and this, with the problems listed:
Omnipotence. What does it mean? The common definition is "all-powerful," and it is a characteristic assigned to God by most religions, including the Judeo-Christian religions. But what does all-powerful mean? Does it mean God can defy logic and do the impossible? Or, as St. Thomas Aquinas argues, does it simply mean that God can only do whatever is logically possible? These questions bring up some very important ramifications for people of the Judeo-Christian tradition. In this essay, I will argue that in order for God to be truly omnipotent, He must be able to do that which is logically impossible, simply because of the words very definition.
St. Thomas Aquinas begins his argument by saying, All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists. In other words, all Christians say that God is omnipotent rather easily and without much thought; but describing just what His omnipotence is, is much more difficult. For if one claims that God can do absolutely anything, one must concede that God can sin. However, this idea is contradictory to the idea of omnipotence, because to sin is to fall short of a perfect action, which is impossible for any being that is omnipotent. Nelson Pike does not necessarily agree, though. He argues that omnipotence does include the ability to sin. It is entirely logically possible for God to do evil, but He would never do it, because that would violate a firm and stable feature of his nature. However, I think this avoids the issue. The issue is not whether or not God would want to sin, it is whether or not God has the ability to sin. This goes back to the age-old argument about God creating a stone so heavy that He could not lift it. As formulated by Wade Savage:
1. Either x can create a stone that x cannot lift, or x cannot create a stone that x cannot lift.
2. If x can create a stone that x cannot lift, then, necessarily, there is at least one task that x cannot perform (namely, lift the stone in question).
3. If x cannot create a stone that x cannot lift, then, necessarily, there is at least one act that x cannot perform (namely, create the stone in question).
4. Hence, there is at least one task that x cannot perform.
5. If x is an omnipotent being, then x can perform any task.
6. Therefore, x is not omnipotent.
Aquinas says that the obvious solution to this paradox is that Gods omnipotence simply covers that which is possible absolutely. For example, God can create a universe, because there is no logical impossibility. However, God cannot make a square circle, because it is not logically possible. There is no way for a circle, which consists of no sides, to be a square, which consists of four sides, at the same time. According to Aquinas, there is no contradiction in saying that God cannot create a square circle and then saying that God is omnipotent. George Mavrodes also agrees with Aquinas, saying that such tasks, not falling within the realm of possibility, are not objects of power at all. Hence the fact that they cannot be performed implies no limit on the power of God, and hence no defect in the doctrine of omnipotence. I disagree with this line of reasoning due to the very definition of omnipotence. Omnipotence is defined as having unlimited or universal power, authority, or force; all-powerful. To say that God possesses omnipotence is to say that Gods power is unlimited. To say that God cannot perform certain tasks is to place a limit on Gods power. Therefore, God is not omnipotent. To claim that Gods power is only the ability to do that which is logically possible and nothing more does not fulfill the requirement of claiming the title of omnipotence. Being limited by the laws of logic is a limit, pure and simple. As much as I hate to admit agreeing with Descartes, I agree with his contention that being omnipotent means having power that is not limited. Perhaps a more appropriate word for the type of power Aquinas is describing would be semipotence, as Gods power is not unlimited.
Now, if one claims that God can do absolutely anything, whether it is logically possible or not, then there appears to be a contradiction as outlined previously in Wade Savages argument. However, Harry Frankfurt argues that the paradox Savage presents does not show that the notion of omnipotence is incoherent. Frankfurt has a wonderfully clever response to the critics of omnipotence. He says, with regards to the stone paradox, to suppose that Gods omnipotence allows Him to create a stone so heavy that He cannot lift it. In doing so, God does a logical impossibility. The critic of omnipotence will then point out that God is not, in fact, omnipotent, because He now cannot lift the rock. Frankfurt would reply, quite simply, Why not? For if God can do one impossible thing, namely creating a rock so heavy that an omnipotent being cannot lift it, why can He not then lift the rock? Is it any greater a trick to do one impossibility than to do two? In Frankfurts words:
If an omnipotent being can do what is logically impossible, then he can not only create situations which he cannot handle but also, since he is not bound by the limits of consistency, he can handle situations which he cannot handle.
Frankfurt makes a valid argument, and many Christians would agree with his logic. If one asks the average Christian on the street about Gods power, he or she would most likely say that God can do anything, logically possible or not. We would have to concede that this is not incoherent due to Frankfurts argument. However, if a Christian agrees with this argument, he or she comes across many problems with Christian philosophy, such as the free will defense for the existence of evil. The existence of free will seems to necessitate that God allow evil to exist. For in order to have free will, we must have the opportunity to choose good or evil. If there were no evil to choose, then we could not truly have free will. The problem arises when one considers that, if God can do the impossible, God can make it so that we have no choice yet we still have free will. It is a logical impossibility, but if God can do the logically impossible, it is possible for Him. The Christian must then concede that God is not omnibenevolent, because He allows evil when He does not have to. There is no obvious way out of this problem, as far as I can tell.
Aquinas says that Gods omnipotence extends only as far as logical possibilities do. Descartes and I contend that God can do anything, logically possible or not, if He is, in fact, truly omnipotent. Aquinas may say that to hold such a belief is a contradiction due to the paradox that Savage formalized, but I contend that Frankfurt has accurately shown that it is not incoherent to say that God can both make a rock so heavy that He cannot lift it as well as lift the rock He cannot lift. However, for the Christian, this presents a few problems. For one, the free will defense for the existence of evil is no longer valid. It relied on the fact that free will cannot exist without choices. However, if God can do anything, logically possible or not, He could make it such that we have no choice, but we still have free will. This would mean that God is not omnibenevolent. Another omnibenevolence problem arises when one considers that Christianity says some people will go to hell. If God truly wanted nobody to go to hell and be tortured for all eternity, everybody would be in heaven. Either He could wave His hand and make it so, or He could make it such that the only choice we have is to choose Him and to choose good. That way, we all get to heaven. For these reasons, the Christian theist is left with some troublesome problems.
