Treason At Pearl Harbor.

[RetiredGySgt]

Few Americans today know that in the days following the Pearl Harbor attack, FDR, through his cabinet members and through his allies in the War Department, Congress, and the press, spread numerous false reports that German planes and pilots had participated in the bombing and that German military personnel were aiding Japanese assaults in other parts of the Pacific. However, these tales were soon abandoned when it became clear that no German military personnel had played any role in Pearl Harbor and that no Germans were advising Japanese units in the Pacific.

FDR may have spread these tales because he could not believe that the Japanese could have done so damage to Pearl Harbor by themselves. Or, FDR may have spread these lies to further inflame public opinion into supporting entrance into the war. Or, both motives may have been behind the brief propaganda campaign.

This is a fascinating chapter of World War II history that few Americans have even heard of. Although some scholars, including Gordon Prange, have discussed this issue, Dr. Richard Hill has offered the only in-depth look at this propaganda campaign and its impact on American public opinion. See his book Hitler Attacks Pearl Harbor: Why the United States Declared War on Germany (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2003).

Germany declared war on the US

 

[gipper]

Germany declared war on the US

Simpleton!

 

[DudleySmith]

Simpleton!

Moron.

 

[gipper]

Moron.

 

[DudleySmith]

******.

 

[gipper]

******.

 

[DudleySmith]

flaming ******.

 

[mikegriffith1]

Germany declared war on the US

Uh, yes, after Pearl Harbor--and after FDR had been trying for months to provoke Germany into fighting the U.S.

The point is that FDR was willing to tell just about any lie to try to inflame public opinion into supporting entrance into the war.

Internal government memos and other evidence indicate that months before the Pearl Harbor attack, Roosevelt and other high officials decided to try to provoke hostilities with Japan in order to overcome the American public’s opposition to entering World War II.

One memo, known as the McCollum Memo, dated 7 October 1940, even detailed a point-by-point plan for doing so, and much of that plan was implemented. Written by Lieutenant Commander Arthur McCollum, the chief of ONI’s Far Eastern Section, the memo noted the lack of public support for entry into the war, and it "therefore" suggested several steps to provoke Japan.

One of the steps was to keep the Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor as a lure. After listing the steps, the memo added that it would be “so much the better” if the steps led Japan to commit an overt act of war:

If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better.

Defenders of the traditional story note that there is no direct evidence that FDR ever saw the McCollum Memo. But we know that Captain Walter Anderson, the director of ONI, received a copy of the memo, and Anderson was one of Roosevelt's most trusted naval advisers and had direct access to FDR.

Furthermore, we know that Admiral Stark, Admiral Turner (the director of the Navy's War Plans Division), and Captain Harold Bode (the chief of ONI's Foreign Intelligence Branch) also received copies of the memo. Needless to say, Stark, as Chief of Naval Operations, met with FDR frequently. So at a minimum, it seems entirely plausible that FDR was made aware of McCollum's memo, especially since it was written by the chief of ONI's Far Eastern Section. Also, Roosevelt carried out many of the actions recommended in the memo.

McCollum's memo is important partly because it reveals the attitude of many senior military officers.

Moreover, the McCollum Memo is not the only written evidence that high officials in FDR’s administration wanted to provoke war with Japan. We also have Secretary of War Henry Stimson’s diary. In talking about a recent meeting at the White House, On 25 November 1941, Stimson wrote that they discussed how they could get Japan to fire “the first shot” without suffering too much damage from that first shot:

Then at 12 o’clock we (General Marshall and I) went to the White House, where we were until nearly half past one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark, and myself. There the President, instead of bringing up the Victory Parade, brought up entirely the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as next Monday. . . . The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves.

We also have the diary of Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, who strongly favored entering the war. On 18 October 1941, Ickes wrote that the best way to enter the war would be “by way of Japan”:

For a long time, I have believed that our best entrance into the war would be by way of Japan. . . . And, of course, if we go to war against Japan, it will inevitably lead to war against Germany.

