Ethics and The A-Bomb

[RetiredGySgt]

Document 17: Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew to the President, "Analysis of Memorandum Presented by Mr. Hoover," June 13, 1945
Source: Record Group 107, Office of the Secretary of War, Formerly Top Secret Correspondence of Secretary of War Stimson ("Safe File"), July 1940-September 1945, box 8, Japan (After December 7/41)

A former ambassador to Japan, Grew’s knowledge of Japanese politics and culture informed his critical stance toward the concept of unconditional surrender. He believed it essential that the United States declare its intention to preserve the institution of the emperor. As he argued in this memorandum to President Truman, “failure on our part to clarify our intentions” on the status of the emperor “will insure prolongation of the war and cost a large number of human lives.” Documents like this have played a role in arguments developed by Alperovitz that Truman and his advisers had alternatives to using the bomb such as modifying unconditional surrender and that anti-Soviet considerations weighed most heavily in their thinking. By contrast, Herbert P. Bix has argued that the Japanese leadership would “probably not” have “surrendered if the Truman administration had clarified the status of the emperor” when it demanded unconditional surrender.[15]

one document.

 

[RetiredGySgt]

Document 18: Memorandum from Chief of Staff Marshall to the Secretary of War, 15 June 1945, enclosing "Memorandum of Comments on 'Ending the Japanese War,'" June 14, 1945
Source: Record Group 107, Office of the Secretary of War, Formerly Top Secret Correspondence of Secretary of War Stimson ("Safe File"), July 1940-September 1945, box 8, Japan (After December 7/41)

Commenting on another memorandum by Herbert Hoover, George A. Lincoln discussed war aims, face-saving proposals for Japan, and the nature of the proposed declaration to the Japanese government, including the problem of defining “unconditional surrender.” Lincoln argued against modifying the concept of unconditional surrender: if it is “phrased so as to invite negotiation” he saw risks of prolonging the war or a “compromise peace.” J. Samuel Walker has observed that those risks help explain why senior officials were unwilling to modify the demand for unconditional surrender.[16]

Another document.

 

[Samson]

Straight up LIE. The Japanese NEVER offered a surrender. They offered an end to hostilities. You are either lying or a fool. Even after the first bomb they never offered to surrender.

The Army ran the Government and REFUSED to surrender. Even after 2 bombs they REFUSED to surrender. The only reason they did surrender is because the Emperor intervened.

They are lying AND they are fools.

Half-quotes, and idiot quotes seem to be their only resouce.

meh.....[unsubscribe]....anyone who wants to continue to read these morons posts is welcome to it. They're beginning to bore me.

 

[RetiredGySgt]

Document 28: Combined Chiefs of Staff, “Estimate of the Enemy Situation (as of 6 July 1945, C.C.S 643/3, July 8, 1945, Secret (Appendices Not Included)
Source: RG 218, Central Decimal Files, 1943-1945, CCS 381 (6-4-45), Sec. 2 Pt. 5

This review of Japanese capabilities and intentions portrays an economy and society under “tremendous strain”; nevertheless, “the ground component of the Japanese armed forces remains Japan’s greatest military asset.” Alperovitz sees statements in this estimate about the impact of Soviet entry into the war and the possibility of a conditional surrender involving survival of the emperor as an institution as more evidence that the policymakers saw alternatives to nuclear weapons use. By contrast, Richard Frank takes note of the estimate’s depiction of the Japanese army’s terms for peace: “for surrender to be acceptable to the Japanese army it would be necessary for the military leaders to believe that it would not entail discrediting the warrior tradition and that it would permit the ultimate resurgence of a military in Japan.” That, Frank argues, would have been “unacceptable to any Allied policy maker”.[21]

And another.

 

[RetiredGySgt]

Document 33: "Magic" – Diplomatic Summary, War Department, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, No. 1210 – July 17, 1945, Top Secret Ultra
Source: Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, "Magic" Diplomatic Summaries 1942-1945, box 18.

Another intercept of a cable from Togo to Sato shows that the Foreign Minister rejected unconditional surrender and that the emperor was not “asking the Russian’s mediation in anything like unconditional surrender.” Incidentally, this “Magic’ Diplomatic Summary” indicates the broad scope and capabilities of the program; for example, it includes translations of intercepted French messages (see pages 8-9). [Page 14 missing from original]

NO unconditional Surrender allowed.

