New Game-Changing Book on Gen. George B. McClellan

[mikegriffith1]

Every now and then, a book comes along that has new information that causes a sea-state change among scholars on the subject. Last year, Civil War historians Gene Thorp and Alex Rossino arguably published just such a book with their book The Tale Untwisted: General George B. McClellan, the Maryland Campaign, and the Discovery of Lee’s Lost Orders, published by the prestigious Civil War publishing house Savas Publishing.

Using newly discovered documentary evidence, Thorp and Rossino explode the traditional tale that McClellan waited 18 hours after receiving Lee's lost orders. They also indisputably refute the Radical Republican myth that McClellan moved his army only 6 miles per day in pursuit of Lee's army before the Battle of Antietam and that McClellan caused the capture of the Harpers Ferry garrison.

Thorp and Rossino's case is so well documented and convincing that none other than James McPherson, arguably the leading Civil War historian in the last 50 years, has endorsed the book, saying that if he were writing his book on Antietam today, he would follow Thorp and Rossino's account:

“Thorp and Rossino make a very persuasive case for McClellan having received the Lost Orders in mid-afternoon and sending his dispatch to Lincoln at midnight on September 13, 1862. If I were writing my Antietam book today, I would follow their account.”

Another leading Civil War historian, D. Scott Hartwig, has also praised the book:

“A clear, extremely well-researched study exploring when Lee’s famous ‘Lost Orders,’ S.O. 191, came into McClellan’s possession and how he responded to them. It is good history and anyone with an interest in the 1862 Maryland Campaign will find it a fascinating and illuminating read.”

Those of you who follow Civil War scholarship know that when two heavyweights like McPherson and Hartwig endorse a book that defends McClellan, that book must be very convincing. Liberal historians have been especially hard on McClellan because he opposed waging war on Southern civilians, because he ran against Lincoln in the 1864 presidential election, and because he opposed Radical Reconstruction after the war. This is why it is especially telling that McPherson, an ardent neo-Radical Republican historian, has endorsed Thorp and Rossino's book. McPherson deserves great credit for being honest and open minded enough to admit he has been wrong about McClellan's actions at Antietam.

Over the last few decades, the pendulum had already begun to swing away from the traditional, Radical Republican-created portrait of McClellan as a slow, dawdling, timid general. The first big step in the swing began with Dr. Ethan Rafuse's seminal 2005 study McClellan's War, which debunked every criticism of McClellan's leadership and actions starting with his siege of Yorktown to his campaign against Lee's army in Virginia after Antietam. The swing received another strong push with Civil War scholar Steven Stotelmyer's exhaustively detailed 2022 book Too Useful to Sacrifice: Reconsidering George B. McClellan's Generalship in the Maryland Campaign from South Mountain to Antietam, which powerfully answers the traditional criticisms of McClellan's handling of the Battle of Antietam and received positive reviews in most Civil War journals.

For those who might be interested, here is my defense of McClellan:

Answering Some Criticisms of General George B. McClellan

answering_criticisms_of_mcclellan (text-only version)

 

[CrusaderFrank]

Every now and then, a book comes along that has new information that causes a sea-state change among scholars on the subject. Last year, Civil War historians Gene Thorp and Alex Rossino arguably published just such a book with their book The Tale Untwisted: General George B. McClellan, the Maryland Campaign, and the Discovery of Lee’s Lost Orders, published by the prestigious Civil War publishing house Savas Publishing.

Using newly discovered documentary evidence, Thorp and Rossino explode the traditional tale that McClellan waited 18 hours after receiving Lee's lost orders. They also indisputably refute the Radical Republican myth that McClellan moved his army only 6 miles per day in pursuit of Lee's army before the Battle of Antietam and that McClellan caused the capture of the Harpers Ferry garrison.

Thorp and Rossino's case is so well documented and convincing that none other than James McPherson, arguably the leading Civil War historian in the last 50 years, has endorsed the book, saying that if he were writing his book on Antietam today, he would follow Thorp and Rossino's account:

“Thorp and Rossino make a very persuasive case for McClellan having received the Lost Orders in mid-afternoon and sending his dispatch to Lincoln at midnight on September 13, 1862. If I were writing my Antietam book today, I would follow their account.”

Another leading Civil War historian, D. Scott Hartwig, has also praised the book:

“A clear, extremely well-researched study exploring when Lee’s famous ‘Lost Orders,’ S.O. 191, came into McClellan’s possession and how he responded to them. It is good history and anyone with an interest in the 1862 Maryland Campaign will find it a fascinating and illuminating read.”

Those of you who follow Civil War scholarship know that when two heavyweights like McPherson and Hartwig endorse a book that defends McClellan, that book must be very convincing. Liberal historians have been especially hard on McClellan because he opposed waging war on Southern civilians, because he ran against Lincoln in the 1864 presidential election, and because he opposed Radical Reconstruction after the war. This is why it is especially telling that McPherson, an ardent neo-Radical Republican historian, has endorsed Thorp and Rossino's book. McPherson deserves great credit for being honest and open minded enough to admit he has been wrong about McClellan's actions at Antietam.

