We are right now a carbon copy of this lost decade: Same economic problems, same economic circumstances that brought us to this economic collapse.
Japan in the 1980's had the stock market of all time. Property values were also sky-rocketing, selling vacant land at about $50,000.00 per sq. foot. Of course, their stock market crashed & property values dropped to 5% of their prior value. Bank loaning practices were as bad as we have seen with Freddie/Fannie--they too were lending to people who could not afford to re-pay the loans.
The government of Japan--threw billions in spending back into the economy. IT DIDN'T WORK.
It lasted for 10 years, each new Prime Minister kept throwing government money at the problem in new spending bills to re-vitalize it. Finally a conservative Prime Minister, told the truth to the citizens of Japan--that they were going to go through some pain. The government stopped throwing money at the problem & the economy RECOVERED.
Barack Obama's theory is that Japan did not act fast enough in throwing money at the economy to revive it. That's why he is determined to rush this bill through.
Many other economists disagree--stating that when the government stopped trying to solve the problem by throwing billions at it, is finally when Japan's economy came back.
DID YOU KNOW: The United States also had a lost decade. It was called the Great Depression. President Hoover a republican & President Roosevelt a democrat, both threw billions at road, bridge & dam projects. They didn't work. It was WW2 that eventually brought us out of the Great Depression.
I found this interesting article that also talks about the comparisons of the Japanese crisis of the past and the current US crisis:
" TOKYO — The Obama administration is committing huge sums of money to rescuing banks,
but the veterans of Japan’s banking crisis have three words for the Americans: more money, faster.
The Japanese have been here before. They endured a “lost decade” of economic stagnation in the 1990s as their banks labored under crippling debt, and successive governments wasted trillions of yen on half-measures.
Only in 2003 did the government finally take the actions that helped lead to a recovery: forcing major banks to submit to merciless audits and declare bad debts; spending two trillion yen to effectively nationalize a major bank, wiping out its shareholders; and allowing weaker banks to fail.
By then, Tokyo’s main Nikkei stock index had lost almost three-quarters of its value. The country’s public debt had grown to exceed its gross domestic product, and deflation stalked the land. In the end, real estate prices fell for 15 consecutive years.
More alarming? Some students of the Japanese debacle say they see a similar train wreck heading for the United States.
“I thought America had studied Japan’s failures,” said Hirofumi Gomi, a top official at Japan’s Financial Services Agency during the crisis. “Why is it making the same mistakes?”
Many American critics of the plan unveiled Tuesday by Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner said the plan lacked details. Experts on Japan found it timid — especially given the size of the banking crisis the administration faces.
“I think they know how big it is, but they don’t want to say how big it is. It’s so big they can’t acknowledge it,” said John H. Makin, an economist at the American Enterprise Institute, referring to administration officials. “The lesson from Japan in the 1990s was that they should have stepped up and nationalized the banks.”
Instead, the Japanese first tried many of the same remedies that the Bush administration tried and the Obama administration is trying — ultra-low interest rates, fiscal stimulus and ineffective cash infusions, among other things. The Japanese even tried to tap private capital to buy some of the bad assets from banks, as Mr. Geithner proposed.
One reason Japan’s leaders were so ineffectual for so long was their fear of stoking public outrage. With each act of the bailout, anger grew, making politicians more reluctant to force real reform, which only delayed the day of reckoning and increased the ultimate price tag. Japanese taxpayers are estimated to have recouped less than half what it cost the government to bail out the banks.
A further lesson from Japan is that the bank rescue will determine the fate of the wider economy. While President Obama has prioritized his stimulus plan, no stimulus is likely to succeed unless the banking sector is repaired.
The Japanese crisis of the 1990s and early 2000s had roots similar to the American crisis: a real estate bubble that collapsed, leaving banks holding trillions of yen in loans that were virtually worthless.
Initially, Japan’s leaders underestimated how badly the real estate collapse would hurt the country’s banks. As in the United States, a policy of easy money had fueled both stock and real estate speculation, as well as reckless lending by banks.
