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It was suicide to initiate a 2-front war with the soviets before defeating BritainMaybe and maybe not. But with the plan to attack the Soviets, they did what made the most militarian decision.
How when the RAF was getting stronger every day and the Luftwaffe was getting weaker? The RAF had a deep pool of bomber pilots to draw upon as well as foreign pilot refugees who were combat veterans and highly skilled. Messerschmidt was operating on a peacetime footing while Hawker, Supermarine and Rolls Royce were opening "shadow factories" that were cranking out fighters and engines.Thats all true
but still the germans had enough reserves to win if they pushed on in spite of the losses
The germans were expending their strength attacking British cities instead of the airfieldsHow when the RAF was getting stronger every day and the Luftwaffe was getting weaker? The RAF had a deep pool of bomber pilots to draw upon as well as foreign pilot refugees who were combat veterans and highly skilled. Messerschmidt was operating on a peacetime footing while Hawker, Supermarine and Rolls Royce were opening "shadow factories" that were cranking out fighters and engines.
Not at first. All the resources the Luftwaffe had was directed at Chain Home and Fighter Command. Hitting the cities came later.The germans were expending their strength attacking British cities instead of the airfields
Yes I knowNot at first. All the resources the Luftwaffe had was directed at Chain Home and Fighter Command. Hitting the cities came later.
The RAF wasn't getting stronger every day. When the Luftwaffe was concentrating on the airfields the RAF was losing ground. Aircraft were becoming in short supply and they were beginning to lose pilots because of wounds.How when the RAF was getting stronger every day and the Luftwaffe was getting weaker? The RAF had a deep pool of bomber pilots to draw upon as well as foreign pilot refugees who were combat veterans and highly skilled. Messerschmidt was operating on a peacetime footing while Hawker, Supermarine and Rolls Royce were opening "shadow factories" that were cranking out fighters and engines.
The Luftwaffe started the BoB with just shy of fifteen hundred fighters, three hundred and fifty seven of which were Bf-110s that needed escorts of their own if they were going to survive in British skies. So you can actually subtract them from the total. That leaves one thousand one hundred seven usable fighters. The RAF started with nine hundred three fighters, of which one hundred forty nine were two seaters ranging from Fulmars which were marginally useful to Boulton Paul Defiants and Blackburn Rocs which were useless. That means the actual useful fighters strength was about 1107 for the Luftwaffe and 750 for the RAF. Seeing that Chain Home allowed the RAF to achieve parity or superiority at will on any single raid, those numbers favor the RAF. The Luftwaffe had to escort every raid while Fighter Command could pick and choose which raids to oppose. The Luftwaffe lost eight hundred seventy fighters to the RAF’s one thousand twenty three. Fighter command actually gained strength and had more fighters at the end of the BoB than it started with. The Luftwaffe was weaker at the end than the beginning with no increase in production rates from peacetime, the Luftwaffe’s fighter force was reduced by thirty percent from the beginning of the battle, the bomber force was reduced by twenty five percent, while the RAF’s strength actually increased by a small margin despite taking heavier losses. If Leigh-Mallory had been taken in hand by Dowding and his “ big wings” broken up and actually committed to battle instead of stooging around trying to assemble for attacks, the Luftwaffe’s losses would have been far worse,The RAF wasn't getting stronger every day. When the Luftwaffe was concentrating on the airfields the RAF was losing ground. Aircraft were becoming in short supply and they were beginning to lose pilots because of wounds.
Yes, they would come back, but the majority after the BoB.
The P-38 could run rings around any make of Me109 at altitudes of 15,000 feet or less. With the Fowler flaps it could turn inside a 109 with ease. It could out turn a Zero.
The RAF wasn't getting stronger every day. When the Luftwaffe was concentrating on the airfields the RAF was losing ground. Aircraft were becoming in short supply and they were beginning to lose pilots because of wounds.
Yes, they would come back, but the majority after the BoB.
And they failed to intercept a large percentage of the time.If the Brits would have kept their air bases where they were in range of the 109s, you would be right. But using Chain Home to alert them, the Brits could be based just outside the Luftwaffe range and not waste fuel and pilot fatigue on searching for the best was to counter the Luftwaffe.
Read any book on the BoB.I think I need a cite to that one.
Wrong, here is a cite : "Read any book on the BoB.
At the end of the Battle, yes. At the beginning it was around 50%. The issues arise when you look at who is intercepting who. A flight of 12 intercepting 100+ aircraft isn't exactly a good option.Wrong, here is a cite : "
90%
During the Battle of Britain, the interception rates of the Royal Air Force (RAF) were over 90%123. This was due to the Dowding system, which allowed the RAF to maintain such high rates of successful interceptions. In contrast, during the preceding Battle of France, the RAF's interception rates were typically around 30%" "The Dowding system is considered key to the success of the RAF against the German air force (Luftwaffe) during the Battle of Britain. The combination of early detection and rapid dissemination of that information acted as a force multiplier, allowing the fighter force to be used at extremely high rates of effectiveness. In the pre-war period, interception rates of 30% to 50% were considered excellent; that meant that over half the sorties sent out would return without having encountered the enemy. During the Battle, average rates were around 90%, and several raids were met with 100% success rates.<a href="Dowding system - Wikipedia"><span>[</span>3<span>]</span></a> Lacking their own direction system, Luftwaffe fighters had little information on the location of their RAF counterparts, and often returned to base having never seen them. When they did, the RAF fighters were almost always in an advantageous position." That is from Wikki, but if you look there are numerous articles that agree with those numbers.
German raids were rarely a hundred plus. Usually they were a group escorted by a squadron of fighters.At the end of the Battle, yes. At the beginning it was around 50%. The issues arise when you look at who is intercepting who. A flight of 12 intercepting 100+ aircraft isn't exactly a good option.
Oh, that was the norm at the beginning. Between the fighter escort, and the bomber forces, not to mention the diversions raids.German raids were rarely a hundred plus. Usually they were a group escorted by a squadron of fighters.
So? A dozen Hurricanes would really mess up a diversionary raid. Mess up enough diversionary raids and the crews in them will get timid and turn back at the first sign of opposition. The German crews weren’t like the Japanese who would push through regardless of opposition taking huge losses in the process.Oh, that was the norm at the beginning. Between the fighter escort, and the bomber forces, not to mention the diversions raids.
A diversionary raid would number 50 or more aircraft. The RAF rarely was able to send up a full squadron, spares were in short supply.So? A dozen Hurricanes would really mess up a diversionary raid. Mess up enough diversionary raids and the crews in them will get timid and turn back at the first sign of opposition. The German crews weren’t like the Japanese who would push through regardless of opposition taking huge losses in the process.