Over the last few decades, the pendulum had already begun to swing away from the traditional, Radical Republican-created portrait of McClellan as a slow, dawdling, timid general. The first big step in the swing began with Dr. Ethan Rafuse's seminal 2005 study McClellan's War, which debunked every criticism of McClellan's leadership and actions starting with his siege or Yorktown to his campaign against Lee's army in Virginia after Antietam. The swing received another strong push with Civil War scholar Steven Stotelmyer's exhaustively detailed 2022 book Too Useful to Sacrifice: Reconsidering George B. McClellan's Generalship in the Maryland Campaign from South Mountain to Antietam, which powerfully answers the traditional criticisms of McClellan's handling of the Battle of Antietam and received positive reviews in most Civil War journals.

For those who might be interested, here is my defense of McClellan:

Answering Some Criticisms of General George B. McClellan

Great OP!

I got a “not available” for your link

 

[mikegriffith1]

Great OP!

I got a “not available” for your link

Huh, that's odd. Try this link instead:

answering_criticisms_of_mcclellan

Answering Some Criticisms of General George B. McClellan Michael T. Griffith 2022 @All Rights Reserved Third Edition Anyone who wants to fairly and accurately judge George B. McClellan as a combat commander must understand that Civil War history has been heavily politicized almost since the day

sites.google.com

This version doesn't have the photos, and has no page numbers, but it has all the same text.

 

[1srelluc]

I don't think he moved all that quick due to still suffering from the faulty intelligence that Lee's Army was substantially larger than his.

The bottom line was that he was not near the risk taker that Lee was. Then again Lee had to take risks because he knew what he was up against.....A much stronger force growing stronger (and more experienced) by the day with no end to that growth in sight.....It must have been really daunting.

 

[mikegriffith1]

I don't think he moved all that quick due to still suffering from the faulty intelligence that Lee's Army was substantially larger than his.

This myth was debunked years ago, and Thorp and Rossino destroy it even more thoroughly.

And McClellan's intel about Lee's army was not off by much. McClellan's enemies in the War Department later underestimated the size of Lee's army by quite a bit. We should also keep in mind that a huge chunk of McClellan's army consisted of new or recent recruits who had little or no experience, whereas most of Lee's soldiers were veterans.

The bottom line was that he was not near the risk taker that Lee was. Then again Lee had to take risks because he knew what he was up against.....A much stronger force growing stronger (and more experienced) by the day with no end to that growth in sight.....It must have been really daunting.

You might want to do a bit more reading on the subject. You could start with my article on McClellan. McClellan took plenty of risks, but never reckless risks.

 

[1srelluc]

This myth was debunked years ago, and Thorp and Rossino destroy it even more thoroughly.

And McClellan's intel about Lee's army was not off by much. McClellan's enemies in the War Department later underestimated the size of Lee's army by quite a bit. We should also keep in mind that a huge chunk of McClellan's army consisted of new or recent recruits who had little or no experience, whereas most of Lee's soldiers were veterans.


You might want to do a bit more reading on the subject. You could start with my article on McClellan. McClellan took plenty of risks, but never reckless risks.

Reads a lot like revisionist clap-trap.....Why people try to "rehabilitate" McClellan every so often is beyond me.

McClellan served at useful purpose at the time but letting Lee's Army escape back into Virginia was simply unforgivable and no amount of "rehabilitation" will ever erase that fact.....What went before turned pretty moot after that failure.

Meh, glad he failed or there may have been fewer branches on my family tree.

 

[mikegriffith1]

Reads a lot like revisionist clap-trap.....

Oh, here we go with the "revisionist" dodge. So just call it "revisionist" and dismiss it, hey? Well, gee, I guess McPherson and Hartwig are now "revisionists," right?

Facts are facts, and if new facts require us to "revise" our previous belief about an issue, then we can either ignore the facts with the dodge that they are "revisionist" or we can face the facts and acknowledge reality.

Why people try to "rehabilitate" McClellan every so often is beyond me.

What an odd mindset you have. Scholars are revising their view of McClellan because a growing number of them are realizing that the traditional view of McClellan is based on blatant falsehoods that came from McClellan's rabid political enemies.

McClellan served at useful purpose at the time but letting Lee's Army escape back into Virginia was simply unforgivable and no amount of "rehabilitation" will ever erase that fact.....What went before turned pretty moot after that failure.