Many in Japan thought that low interest rates and economic stimulus measures would help banks recover on their own. In late 1997, however, a string of bank failures set off a crippling credit crisis.
Prodded into action, the government injected 1.8 trillion yen into Japan’s main banks. But the injections — too small, poorly planned and based on little understanding of the extent of the banking sector’s woes — failed to stem the growing crisis.
Fearing more bad news if banks were forced to disclose their real losses, Japan’s leaders allowed banks to keep loans to “zombie” companies on their balance sheets.
Japan, instead, experimented with a series of funds, in part privately financed, to relieve banks of their bad assets.
The funds brought limited results at best, says Takeo Hoshi, economics professor at the University of California, San Diego. For one thing, the funds were too small to make an impact. The depository for bad loans had no orderly way to sell them off. And the purchases that did take place failed to recapitalize banks because the bad assets were priced so low.
So far, the Obama administration’s plan avoids the hardest decisions, like nationalizing banks, wiping out shareholders or allowing banks to collapse under the weight of their own bad debts. In the end, Japan had to do all those things.
Economists say these blunders meant Japan’s financial system did not start to recover until late 2002, six years after the crisis broke. That year, the government of the reformist leader Junichiro Koizumi ordered a tough audit of the country’s top banks.
Called the Takenaka Plan after Heizo Takenaka, who headed the government’s financial reform efforts, the move finally brought the full extent of bad loans to light. Initially, banks lashed out at Mr. Takenaka. “The government can’t order bank management to do this and that,” Yoshifumi Nishikawa, president of the Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group, complained to the press in October 2002. “It’s absolutely absurd.”
But Mr. Takenaka stood firm. His rallying cry, he said in an interview on Wednesday, was, “Don’t cover up. Don’t distort principles. Follow the rules.”
“I told the banks clearly, ‘I am in a position to supervise you,’ ” Mr. Takenaka said. “I told them I am not open to negotiation.”
It took three more years to finally get the majority of bad loans off the banks’ books. Resona Bank, which was found to have insufficient capital, was effectively nationalized.
From 1992 to 2005, Japanese banks wrote off about 96 trillion yen, or about 19 percent of the country’s annual G.D.P. But Mr. Takenaka’s toughness restored faith in the banks.
“That was a turning point in the banking crisis,” said Mr. Gomi of the Financial Services Agency, who worked with Mr. Takenaka on the audits.
By then, other factors had fallen into place that aided economic recovery, including a boom in exports to the United States and China.
(Those very share holdings would come back to haunt banks, as the recent market sell-off batters their balance sheets. And as the economy worsens, bad loans are again on the rise, the Financial Services Agency said Tuesday.)
The United States will probably not be able to count on growing demand for its products, since the global economy is worsening.
“The way things are going right now,” said Mr. Hoshi, “the U.S. taxpayers’ burden will keep going up and up.” "
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/13/business/economy/13yen.html?ref=business
Also very interesting is this article (but it is to big to post completely):
" ...
In a nutshell, Japan’s experience suggests that infrastructure spending, while a blunt instrument, can help revive a developed economy, say many economists and one very important American official: Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner, who was a young financial attaché in Japan during the collapse and subsequent doldrums. One lesson Mr. Geithner has said he took away from that experience is that spending must come in quick, massive doses, and be continued until recovery takes firm root.
...
Moreover, they say, any direct comparison of Japan and the United States is inevitably misleading, because Japan has spent so much more over the years on infrastructure. Having neglected its roads, bridges, water treatment plants and more over the years, the United States is bound to generate a greater payback for such spending than would Japan.
Beyond that, proponents of Keynesian-style stimulus spending in the United States say that Japan’s approach failed to accomplish more not because of waste but because it was never tried wholeheartedly. They argue that instead of making one big push to pump up the economy with economic shock therapy, Japan spread its spending out over several years, diluting the effects. ..."
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/06/w...nce/Times Topics/People/G/Geithner, Timothy F.
It s good to know that we have an guy with experience with that situation at the highest possible economic position in the US, I think we probably couldn't have had a better guy at that spot right now (despite his tax-problems).