Doolittle Raid brilliant strategy or desperate risk

Japan knew there was only a small possibility she she could not win the war when it bombed Pearl Harbor so what was Japan's strategy?

I think Japan held dangerously flawed and fatal assumptions about the US also. I think they thought the US didn't have the heart for war and would cave into demands about expansion and oil.

plus they didnt know that we had been listening in on them

Correct me if I'm wrong but the only victory that Magic gave us was at Midway and maybe the shooting down of the Yamamoto plane. Thanks to Magic, Marshall had the the final Japanese attack message in his hands for hours on 12/7/1941 when the Army message center went (conveniently?) down and he sent a telegram to Hawaii which arrived at the same time as the Zeroes.
 
I think Japan held dangerously flawed and fatal assumptions about the US also. I think they thought the US didn't have the heart for war and would cave into demands about expansion and oil.

plus they didnt know that we had been listening in on them

Correct me if I'm wrong but the only victory that Magic gave us was at Midway and maybe the shooting down of the Yamamoto plane. Thanks to Magic, Marshall had the the final Japanese attack message in his hands for hours on 12/7/1941 when the Army message center went (conveniently?) down and he sent a telegram to Hawaii which arrived at the same time as the Zeroes.

code breakers had figured out the location and date of the midway ambush
 
plus they didnt know that we had been listening in on them

Correct me if I'm wrong but the only victory that Magic gave us was at Midway and maybe the shooting down of the Yamamoto plane. Thanks to Magic, Marshall had the the final Japanese attack message in his hands for hours on 12/7/1941 when the Army message center went (conveniently?) down and he sent a telegram to Hawaii which arrived at the same time as the Zeroes.

code breakers had figured out the location and date of the midway ambush

and that was the key. the JN25 constant radio reference to objective AF.

In the spring of 1942, Japanese intercepts began to make references to a pending operation in which the objective was designated as "AF." Rochefort and Captain Edwin Layton, Nimitz's Fleet Intelligence Officer, believed "AF" might be Midway since they had seen "A" designators assigned to locations in the Hawaiian Islands. Based on the information available, logic dictated that Midway would be the most probable place for the Japanese Navy to make its next move. Nimitz however, could not rely on educated guesses.

In an effort to alleviate any doubt, in mid-May the commanding officer of the Midway installation was instructed to send a message in the clear indicating that the installation's water distillation plant had suffered serious damage and that fresh water was needed immediately. Shortly after the transmission, an intercepted Japanese intelligence report indicated that "AF is short of water." Armed with this information, Nimitz began to draw up plans to move his carriers to a point northeast of Midway where they would lie in wait. Once positioned, they could stage a potentially decisive nautical ambush of Yamamoto's massive armada.

Course to Midway - How Cryptology enabled the Untied States to turn the tide in the Pacific War
 
Correct me if I'm wrong but the only victory that Magic gave us was at Midway and maybe the shooting down of the Yamamoto plane. Thanks to Magic, Marshall had the the final Japanese attack message in his hands for hours on 12/7/1941 when the Army message center went (conveniently?) down and he sent a telegram to Hawaii which arrived at the same time as the Zeroes.

code breakers had figured out the location and date of the midway ambush

and that was the key. the JN25 constant radio reference to objective AF.

In the spring of 1942, Japanese intercepts began to make references to a pending operation in which the objective was designated as "AF." Rochefort and Captain Edwin Layton, Nimitz's Fleet Intelligence Officer, believed "AF" might be Midway since they had seen "A" designators assigned to locations in the Hawaiian Islands. Based on the information available, logic dictated that Midway would be the most probable place for the Japanese Navy to make its next move. Nimitz however, could not rely on educated guesses.

In an effort to alleviate any doubt, in mid-May the commanding officer of the Midway installation was instructed to send a message in the clear indicating that the installation's water distillation plant had suffered serious damage and that fresh water was needed immediately. Shortly after the transmission, an intercepted Japanese intelligence report indicated that "AF is short of water." Armed with this information, Nimitz began to draw up plans to move his carriers to a point northeast of Midway where they would lie in wait. Once positioned, they could stage a potentially decisive nautical ambush of Yamamoto's massive armada.

Course to Midway - How Cryptology enabled the Untied States to turn the tide in the Pacific War

yes fascinating isnt it
 
code breakers had figured out the location and date of the midway ambush

and that was the key. the JN25 constant radio reference to objective AF.

In the spring of 1942, Japanese intercepts began to make references to a pending operation in which the objective was designated as "AF." Rochefort and Captain Edwin Layton, Nimitz's Fleet Intelligence Officer, believed "AF" might be Midway since they had seen "A" designators assigned to locations in the Hawaiian Islands. Based on the information available, logic dictated that Midway would be the most probable place for the Japanese Navy to make its next move. Nimitz however, could not rely on educated guesses.