 

[RetiredGySgt]

Document 42: Diary Entry, July 24, 1945, "Japanese Peace Feelers"
Source: Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives, James Forrestal Diaries

Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal was a regular recipient of “Magic” intercept reports; this substantial entry reviews the dramatic Sato-Togo exchanges covered in the 22 July “Magic” summary (although Forrestal misdated Sato’s cable as “first of July” instead of the 21st). In contrast to Alperovitz’s argument that Forrestal tried to modify the terms of unconditional surrender to give the Japanese an out, Frank sees Forrestal’s account of the Sato-Togo exchange as additional evidence that senior U.S. officials understood that Tokyo was not on the “cusp of surrender.” [34]

Japan not ready to surrender.

 

[QUENTIN]

Madeline,

To whatever weight you give USMB-ers, I hope I can add my two cents and experience.

I was a research assistant for 15 months with the Nuclear Studies Institute , in my capacity as a researcher compiling documents, quotes, sources, etc. for peer-reviewed articles and a book, I pored over several hundred and probably thousands of official documents from the time the bomb was dropped. I think it's fair to call myself an expert on the subject and I was mentored by one of the nation's foremost scholars on the subject..

Yes, Madeline, I suggest you actually go to the sources of these claims and see what the articles REALLY say, rather than relying on half-quotes.

I suggest she do that too. That's why I not only provided her with links, but with several scholarly book recommendations that are far more comprehensive, thorough, well-researched and sourced than any website would be. If she's genuinely curious about this, it's a subject I'm fascinated by and spent a significant portion of my life researching, so I'm trying to make finding the knowledge for herself as easy as possible.

Also, you'll notice I cited all of my quotes and they can be easily verified. I see that CurveLight, knowingly or not, posted a half-quote that gave an inaccurate impression, but I am not him and I have not done the same so don't attempt to smear me by association unless you have some legitimate issue with any of the accurate and contextualized quotes.

 

[RetiredGySgt]

Document 47: "Magic" – Diplomatic Summary, War Department, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, No. 1225 – August 2, 1945, Top Secret Ultra
Source: Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, "Magic" Diplomatic Summaries 1942-1945, box 18.

An intercepted message from Togo to Sato showed that Tokyo remained interested in securing Moscow’s good office but that it “is difficult to decide on concrete peace conditions here at home all at once.” “[W]e are exerting ourselves to collect the views of all quarters on the matter of concrete terms.” Barton Bernstein, Richard Frank, and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, among others, have argued that the “Magic” intercepts from the end of July and early August show that the Japanese were far from ready to surrender. According to Herbert Bix, for months Hirohito had believed that the “outlook for a negotiated peace could be improved if Japan fought and won one last decisive battle,” thus, Hirohito delayed surrender, continuing to “procrastinate until the bomb was dropped and the Soviets attacked.”[38]

Again no plan to surrender.

 

[RetiredGySgt]

Documents 55a and 55b: Early High-level Reactions to the Hiroshima Bombing

Document 55a: Cabinet Meeting and Togo's Meeting with the Emperor, August 7-8, 1945
Source: Gaimusho (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) ed. Shusen Shiroku (The Historical Records of the End of the War), annotated by Jun Eto, volume 4, 57-60 [Excerpts] [Translation by Toshihiro Higuchi]

Document 55b: Diary Entry for Wednesday, August 8 , 1945
Source: Takashi Itoh, ed., Sokichi Takagi: Nikki to Joho [Sokichi Takagi: Diary and Documents] (Tokyo, Japan: Misuzu-Shobo, 2000), 923-924 [Translation by Hikaru Tajima]
Ground Zero at Hiroshima Today: This was the site of Shima Hospital; the atomic explosion occurred 1,870 feet above it (Photo courtesy of Lynn Eden, www.wholeworldonfire.com)

Excerpts from the Foreign Ministry's compilation about the end of the war show how news of the bombing reached Tokyo as well as how Foreign Minister's Togo initially reacted to reports about Hiroshima. When he learned of the atomic bombing from the Domei News Agency, Togo believed that it was time to give up and advised the cabinet that the atomic attack provided the occasion for Japan to surrender on the basis of the Potsdam Declaration. Togo could not persuade the cabinet, however, and the Army wanted to delay any decisions until it had learned what had happened to Hiroshima. When the Foreign Minister met with the Emperor, Hirohito agreed with him; he declared that the top priority was an early end to the war, although it would be acceptable to seek better surrender terms--probably U.S. acceptance of a figure-head emperor--if it did not interfere with that goal. In light of those instructions, Togo and Prime Minister Suzuki agreed that the Supreme War Council should meet the next day. [42a]

