"Prosperity doesn't trickle down, but greed does." John Naughton
If 85 individuals control more wealth than the bottom 50% of the whole planet's population, would murdering those 85 and seizing their assets then distributing it among the ~3.5 billion poorest be ethically justifiable?
Ethically why? Where would that justification come from?
Why murder them, why not just share what is sharable? Of course most of this wealth is speculative paper money. See quotes below.
The fact they own 50% of the wealth is a result of greed, accumulated advantage, unfair tax structure, tax shelters, and deregulation.
Of course, morally no one has a right to this much of the world's capital, but morals, justice, or fairness have nothing to do with markets.
None of these people created this money, only society and government create wealth. Alone on an island they would be broke and useless.
"On moral grounds, then, we could argue for a flat income tax of 90 percent to return that wealth to its real owners. In the United States, even a flat tax of 70 percent would support all governmental programs (about half the total tax) and allow payment, with the remainder, of a patrimony of about $8,000 per annum per inhabitant, or $25,000 for a family of three. This would generously leave with the original recipients of the income about three times what, according to my rough guess, they had earned.
Untitled, UBI and the Flat Tax
"What is a human life worth? You may not want to put a price tag on a it. But if we really had to, most of us would agree that the value of a human life would be in the millions. Consistent with the foundations of our democracy and our frequently professed belief in the inherent dignity of human beings, we would also agree that all humans are created equal, at least to the extent of denying that differences of sex, ethnicity, nationality and place of residence change the value of a human life." What Should a Billionaire Give – and What Should You?, by Peter Singer
"The Conservative Nanny State: How the Wealthy Use the Government to Stay Rich and Get Richer"
The Conservative Nanny State Strikes Again | Op-Eds & Columns
Excerpt from 'Voltaire's Bastards' John Ralston Saul
"Meanwhile. every other potentially inflationary area was gradually being opened to marketplace manipulation. General economic activity was drawn towards the financial sector by this explosion in ever-less-regulated activities. Inventiveness concentrated itself on the creation of new, immeasurable financial abstractions - abstractions built upon abstractions - forms and levels of leverage which made the standards of 1929 seem almost responsible by comparison.
By the mid-1980s - even before the Big Bang - the annual value of transactions in the London financial market was $75 trillion a year. That is more than twenty-five times the total value of world trade, which was $2.84 trillion in 1988. Foreign exchange speculation in major world centres was $35 trillion a year - twelve times the total value of world trade. These transactions represent no concrete activity. They are multiplications of paper which have no beneficial effect on economic activity. Thus, the City in London may prosper and cohabit quite happily with general economic depression in the rest of Britain. The degree to which governments have become addicted to the easy pleasures of this speculation could be seen in Britain's reluctance to put the pound into the European Snake, and indeed into the European Monetary System, both of which are attempts to develop monetary stability in a large but realistically manageable geographic area. The official British argument against participation has been that the Snake might limit the government's ability to set policies appropriate for competition at home and in the world. One of the unspoken reasons was that membership in the Snake might eventually limit the City's ability to speculate in currencies. The gradual conversion of the City to the Snake came as they realized that speculation would not be limited.
In this context the traditional definitions of bank exposure no longer mean very much. Writing in 1873, Walter Bagehot said of reserves:
"The amount of that cash is so exceedingly small that a bystander almost trembles when he compares its minuteness with the immensity of the credit which rests upon it. ". Bagehot's minuteness would seem enormous today. For example, in the mid-1980s, the American merchant bank Lehman Brothers had a capital base of $270 million. It had a daily exposure of $10 billion.
This floating speculation in bonds and securities is done by numbers men on computers. Convention calls them bankers, but they arc merely technicians, whose training resembles that of a clerk and whose talents parallel that of a racetrack bookie. They have no experience away from their screens; no understanding of the industrial activity the illuminated numbers represent. Worse still, they have neither responsibility for nor a sense of the effect that their enormous transactions might have on society as a whole. As early as 1984 men such as this were tradlng $4.1 trillion in a single New York merchant bank, First Boston Corporation. That was more than the total American GNP.
The golden word which has permitted all of this is deregulating. The United States followed by the entire West, has raised this flag in the name of the spirit of initiative. There is no doubt that a half century of administrative structure building - aimed at repairing the injustice, instability and damages created by nineteenth - and early twentieth century free markets - had gone too far in certain areas. But the reaction to this over regulation has borne no relationship to the real problem at hand. The result has been the return of antisocial freedom: the freedom to act irresponsibly, to speculate and profiteer, not just over stocks but over money itself.
The problem docs not lie only with specific fashions, which may be short-lived, from currency swaps, junk bonds, financial futures and options to stock index futures (which require a down payment of only 6 percent), leveraged buyouts and over-the-counter equities, whose real value is unclear and thus open to speculation and arbitrage. Nor are these fashions as short-lived as they sometimes appear, to an economy so distanced from reality, forms of speculation no longer disappear simply because they have been exposed as of dubious value. For example, junk bonds have gone on after their disasters of the late 19805 and now represent more than a quarter of all corporate bonds rated by Moody's. Nor are these dangerous phenomena limited to the United States. Japanese regulations permit leverage based on 5 percent, British corporate debt has risen from £10 billion just before the first crash in 1973 to £53 billion billion in 1988. One might suspect that this was a creation of the inflation-infected 1970s. But official inflation seemed neither to encourage nor to discourage corporate debt. Things got even further out of control during the 1980s.
The whole process was fed by minor finance companies, which under stricter regulations would be considered marginal, if not criminal. With deregulation they became banks. And the large deposit banks, seeing the enormous paper profits made by these little speculators, leaped down into the gutter to play the same game. The overall picture is what Keynes would have called a Casino society.
And that is now one of the determining activities of our economies. The truth is that annual growth in the U.S. economy after inflation has steadily shrunk as deregulation has proceeded: 4.2 percent during the 196Os, 3.1 percent during the crisis-ridden 1970s, and 2.1 percent during the theoretically prosperous 19805. In Canada, despite its wide and solid social protection net,
the number of people living in poverty grew in this period of deregulation from 14.7 percent in 1981 to 17.3 percent by 1985 and continues 10 grow." from pp 397,398
"Do not waste your time on Social Questions. What is the matter with the poor is Poverty; what is the matter with the rich is Uselessness." George Bernard Shaw