Doolittle Raid brilliant strategy or desperate risk

[whitehall]

We just passed the 70'th anniversary of Doolittle's daring raid on 4/18/42. Did it have an unintended consequence of galvanizing the Japanese civilians support for the war? By all accounts the raid was just a symbolic propaganda operation designed to bolster the confidence of the American public in the black early days of the war when the entire Philippine Army was forced to surrender at Corrigador and Battan. I expect if you got into Adml Halsey's mind back then you would probably hear grumbling about risking a Carrier on a propaganda mission. After sighting a couple of Japanese boats and fearing an attack Halsey forced the bombers to launch several hundred miles before their scheduled takeoff virtually dooming the courageous pilots to death by crashing or execution.

 

[Staidhup]

In my opinion the raid was undertaken for three reasons, US moral, symbolic, and formal notice to To Jo Hideki and the Japanese citizens that American resolve would soon take to war to their homeland.

 

[martybegan]

We just passed the 70'th anniversary of Doolittle's daring raid on 4/18/42. Did it have an unintended consequence of galvanizing the Japanese civilians support for the war? By all accounts the raid was just a symbolic propaganda operation designed to bolster the confidence of the American public in the black early days of the war when the entire Philippine Army was forced to surrender at Corrigador and Battan. I expect if you got into Adml Halsey's mind back then you would probably hear grumbling about risking a Carrier on a propaganda mission. After sighting a couple of Japanese boats and fearing an attack Halsey forced the bombers to launch several hundred miles before their scheduled takeoff virtually dooming the courageous pilots to death by crashing or execution.

The doolittle raid had the effect of making Japan worry about its home islands, something it really had not considered before. It also led to the desecion to try to take Midway, giving Japan another Picket Island in the central pacific at worst, and allowing them to draw the US fleet into a descisive battle and maybe take the Hawaiian islands at best.

 

[whitehall]

Pretty long stretch to connect Doolittle's 30 minutes over Tokyo with the Japanese decision to capture Midway.

 

[namvet]

Halsey did NOT force any decision. it was Doolittle's call all the way. the attack was designed to show it could be done with minimum resources available and to lift morale back here for people going into the war plants. and prove to Japan the price paid for missing the carriers at Pearl.

they struck back at midway. that's another story

 

[martybegan]

Pretty long stretch to connect Doolittle's 30 minutes over Tokyo with the Japanese decision to capture Midway.

It wasnt the deciding factor, but it gave Yamamoto the ammunition to push the operation. The Army was worried about China, the Rest of the Navy and the Air Force wanted to concentrate in the SW Pacific where all the reasources were.

Yamamoto used the Doolittle Raid as an example of why they had to both expand thier defensive perimeter in the Central Pacific, or finally draw what was left of the US Pacific fleet into the "Deciding Battle," The theory of which still held sway with Yammamoto and alot of the IJN Brass.

 

[whitehall]

The US was afflicted with an almost criminal racial bigotry toward the Japanese before the war which led to the US being unprepared for Pearl Harbor and later the Philippines. In retrospect we are still guilty of underestimating the Japanese. Of course the Japanese figured out that a bunch of planes were falling out of the sky because they were out of gas and they plotted every possible takeoff point. It is also quite likely that the pilots taken prisoner were tortured into divulging details of the mission. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that the myth of disorganization and panic in Japan that legend seems to encourage did not happen and Doolittle's raid had no strategic value.

 

[regent]

Japan knew there was only a small possibility she she could not win the war when it bombed Pearl Harbor so what was Japan's strategy?

 

[whitehall]

Japan knew there was only a small possibility she she could not win the war when it bombed Pearl Harbor so what was Japan's strategy?

I think Japan held dangerously flawed and fatal assumptions about the US also. I think they thought the US didn't have the heart for war and would cave into demands about expansion and oil.

 

[namvet]

Japan knew there was only a small possibility she she could not win the war when it bombed Pearl Harbor so what was Japan's strategy?

after Midway retreat

 

[konradv]

Tactically the raid meant very little, but strategically it put the Japanese on notice, forcing them to divert some of their strength and heartened Americans who were in need of some good news.

 

[namvet]

and off to work we went

 

[oldfart]

Japan knew there was only a small possibility she she could not win the war when it bombed Pearl Harbor so what was Japan's strategy?

I think Japan held dangerously flawed and fatal assumptions about the US also. I think they thought the US didn't have the heart for war and would cave into demands about expansion and oil.

My impression is that the Japanese military leadership was deeply divided. The Army was hell-bent for war with America because of the steel embargo and the petroleum situation. They thought (probably correctly) that Roosevelt was trying to starve the Japanese war machine into being unable to overrun China. The Army was always focused on China.

