Commodore Perry and the opening of Japan

Xenophon

Gone and forgotten
Nov 27, 2008
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In your head
President Millard Fillmore was very concerned. For years, American sailors were being killed by Japan when they were shipwrecked, and it had to stop. These sailors, taking part in the whale trade, were a vital source of wealth for young America. These men, often washed up on the shores of Japan after violent storms, could not enjoy the usual rights bestowed upon shipwrecked men, instead, Japan, isolated and xenophobic, had as a matter of state policy, killed outright all foreigners, except for a small Dutch trading mission in Nagasaki.

The President knew there were other concerns as well, for Japan offered a virgin market for US goods, as well as good harbors for American whalers and trade ships, and he very much wanted to secure these. In those days of the 1850s, diplomatic missions were more often than not carried out by active duty Naval officers, rather then Washington politicians. But who should the President send? The man selected must be of impeccable moral character, must have a through knowledge of diplomacy, as well as a commanding presence and a sense of showmanship. The Japanese were known to respond only to the strictest essence of formality, so the leader of the mission must also have patience, and since there was an excellent chance the mission might go badly, he also needed to be a skilled military officer. It seemed impossible to find such a paragon, but fortunately, the President found such a man.

Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry was the man the President selected for this delicate, yet vital mission. The younger brother of the famed hero of Lake Erie in the war of 1812, Perry was perhaps the only man in the entire country suitable for the assignment. Known throughout the Navy as "the cast-iron Commodore" and "Old Matt", he had the right combination of astute imagination, high regaurd for tradition, and careful attention to detail.

"We will demand as a right, not solicit as a favor, those acts of courtesy due one civilized nation to another" Perry thundered.

Some of the government officials in Washington were dubious. President Fillmore prepared a special letter addressed to the Emperor of Japan. Perry would carry this in an elaborate, hand-carved box of fragrant rose-wood. And he requested the letter and other official documents be inscribed on the finest vellum, embellished with government seals and ribbons. In the box were delicate gifts for the Emperor.

Preparing this massive undertaking took two years, during which Perry read up on what was known of Japan, and also hand picked the officers of his fleet for this special duty. All the officers who would come into close contact with the Japanese would be tall, formal in manor, and distinctive in outward appearance.

Perry arrived at Yedo bay (modern Tokyo bay) on July 8, 1853, aboard his flagship, the USS Susquehanna, the most modern side-wheel steam frigate in the US Navy. With her was another big, impressive side-wheeler, the Mississippi, and two trim sloops, the Plymouth and the Saratoga. The ships steamed slowly up the bay and anchored off the town of Uraga. Suddenly, the warships were surrounded by a throng of small picket vessels, and the local Shogun warned the Americans to leave at once. Perry, unfazed, ignored the warning, knowing full well the tiny Japanese vessels could not harm the powerful American squadron. The frustrated Japanese now sent an officer alongside in a small boat and demanded to see the American commanding officer.

Perry's officers politely told this officer that "The Lord of the Forbidden Interior could not possibly demean his rank by appearing on deck to carry on a discussion".

This was the answer Perry had ordered and the crew was astonished to see that the Japanese took no affront. Instead, as Perry knew they would be, they seemed duly impressed. "We have the vice-governor of Uraga aboard", said the Japanese officer, "he is of very high rank."

"Why did you not bring the governor?" he was asked by the petty officer who was carrying on the liaison.

"He is forbidden to be on ships", came the answer. And would the Lord of the Forbidden Interior designate an officer whose rank was appropriate to conversing with the vice-governor?

Here is were the long months of selection and training were to prove themselves. Perry now sent, not a Captain or a Commander, but a junior Lieutenant. The lieutenant after a ceremonious greeting, announced that the expedition was a most honored one, for it bore a message from the President of the United States to the Emperor himself. Could the vice-governor see this message? No one was permitted to see it but the Emperor or one of his princes. However, if the governor himself would appear, he would be shown a copy of the letter.

A day later, after the vice-governor had retired to shore for a conference, the governor sailed out on an elaborately decorated barge. Now Perry, who had remained completely out of site at all times, sent Captain Buchanan of his flagship to carry on the ceremonious negotiations at this level. The governor was impressed when he saw the rosewood box. Yet he hesitated. He was not certain that he would be best be serving his Emperor by permitting foreigners to land to meet with members of the royal household.

"That would indeed be too bad", he was told, "for the Lord of the Forbidden Interior is committed to delivering the message, or dying in the attempt."

The governor carefully eyed the tremendous guns of the ships, which had been purposely readied and exposed. Then, displaying no sign of emotion, he politely requested time to consult with the proper authorities, and returned to shore.

