Court Rules Obama ‘Recess’ Appointments Unconstitutional!

[Publius1787]

While the idiots at The Blaze laughingly got their election predictions from Rove and Morris, they did spout some wisdom before falling back into the pit of wingnuttiness...

Five Reasons Why the Obamacare Decision Might Not Be As Bad As You Think | Video | TheBlaze.com

The smaht thinking is that their is lots certain liberals and many progressives will not like about the Obamacare ruling when it is used in later cases.

Conservatives were just caught off guard. They wanted an ideologically pure decision, but Roberts cares more about the Court and the nation than he does about ideology.

His split on Obamacare was very Marshall-esque in more than a few ways

Yeah, if I am not mistaken the commerce clause ruling was mere dicta and nothing more. So conservatives shouldent exactly be jumping for joy.

read the opinion

Done and done. There is still a possibility of dicta.

 

[Publius1787]

..never in our history has the SCOTUS ruled that a penalty can reasonably be construed as a tax.

did you read the opinion?

For the third time, yes.

 

[Publius1787]

since you are doing predictions:

Who did you predict would win the Presidential election in 2012 and what did you predict about the SCOTUS and Obamacare?

I predict the SCOTUS will go liberal for the next 20 or so years and the idea of constitutional limitations with respect to federal powers will be ignored in the opposite of what James Madison predicted in the last 4 paragraphs of Federalist no. 41. As far as the presidency is concerned I am going with Hillary should she be able to keep her health up.

With respect to my prediction of Obamacare, I said that there was no authority under the commerce clause and the Supreme Court agreed. However, I also predicted that there was no taxing power that allowed for the individual mandate and the supreme court disagreed. This ruling, of course, makes no since because only a limited number of taxes are allowed under the U.S. Constitution (capitation, excise, etc...). The individual mandate falls under neither category of constitutional taxation. That and never in our history has the SCOTUS ruled that a penalty can reasonably be construed as a tax.

Obamacare ruling by CJ Roberts is hardly a liberal ruling -- when you bother to read it.

Your predictions on Presidential 2012?

---------------------------


this is where the train started to go off the tracks

I simply answered a question of yours not adhering to the topic of the op. Did you not ask for a prediction? Not only did you ignore it but you failed to debate it on the merits. You just engaged in a series of contradictions. That's where the train went off track.

 

[Procrustes Stretched]

..never in our history has the SCOTUS ruled that a penalty can reasonably be construed as a tax.

did you read the opinion?

For the third time, yes.

when you follow this back...I added text right out of the opinion where Roberts cites case law and more on when and how penalties were/are taxes

http://www.asahq.org/For-Members/Ad...ing-Released-PPACA-Deemed-Constitutional.aspx

 

[Procrustes Stretched]

"It is of course true that the Act describes the payment as a penalty, not a tax. But while that label is fatal to the application of the Anti-Injunction Act, it does not determine whether the payment may be viewed as an exercise of Congress's taxing power. It is up to Con-gress whether to apply the Anti-Injunction Act to any particular statute, so it makes sense to be guided by Con-gress's choice of label on that question. That choice does not, however, control whether an exaction is within Con-gress's constitutional power to tax.Our precedent reflects this: In 1922, we decided two challenges to the Child Labor Tax on the same day."

..never in our history has the SCOTUS ruled that a penalty can reasonably be construed as a tax.

did you read the opinion?

For the third time, yes.

 

[Publius1787]

did you read the opinion?

For the third time, yes.

when you follow this back...I added text right out of the opinion where Roberts cites case law and more on when and how penalties were/are taxes

Supreme Court Ruling Released PPACA Deemed Constitutional

Yeah, nothing there.

 

[Publius1787]

"It is of course true that the Act describes the payment as a penalty, not a tax. But while that label is fatal to the application of the Anti-Injunction Act, it does not determine whether the payment may be viewed as an exercise of Congress's taxing power. It is up to Con-gress whether to apply the Anti-Injunction Act to any particular statute, so it makes sense to be guided by Con-gress's choice of label on that question. That choice does not, however, control whether an exaction is within Con-gress's constitutional power to tax.Our precedent reflects this: In 1922, we decided two challenges to the Child Labor Tax on the same day."

did you read the opinion?

For the third time, yes.

Yeah, whatever. No specifics or citations as usual. But for the sake of arguement, what type of tax does it fall under? It's not an excise tax, it's not a capitation tax, and it isn't an example of income tax.

