a
fetus 22 weeks is a viable person capable of life out of the womb
The Cellar Image of the Day
22 weeks is not a viable fetus; the birth of a 22 week old fetus was an anomaly in that instance. Attempting to induce birth in a mother carrying a 22 week old fetus would itself act as an abortion in many instances because the fetus would not be prepared to survive in the outside environment yet. I might support the inducement of labor in some instances, but if I believe it would be more likely to cause the fetus extreme physical pain and suffering, I would say that painless death would be preferable.
Moreover, you are confused about the definition of personhood. An ethical definition of personhood that has survived in one form or another since the Enlightenment is one that stresses some degree of sentience and self-awareness, the former being basic awareness and the latter being best defined as
awareness of that awareness. Hence, we ought to choose to define personhood by these traits since it is beings with these traits that have a greater capacity to
suffer than other beings.
Jeremy Bentham said:
The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come to be recognized that the number of legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a week or even a month, old. But suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?
If you have objections to or contentions with this definition of personhood, then by all means, state them.
Thus, because an infant is not a self-aware being, an infant itself is not a person, and an infant's life is not equivalent to that of a person.
Before you pick up the misconception that I think it's acceptable to kill healthy infants, as so many has, an infant has extrinsic moral value in that, contrary to a fetus, it can be adopted by others, as well as the fact that an infant's parents presumably have a desire for it to live, as opposed to their deliberate attempts to kill a fetus. Hence, depriving them of that interest or desire would be a denial of their preferences, and would cause them to suffer.
The law defines personhood? Really? And now you're going to cite us this law, right? Just as a hint, I wouldn't suggest you come back with some agenda-driven leftist judge's legislation from the bench as an answer, either. I'm talking about REAL laws, not propaganda illegally usurping the power of the legislature.
And who is this "we" that knows this apocryphal thing called "personhood" exists?
The law most certainly does not define the
ethical dimensions of personhood; though Dred Scott may have been a nonperson according to the law, he was most certainly a person in the ethical sense. I believe that I have laid out an ethically consistent definition of personhood in defining fundamental traits of personhood as basic sentience, (basic awareness and the capacity to feel pain), and in addition to that, self-awareness, (the capacity to view oneself as a distinct entity existing over time), as well as the capacity to form rational moral preferences about one's own future that stems from self-awareness.
Something along those lines has characterized ethical definitions of personhood since the Enlightenment.
Western Philosophers have expounded on every dimension — from the purely analytical to the metaphysical — in discourses on personhood. Conceptually, a person is defined by the characteristics of reasoning, consciousness, and persistent personal identity. The English philosopher John Locke defined a person as "a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it" [4].
According to Boethius:
Person is an individual substance of rational nature. As individual it is material, since matter supplies the principle of individuation. The soul is not person, only the composite is. Man alone is among the material beings person, he alone having a rational nature. He is the highest of the material beings, endowed with particular dignity and rights.[citation needed] John Locke emphasized the idea of a living being that is conscious of itself as persisting over time (and hence able to have conscious preferences about its own future).
In a Lockean approach, some criteria a person might be required to have in order to be a person are one or more of the following:
Consciousness,
The ability to steer one's attention and action purposively,
Self-awareness, self-bonded to objectivities (existing independently of the subject's perception of it),
Self as longitudinal thematic identity, one's biographic identity.
Neo-Kantian philosophers over the last two decades have emphasized that conscious awareness requires both:
The sensorial capacity to access an environment (and one's own body) in a way that offers the basic qualitative content for subjective experience.
The intellectual capacity to conceptually interpret sensorial content as representing some thing to oneself.
Both of these capacities are required for a subject of experience, action, thought, or self-reflection to exist, at least in the physically embodied, world-accessing manner of humans (and presumably other intelligent animals). As Kant wrote:
Without sensibility no object would be given to us, and without understanding none would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.
I use this definition because of an ethical imperative to
reduce suffering. If you have objections to this definition, let them be known.