An entry from Admiral Tagaki's diary for August 8 conveys more information on the mood in elite Japanese circles after Hiroshima, but before the Soviet declaration of war and the bombing of Nagasaki. Seeing the bombing of Hiroshima as a sign of a worsening situation at home, Tagaki worried about further deterioration. Nevertheless, his diary suggests that military hard-liners were very much in charge and that Prime Minister Suzuki was talking tough against surrender, by evoking last ditch moments in Japanese history and warning of the danger that subordinate commanders might not obey surrender orders. The last remark aggravated Navy Minister Yonai who saw it as irresponsible. That the Soviets had made no responses to Sato's request for a meeting was understood as a bad sign; Yonai realized that the government had to prepare for the possibility that Moscow might not help. One of the visitors mentioned at the beginning of the entry was Iwao Yamazaki who became Minister of the Interior in the next cabinet.

Again Hardliners controlled the Government and had no intention of surrender even after the first atomic bomb. The Emperor wanted better terms before he would agree.

 

[QUENTIN]

Document 33: "Magic" – Diplomatic Summary, War Department, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, No. 1210 – July 17, 1945, Top Secret Ultra
Source: Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, "Magic" Diplomatic Summaries 1942-1945, box 18.

Another intercept of a cable from Togo to Sato shows that the Foreign Minister rejected unconditional surrender and that the emperor was not “asking the Russian’s mediation in anything like unconditional surrender.” Incidentally, this “Magic’ Diplomatic Summary” indicates the broad scope and capabilities of the program; for example, it includes translations of intercepted French messages (see pages 8-9). [Page 14 missing from original]

NO unconditional Surrender allowed.

Do you think you're somehow disproving, or even arguing, with what I said?

They were never willing to surrender unconditionally, I made that quite clear.

They were however willing to surrender with the sole condition that the Emperor retain his throne, we refused that sole condition, dropped two atomic bombs on their cities, and then allowed the Emperor to retain his throne anyway.

 

[RetiredGySgt]

Document 71: The Cabinet Meeting over the Reply to the Four Powers (August 13)
Source: Gaimusho [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], ed., Shusen Shiroku [Historical Record of the End of the War] (Tokyo: Hokuyosha, 1977-1978), vol. 5, 27-35 [Translated by Toshihiro Higuchi]

The Byrnes Note did not break the stalemate at the cabinet level. An account of the cabinet debates on August 13 prepared by Director of Information Toshiro Shimomura showed the same divisions as before with Anami and a few other ministers continuing to argue that the Allies threatened the kokutai and that setting the four conditions (no occupation, etc.) did not mean that the war would continue. Nevertheless, Anami argued, “We are still left with some power to fight.” Suzuki, who was working quietly with the peace party, declared that the Allied terms were acceptable because they gave a “dim hope in the dark” of preserving the emperor. At the end of the meeting, he announced that he would report to Hirohito and ask him to make another “Sacred Judgment”. Meanwhile, junior Army officers plotted a coup to thwart the plans for surrender.[52]

After 2 ATOMIC bombs the Army refused to surrender and planned a coup to prevent the Emperor from surrendering. This was after 2 Atomic Bombs AND the Soviet attack.

 

[RetiredGySgt]

All the preceding quotes are from a single source. The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II: A Collection of Primary Sources which I provided earlier. None of them are the entire document but rather summaries of what they said.

The Japanese had no intention of surrendering even after 2 Atomic Bombs and the Soviets attacking them. The Army controlled the Government and refused to surrender. When the Emperor intervened the Army plotted a Coup to stop even him from surrendering.

Any claim that the Japanese would simply surrender with no Atomic bombs IGNORES the fact they REFUSED even after 2 were dropped. Quoting Generals and Admirals from Europe on their beliefs of the Japanese intent is ignorant at best.

 

[RetiredGySgt]

Document 33: "Magic" – Diplomatic Summary, War Department, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, No. 1210 – July 17, 1945, Top Secret Ultra
Source: Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, "Magic" Diplomatic Summaries 1942-1945, box 18.

Another intercept of a cable from Togo to Sato shows that the Foreign Minister rejected unconditional surrender and that the emperor was not “asking the Russian’s mediation in anything like unconditional surrender.” Incidentally, this “Magic’ Diplomatic Summary” indicates the broad scope and capabilities of the program; for example, it includes translations of intercepted French messages (see pages 8-9). [Page 14 missing from original]

NO unconditional Surrender allowed.

Do you think you're somehow disproving, or even arguing, with what I said?