 

[Soupnazi630]

Uh, yes, after Pearl Harbor--and after FDR had been trying for months to provoke Germany into fighting the U.S.

The point is that FDR was willing to tell just about any lie to try to inflame public opinion into supporting entrance into the war.

Internal government memos and other evidence indicate that months before the Pearl Harbor attack, Roosevelt and other high officials decided to try to provoke hostilities with Japan in order to overcome the American public’s opposition to entering World War II.

One memo, known as the McCollum Memo, dated 7 October 1940, even detailed a point-by-point plan for doing so, and much of that plan was implemented. Written by Lieutenant Commander Arthur McCollum, the chief of ONI’s Far Eastern Section, the memo noted the lack of public support for entry into the war, and it "therefore" suggested several steps to provoke Japan.

One of the steps was to keep the Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor as a lure. After listing the steps, the memo added that it would be “so much the better” if the steps led Japan to commit an overt act of war:



Defenders of the traditional story note that there is no direct evidence that FDR ever saw the McCollum Memo. But we know that Captain Walter Anderson, the director of ONI, received a copy of the memo, and Anderson was one of Roosevelt's most trusted naval advisers and had direct access to FDR.

Furthermore, we know that Admiral Stark, Admiral Turner (the director of the Navy's War Plans Division), and Captain Harold Bode (the chief of ONI's Foreign Intelligence Branch) also received copies of the memo. Needless to say, Stark, as Chief of Naval Operations, met with FDR frequently. So at a minimum, it seems entirely plausible that FDR was made aware of McCollum's memo, especially since it was written by the chief of ONI's Far Eastern Section. Also, Roosevelt carried out many of the actions recommended in the memo.

McCollum's memo is important partly because it reveals the attitude of many senior military officers.

Moreover, the McCollum Memo is not the only written evidence that high officials in FDR’s administration wanted to provoke war with Japan. We also have Secretary of War Henry Stimson’s diary. In talking about a recent meeting at the White House, On 25 November 1941, Stimson wrote that they discussed how they could get Japan to fire “the first shot” without suffering too much damage from that first shot:



We also have the diary of Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, who strongly favored entering the war. On 18 October 1941, Ickes wrote that the best way to enter the war would be “by way of Japan”:

All of this ONLY shows that some people wanted a war with Japan none it proves a set up

 

[Zebra]

There was no intelligence network in the United States during the FDR presidency. The prevailing government opinion was that the Japanese were little yellow savages who couldn't build a ship that would float or a plane that would fly. FDR's dementia and social bias might have caused his bad decision to invite an attack so the U.S. could overcome anti-war sentiment in the U.S. and get into the real war in Europe. COS Marshall was credited with a photographic memory but he claimed that he could not remember where he was on the night of Dec. 6 1941. When he arrived uncharacteristically late for work his frantic staffers gave him the decoded message that implied an imminent Japanese attack. He read and re-read and re-re-read the decoded transcript until the message center went out for some reason. Instead of picking up a phone and calling Pearl Harbor Marshall sent a Western Union telegram that arrived about the same time as the Japanese Zeroes.

true?

 

[DudleySmith]

true?

It's true we had no CIA back then, but we had a few Navy intelligence officers, the FBI handled a little bit, the rest was volunteers usually affiliated with U.S. corporations operating overseas and mostly informal, nothing as elaborate as British, French, Russian, and German professional spy services. The rest is just petty FDR bashing nonsense, most right wingers feeling bad about FDR being elected 4 times after they screwed up the country and caused a major Depression with their hair brained economic fantasies and lack of any business ethics after WW I.

 

[mikegriffith1]

When judging 20th-century Imperial Japan, one must understand that there were two main factions: the militarists and the non-militarists. Many of the militarists were as bad as the worst Stalinists and Nazis. Some of the militarists, such as Anami and Ishiwara, though bad, opposed violence against the government and occasionally sought to reign in the more radical militarists.