It was not until July 14 that Perry permitted himself to be seen. The Japanese had set up a fine pavilion on the shore, to which would come the Price of Idzu, the properly ranked representative of the Emperor. The ships had all moved closer to shore, where the Japanese could easily see that his mission of peace was well supported by the necessary engines of war. One hundred Marines in well-starched dress uniforms had gone ashore and were lined up in procession with a company of seamen and two navy bands.

At the proper moment, Perry appeared on the spotless deck of the Susquehanna in full dress, and was helped into his official barge to the sound of a thirteen-gun salute which echoed across the bay. Then, proceeded by fifteen boats, each mounting a gun, the barge advanced at a dignified pace to the shore. The extent to which Perry had prepared and supervised each detail was now seen at its best. As he stepped ashore, he was flanked by two superb looking black seamen, the tallest, most impressive men he could find in the navy. And in front of them marched two midshipmen, bearing the rosewood box. To the Japanese, this pomp and pageantry signified that America was a nation worthy to carry on trade with Japan.

The meeting of Prince Idzu and the Commodore was not, however, the end of the negotiations. Perry was well aware that he could by no means expect an official answer to the request in the letter that trade be opened within a few days, or even weeks. "I shall return for an answer within six months," stated perry solemnly.

In the United States, some newspapers severely criticized the Commodore, and suggested that the government attend to serious matters and discourage this type of 'humbug." In February 1854, The American squadron returned. Further ceremonies took place. There were exchanges of gifts: for the Americans, silks and carvings and other Japanese handicrafts; for the Japanese, firearms, tools, clocks, and the most unusual item of all-a miniature railway with an engine which had a speed of twenty miles per hour.

Then the results of all this "humbug" were made clear. The Japanese, impressed with Perry's stratagem, and fully aware now of American naval strength, announced that they would sign the treaty. And thus it was that an inspired officer won the most important peacetime battle of the nineteenth century for the US Navy.
 
Commodore Mattew Perry USN

BE041149.jpg
 
interesting..shows the difference in understand the culture you are dealing with....unlike bush and the chinese..when they took the ship...chinese culture does not consider being a "hostage" as we do....they simply do not make fast decisions..and that should have been realized....given time they would have release the "heros"
 
This is one of the focal points of history.

Japan goes from backward isolationism to world power in less then 50 years, and takes on the USA in a war in less then a century.

All of it can betraced to the US opening up Japan to the world.
 
This is one of the focal points of history.

Japan goes from backward isolationism to world power in less then 50 years, and takes on the USA in a war in less then a century.

All of it can betraced to the US opening up Japan to the world.

Indeed, led to the Meiji Restoration, one of the most fascinating paradigms in history. That it's not taught before college level, always amazes me. It should be up there with the American Revolution.

Meiji Restoration/Revolution in Japan

...The Meiji Program of Economic Development

The Meiji Era leaders sought economic development as a concomidant of strengthening Japan, but circumstances allowed them very little policy choice. The first problem to be solved was financing the national government budget. In 1871 the national government in Tokyo assumed the debts of the domains which accepted its rule. The national government also assumed responsibility for the stipends paid to the samurai. The samurai class lost its source of livelihood in the land reforms and the creation of the conscription army of commoners. Although the revolution was called a restoration of the Emperor, what it was more fundamentally was an overthrow of the seven hundred-year rule by the warrior class of samurai. The samurai warriors accepted their displacement in return for a stipend. The aggregate magnitude of the samurai stipend was enourmous and requried one third of the revenue of the national government. Under this burden the national government substituted fixed interest bonds for the stipends. Later, with the excessiv creation of money, prices went up and the real value of the samurai's bonds declined. The inflation benefited the farmers whose land tax was at fixed monetary levels. They gained at the expense of the samurai and the city dwellers. Samurai rebellions in such places as Satsuma led to the creation of money to finance the suppression of these rebellions, which in turn led to inflation and a decline in the real income of the samurai and more dissatisfaction among the samurai.


Matsukata Masaoyoshi
Minister of Finance
Matsukata Masayoshi of Satsuma was the Minister of Finance over a ten year period. He sought to protect Japanese industry from foreign competition, but was restricted by the unequal treaties. The unavailability of standard protectionist devices probably benefited Japan in the long run. Had Japan been able to fully shield its infant import-substitution industries from foreign competition Japan would likely not have developed its export industries.