The IJN, especially Yamamoto, had severe reservations about war with America. They knew that in a protracted war, American industry and manpower could overwhelm the Japanese forces. Their calculus before Pearl Harbor was that if they fought with the fleet they had afloat or almost finished and could disable the American fleet, America would not be able to reconstitute its navy for at least two years. They expected Germany to enter the way and divert American resources to Europe, in which they were correct. They hoped that during that two year period they could seize enough resources to bolster their industrial base and that America would prefer to negotiate with them rather than fight a two ocean war.

Of course the Japanese were wrong, but they didn't know that in advance. They botched the declaration of war which was scheduled to be delivered thirty minutes prior to the Pearl Harbor attack and they miscalculated the resulting evaporation of anti-war sentiment in the United States. They failed to catch the American carriers at Pearl Harbor and the American fleet was able to limp through while more carriers were completed. And of course they had no idea of the American intelligence code-breaking that set up the Battle of Midway, where fear of losing a battle led the Japanese to losing the war.

 

[editec]

Doolittle Raid brilliant strategy or desperate risk

Both.

It really didn't do anything tactically, but it served to hearten the American people and that was sorely needed at the time.

 

[namvet]

Japan knew there was only a small possibility she she could not win the war when it bombed Pearl Harbor so what was Japan's strategy?

I think Japan held dangerously flawed and fatal assumptions about the US also. I think they thought the US didn't have the heart for war and would cave into demands about expansion and oil.

My impression is that the Japanese military leadership was deeply divided. The Army was hell-bent for war with America because of the steel embargo and the petroleum situation. They thought (probably correctly) that Roosevelt was trying to starve the Japanese war machine into being unable to overrun China. The Army was always focused on China.

The IJN, especially Yamamoto, had severe reservations about war with America. They knew that in a protracted war, American industry and manpower could overwhelm the Japanese forces. Their calculus before Pearl Harbor was that if they fought with the fleet they had afloat or almost finished and could disable the American fleet, America would not be able to reconstitute its navy for at least two years. They expected Germany to enter the way and divert American resources to Europe, in which they were correct. They hoped that during that two year period they could seize enough resources to bolster their industrial base and that America would prefer to negotiate with them rather than fight a two ocean war.

Of course the Japanese were wrong, but they didn't know that in advance. They botched the declaration of war which was scheduled to be delivered thirty minutes prior to the Pearl Harbor attack and they miscalculated the resulting evaporation of anti-war sentiment in the United States. They failed to catch the American carriers at Pearl Harbor and the American fleet was able to limp through while more carriers were completed. And of course they had no idea of the American intelligence code-breaking that set up the Battle of Midway, where fear of losing a battle led the Japanese to losing the war.

that's pretty much it. the IJN wanted no part of this but they were not in charge. army hot heads were. Japan had no natual resources so the embargo forced their hand. the only way to get it was invasion so they ordered the attack on Pearl to neutralize us. they were unaware of our industrial might and resolve to fight back. Yamamoto knew and voiced his warning. but he was ignored.

 

[martybegan]

Japan knew there was only a small possibility she she could not win the war when it bombed Pearl Harbor so what was Japan's strategy?

I think Japan held dangerously flawed and fatal assumptions about the US also. I think they thought the US didn't have the heart for war and would cave into demands about expansion and oil.

Japan held on to the "One Big Battle" Theory that a single large naval battle would decide the outcome of the war. They also assumed thier German allies would be able to keep both the US and the Brits busy enough that they might consider peace with Japan at a certain cost in order to concentrate on the Germans.

 

[there4eyeM]

Not strategic at all, merely tactical. It was of almost no military consequence, but great propaganda effect. It was important to American morale at the cost of valuable lives, of course, but such is war.

 

[konradv]

Not strategic at all, merely tactical. It was of almost no military consequence, but great propaganda effect. It was important to American morale at the cost of valuable lives, of course, but such is war.

I think you're confused regarding the definitions of strategic and tactical. To say it helped American morale, proves that it was strategic victory. For it to be a tactical victory, it would have had to significantly effect some aspect of Japan's war machine, which it did not.

 

[there4eyeM]

Not strategic at all, merely tactical. It was of almost no military consequence, but great propaganda effect. It was important to American morale at the cost of valuable lives, of course, but such is war.

I think you're confused regarding the definitions of strategic and tactical. To say it helped American morale, proves that it was strategic victory. For it to be a tactical victory, it would have had to significantly effect some aspect of Japan's war machine, which it did not.

No, I'm not confusing anything. I didn't say it was a tactical victory. I was saying that, as a military operation, it was tactical. Normandy was strategic, Midway could be called strategic. A bombing mission is tactical. The effect on America was like a little whiff of cocaine; it made the country feel good, briefly.

 

[namvet]

Not strategic at all, merely tactical. It was of almost no military consequence, but great propaganda effect. It was important to American morale at the cost of valuable lives, of course, but such is war.

I think you're confused regarding the definitions of strategic and tactical. To say it helped American morale, proves that it was strategic victory. For it to be a tactical victory, it would have had to significantly effect some aspect of Japan's war machine, which it did not.

yes it did. 4 carriers (war machines ???) sunk at midway put them them in retreat