Writiing in today's WSJ, Alan Reynolds shows pretty conclusively that all the "demand side" stimulus of the Obama era failed. The recession ended. Job growth edged up. But based on all the money thrown at it, growth should have been in excess of other recoveries. It wasn't. It was worse. Over a trillion dollars wasted.
Alan Reynolds: Demand-Side Policy Gave Us the Big Economic Fizzle - WSJ.com
Alan Reynolds: Demand-Side Policy Gave Us the Big Economic Fizzle - WSJ.com
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By
Alan Reynolds
April 27, 2014 5:17 p.m. ET
Nearly five years since the recession ended in June 2009, economic policy discussions continue to focus on dubious short-term countercyclical measures to "stimulate demand." The Economic Report of the President for 2014 wastes an entire chapter rehashing the jobs supposedly "saved or created" by the 2009 fiscal stimulus and Federal Reserve easing. That analysis relies on notoriously inaccurate forecasting models to take credit for the entirely prosaic facts that (1) the last recession eventually ended just as all previous recessions did, and that (2) employment subsequently rose a bit.
This evades the key issue: Did fiscal or monetary stimulus actually "stimulate demand"?
In recent years the U.S. has experimented with demand-side stimulants on an unprecedented scale. Monetary stimulus involves pushing interest rates down to subsidize big borrowers (mainly governments and banks) at the expense of small savers (seniors). That was the reason the Fed shoved the federal-funds rate down to near zero. Even quadrupling the Fed's assets had no clear and significant impact on the sluggish growth of nominal GDP.
Fiscal stimulus involves big increases in the national debt, in the hope that taxpayers will not notice that national debt is their debt. Borrowing from Peter to pay Paul is thought to provide a net increase in their combined income or wealth, and therefore faster growth in total spending or "aggregate demand."
To find out if fiscal stimulus worked as advertised, we first need to separate deliberate increases in budget deficits from the portion caused by lost incomes and jobs. Once that separation is taken into account, we see thataccording to Congressional Budget Office estimates of cyclically-adjusted budget deficitsthe average increases were an unprecedented 5.7% of potential GDP from 2009 to 2012. No fiscal stimulus that large ever happened before in peacetime, and certainly not for four full years.
What happened? After such energetic demand-side stimulus, nominal GDP rose by only 3.8% a year from 2010 to 2013, and by 4% in the first quarter of 2014, compared with average GDP growth of 6.1% from 1983 to 2007. Ironically, the Economic Report of the President predicts faster growth of demand from now on5% or morebut only after deep cuts in federal spending and euthanasia of quantitative easing. The promised stimulus from the previous fiscal and monetary binge remains undetectablea big fizzle. Demand grew much faster (at a 6.1% pace) from 1998 to 2000, when the budget was in surplus and the Fed hiked the fed-funds rate to 6.5%