The national government tried at first to create government industry to produce particular products or services. The lack of funds forced the government to turn these industries over to private business which in return for special privileges would accomodate the government's goals. This was the origin of the zaibatsu system. An example of this is the rise of Mitsubishi. A semi-government shipping company was reluctant to to send its ships into military zones to provide troop transport. Mitsubishi provided troop transport for the national government's military expeditions and in return received the ships from the bankrupt semi-government shipping line. Mitsubishi was granted special privileges which enabled it to prosper and grow.

The national government created some programs, such as public education, by declaring that it must be done and leaving it to the villages to finance and arrange for its provision.

Matsukata was aided in his rise to the office of the Minister of Finance by Okubo Toshimichi.




Okubo Toshimichi
Okubo was assassinated in 1878.
















While some samurai leaders expressed their dissatisfaction with the situation by rebellion others such as Itagaki petitioned for representative government.






Itagaki Taisuke


















It was not easy for Japanese businesses to find markets where they could compete successfully against European and American firms. In many cases Japanese businesses captured markets simply by selling at a loss. This strategy could not prevail without some source of financial subsidy. One industry in which Japanese businesses did compete successfully at a profit was the silk industry. At just about the time that Japanese silk producers wanted to enter the international market for silk there had been a failure of the silk industry in Italy. The failure of the Italian supply of silk resulted in higher prices for silk that was ususally the case and this higher price enabled the Japanese silk producers to make a profit. The available statistics for the Meiji period do document the success.

Raw Silk Production and Export from Japan 1868 to 1913
Period Production
annual average
(tons) Exports
annual average
(tons)
1868-1872 1026 646
1883 1687 1347
1889-1893 4098 2444
1899-1903 7103 4098
1909-1913 12460 9462
With industrialization came the demand for coal. There was dramatic rise in production, as shown in the table below.

Coal Production in Japan in Various Years from 1875 to 1913
Year Coal Production
(metric tons)
1875 600,000
1885 1,200,000
1895 5,000,000
1905 13,000,000
1913 21,300,000
Two of the things the coal was needed for were steamships and railroads. The growth of these sectors is shown below.

The Size of the Japanese Merchant Fleet in Various Years from 1873 to 1913
Year Number of Steamships
1873 26
1894 169
1904 797
1913 1514
Railroad Mileage in Japan in Various Years from 1873 to 1913
Year Track
(miles)
1872 18
1883 240
1887 640
1894 2100
1904 4700
1914 7100
The Meiji Era policy of using private businesses to promote government policy objectives proved successful. When Park Chung Hee of South Korea wanted to industrialize South Korea he created the system of Chaebol, the goverment-sponsored firms such as Hyundai, Samsun, Lucky Goldstar, Daewoo, etc. This program was modeled on the Japanese Meiji Era experience. It was not surprising that Park used the Japanese model. He himself had become an officer in the Japanese Army complete with a Japanese name while Korea was under Japanese control. Park served in Manchukuo during World War II and was highly impressed with the logistics and planning operations of the Japanese Army.

They sent delegations of professors and business professionals to Europe and the United States to study and report on everything from prisons, judicial systems, education, and health care. Then they set out to beat them...
 
It is amazing just how far and how fast the Japanese moved in less than 100 years.
They achieved what the communists promised.

Of course, the Mejii government wasn't a whole lot better than the Shoguns. They were just better motivated.

Still, very few people have bothered to learn how the Japanese (and the Koreans too followed the same system since the truce in 53) managed to pull this off. Everyone goes after the Russian model instead. And that gets them the same place it managed to get the russians.
 
I think one of the reasons China was so successful with communism in the beginning had more to do with their alliance with Sun Yat Sen and the Koumintang party which helped the modify the Russian version. Of course they broke the alliance but the CCP in my opinion gained a few things during the alliance.
 
One of the darker parts of this is teh Japanese most admired Western Imperial as a means to solve raw material shortages.

They quite happily took from the weaker and started war after war with this goal in mind, and it lead to a shattering triumph over Imperial Russia in 1905.

One of the things that begins to sour US/Japanese relations is Teddy roosevelt's peace plan for that war, the Japanese felt the USA robbed them of what they won in battle. It moves Japan closer to Great britain and on teh road to eventual confrontation with the United States.
 
One of the darker parts of this is teh Japanese most admired Western Imperial as a means to solve raw material shortages.

They quite happily took from the weaker and started war after war with this goal in mind, and it lead to a shattering triumph over Imperial Russia in 1905.

One of the things that begins to sour US/Japanese relations is Teddy roosevelt's peace plan for that war, the Japanese felt the USA robbed them of what they won in battle. It moves Japan closer to Great britain and on teh road to eventual confrontation with the United States.

Indeed they did. However one must ask oneself considering US via Perry actions, what country that wanted to survive not start attacking weaker? Lesson learned?
 

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