- Oct 20, 2013
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A lot is being said, (in the latest attempt to derail the candidacy of Donald Trump), about Trump's words regarding George W. Bush's ineffectiveness at protecting the nation from the 9-11 attacks. Yes, I said INeffectiveness, despite some claims that 80% of Republicans are backing Bush on this. Some of them (Michael Mukasey, Jeb Bush, George Pataki, et al) are going on TV cable news shows slamming Trump on this. Yes, I now what they say. I know exactly what they say. They're wrong.
One very interesting example is Pataki, whose presidential bid is a joke. He seems to relish the opportunity to slam Trump, using demeaning metaphors ("schoolyard bully, etc) to make his points. Trouble with Pataki is what he thinks are facts are just wrong. He asks why doesn't Trump attack Bill Clinton's presidency pertaining to the lead up time to 9-11.
I'll tell you why Mr. Pataki. It's because in the Clinton administration, (which I am no fan of, believe me), they did take non-government terrorism seriously, as opposed to governments like Iraq and Iran. Consequently, the 1999-2001 facts do show that Bush made a huge national security mistake when he demoted Richard Clarke from being a cabinet member to being some sort of adviser.As of that point, Clarke could not call a meeting of the major cabinet members, the principals. They included the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, CIA director George Tenet, and Secretary of State Colin Powell.
In the Clinton era, before he was demoted, Clarke could and did call meetings of the principals and read them into the intelligence on al-Qaeda. In spring of 2001 and summer of 2001, Clarke was helpless. He tried one last time in mid-summer. But Bush and the others all went on vacation. Bush was on vacation 42% of the time in 2001 before 9/11.
Clarke says that when the Bush team came to the White House, it was as though they had been frozen in amber. They went out just after the Gulf War when Iraq was big. They had missed the rise of al-Qaeda in the 1990s, and were not inclined to recognize the danger of an asymmetric terrorist organization. They thought in terms of states being the real threat. Terrorist organizations in their experience were just ways for states to bother one another.
In addition to this huge blunder, Bush was terribly weak on immigration, and tracking terrorists coming into the United States. Another example of the stark contrast of the better protection in the Clinton years (again blundered by Bush) was the al-Qaeda āMillennium Plotā of late 1999, one element of which was supposed to be an attack by Ahmed Ressam, on Los Angeles Airport. What Clarkeās book reveals is that the way Ressam was shaken out at Port Angeles by customs agent Diana Dean was not an accident. Rather, Clinton had made Clarke a cabinet member. He was given the authority to call other key cabinet members and security officials to ābattle stations,ā involving heightened alerts in their bureaucracies and daily meetings. Clarke did this with Clintonās approval in December of 1999, because of increased chatter (and American security experts PAYING ATTENTION) and because the Jordanians caught a break when they cracked Raed al-Hijaziās cell in Amman.
But, in the spring of 2001, with Clarke now demoted (for cronyism or whatever), Clarke didn't have the capability any more to call Cabinet meetings to deal with the major threat now manifesting itself. In summer of 2001 the chatter was much greater and more ominous than in fall of 1999. Clarke wanted to go to battle stations and have daily meetings with the āprincipalsā (i.e. Rumsfeld, Ashcroft, Powell, Tenet). He wanted to repeat the procedures that had foiled the Millennium Plot. He could not convince anyone to let him do that.
It's undeniable that going to such a heightened level of alert and concerted effort in 2001 might have shaken loose much earlier the information that the CIA knew that Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi were in the US. As it is, the INS wasnāt informed of this advent, and did not start looking for them until Aug. 21, 2001, by which time it was too late. Since they made their plane reservations for September 11 under their own names, names known to the USG, a heightened level of alert might have allowed the FBI to spot them.
So. sorry Mr. Pataki (et al), it just is not true that Bush was doing exactly the same thing on terrorism that Clinton was.
He >>>
1. didnāt have a cabinet-level counter-terrorism czar;
2. he didnāt have the routine of principalsā meetings on terrorism;
3. he didnāt authorize Clarke to go to ābattle stationsā and heightened security alert in summer of 2001 the way Clinton had done in December, 1999.