 

[Procrustes Stretched]

Yeah, whatever. No specifics or citations as usual. But for the sake of arguement, what type of tax does it fall under? It's not an excise tax, it's not a capitation tax, and it isn't an example of income tax.

It is of course true that the Act describes the payment as a penalty, not a tax. But while that label is fatal to the application of the Anti-Injunction Act,
supra
, at 1213, it does not determine whether the payment may be viewed as an exercise of Congresss taxing power. It is up to Con-gress whether to apply the Anti-Injunction Act to any particular statute, so it makes sense to be guided by Con-gresss choice of label on that question. That choice does not, however, control whether an exaction is within Con-gresss constitutional power to tax.Our precedent reflects this: In 1922, we decided two

Opinion of R
OBERTS
,

C. J.
34 NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS
v.
SEBELIUS

Opinion of the Court
challenges to the Child Labor Tax on the same day. In the first, we held that a suit to enjoin collection of the so-called tax was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act.
George
,259 U. S., at 20. Congress knew that suits to obstruct taxes had to await payment under the Anti-Injunction Act; Congress called the child labor tax a tax; Congress therefore intended the Anti-Injunction Act to apply. In the second case, however, we held that the same exaction,although labeled a tax, was not in fact authorized by Con-gresss taxing power.

Drexel Furniture
, 259 U. S., at 38.That constitutional question was not controlled by Con-gresss choice of label.We have similarly held that exactions not labeled taxes nonetheless were authorized by Congresss power to tax.

In the
License Tax Cases
, for example, we held that federal licenses to sell liquor and lottery ticketsfor which the licensee had to pay a feecould be sustained as exercises of the taxing power. 5 Wall., at 471. And in
New York
v.
United States
we upheld as a tax a surcharge on out-of-state nuclear waste shipments, a portion of which waspaid to the Federal Treasury. 505 U. S., at 171. We thus ask whether the shared responsibility payment falls within Congresss taxing power, [d]isregarding the designa-tion of the exaction, and viewing its substance and appli-cation.
United States
v.
Constantine
, 296 U. S. 287, 294(1935); cf.
Quill Corp.
v.
North Dakota
, 504 U. S. 298, 310(1992) ([M]agic words or labels should not disable another wise constitutional levy (internal quotation marks omitted));
Nelson
v.
Sears
,
Roebuck & Co.
, 312 U. S. 359,363 (1941) (In passing on the constitutionality of a taxlaw, we are concerned only with its practical operation,not its definition or the precise form of descriptive words which may be applied to it (internal quotation marks omitted));
United States
v.
Sotelo
, 436 U. S. 268, 275(1978) (That the funds due are referred to as a penalty

Opinion of R
OBERTS
,

C. J.
35Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012)Opinion of the Court
. . . does not alter their essential character as taxes&#57347.
7
Our cases confirm this functional approach. For ex-ample, in
Drexel Furniture
, we focused on three practical characteristics of the so-called tax on employing child laborers that convinced us the tax was actually a pen-alty. First, the tax imposed an exceedingly heavy bur-den10 percent of a companys net incomeon those who employed children, no matter how small their infraction.Second, it imposed that exaction only on those who know-ingly employed underage laborers. Such scienter require-ments are typical of punitive statutes, because Congress often wishes to punish only those who intentionally break the law. Third, this tax was enforced in part by the Department of Labor, an agency responsible for pun-ishing violations of labor laws, not collecting revenue. 259U. S., at 3637; see also,
e.g., Kurth Ranch
, 511 U. S., at780782 (considering,
inter alia
, the amount of the exac-tion, and the fact that it was imposed for violation of a separate criminal law);
Constantine
,
supra
, at 295 (same).The same analysis here suggests that the shared re-sponsibility payment may for constitutional purposes be considered a tax, not a penalty: * * * *

....................... are there no specifics and citations in Roberts' ruling?

..never in our history has the SCOTUS ruled that a penalty can reasonably be construed as a tax.

did you read the opinion?

For the third time, yes.

 

[Publius1787]

It is of course true that the Act describes the payment asa penalty, not a tax. But while that label is fatal to the application of the Anti-Injunction Act,
supra
, at 1213, itdoes not determine whether the payment may be viewedas an exercise of Congresss taxing power. It is up to Con-gress whether to apply the Anti-Injunction Act to any particular statute, so it makes sense to be guided by Con-gresss choice of label on that question. That choice does not, however, control whether an exaction is within Con-gresss constitutional power to tax.Our precedent reflects this: In 1922, we decided two

Opinion of R
OBERTS
,

C. J.
34 NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS
v.
SEBELIUS

Opinion of the Court
challenges to the Child Labor Tax on the same day. Inthe first, we held that a suit to enjoin collection of the so-called tax was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act.
George
,259 U. S., at 20. Congress knew that suits to obstruct taxes had to await payment under the Anti-Injunction Act; Congress called the child labor tax a tax; Congress therefore intended the Anti-Injunction Act to apply. In the second case, however, we held that the same exaction,although labeled a tax, was not in fact authorized by Con-gresss taxing power.

Drexel Furniture
, 259 U. S., at 38.That constitutional question was not controlled by Con-gresss choice of label.We have similarly held that exactions not labeled taxes nonetheless were authorized by Congresss power to tax.

In the
License Tax Cases
, for example, we held that federal licenses to sell liquor and lottery ticketsfor which the licensee had to pay a feecould be sustained as exercises of the taxing power. 5 Wall., at 471. And in
New York
v.
United States
we upheld as a tax a surcharge on out-of-state nuclear waste shipments, a portion of which waspaid to the Federal Treasury. 505 U. S., at 171. We thusask whether the shared responsibility payment fallswithin Congresss taxing power, [d]isregarding the designa-tion of the exaction, and viewing its substance and appli-cation.
United States
v.
Constantine
, 296 U. S. 287, 294(1935); cf.
Quill Corp.
v.
North Dakota
, 504 U. S. 298, 310(1992) ([M]agic words or labels should not disable anotherwise constitutional levy (internal quotation marksomitted));
Nelson
v.
Sears
,
Roebuck & Co.
, 312 U. S. 359,363 (1941) (In passing on the constitutionality of a taxlaw, we are concerned only with its practical operation,not its definition or the precise form of descriptive wordswhich may be applied to it (internal quotation marksomitted));
United States
v.
Sotelo
, 436 U. S. 268, 275(1978) (That the funds due are referred to as a penalty

Opinion of R
OBERTS
,

C. J.
35Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012)Opinion of the Court
. . . does not alter their essential character as taxes&#57347.
7
Our cases confirm this functional approach. For ex-ample, in
Drexel Furniture
, we focused on three practicalcharacteristics of the so-called tax on employing childlaborers that convinced us the tax was actually a pen-alty. First, the tax imposed an exceedingly heavy bur-den10 percent of a companys net incomeon those whoemployed children, no matter how small their infraction.Second, it imposed that exaction only on those who know-ingly employed underage laborers. Such scienter require-ments are typical of punitive statutes, because Congressoften wishes to punish only those who intentionally breakthe law. Third, this tax was enforced in part by theDepartment of Labor, an agency responsible for pun-ishing violations of labor laws, not collecting revenue. 259U. S., at 3637; see also,
e.g., Kurth Ranch
, 511 U. S., at780782 (considering,
inter alia
, the amount of the exac-tion, and the fact that it was imposed for violation of aseparate criminal law);
Constantine
,
supra
, at 295 (same).The same analysis here suggests that the shared re-sponsibility payment may for constitutional purposes beconsidered a tax, not a penalty: * * * *

....................... are there specifics and citations in Roberts' ruling?

Yes, a tax has been ruled to be a penalty but never a penalty ruled to be a tax. My statement stands and if you had read the opinion you would understand that I was summarizing Scalia. If you actually read the opinion properly you will find that Roberts is justifying labeling a penalty as a tax via pointing to cases that concluded a tax was a penalty, and thus, reversing the methodology.

 

[Procrustes Stretched]

It is of course true that the Act describes the payment asa penalty, not a tax. But while that label is fatal to the application of the Anti-Injunction Act,
supra
, at 1213, itdoes not determine whether the payment may be viewedas an exercise of Congresss taxing power. It is up to Con-gress whether to apply the Anti-Injunction Act to any particular statute, so it makes sense to be guided by Con-gresss choice of label on that question. That choice does not, however, control whether an exaction is within Con-gresss constitutional power to tax.Our precedent reflects this: In 1922, we decided two

Opinion of R
OBERTS
,

C. J.
34 NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS
v.
SEBELIUS

Opinion of the Court
challenges to the Child Labor Tax on the same day. Inthe first, we held that a suit to enjoin collection of the so-called tax was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act.
George
,259 U. S., at 20. Congress knew that suits to obstruct taxes had to await payment under the Anti-Injunction Act; Congress called the child labor tax a tax; Congress therefore intended the Anti-Injunction Act to apply. In the second case, however, we held that the same exaction,although labeled a tax, was not in fact authorized by Con-gresss taxing power.

Drexel Furniture
, 259 U. S., at 38.That constitutional question was not controlled by Con-gresss choice of label.We have similarly held that exactions not labeled taxes nonetheless were authorized by Congresss power to tax.

In the
License Tax Cases
, for example, we held that federal licenses to sell liquor and lottery ticketsfor which the licensee had to pay a feecould be sustained as exercises of the taxing power. 5 Wall., at 471. And in
New York
v.
United States
we upheld as a tax a surcharge on out-of-state nuclear waste shipments, a portion of which waspaid to the Federal Treasury. 505 U. S., at 171. We thusask whether the shared responsibility payment fallswithin Congresss taxing power, [d]isregarding the designa-tion of the exaction, and viewing its substance and appli-cation.
United States
v.
Constantine
, 296 U. S. 287, 294(1935); cf.
Quill Corp.
v.
North Dakota
, 504 U. S. 298, 310(1992) ([M]agic words or labels should not disable anotherwise constitutional levy (internal quotation marksomitted));
Nelson
v.
Sears
,
Roebuck & Co.
, 312 U. S. 359,363 (1941) (In passing on the constitutionality of a taxlaw, we are concerned only with its practical operation,not its definition or the precise form of descriptive wordswhich may be applied to it (internal quotation marksomitted));
United States
v.
Sotelo
, 436 U. S. 268, 275(1978) (That the funds due are referred to as a penalty

Opinion of R
OBERTS
,

C. J.
35Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012)Opinion of the Court
. . . does not alter their essential character as taxes&#57347.
7
Our cases confirm this functional approach. For ex-ample, in
Drexel Furniture
, we focused on three practicalcharacteristics of the so-called tax on employing childlaborers that convinced us the tax was actually a pen-alty. First, the tax imposed an exceedingly heavy bur-den10 percent of a companys net incomeon those whoemployed children, no matter how small their infraction.Second, it imposed that exaction only on those who know-ingly employed underage laborers. Such scienter require-ments are typical of punitive statutes, because Congressoften wishes to punish only those who intentionally breakthe law. Third, this tax was enforced in part by theDepartment of Labor, an agency responsible for pun-ishing violations of labor laws, not collecting revenue. 259U. S., at 3637; see also,
e.g., Kurth Ranch
, 511 U. S., at780782 (considering,
inter alia
, the amount of the exac-tion, and the fact that it was imposed for violation of aseparate criminal law);
Constantine
,
supra
, at 295 (same).The same analysis here suggests that the shared re-sponsibility payment may for constitutional purposes beconsidered a tax, not a penalty: * * * *

....................... are there specifics and citations in Roberts' ruling?

Yes, a tax has been ruled to be a penalty but never a penalty ruled to be a tax. My statement stands and if you had read the opinion you would understand that I was summarizing Scalia.

If you are using Scalia, say so...not everyone remembers everything in the decision word for word.

A statement standing defense is weak. Roberts' wrote out his reasoning and he cited and explained...you just disagree...but your claim is bogus...

 

[Procrustes Stretched]

..never in our history has the SCOTUS ruled that a penalty can reasonably be construed as a tax.

did you read the opinion?

For the third time, yes.

In the License Tax Cases, for example, we held that federal licenses to sell liquor and lottery ticketsfor which the licensee had to pay a feecould be sustained as exercises of the taxing power.

Yes, a tax has been ruled to be a penalty but never a penalty ruled to be a tax. My statement stands and if you had read the opinion you would understand that I was summarizing Scalia.

 

[Procrustes Stretched]

Fee - Penalty - Tax

Roberts was brilliant

and Pube has been officially spanked by Dante

 

[Publius1787]

....................... are there specifics and citations in Roberts' ruling?

Yes, a tax has been ruled to be a penalty but never a penalty ruled to be a tax. My statement stands and if you had read the opinion you would understand that I was summarizing Scalia.

If you are using Scalia, say so...not everyone remembers everything in the decision word for word.

A statement standing defense is weak. Roberts' wrote out his reasoning and he cited and explained...you just disagree...but your claim is bogus...