"Letting Lee's army escape back into Virginia"??? What in the world??? You don't know what you're talking about. McClellan hotly pursued Lee's army into Virginia and was on the verge of routing it because he had carried out a brilliant maneuver that had forced Lee to split his army. I quote from my article on McClellan:

To this day Lincoln’s reason for removing McClellan on November 7
remains a subject of debate. Why? Because not only had McClellan just won three important battles in a row, but Lincoln relieved McClellan just as he was in the middle of carrying out what Edward Hagerman calls “one of the most impressive strategic movements of the war” (The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare, Indiana University Press, 1998, p. 64). McClellan had maneuvered Lee into dividing his army and was in position to achieve a decisive victory. It was just at this point that Lincoln relieved McClellan of command and turned the army over to General Ambrose Burnside. Burnside then abandoned McClellan’s plan of operations, allowed Lee to recombine his army, and soon led the Army of the Potomac to a horrendous defeat at the Battle of Fredericksburg, where he launched foolish frontal assaults against strong defensive positions.

I'm guessing you didn't bother to read my article, much less read Thorp and Rossino's book or Stotelmyer's book or Rafuse's book--or any of the many other books that correct the record about McClellan. Even many neutral scholars have observed that the firing of McClellan on November 7 was baffling and baseless given what McClellan had just accomplished.

Lee only managed to avoid getting trapped in Maryland after Antietam because he carried out a frantic, desperately hurried retreat, something he had never had to do before. McClellan moved as quickly as possible to pursue Lee into Virginia, caught up with him, and then, as mentioned, carried out a cunning maneuver that forced Lee to split his army.

As if willing to do anything to keep McClellan from crushing Lee's army and ending the war "too soon," Stanton talked Lincoln into firing McClellan at exactly this point: just after he had forced Lee to split his army and just before McClellan was about to pounce on it.

Even worse, Stanton talked Lincoln into handing the army over to the feckless, incompetent Ambrose Burnside. Burnside, to his credit, furiously objected to McClellan's firing and strenuously argued that he should be left in command.

Meh, glad he failed or there may have been fewer branches on my family tree.

Huh? Yeah, well, enjoy your closed mind, and don't read anything that will present facts that refute the myths you want to believe about McClellan.

 

[whitehall]

Why is it a "radical republican" myth? Lincoln was a republican and one of his most famous quotes regarding little Mac was "if you aren't going to use the army can I borrow it for a while".

 

[mikegriffith1]

Why is it a "radical republican" myth? Lincoln was a republican and one of his most famous quotes regarding little Mac was "if you aren't going to use the army can I borrow it for a while".

Obviously, you did not bother to read my article on McClellan, and I wonder if you even bothered to read the OP.

Lincoln was no Radical Republican. The Radicals detested Lincoln and actually accused him of treason over his mild version of Reconstruction and over other issues (such as his veto of the Radical-backed Wade-Davis Bill). The Radicals rejoiced over Lincoln's death (and some of them may have been behind his death: LINK, LINK).

For all his great qualities, Lincoln was totally clueless when it came to military matters, a fact that he finally realized after he put Ulysses S. Grant in charge of the Army of the Potomac. Lincoln was constantly fed false information about McClellan by his Radical-loving Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton, and he didn't know enough about military operations to realize how badly Stanton was lying to him.

Read my article on McClellan: LINK.

Better yet, read Thorp and Rossino's book, which has caused even neo-Radical historian James McPherson to change his mind about McClellan (see the OP).

 

[whitehall]

Obviously, you did not bother to read my article on McClellan, and I wonder if you even bothered to read the OP.

Lincoln was no Radical Republican. The Radicals detested Lincoln and actually accused him of treason over his mild version of Reconstruction and over other issues (such as his veto of the Radical-backed Wade-Davis Bill). The Radicals rejoiced over Lincoln's death (and some of them may have been behind his death: LINK, LINK).

For all his great qualities, Lincoln was totally clueless when it came to military matters, a fact that he finally realized after he put Ulysses S. Grant in charge of the Army of the Potomac. Lincoln was constantly fed false information about McClellan by his Radical-loving Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton, and he didn't know enough about military operations to realize how badly Stanton was lying to him.

Read my article on McClellan: LINK.

Better yet, read Thorp and Rossino's book, which has caused even neo-Radical historian James McPherson to change his mind about McClellan (see the OP).

It's true that Lincoln was clueless and had bad advice. Maybe they ought to leave little Mac alone and do a game changing book on Lincoln.

 

[mikegriffith1]

It's true that Lincoln was clueless and had bad advice. Maybe they ought to leave little Mac alone and do a game changing book on Lincoln.

But Lincoln did learn his lesson after he saw the disasters that occurred after he fired McClellan for the second time, and after he saw that General Grant was often even more deliberate and careful in his preparations for military operations than McClellan had been. Lincoln even later admitted to Grant that he knew "nothing" about military operations and tactics, and he never withheld promised forces from Grant, or denied Grant's requests for additional troops, or questioned Grant's preparation pauses.

For those who prefer video to reading, here's a video by Gene Thorp in which he summarizes the key points from his and Rossino's research on McClellan's response to the finding of Lee's lost orders--this is much of the same material that is in his and Rossino's book: