There is no mandate for recusal that applies to Supreme Court Justices.
Supreme Court Justices decide whether to recuse themselves.
Since there is no appearance of bias why would any of the justices recuse themselves on such an important case?
No... Recusal is a function of honor..
Actually Syriusly is completely wrong and Swimexpert is only half right. According to
2009 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. a Judge (any and all of them) may not indicate connections or displays of bias that an objective person would see as their penchant to vote for either the plaintiff or the defendant before the arguments on the merits are heard. "Appearance of bias" and "suspicion of bias" meet the standard for recusal. No judge or Justice is immune from laws regulating judges or justices. It goes beyond decorum and in fact became a mandate in 2009.
Here (again) for the legal definition/winning premise on bias of a judicial officer (ANY judicial officer)
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-22.pdf
(page 3 attorney Ted Olsen for petitioners) "
Olsen: "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a fundamental constitutional right. That means not only the absence of actual bias, but a guarantee against even the probability of an unfair tribunal."
Scalia: "Who says? Have we ever held that?"
Olsen: "You have said that in the Murchison case and in a number of cases, Your Honor....the language of the Murchison case specifically says so. The Court said in that case: "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness, of course, requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases, but our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness." ...(page 4 continues Olsen).."
the Court has said that frequently, not only the probability of bias, the appearance of bias, the likelihood of bias, the inherent suspicion of bias. The Court has repeatedly said that in the context -- a series of contexts or cases...It's probable cause, Mr. Chief Justice (speaking to Roberts now). The Court frequently decides questions involving due process, equal protection, probable cause, speedy trial, on the basis not of mathematical certainty, but in this case
where an objective observer (page 5 continuing) would come to the conclusion -- knowing all of the facts, would come to the conclusion that a judge or jurist would probably be biased against that individual or in favor of his opponent, that would be sufficient under the Due Process Clause, we submit.
Ginsburg:
"Does it mean the same thing as likelihood of bias?"
Olsen: "The Court --
the Court, Justice Ginsburg, has used the changes interchangeably. We think the probably -- the "probable" standard is the one we would advance to this Court. But the -- but
the seminal case, the Tumey case, said that even if there was a possibility -- any procedure where there would be a possible temptation for the judge not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true, would be the standard. But -- and the Aetna --
in the Aetna v. Lavoie case not very many years ago, the Court repeated that standard, and that standard has been repeated again and again.
... for you.
Your concession is duly noted and summarily accepted.