Funny you've made the assessment that I haven't read The ruling while I was summarizing Scalia from the start. If I had noted so in the beginning I wouldent have had nearly the satisfaction as I do now.

 

[Publius1787]

Fee - Penalty - Tax

Roberts was brilliant

and Pube has been officially spanked by Dante

Words have meaning. The self agrandizing IOT fulfill emotional voids is unecessary though. So what kind of tax is it?

 

[Publius1787]

did you read the opinion?

For the third time, yes.

In the License Tax Cases, for example, we held that federal licenses to sell liquor and lottery ticketsfor which the licensee had to pay a feecould be sustained as exercises of the taxing power.

Yes, a tax has been ruled to be a penalty but never a penalty ruled to be a tax. My statement stands and if you had read the opinion you would understand that I was summarizing Scalia.

A fee is not a penalty. They did not penalize them for selling tickets, (or not selling tickets) they did not penalize them for selling beer, (or not,selling beer) and they were already engaged in an act of commerce. I will ask you again. What kind of tax is the individual mandate?

 

[Procrustes Stretched]

Yes, a tax has been ruled to be a penalty but never a penalty ruled to be a tax. My statement stands and if you had read the opinion you would understand that I was summarizing Scalia.

If you are using Scalia, say so...not everyone remembers everything in the decision word for word.

A statement standing defense is weak. Roberts' wrote out his reasoning and he cited and explained...you just disagree...but your claim is bogus...

Funny you've made the assessment that I haven't read The ruling while I was summarizing Scalia from the start. If I had noted so in the beginning I wouldent have had nearly the satisfaction as I do now.

Try and be coy. You are being a tool and playing games again. This time instead of going off on Soviets, Communists, leftists, collectives, you stumble upon :"Aha! I fooled you."

You were summarizing somebody. The minority opinion as if it were law and god's word.

Your summary must be flawed because to say what you have is silly and untrue.

Read Roberts' opinion...it IS the law

Fee - Penalty - Tax

 

[Quantum Windbag]

The government must request a stay of what? The court ruled on a specific case which came before the Board and overturned that case. Unless I missed something, that's all they did.

Yep , you did miss something


"The decision will effectively shut the NLRB down, because only the Chairman, Mark Gaston Pearce would remain as a constitutionally-appointed member. The two remaining NLRB appointees, Sharon Block and Richard Griffin, both recess appointees, would have to either submit to the Senate confirmation process or step down. (A third appointee, Terrence Flynn, has since stepped down.) The five-member board requires at least three members to provide a quorum and act."

COURT ORDER HERE

.


.

No, I meant did I miss something in the Court's ruling. I'll look at it again tomorrow.

The court ruled that there were no appointments at all. That decision is binding on the entire circuit, and effectively allows anyone to file in that circuit and not comply with anything the NRLB ordered.

 

[Publius1787]

What a wast of time. I figured you and I would be well into the weeds of this opinion by now but you've yet to scratch the surface. I'm willing to bet your scrolling up and down the opinion as I type attempting to find new information to add to an argument that I am wageing via memory. And yet no matter how many times I ask, you cannot tell me what kind of tax the individual mandate is. Dodging that question is revealing because Roberst didn't even attempt to answer it and I know that to be the case; but do you? You see, there are only a limited number of taxes allowed by the US Constitution. The individual mandate falls under none of them.,

 

[Procrustes Stretched]

For the third time, yes.

In the License Tax Cases, for example, we held that federal licenses to sell liquor and lottery ticketsfor which the licensee had to pay a feecould be sustained as exercises of the taxing power.

Yes, a tax has been ruled to be a penalty but never a penalty ruled to be a tax. My statement stands and if you had read the opinion you would understand that I was summarizing Scalia.

A fee is not a penalty. They did not penalize them for selling tickets, (or not selling tickets) they did not penalize them for selling beer, (or not,selling beer) and they were already engaged in an act of commerce. I will ask you again. What kind of tax is the individual mandate?

So you fancy yourself a man of words?

No one will pay an 'individual mandate' - The PPACA mandates a shared responsibility payment...that payment is a penalty.

asking me to explain Roberts ruling is silly. Since you are such an expert on words I would think Roberts' meanings would be to you -- self evident

 

[Procrustes Stretched]

The penalty. It is levied on those who choose NOT to participate in the shared responsibility. The penalty is not universal and it is only mandated that deadbeats pay it

See? there are times one can use a term without being a complete ideological moron...it's a joke: deadbeats