Dishonest? In what way? All I've pointed out is that the "plan" you keep referring to was drawn up under faulty assurances that the war in South Vietnam was going great! Something which Kennedy very quickly discovered was not the case. What you would have us believe is that the same man who drew a line in the sand one year earlier with the Soviets over Cuban missiles...risking WWIII and nuclear conflict...was going to simply walk away from South Vietnam and let it be taken by the communists?
The vast majority of historians have looked at what was happening prior to Kennedy's death and come to the conclusion that he had already turned away from a withdrawal from South Vietnam when he backed the coup that removed Diem from power.
The very definition of vacuous is to blame a President for policy change, TWO DAYS AFTER HE DIED. Policy does not operate on emotions, or on a whim. It is executive ORDERS. It can only be changes by ORDERS from a president. Kennedy gave no orders to change the policy of withdrawal of 1,000 troops by the end of 1963 and complete withdrawal by the end of 1965...win OR LOSE.
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As McNamara’s 1986 oral history, on deposit at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, makes clear (but his book does not), he was himself in the second group, who favored withdrawal without victory—not necessarily admitting or even predicting defeat, but accepting uncertainty as to what would follow. The denouement came shortly thereafter:
"After much debate, the president endorsed our recommendation to withdraw 1,000 men by December 31, 1963. He did so, I recall, without indicating his reasoning. In any event, because objections had been so intense and because I suspected others might try to get him to reverse the decision, I urged him to announce it publicly. That would set it in concrete. . . . The president finally agreed, and the announcement was released by Pierre Salinger after the meeting.'
On the day Kennedy died, the course of policy had been set. This is not speculation about a state of mind. It is a statement of fact about a decision.
JFK?s Vietnam Withdrawal Plan Is a Fact, Not Speculation
And once again your "proof" that JFK was going to withdraw 1,000 troops is Galbraith...a man who over the years has been one of the foremost authors of the Kennedy "myth"? Someone who views all things Kennedy through rose colored glasses?
Why even waste our time with this nonsense?
Set in concrete? How exactly? You mean to say if things changed...like if it was discovered that the reports about how well the war were going turned out to be wildly optimistic that Kennedy couldn't change his mind and not only not withdraw a thousand but send more? Would that be violating some sort of "Presidential law" that I'm not aware of? That Presidents aren't allowed to change their minds when it turns out that they were given bogus information?
It's not like Kennedy was known for his resolve on decisions, Bfgrn! The reason the Bay of Pigs was such a disaster was that Kennedy changed his mind at the last second and didn't provide the air support he originally agreed to. Funny how THAT guy...suddenly morphs into John "My Mind Is Made Up!" Kennedy on a decision to pull out troops. But that's what happens when you look at things with an agenda in mind. For folks like Galbraith the agenda is to make JFK the guy who was going to pull our troops out...even though Kennedy is REALLY the guy who escalated troop levels from under a thousand when he took office to sixteen thousand when he was killed!
The proof is in the official documents of policy.
On October 2, 1963, as we have previously seen, President Kennedy made clear his determination to implement those plans—to withdraw 1,000 troops by the end of 1963, and to get almost all the rest out by the end of 1965. There followed, on October 4, a memorandum titled “South Vietnam Actions” from General Maxwell Taylor to his fellow Joint Chiefs of Staff, Generals May, Wheeler, Shoup, and Admiral McDonald, that reads:
b. The program currently in progress to train Vietnamese forces will be reviewed and accelerated as necessary to insure that all essential functions visualized to be required for the projected operational environment, to include those now performed by U.S. military units and personnel, can be assumed properly by the Vietnamese by the end of calendar year 1965.
All planning will be directed towards preparing RVN forces for the withdrawal of all U.S. special assistance units and personnel by the end of calendar year 1965. (Emphasis added.)
“All planning” is an unconditional phrase. There is no contingency here, or elsewhere in this memorandum. The next paragraph reads:
c. Execute the plan to withdraw 1,000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963 per your DTG 212201Z July, and as approved for planning by JCS DTG 062042Z September.
Previous guidance on the public affairs annex is altered to the extent that the action will now be treated in low key, as the initial increment of U.S. forces whose presence is no longer required because (a) Vietnamese forces have been trained to assume the function involved; or (b) the function for which they came to Vietnam has been completed. (Emphasis added.)
This resolves the question of how the initial withdrawal was to be carried out. It was not to be a noisy or cosmetic affair, designed to please either U.S. opinion or to change policies in Saigon. It was rather to be a low-key, matter-of-fact beginning to a process that would play out over the following two years. The final paragraph of Taylor’s memorandum underlines this point by directing that “specific checkpoints will be established now against which progress can be evaluated on a quarterly basis.” There is much more in the JCS documents to show that Kennedy was well aware of the evidence that South Vietnam was, in fact, losing the war. But it hardly matters. The withdrawal decided on was unconditional, and did not depend on military progress or lack of it.
The Escalation at KennedyÂ’s Death
Four days after Kennedy was killed, NSAM 273 incorporated the new president’s directives into policy. It made clear that the objectives of Johnson’s policy remained the same as Kennedy’s: “to assist the people and government of South Vietnam to win their contest against the externally directed and supported Communist conspiracy” through training support and without the application of overt U.S. military force. But Johnson had also approved intensified planning for covert action against North Vietnam by CIA-supported South Vietnamese forces.
With this, McNamara confirms one of Newman’s central claims: NSAM 273 changed policy. Yes, the “central objectives” remained the same: a Vietnamese war with no “overt U.S. military force.” But covert force is still “U.S. military force.” And that was introduced or at least first approved, as McNamara writes, by NSAM 273 within four days of Kennedy’s assassination.Moreover, McNamara effectively supports Newman on the meaning of NSAM 273’s seventh paragraph, which was inserted in the draft (as we have seen) sometime between November 21 and 26—after the Honolulu meeting had adjourned and probably after Kennedy died.