They were never willing to surrender unconditionally, I made that quite clear.

They were however willing to surrender with the sole condition that the Emperor retain his throne, we refused that sole condition, dropped two atomic bombs on their cities, and then allowed the Emperor to retain his throne anyway.

The Emperor only agreed to the provision of a a surrender with him in control AFTER the first bomb, NOT before. There is NO surrender agreement prior to the first atomic blast. All they offered was to cease hostilities and return to the Dec 1941 lines.

Even after the first blast the Emperor did not FORCE the Army to give up. He told them to continue to work for better terms. they offered 4 terms which were rejected.

After the second Bomb and a Soviet Invasion the Army STILL refused to surrender. It took the Emperor to intervene and even then the Army tried a Coup to stop him

 

[RetiredGySgt]

Document 33: "Magic" – Diplomatic Summary, War Department, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, No. 1210 – July 17, 1945, Top Secret Ultra
Source: Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, "Magic" Diplomatic Summaries 1942-1945, box 18.

Another intercept of a cable from Togo to Sato shows that the Foreign Minister rejected unconditional surrender and that the emperor was not “asking the Russian’s mediation in anything like unconditional surrender.” Incidentally, this “Magic’ Diplomatic Summary” indicates the broad scope and capabilities of the program; for example, it includes translations of intercepted French messages (see pages 8-9). [Page 14 missing from original]

NO unconditional Surrender allowed.

Do you think you're somehow disproving, or even arguing, with what I said?

They were never willing to surrender unconditionally, I made that quite clear.

They were however willing to surrender with the sole condition that the Emperor retain his throne, we refused that sole condition, dropped two atomic bombs on their cities, and then allowed the Emperor to retain his throne anyway.

That is a lie, they demanded 4 conditions. After the second bomb and the Soviet attack the Emperor changed it to one condition. Prior to the Atomic bombs they only offered a cease fire and return to Dec 1941 borders.

 

[CurveLight]

Admiral William Leahy told President Truman: "This is the biggest fool thing we have ever done."
Hiroshima

Just when I thought you couldn't get more idiotic



You posted only HALF the quote!!!

Admiral William Leahy told President Truman: "This is the biggest fool thing we have ever done. The bomb will never go off, and I speak as an expert in explosives."

I was fully prepared for you to try and jump on that and had Leahy's quote from his book ready to use in response. What you fail to understand is his prediction that it would not go off has absolutely nothing to do with the fact he said the bombs were not necessary. Quentin already posted Leahy's quote so I don't need to.

So will you respond to the fact our top military leaders all agreed the bombs were not necessary or will you continue to be dishonest and claim I'm citing sources I've not cited?

Wait....aren't you the same person that had no idea of the significance the bombs had with Russia? Do you know what else happened on August 9th, 1945?

 

[Stainmaster]

First thing. The Atomic Bombs were not ready until Summer 1945. Germany surrendered in April. We had no reason to drop said bombs on Germany.

The reality is that it took BOTH bombs to get the Emperor of Japan to over ride his Army Controlled Government and order an immediate surrender. With those bombs we would have starved Japan through the winter killing untold thousands followed by an Invasion of a Home Island which would have seen MILLIONS of dead Japanese civilians and soldiers.

Japan was teaching her civilians to arm themselves with Bamboo spears and human wave charge any invasion. The continued invasion of Japan could have seen the potential elimination of the Japanese race.

The lie that Japan was ready to surrender is revisionist history. Japan under the Army had no intention of surrender. What they "offered" through the Soviet Union was a cease fire with Japan keeping everything she still possessed and the return of Japanese home possessions like Saipan and Okinawa. Japan was offering to let us just stop attacking them. They would retain all of their Chinese, Korean and other possessions and we would return their home island captures.

Here is a link to SOURCE documents verifying that Japan was NOT offering a meaningful surrender, that even after two atomic Bombs the Army controlled government refused to surrender, that the Emperor failed to act until after the second atomic bomb and that the Army attempted a Coup to prevent the Emperor from surrendering.

The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II: A Collection of Primary Sources

The atomic bombs were necessary unless one thinks we should have just let Japan keep everything from before the war and not disarm. They SAVED millions of lives.

From everything I've read, and talking with people at my Grandpop's lodge, this is the version I believe. I think the Truman Administration did the right thing to save American lives as terrifying as it was.

 

[CurveLight]

Madeline,

To whatever weight you give USMB-ers, I hope I can add my two cents and experience.

