You haven't read enough on Custer and the Little Big Horn to have any business talking about the subject in a public forum. Your OP cites a documentary that rejects your ignorant woke view of him.
And, just FYI, not that you care about facts on this issue, but Sitting Bull had nothing to do with the tactical decisions that the Indians made. Those were made by Gall, Crazy Horse, and Two Moons.
More information for you to try to process:
"Based on his background, education, training, and the information available at the time of his attack, Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer made good decisions as he lead the 7th Cavalry in its defeat at the Little Bighorn." (Major John Neumann,
The Military Decision Making Process and the Battle of the Little Bighorn, p. vi)
"Eyewitness accounts from survivors of Reno's command claim that Reno quickly lost control of the situation and ordered a mount and dismount three times in rapid succession. Had he maintained control of the situation, not dismounted, and pressed the attack into the village, Custer's later 'last stand' may never have become a reality. Even his Indian adversaries recognized the opportunity that Reno had. In 1883 a Sioux woman, disgusted by the conduct of Reno's command, said that, 'He had the camp at his mercy, and he could have killed us all or driven us away.…' Instead, he panicked and withdrew." (Major Eric Eibe,
Custer Revisited, p. 10)
"While Custer may have been seeking glory, he was no fool. He was a top-notch cavalry commander, and his tactics that day were consistent with the Army doctrine of his time. . . .
"The idea that Custer was a compulsive risk-taker and poor tactician is belied by his success in the Civil War. From 1863 to 1865, he led his brigade and division in 23 cavalry engagements, many of them major battles. He won most of them decisively; and while he suffered a few reversals, he never lost in a calamitous way. . . ." (David C. Gompert and Dr. Richard L. Kugler,
“Custer and Cognition,” Joint Force Quarterly issue 41, 2006, p. 89)
Historian T. J. Stiles won a Pulitzer Prize for his 2015 book
Custer’s Trials: A Life on the Frontier of a New America. In many places in his book, Stiles offers sharp criticisms of Custer regarding events before the Last Stand. The fact that Stiles is so critical of Custer when he feels criticism is warranted makes his chapter on the Last Stand all the more convincing and important. Below are parts of Stiles’ analysis of Benteen’s performance during the battle and his RCOI testimony.
Benteen’s RCOI Testimony Shows He Was Bitter and Held Pervasive Disdain for Custer
Did Benteen do all he could to support Custer? Could he have saved him? Did he follow his orders? Or did his personal hatred affect his actions?
Benteen did not answer directly, but he did take the stand in the court of inquiry. His testimony established one thing for certain: it is possible to sneer continuously for days at a time. He appeared in the full flower of his petty arrogance, steeped in an embittered subordinate’s nitpicking resentfulness and a pervasive disdain for Custer. (pp. 451-452)
Benteen Lied About Custer’s Statement Regarding Indians in the Valley
On the eighteenth day of the inquiry, February 1, 1879, Lee asked Benteen to describe the orders to break the regiment into battalions. Oddly, this deceptively soft-faced man began at a point in the events just after Custer returned from the Crow’s Nest, an observation point on a peak used by the Crows in their war with the Lakotas. “General Custer told us that he had just come down from the mountain, that he had been told by the scouts that they could see a village, ponies, tepees, and smoke. He gave it to us as his belief that they were mistaken, that there were no Indians there, that he had looked through his glass and could not see any and did not see any there.”
Benteen’s recollection was wrong. Custer had difficulty spotting the Lakotas, but he believed that Indians had sharper senses and did not doubt them. Benteen’s version made no sense. Everything Custer did thereafter proved that he believed the Lakotas were in the Little Bighorn valley; nothing indicated any doubts. Eager to cast Custer as a fool, Benteen twisted his words to make him solely responsible for his own death. (p. 452)
Benteen Disobeyed Custer’s Scout Orders
This recollection set a pattern. He derided Custer’s every order, coloring each one as foolhardy, as picayune, wrongheaded interference with Benteen’s affairs. Custer reasonably asked his company commanders to be sure each had detailed seven men to escort the pack train and that each trooper carried 100 rounds of carbine ammunition; Benteen depicted it as an absurdity that he executed for “formality’s sake.”
“Describe where it was that you separated from General Custer’s column,” Lee directed Benteen. “What orders did you receive…?”
“My orders were to proceed out into a line of bluffs about 4 or 5 miles away, to pitch into anything I came across, and to send back word to General Custer at once if I came across anything.” He said further messages directed him to search beyond the first and second lines of bluffs. “I forgot to give some instructions of General Custer’s which were that I was to send an officer and about six men in advance of my battalion and to ride rapidly.” In other words, Custer wanted Benteen to send out scouts so the captain could remain in communication with him. Typically, Benteen ignored the intent of the orders and rode ahead of his own scouts. (p. 452)
Benteen Disobeyed Custer’s “Come on . . . Be Quick" Order
Resentful of any imposition, he declined to take any responsibility beyond his official sphere, despite the importance of the order. “About a mile after that I met trumpeter [John] Martin who brought a written order.…It says: ‘Benteen. Come on. Big Village. Be Quick. Bring Packs. W. W. Cooke P. bring pacs.’ ”17
It was an unequivocal, positive command to join Custer, and an insistent demand for ammunition and supplies. The order was in keeping with Custer’s tactics that day; he divided his regiment for a reconnaissance in force, apparently intending to consolidate upon contact with the enemy. But Benteen moved without urgency, and declined to hurry along the pack train. He did not go in search of Custer, though his commander’s battalion left a clear trail toward the right bank of the river, along with the main Lakota trail that Benteen himself stressed was so critically important. (p. 453)
Benteen’s Four Excuses for Not Obeying Custer’s Written Order
In the witness chair, he made contradictory excuses for his refusal to follow Custer’s clear instructions. First he said that Martin (an Italian immigrant with imperfect English) told him the Indians were “skedaddling” and there was “less necessity” to bring up the pack train—implying that the trumpeter’s personal impression outweighed an emphatic written order. Then he excused himself by saying that he saw Reno’s retreat from the river bottom. “I thought the whole command was thrashed and that was not a good place to come. I saw the men who were up on the bluff and I immediately went there and was met by Maj. Reno.” He said he showed Reno the order. “I asked him if he knew where General Custer was. He said he did not.” (p. 453)
Lee asked Benteen if he had asked Reno for permission to go in search of Custer, or to his aid. He replied with his third excuse. “Not at all. I supposed General Custer was able to take care of himself.” Then came a fourth excuse, contradicting the third. “I think now there were between 8 and 9 thousand” hostile warriors, he claimed, a number wildly beyond all other estimates. “I wish to say before that order”—the one delivered by Martin—“that I believe that General Custer and his whole command were dead.”
Putting all four excuses together, Benteen claimed that he believed that Custer was perfectly safe and that he was dead; that the Lakotas were running away and that they had smashed the regiment. He never suggested the most likely explanation: that in his petty, self-absorbed spite against his commanding officer, he seized the first available pretense to avoid helping him or the hundreds of men with him. He even derided the movement from the bluff in search of Custer, initiated by Captain Weir, as “a fit of bravado without orders”….18 (pp. 453-454)
Benteen’s Performance on Reno Hill vs. His Abandonment of Custer
It is true that Benteen effectively took command from Reno of the troops cornered on the bluff, where he displayed true bravery and a sure hand. This portrait of a cool leader in a desperate siege colored the public’s impression of his testimony. Yet it is striking that Benteen, who loathed Custer for purportedly abandoning Maj. Joel Elliott and seventeen men at the Washita, should so lightly excuse his own abandonment of ten times as many troops. (p. 454)