In an effort to alleviate any doubt, in mid-May the commanding officer of the Midway installation was instructed to send a message in the clear indicating that the installation's water distillation plant had suffered serious damage and that fresh water was needed immediately. Shortly after the transmission, an intercepted Japanese intelligence report indicated that "AF is short of water." Armed with this information, Nimitz began to draw up plans to move his carriers to a point northeast of Midway where they would lie in wait. Once positioned, they could stage a potentially decisive nautical ambush of Yamamoto's massive armada.

Course to Midway - How Cryptology enabled the Untied States to turn the tide in the Pacific War

yes fascinating isnt it

they earned their pay here. the IJN did change codes just prior to midway but it was all to late. the same code breaking would later cost Yamamoto and his staff their lives at Guadalcanal
 
and that was the key. the JN25 constant radio reference to objective AF.



Course to Midway - How Cryptology enabled the Untied States to turn the tide in the Pacific War

yes fascinating isnt it

they earned their pay here. the IJN did change codes just prior to midway but it was all to late. the same code breaking would later cost Yamamoto and his staff their lives at Guadalcanal

i grew up around World War II and Vietnam Vets

Heroes all of Them
 
why is that so hard to believe

It isn't. The problem may be that today's world takes forever to coordinate something huge.

WWII witnessed all the nations moving as quickly as possibly, sometimes recklessly or worse, to get there first with the most (to paraphrase one of our Confederate generals).

If the Japanese Navy had managed to get those American carriers at Midway, our war time schedule may have been delayed as much as 18 months.

perhaps however they under estimated us when they set the trap

Undoubtedly the IJN under estimated the USN and its leaders and fighting personnel.
 
It isn't. The problem may be that today's world takes forever to coordinate something huge.

WWII witnessed all the nations moving as quickly as possibly, sometimes recklessly or worse, to get there first with the most (to paraphrase one of our Confederate generals).

If the Japanese Navy had managed to get those American carriers at Midway, our war time schedule may have been delayed as much as 18 months.

perhaps however they under estimated us when they set the trap

Undoubtedly the IJN under estimated the USN and its leaders and fighting personnel.

back then American's were thought of as decadent, lazy and without scruples compared to the disciplined workforce of Japan that worshipped their emperor, Hirohito. we were ripe for the pickin's
 
That Japanese perimeter was to be part of the Japanese key to victory. Japan needed the oil and other raw materials that she had in that newly captured perimeter. The strategy was simple, the Americans would soon tire of the war and of the casualties and make some sort of peace. In those peace terms Japan would retain the raw materials and everyone would be happy. The larger the perimeter and the greater the American casualties was Japan's key to victory.
 
We just passed the 70'th anniversary of Doolittle's daring raid on 4/18/42. Did it have an unintended consequence of galvanizing the Japanese civilians support for the war? By all accounts the raid was just a symbolic propaganda operation designed to bolster the confidence of the American public in the black early days of the war when the entire Philippine Army was forced to surrender at Corrigador and Battan. I expect if you got into Adml Halsey's mind back then you would probably hear grumbling about risking a Carrier on a propaganda mission. After sighting a couple of Japanese boats and fearing an attack Halsey forced the bombers to launch several hundred miles before their scheduled takeoff virtually dooming the courageous pilots to death by crashing or execution.

The Axis and the japs LOST. Something weird about history. Osama bin laden used Hiroshima ( even though the Japanese started the war in 1933 by invading Manchuria and attacked the US at Pearl Harbor in 41’ ) to attack America , apparently Muslims can pick and choose their history to fit their agenda. Actually, the Muslims aren't learning from history either. I think the Japanese imperialist learned their lesson. Muslims seem to think they taught infidels a lesson or two. After 9/11, we didn’t seem to learn a damned thing about these jerks. What happened in Boston was trivial. We face a threat far worse than the AXIS. Islam will make Fascists look like boy scouts.
 
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When Bush was President our friends and foes alike knew that "these Americans are nuts and will respond to an attack by going ape-shit on entire regions of the world if need be. They will overthrow governments, invade and level entire countries, and if you get in their way you are fucked."

That is what our enemies - and our friends - need to think of us.

Now, our enemies know they are as likely to get a few hollow words or perhaps an apology as they are a military response, and our friends know they can 'count on us' for sales, tech support, and leading from behind.
 
When Bush was President our friends and foes alike knew that "these Americans are nuts and will respond to an attack by going ape-shit on entire regions of the world if need be. They will overthrow governments, invade and level entire countries, and if you get in their way you are fucked."

That is what our enemies - and our friends - need to think of us.

Now, our enemies know they are as likely to get a few hollow words or perhaps an apology as they are a military response, and our friends know they can 'count on us' for sales, tech support, and leading from behind.

Don't overdo it. It's pointless, empty hyperbole
 
Some of our wars are just cheap John Wayne movies, but unlike a John Wayne movie, will cost America long after the popcorn is gone. Americans will still be paying for Iraq and that Mission Accomplished sign even long after the carrier is scrapped. How many wars has America had that have been useless, pointless and political?
 
