P F Tinmore, et al,
I don't think that the Security Cooperation (under Oslo Accords) represents a violation of international law. Instead, the move means something else entirely, a new strategy.
The Palestinian Authority (PA) know that there is a distinction between the legality of conduct during occupation --- versus --- the legality of the occupation [(
jus ad bellum v. jus in bello)(the criteria to determine whether entering into occupation is permissible --- versus --- the legal criteria in waging war). It would also set the conditions under which the internationally the criteria is met for the "occupation." Or even more simply it makes the distinction between the legality of the “extended occupation” --- 'v' --- the legality in the "use of force." AND determine the extent to which an "occupation" is maintained.
Abbas is yet to make the final decision but it looks likely...
A shrewd political move by the PLO in the wake of Nut&yahoo in congress?
Pressure on Nut&yahoo in the upcoming elections?
Suicide for the PLO?
Strangulation of Hamas from within?
PLO leadership votes to suspend security cooperation with Israel World news The Guardian
That's good. The security coordination violates domestic and international law.
The Palestinians regularly protest against the PA for working for Israel.
Which law would that be?
(COMMENT)
I think this is a move to demonstrate, for future legal use, that the PA can not be held accountable for any law and order issues in the territories occupied since 1967. This has to do with the legal definition of an "occupation" versus the common understanding by the layman. "Occupation law – in its early stages – was not aimed primarily at ensuring comprehensive protection for the individuals living under occupation; it concentrated on maintaining the sovereign rights of the ousted government until the conditions for its return were agreed upon by the belligerents." (See: ICRC:
Occupation and Other Forms of Administration of Foreign Territory) And this is directed related to the understanding of the conditions which legally describe an "Occupation:" the effective control of a foreign territory by hostile armed forces. (See: ICRC:
Article 42 of the Hague Regulations of 1907) which states that “Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.” And as such, an occupation is a factual situation and not subjective; to identify legal issues in the factual situation --- the question must first ask for the criteria under which the conditions for an "occupation" exists.
ICRC: Occupation and Other Forms of Administration of Foreign Territory said:
It was argued that requiring the foreign forces to concretely exercise authority (for instance, by establishing a provisional civil administration) would open the door to bad-faith interpretation of this criterion. Indeed, it would be enough for the occupier to refuse to assume its duties under the law in order to be seen as not actually exerting authority over the territory it had just invaded. Ultimately, such an approach could encourage the foreign forces to refrain from maintaining law and order or meeting the basic needs of the local population in order to not be seen as the occupying power. This would leave the local population without any protection since its own government would be incapable of governing the area and the foreign troops unwilling to do so.
(See: ICRC:
Occupation and Other Forms of Administration of Foreign Territory)
And this is the move to spread confusion on any task performed by the "occupation power" (in this case thought to be the Israelis), even if not a core task of duties under International Humanitarian Law, contribute to the running of the occupation, since it would – if nothing else – free the “uncontested” occupying power (the Israelis) from doing secondary tasks and allow them to focus on the main ones, such as enforcing law and order. Consequently, the actions of “cooperating” PA would appear to be in support of the occupying power and would make the task of determining the legal status and responsibilities of the PA particularly difficult, at least from the legal review perspective.
This is another case of the Arab Palestinian abdicating the opportunity to demonstrate abilities of governance and leadership --- and attempting to shift governance over to the Occupation Power (the Israelis) for the purpose of relieving themselves of any further meaning responsibilities. The
Article 43 of the Hague Convention, as supplemented by
Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, provides the basic initial construct requiring the Israelis to restore, and then maintain, law and order over the territory. The implementation of operations that focus on law and order measures would require a significant degree of control over the area or situation under scrutiny. The variations in control in the occupied territory, as exemplified by the Oslo agreements between the PA and Israel, would inevitably require the occupying power to reconsider its responses to threats posed by insurgent groups (Jihadist and Fedayeen).
Needless to say, this latest move by the PA forfeiting the responsibility for security cooperation is an attempt to muddy the waters. It creates a chicken and egg dilemma at to which comes first:
- Does "effective control" need to be establish first, before "law and order" functions are assumed?
- Does the "implementation" of "law and order" responsibilities demonstrate "effective control?"
And what impact does it have on the scope and nature of the occupation when the law enforcement and security apparatus of the occupied territory refuse to participate in law enforcement functions?
Most Respectfully,
R
