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- Nov 15, 2009
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Major Erik Kleinsmith, U.S. Army Former Chief of Intelligence, Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA). Awarded Meritorious Service Medal, Army Commendation Medal, Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal, and the National Defense Service Medal. 14-year Army career. Currently Project Manager for Intelligence Analytical Training, Lockheed Martin Company.
Testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee 9/21/05: "Mr. KLEINSMITH: From March 1999 until February of 2001, I was an active duty Army Major and the Chief of Intelligence of the Land Information Warfare Activity. ...
In December of 1999, we were approached by U.S. Special Operations Command to support Able Danger. ... In the months that followed, we were able to collect an immense amount of data for analysis that allowed us to map Al Qaeda as a worldwide threat with a surprisingly significant presence within the United States.
In approximately April of 2000, from my recollections, our support to Able Danger became severely restricted and ultimately shut down due to intelligence oversight concerns. ... I, along with one of my analysts, Chief Warrant Officer 3 Terri Stephens, were forced to destroy all data, charts, and other analytical products that we had not already passed on to SOCOM-related Able Danger. ...
Chairman Arlen SPECTER: Are you in a position to evaluate the credibility of Captain Phillpott, Colonel Shaffer, Mr. Westphal, Ms. Preisser, or Mr. J.D. Smith, as to their credibility when they say they saw Mohammed Atta on the chart?
Mr. KLEINSMITH: Yes, sir. I believe them implicitly from the time that I had worked with all of them, and everyone you had mentioned was part and I had contact with during this time. I cannot
Chairman SPECTER: You had contact with all of them?
Mr. KLEINSMITH: Yes, sir. I cannot corroborate them completely and say that, yes, they saw it, because I myself do not remember seeing either a picture or his name on any charts, but I believe them implicitly. When they say they do, I believe them."
Testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee 9/21/05: "Mr. KLEINSMITH: From March 1999 until February of 2001, I was an active duty Army Major and the Chief of Intelligence of the Land Information Warfare Activity. ...
In December of 1999, we were approached by U.S. Special Operations Command to support Able Danger. ... In the months that followed, we were able to collect an immense amount of data for analysis that allowed us to map Al Qaeda as a worldwide threat with a surprisingly significant presence within the United States.
In approximately April of 2000, from my recollections, our support to Able Danger became severely restricted and ultimately shut down due to intelligence oversight concerns. ... I, along with one of my analysts, Chief Warrant Officer 3 Terri Stephens, were forced to destroy all data, charts, and other analytical products that we had not already passed on to SOCOM-related Able Danger. ...
Chairman Arlen SPECTER: Are you in a position to evaluate the credibility of Captain Phillpott, Colonel Shaffer, Mr. Westphal, Ms. Preisser, or Mr. J.D. Smith, as to their credibility when they say they saw Mohammed Atta on the chart?
Mr. KLEINSMITH: Yes, sir. I believe them implicitly from the time that I had worked with all of them, and everyone you had mentioned was part and I had contact with during this time. I cannot
Chairman SPECTER: You had contact with all of them?
Mr. KLEINSMITH: Yes, sir. I cannot corroborate them completely and say that, yes, they saw it, because I myself do not remember seeing either a picture or his name on any charts, but I believe them implicitly. When they say they do, I believe them."