Some of our wars are just cheap John Wayne movies, but unlike a John Wayne movie, will cost America long after the popcorn is gone. Americans will still be paying for Iraq and that Mission Accomplished sign even long after the carrier is scrapped. How many wars has America had that have been useless, pointless and political?

well ill be damned. I didn't know Doolittle bombed Iraq. thanks for clearing this up :cuckoo:
 
It isn't. The problem may be that today's world takes forever to coordinate something huge.

WWII witnessed all the nations moving as quickly as possibly, sometimes recklessly or worse, to get there first with the most (to paraphrase one of our Confederate generals).

If the Japanese Navy had managed to get those American carriers at Midway, our war time schedule may have been delayed as much as 18 months.

perhaps however they under estimated us when they set the trap

Undoubtedly the IJN under estimated the USN and its leaders and fighting personnel.

First, as I discussed upthread, the IJN did not underestimate the nature of their longshot. The Navy generally was opposed to the war before the Pearl Harbor decision had been made, the driving force behind war was the Army and the war in China.

Second, the intelligence coup of the codebreakers deserves the credit it has rightly been given. But this is complementary to and in no way diminishes the bold plan for the Battle of Midway. The IJN dissipated its carriers, sending four to Midway, two to the diversionary attack in the Aleutians, and finishing repairs and two more. Had the force had eight carriers at Midway the outcome would be much more problematic. After the war, senior Japanese naval officers evaluated Midway and generally agreed that the battle revealed defects in the decisions of the senior Japanese naval command, including an excess of caution stemming from the knowledge that they would have to fight the war with the carriers they had, while America would be able to replace lost carriers. The American Navy began the war with eight carriers and lost six of them (Langley CV-1, Lexington CV-2, Ranger CV-4, Yorktown CV-5, Wasp CV-7, and Hornet CV-8) in 1942. The only replacement that year was the lead ship of the Essex class (Essex CV-9), joining the surviving Saratoga CV-3 and Enterprise CV-6. The American Navy did not lose another fleet carrier for the entire remainder of the war.

If we write a counterhistory based on a different outcome at Midway, the American Pacific Fleet would be one or two carriers until the Essex arrived and would have faced a much stronger opponent. The fleet would probably have retreated to the West Coast until sufficient Essex class carriers were available. The Pacific war would then have centered on Australia for perhaps a year. IMHO American public opinion would have supported the war effort through this period contrary to Japanese Army expectations, but the "Europe First" strategy might have been modified. Thus the primary beneficiary of of a Japanese victory at Midway might have been Germany and the primary loser might have been the Soviet Union.

Peace.
 
Some of our wars are just cheap John Wayne movies, but unlike a John Wayne movie, will cost America long after the popcorn is gone. Americans will still be paying for Iraq and that Mission Accomplished sign even long after the carrier is scrapped. How many wars has America had that have been useless, pointless and political?

You liberals just can't bring yourselves to stop lying about that banner, can you?
 
Some of our wars are just cheap John Wayne movies, but unlike a John Wayne movie, will cost America long after the popcorn is gone. Americans will still be paying for Iraq and that Mission Accomplished sign even long after the carrier is scrapped. How many wars has America had that have been useless, pointless and political?

You liberals just can't bring yourselves to stop lying about that banner, can you?

The banner is a symbol and a reminder of a useless war that we will be paying for some time to come. But you're right about the banner, if it weren't for the banner we would be using the picture of Bush in his flight suit to symbolize the event. Thank you crew for the banner.
 
We just passed the 70'th anniversary of Doolittle's daring raid on 4/18/42. Did it have an unintended consequence of galvanizing the Japanese civilians support for the war? By all accounts the raid was just a symbolic propaganda operation designed to bolster the confidence of the American public in the black early days of the war when the entire Philippine Army was forced to surrender at Corrigador and Battan. I expect if you got into Adml Halsey's mind back then you would probably hear grumbling about risking a Carrier on a propaganda mission. After sighting a couple of Japanese boats and fearing an attack Halsey forced the bombers to launch several hundred miles before their scheduled takeoff virtually dooming the courageous pilots to death by crashing or execution.

Meanwhile, back on the topic...every August when America replays the use of the atomic bomb to stop the Japanese, we always seem to reflect on it like Hamlet. We always seem to be afflicted with this mental flaw, eternal doubt that our actions weren’t right and didn’t quite fit the situation. Doolittle did a darn good job, but it wasn’t enough. The Japanese were trying to build an empire and they were slaughtering innumerable innocent people to build that empire. The Japanese deserved every blow upon their heads they got, up to and including the use of atomic weapons TO STOP THEM.
 
Some of our wars are just cheap John Wayne movies, but unlike a John Wayne movie, will cost America long after the popcorn is gone. Americans will still be paying for Iraq and that Mission Accomplished sign even long after the carrier is scrapped. How many wars has America had that have been useless, pointless and political?

You liberals just can't bring yourselves to stop lying about that banner, can you?

The banner is a symbol and a reminder of a useless war that we will be paying for some time to come. But you're right about the banner, if it weren't for the banner we would be using the picture of Bush in his flight suit to symbolize the event. Thank you crew for the banner.


No, it's just another example of bumper-sticker dishonesty by far left simpletons like yourself.
 

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