“Iraq has trained al Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases.” [
10/7/02]
What They Knew: The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reported in February 2002 that the source of the claim – a detained al Qaeda terrorist — “could not name any Iraqis involved, any chemical or biological material used or where the training occurred. As a result, ‘it is more likely this individual is intentionally misleading the debriefers.'” [WP,
11/6/05]
What Bush Said: Saddam is “a man who loves to link up with al Qaeda.” [
9/28/02]
What They Knew: “One week after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, White House counterterrorism director Paul Kurtz wrote in a memo to national security adviser Condoleezza Rice that no ‘compelling case’ existed for Iraq’s involvement in the attacks and that links between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein’s government were weak.” [WP,
7/22/04]
What Bush Said: Saddam is “a threat because he is dealing with al Qaeda.” [
11/7/02]
What They Knew: “Responding to a presidential tasking, Clarke’s office sent a memo to Rice on September 18, titled ‘Survey of Intelligence Information on Any Iraq Involvement in the September 11 Attacks.’ Rice’s chief staffer on Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, concurred in its conclusion that only some anecdotal evidence linked Iraq to al Qaeda. The memo found no ‘compelling case’ that Iraq had either planned or perpetrated the attacks.” [
9-11 Commission]
LIES ABOUT NUCLEAR THREAT
What Bush Said: “The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.” [
2003 State of the Union]
What They Knew: The administration was warned at least
three times not to make the claim that Iraq was seeking uranium from Africa. Also, the CIA said the “Brits have exaggerated this issue.” [Guardian,
7/10/04]
What Bush Said: Iraq “has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production.” [
2003 State of the Union]
What They Knew: “Ms. Rice’s staff had been told that the government’s foremost nuclear experts seriously doubted that the tubes were for nuclear weapons, according to four officials at the Central Intelligence Agency and two senior administration officials.” The day before Bush’s State of the Union address, the IAEA told the Security Council that it had found no evidence of a revived nuclear weapons program in Iraq. “‘From our analysis to date,’ the agency reported, ‘it appears that the aluminum tubes would be consistent with the purpose stated by Iraq and, unless modified, would not be suitable for manufacturing centrifuges.'” [NYT,
10/3/04]