I was a research assistant for 15 months with the Nuclear Studies Institute , in my capacity as a researcher compiling documents, quotes, sources, etc. for peer-reviewed articles and a book, I pored over several hundred and probably thousands of official documents from the time the bomb was dropped. I think it's fair to call myself an expert on the subject and I was mentored by one of the nation's foremost scholars on the subject..

Yes, Madeline, I suggest you actually go to the sources of these claims and see what the articles REALLY say, rather than relying on half-quotes.

I suggest she do that too. That's why I not only provided her with links, but with several scholarly book recommendations that are far more comprehensive, thorough, well-researched and sourced than any website would be. If she's genuinely curious about this, it's a subject I'm fascinated by and spent a significant portion of my life researching, so I'm trying to make finding the knowledge for herself as easy as possible.

Also, you'll notice I cited all of my quotes and they can be easily verified. I see that CurveLight, knowingly or not, posted a half-quote that gave an inaccurate impression, but I am not him and I have not done the same so don't attempt to smear me by association unless you have some legitimate issue with any of the accurate and contextualized quotes.

I purposefully cited half of Leahy's quote because his prediction the bombs would not detonate have no bearing on his position they were not necessary. There was no risk of a failed detonation whether the bombs worked or not. If they didn't go off they would have simply looked like conventional duds. It's not like the Japanese military would have said "Look! The nukes didn't go off!"

Although any poor sucker who would have opened a dud would not exactly be radiating with joy.......

 

[CurveLight]

First thing. The Atomic Bombs were not ready until Summer 1945. Germany surrendered in April. We had no reason to drop said bombs on Germany.

The reality is that it took BOTH bombs to get the Emperor of Japan to over ride his Army Controlled Government and order an immediate surrender. With those bombs we would have starved Japan through the winter killing untold thousands followed by an Invasion of a Home Island which would have seen MILLIONS of dead Japanese civilians and soldiers.

Japan was teaching her civilians to arm themselves with Bamboo spears and human wave charge any invasion. The continued invasion of Japan could have seen the potential elimination of the Japanese race.

The lie that Japan was ready to surrender is revisionist history. Japan under the Army had no intention of surrender. What they "offered" through the Soviet Union was a cease fire with Japan keeping everything she still possessed and the return of Japanese home possessions like Saipan and Okinawa. Japan was offering to let us just stop attacking them. They would retain all of their Chinese, Korean and other possessions and we would return their home island captures.

Here is a link to SOURCE documents verifying that Japan was NOT offering a meaningful surrender, that even after two atomic Bombs the Army controlled government refused to surrender, that the Emperor failed to act until after the second atomic bomb and that the Army attempted a Coup to prevent the Emperor from surrendering.

The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II: A Collection of Primary Sources

The atomic bombs were necessary unless one thinks we should have just let Japan keep everything from before the war and not disarm. They SAVED millions of lives.

From everything I've read, and talking with people at my Grandpop's lodge, this is the version I believe. I think the Truman Administration did the right thing to save American lives as terrifying as it was.

I cannot get any pro-bomb person to answer a couple of questions so maybe you can.

If we dropped the bombs to force an unconditional surrender, then why is it the US changed its surrender terms instead of Japan?

Do you realize that after the bombs were dropped it was not Japan who changed their conditions for surrender but the US?

If it was worth nuking two civilian populations to try and force an unconditional surrender then why did we give up? The nukes didn't change Japan's terms for surrender so why didn't we invade? Why didn't we continue firebombing, blockades and air raids?

 

[CurveLight]

NO unconditional Surrender allowed.

Do you think you're somehow disproving, or even arguing, with what I said?

They were never willing to surrender unconditionally, I made that quite clear.

They were however willing to surrender with the sole condition that the Emperor retain his throne, we refused that sole condition, dropped two atomic bombs on their cities, and then allowed the Emperor to retain his throne anyway.

The Emperor only agreed to the provision of a a surrender with him in control AFTER the first bomb, NOT before. There is NO surrender agreement prior to the first atomic blast. All they offered was to cease hostilities and return to the Dec 1941 lines.

Even after the first blast the Emperor did not FORCE the Army to give up. He told them to continue to work for better terms. they offered 4 terms which were rejected.

After the second Bomb and a Soviet Invasion the Army STILL refused to surrender. It took the Emperor to intervene and even then the Army tried a Coup to stop him

Show us in the Potsdam Declaration where the Emperor's disposition is stated upon agreement of surrender.

 

[namvet]

they wanted to surrender on their terms. what was our offical policy????