Carl Popper.
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3. The Problem of Demarcation
For Popper the central problem in the philosophy of science is that of demarcation, i.e., of distinguishing between science and what he terms “non-science” (e.g., logic, metaphysics, psychoanalysis, and Adler’s individual psychology). Popper is unusual amongst contemporary philosophers in that he accepts the validity of the Humean critique of induction, and indeed, goes beyond it in arguing that induction is never actually used in science. However, he does not concede that this entails scepticism and argues that the Baconian/Newtonian insistence on the primacy of “pure” observation, as the initial step in the formation of theories, is completely misguided: all observation is selective and theory-laden and there are no pure or theory-free observations. In this way he destabilises the traditional view that science can be distinguished from non-science on the basis of its inductive methodology. In contradistinction to this, Popper holds that there is no unique methodology specific to science; rather, science, like virtually every other organic activity, consists largely of problem-solving.Popper accordingly rejects the view that induction is the characteristic method of scientific investigation and inference, substituting falsifiability in its place. It is easy, he argues, to obtain evidence in favour of virtually any theory, and he consequently holds that such “corroboration”, as he terms it, should count scientifically only if it is the positive result of a genuinely “risky” prediction, which might conceivably have been false. In a critical sense, Popper’s theory of demarcation is based upon his perception of the asymmetry which, at the level of logic, holds between verification and falsification: it is logically impossible to verify a universal proposition by reference to experience (as Hume saw clearly), but a single genuine counter-instance falsifies the corresponding universal law. In a word, an exception, far from “proving” a rule, conclusively refutes it.
Every genuine scientific theory then, in Popper’s view, is prohibitive, because the theories of natural science take the form of universal statements. “All As are X” is equivalent to “No A is not-X” which is falsified if “Some A is not-X” turns out to be true. For example, the law of the conservation of energy can be expressed as “There is no perpetual motion machine”.
However, the universality of such laws, he argues, does rule out the possibility of their verification. Thus, a theory that has withstood rigorous testing should be deemed to have received a high measure of corroboration. and may be retained provisionally as the best available theory until it is finally falsified and/or is superseded by a better theory.
Popper stresses in particular that there is no unique way, no single method such as induction, which functions as the route to scientific theory, and approvingly cites Einstein on that point:
Science, in Popper’s view, starts with problems rather than with observations—it is, indeed, precisely in the context of grappling with a problem that the scientist makes observations in the first instance: his observations are selectively designed to test the extent to which a given theory functions as a satisfactory solution to a given problem.
On this criterion of demarcation physics, chemistry, and (non-introspective) psychology, amongst others, are classified as sciences, psychoanalysis is a pre-science and astrology and phrenology are pseudo-sciences."
Karl Popper (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
plato.stanford.edu
This was sorted years ago!!!! Your question shows that you are clueless!!!
NEXT!!!!
Greg