4. And he, (and all the Bush administration folks) didn't really see terrorist NGOs as much of a threat.
The added link here is incredibly revealing. I've taken some pieces of it for this OP. But to get a complete assessment of this, it is very helpful to read the extremely well thought-out and organized article by Juan Cole. It's one of the clearest and best articles I've seen in a while >>>
http://www.juancole.com/2015/10/geor...y-attacks.html
One very interesting example is Pataki, whose presidential bid is a joke. He seems to relish the opportunity to slam Trump, using demeaning metaphors ("schoolyard bully, etc) to make his points. Trouble with Pataki is what he thinks are facts are just wrong. He asks why doesn't Trump attack Bill Clinton's presidency pertaining to the lead up time to 9-11.
I'll tell you why Mr. Pataki. It's because in the Clinton administration, (which I am no fan of, believe me), they did take non-government terrorism seriously, as opposed to governments like Iraq and Iran. Consequently, the 1999-2001 facts do show that Bush made a huge national security mistake when he demoted Richard Clarke from being a cabinet member to being some sort of adviser.As of that point, Clarke could not call a meeting of the major cabinet members, the principals. They included the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, CIA director George Tenet, and Secretary of State Colin Powell.
In the Clinton era, before he was demoted, Clarke could and did call meetings of the principals and read them into the intelligence on al-Qaeda. In spring of 2001 and summer of 2001, Clarke was helpless. He tried one last time in mid-summer. But Bush and the others all went on vacation. Bush was on vacation 42% of the time in 2001 before 9/11.
Clarke says that when the Bush team came to the White House, it was as though they had been frozen in amber. They went out just after the Gulf War when Iraq was big. They had missed the rise of al-Qaeda in the 1990s, and were not inclined to recognize the danger of an asymmetric terrorist organization. They thought in terms of states being the real threat. Terrorist organizations in their experience were just ways for states to bother one another.
In addition to this huge blunder, Bush was terribly weak on immigration, and tracking terrorists coming into the United States. Another example of the stark contrast of the better protection in the Clinton years (again blundered by Bush) was the al-Qaeda āMillennium Plotā of late 1999, one element of which was supposed to be an attack by Ahmed Ressam, on Los Angeles Airport. What Clarkeās book reveals is that the way Ressam was shaken out at Port Angeles by customs agent Diana Dean was not an accident. Rather, Clinton had made Clarke a cabinet member. He was given the authority to call other key cabinet members and security officials to ābattle stations,ā involving heightened alerts in their bureaucracies and daily meetings. Clarke did this with Clintonās approval in December of 1999, because of increased chatter (and American security experts PAYING ATTENTION) and because the Jordanians caught a break when they cracked Raed al-Hijaziās cell in Amman.
But, in the spring of 2001, with Clarke now demoted (for cronyism or whatever), Clarke didn't have the capability any more to call Cabinet meetings to deal with the major threat now manifesting itself. In summer of 2001 the chatter was much greater and more ominous than in fall of 1999. Clarke wanted to go to battle stations and have daily meetings with the āprincipalsā (i.e. Rumsfeld, Ashcroft, Powell, Tenet). He wanted to repeat the procedures that had foiled the Millennium Plot. He could not convince anyone to let him do that.
It's undeniable that going to such a heightened level of alert and concerted effort in 2001 might have shaken loose much earlier the information that the CIA knew that Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi were in the US. As it is, the INS wasnāt informed of this advent, and did not start looking for them until Aug. 21, 2001, by which time it was too late. Since they made their plane reservations for September 11 under their own names, names known to the USG, a heightened level of alert might have allowed the FBI to spot them.
So. sorry Mr. Pataki (et al), it just is not true that Bush was doing exactly the same thing on terrorism that Clinton was.
He >>>
1. didnāt have a cabinet-level counter-terrorism czar;
2. he didnāt have the routine of principalsā meetings on terrorism;
3. he didnāt authorize Clarke to go to ābattle stationsā and heightened security alert in summer of 2001 the way Clinton had done in December, 1999.
4. And he, (and all the Bush administration folks) didn't really see terrorist NGOs as much of a threat.
The added link here is incredibly revealing. I've taken some pieces of it for this OP. But to get a complete assessment of this, it is very helpful to read the extremely well thought-out and organized article by Juan Cole. It's one of the clearest and best articles I've seen in a while >>>
http://www.juancole.com/2015/10/geor...y-attacks.html
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