From the ruling:
‘Heller…does plainly provide that the M-16—and weapons “like” it—can be banned as dangerous and unusual weapons. Accordingly, the proper question is: are the semiautomatic rifles at issue here “like” the military’s M-16, a historically banned dangerous and unusual weapon? If so, the semiautomatic rifles are similarly outside the scope of the Second Amendment. This test makes practical sense. It is undisputed that the M-16 is outside the scope of the Second Amendment—thus, if a weapon is essentially the same as the M-16, it is not protected by the Second Amendment merely because gun manufacturers have given it a different model number and dubbed it a “civilian rifle.” Gun manufacturers cannot determine the scope of Second Amendment protection; they cannot, for example, develop a grenade launcher, dub it a “civilian” model, and thereby bring it within the scope of the Second Amendment.
As to whether the semiautomatic rifles at issue are “like” the M-16, the Court agrees with Kolbe’s conclusion that “AR-15-type rifles are ‘like’ M16 rifles under any standard definition of that term.”’
Rupp-semi-auto-California-ruling-7222019.pdf
This addresses the fundamental issue with regard to the constitutionality of AWBs, AR 15 rifles and carbines in particular: are such weapons ‘in common use’ or are they ‘dangerous and usual,’ where their possession is not entitled to Second Amendment protections; current Second Amendment jurisprudence holds the latter to be the case.
Note that regardless how ubiquitous AR platform rifles and carbines might be, that doesn’t mitigate the fact that they are similar enough to M-16s to warrant their prohibition – indeed, the argument that M-16s are select-fire and AR 15s are semi-automatic only is devoid of legal merit.
Also devoid of legal merit are rhetorical semantics as to what is or is not an ‘assault rifle,’ what the military might designate to be an ‘assault rifle,’ and how AR 15s might be marketed to civilian consumers. Just as gun manufacturers lack the authority to determine the scope of the Second Amendment, so too does the military lack such authority.
Therefore, in order for AWBs to be invalidated as un-Constitutional, the ‘argument’ that AR 15s are semi-automatic only and that they are not considered to be assault weapons in a military context needs to be abandoned.
The appropriate argument needs to be that AR 15s are weapons ‘in common use,’ particularly as weapons of self-defense.
Of course, the Supreme Court will need to accept that argument and rule that AR 15s are weapons ‘in common use’ and entitled to Second Amendment protections.
Until the Supreme Court makes such a ruling, AWBs remain perfectly Constitutional and in no manner ‘violate’ the Second Amendment – no matter how ineffective or pointless such a ban might be; that a law might be bad or onerous doesn’t render it ‘un-Constitutional.’
‘Heller…does plainly provide that the M-16—and weapons “like” it—can be banned as dangerous and unusual weapons. Accordingly, the proper question is: are the semiautomatic rifles at issue here “like” the military’s M-16, a historically banned dangerous and unusual weapon? If so, the semiautomatic rifles are similarly outside the scope of the Second Amendment. This test makes practical sense. It is undisputed that the M-16 is outside the scope of the Second Amendment—thus, if a weapon is essentially the same as the M-16, it is not protected by the Second Amendment merely because gun manufacturers have given it a different model number and dubbed it a “civilian rifle.” Gun manufacturers cannot determine the scope of Second Amendment protection; they cannot, for example, develop a grenade launcher, dub it a “civilian” model, and thereby bring it within the scope of the Second Amendment.
As to whether the semiautomatic rifles at issue are “like” the M-16, the Court agrees with Kolbe’s conclusion that “AR-15-type rifles are ‘like’ M16 rifles under any standard definition of that term.”’
Rupp-semi-auto-California-ruling-7222019.pdf
This addresses the fundamental issue with regard to the constitutionality of AWBs, AR 15 rifles and carbines in particular: are such weapons ‘in common use’ or are they ‘dangerous and usual,’ where their possession is not entitled to Second Amendment protections; current Second Amendment jurisprudence holds the latter to be the case.
Note that regardless how ubiquitous AR platform rifles and carbines might be, that doesn’t mitigate the fact that they are similar enough to M-16s to warrant their prohibition – indeed, the argument that M-16s are select-fire and AR 15s are semi-automatic only is devoid of legal merit.
Also devoid of legal merit are rhetorical semantics as to what is or is not an ‘assault rifle,’ what the military might designate to be an ‘assault rifle,’ and how AR 15s might be marketed to civilian consumers. Just as gun manufacturers lack the authority to determine the scope of the Second Amendment, so too does the military lack such authority.
Therefore, in order for AWBs to be invalidated as un-Constitutional, the ‘argument’ that AR 15s are semi-automatic only and that they are not considered to be assault weapons in a military context needs to be abandoned.
The appropriate argument needs to be that AR 15s are weapons ‘in common use,’ particularly as weapons of self-defense.
Of course, the Supreme Court will need to accept that argument and rule that AR 15s are weapons ‘in common use’ and entitled to Second Amendment protections.
Until the Supreme Court makes such a ruling, AWBs remain perfectly Constitutional and in no manner ‘violate’ the Second Amendment – no matter how ineffective or pointless such a ban might be; that a law might be bad or onerous doesn’t render it ‘un-Constitutional.’