In recent months, the discussion on whether the time has come to stop or at least freeze the war in Ukraine has visibly intensified. When contemplating various scenarios of how this could be done, pundits in both the United States and Europe focus on security guarantees and economic assistance that should be provided to Ukraine or on leverages the West could apply to persuade Kyiv to agree to an inescapably painful would-be agreement.
A lot less attention is paid to possible trade-offs that could be demanded from or negotiated with Moscow. It seems that Western diplomats and analysts, sensing the war fatigue in their respective societies, presume that a similar sentiment exists in Russia, or rather, in the Russian leadership.
To think so would be a mistake. The moment to assume that the Kremlin might be ready to seek a peace deal, if it has ever existed, has long since passed. At this point, Vladimir Putin looks confident that time is on his side. His calculus can, of course, still prove to be wrong, but for now, this is the basis for his decisions.
There are two fundamental sets of arguments that likely drive Putin’s thinking.
The first one is that Russia has preserved, and in some areas even increased, its capacity to wage war, including a war of attrition. In the autumn of 2023, Russian troops seized the initiative and currently are advancing. True, casualties are significant. But this is no novelty: this is how both the imperial and the Soviet armies fought for centuries.
Russia has maintained the necessary numbers of manpower, and Western economic sanctions have had a very limited impact on the Russian economy. Again, Russia’s resources are not endless, but for the time being, the Kremlin has enough money to finance the war, to pay salaries to soldiers or compensations to their families in case of a soldier’s death, and to make sure the defense industry will be able to function.
Russia’s budget deficit at war is smaller than that of many Western countries at peace.
Inside Russia, only a minority opposes the war. For the majority, it is extremely difficult to abandon their positive attitudes. It is worth reminding that 86 percent of Russian citizens welcomed the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Whereas support for the full-scale war against Ukraine has been lower, people are unwilling to accept the loss of the Crimean Peninsula. The “rally-around-the-flag” effect played a role in Putin’s reelection as president in March 2024.
Last but not least, Russia does not feel internationally isolated. It engages with the so-called “Global South,” with China playing the leading part in enabling Russia to continue the war. Countries like Iran and North Korea have become important suppliers of weapons, ammunition, and, in the latter case, also manpower.
The second line of argumentation is that Putin needs to achieve an unquestionable victory not only over Ukraine but, by extension, also over the West.
Historical Context:
Putin's motivations in Ukraine are deeply rooted in Russia's historical and cultural ties to the region. Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union, and after its dissolution, Russia saw Ukraine as a key partner in its efforts to maintain influence in the post-Soviet space. Putin has often spoken about the importance of Ukraine to Russia's national identity and has referred to Ukraine as
a "brotherly nation."
Geopolitical Interests:
Putin's primary goal in Ukraine is to prevent the country from becoming a member of NATO and the European Union. He sees Ukraine's integration into Western institutions as a threat to Russia's national security and a challenge to its dominance in the region. By controlling Ukraine, Putin aims to:
1.
Maintain a buffer zone: Ukraine serves as a buffer between Russia and NATO's eastern flank. By controlling Ukraine, Putin can prevent NATO's expansion into the region and maintain a strategic buffer zone.
2.
Secure energy interests: Ukraine is a key transit country for Russian natural gas exports to Europe. By controlling Ukraine, Putin can ensure the continued flow of Russian gas to Europe and maintain Russia's energy leverage over the continent.
3.
Protect Russian-speaking populations: Putin has often cited the need to protect Russian-speaking populations in Ukraine, particularly in the Donbas region. This narrative has been used to justify Russian military intervention in Ukraine.
Domestic Politics:
Putin's actions in Ukraine are also driven by domestic politics. The conflict has allowed him to:
1.
Boost nationalistic sentiment: The Ukraine conflict has enabled Putin to tap into Russian nationalism, boosting his popularity and legitimacy at home.
2.
Distract from domestic issues: The conflict has diverted attention from Russia's economic woes, corruption, and human rights issues, allowing Putin to maintain a tight grip on power.
3.
Consolidate power: The Ukraine conflict has enabled Putin to consolidate power and eliminate potential rivals, as he has used the conflict to justify the suppression of opposition and the consolidation of power.
Long-term Goals:
Putin's long-term goals in Ukraine are likely to include:
1.
Establishing a frozen conflict: Putin may aim to establish a frozen conflict in Ukraine, similar to the conflicts in Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. This would allow him to maintain control over Ukraine without fully annexing it.
2.
Creating a Russian sphere of influence: Putin may seek to create a Russian sphere of influence in Ukraine, with the country becoming
a de facto Russian satellite state.
3.
Revising the post-Cold War order: Putin's actions in Ukraine may be part of a broader effort to revise the post-Cold War order and challenge the dominance of the United States and its allies.
In conclusion, Putin's goals in the Ukraine conflict are complex and multifaceted, driven by a combination of historical, geopolitical, and domestic factors.
Understanding these motivations is essential to developing effective policies to address the conflict and promote a peaceful resolution. 
