on "Centrifuge Component Manufacturing Transparency"; and
15. Within one year from Implementation Day, Iran will have completed the measures specified in paragraphs 47.2 and 48.2 of Section H on "Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant".

 

[g5000]

Second cup of piss: Some funds may be used for terror.

Fact: The US can implement sanctions against Iran for sponsoring terror, unrelated to the terms of the nuclear agreement. We have done this in the past, and can do it again.

 

[g5000]

Third cup of piss: Inspections delayed for 24 days.

Fact: Items 74 through 78 of the agreement deal with undeclared nuclear materials or activities. This is where the boneheads got the idea there are no snap inspections allowed of any kind.

They are wrong, and clearly have never read the agreement and are just being good little parroting rubes.



75. In furtherance of implementation of the JCPOA, if the IAEA has concerns regarding undeclared nuclear materials or activities, or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA, at locations that have not been declared under the comprehensive safeguards agreement or Additional Protocol, the IAEA will provide Iran the basis for such concerns and request clarification.

76. If Iran’s explanations do not resolve the IAEA’s concerns, the Agency may request access to such locations for the sole reason to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at such locations. The IAEA will provide Iran the reasons for access in writing and will make available relevant information.

77. Iran may propose to the IAEA alternative means of resolving the IAEA’s concerns that enable the IAEA to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at the location in question, which should be given due and prompt consideration

78. If the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA cannot be verified after the implementation of the alternative arrangements agreed by Iran and the IAEA, or if the two sides are unable to reach satisfactory arrangements to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at the specified locations within 14 days of the IAEA’s original request for access, Iran, in consultation with the members of the Joint Commission, would resolve the IAEA’s concerns through necessary means agreed between Iran and the IAEA. In the absence of an agreement, the members of the Joint Commission, by consensus or by a vote of 5 or more of its 8 members, would advise on the necessary means to resolve the IAEA's concerns. The process of consultation with, and any action by, the members of the Joint Commission would not exceed 7 days, and Iran would implement the necessary means within 3 additional days.

 

[g5000]

Fourth cup of piss: No access to military facilities.

I challenge anyone to present any treaty or agreement the US has ever signed in which we had unrestricted access to another sovereign country's military facilities.

Go ahead.