Virtually all of the non-militarists wanted to end the war in China on fair terms and wanted peace with the U.S. There was a range of moderation among the non-militarists, just as there was a range of militarism among the militarists. But nearly all non-militarists thought the war in China was a mistake, were willing to withdraw Japanese troops from virtually all of China (except for a temporary and small buffer zone between China and Japan's Manchurian state, Manchukuo), wanted to extend full citizenship to Korean subjects, and wanted good relations with the U.S.

The non-militarists probably constituted at least 75% of the population, but the militarists largely controlled the military and could usually intimidate or threaten the government into going along with their plans and policies.

Both the militarists and the non-militarists were fiercely anti-communist and pro-capitalist.

FDR and his ilk acted as though the militarists were Japan and represented all Japanese. They endorsed the erroneous view that nearly all Japanese were militarists. We see these same attitudes expressed in this thread.

Even some of the militarists did not want war with the U.S. As mentioned, virtually all of the non-militarists, including the emperor and most of the civilian members of the cabinet, did not want war with the U.S. This is why Konoye proposed very reasonable peace terms to FDR (and, surprisingly enough, Tojo did not weaken or withdraw any of those terms when he became prime minister).

Our ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, warned FDR and Cordell Hull (SecState) that Konoye was offering the best peace terms he dared to offer, and that he risked assassination if he offered better terms. By any objective standard, Konoye's terms were reasonable and could have led to the end of the war in China and could have avoided Pearl Harbor. But FDR ignored Grew's sound advice and spurned all of Japan's peace offers, which enabled the militarists to get approval to attack Pearl Harbor.

Most of Japan's leaders did not want war with the U.S., and the vast majority of the Japanese people agreed with them. But FDR, determined to drag America into WWII, played right into the hands of the militarists and sabotaged the non-militarists by imposing draconian sanctions on Japan and rejecting all of Japan's peace offers. It is a matter of historical fact that FDR viewed provoking Japan to war as the best means to get the U.S. into WWII.

 

[RetiredGySgt]

When judging 20th-century Imperial Japan, one must understand that there were two main factions: the militarists and the non-militarists. Many of the militarists were as bad as the worst Stalinists and Nazis. Some of the militarists, such as Anami and Ishiwara, though bad, opposed violence against the government and occasionally sought to reign in the more radical militarists.

Virtually all of the non-militarists wanted to end the war in China on fair terms and wanted peace with the U.S. There was a range of moderation among the non-militarists, just as there was a range of militarism among the militarists. But nearly all non-militarists thought the war in China was a mistake, were willing to withdraw Japanese troops from virtually all of China (except for a temporary and small buffer zone between China and Japan's Manchurian state, Manchukuo), wanted to extend full citizenship to Korean subjects, and wanted good relations with the U.S.

The non-militarists probably constituted at least 75% of the population, but the militarists largely controlled the military and could usually intimidate or threaten the government into going along with their plans and policies.

Both the militarists and the non-militarists were fiercely anti-communist and pro-capitalist.

FDR and his ilk acted as though the militarists were Japan and represented all Japanese. They endorsed the erroneous view that nearly all Japanese were militarists. We see these same attitudes expressed in this thread.

Even some of the militarists did not want war with the U.S. As mentioned, virtually all of the non-militarists, including the emperor and most of the civilian members of the cabinet, did not want war with the U.S. This is why Konoye proposed very reasonable peace terms to FDR (and, surprisingly enough, Tojo did not weaken or withdraw any of those terms when he became prime minister).

Our ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, warned FDR and Cordell Hull (SecState) that Konoye was offering the best peace terms he dared to offer, and that he risked assassination if he offered better terms. By any objective standard, Konoye's terms were reasonable and could have led to the end of the war in China and could have avoided Pearl Harbor. But FDR ignored Grew's sound advice and spurned all of Japan's peace offers, which enabled the militarists to get approval to attack Pearl Harbor.

Most of Japan's leaders did not want war with the U.S., and the vast majority of the Japanese people agreed with them. But FDR, determined to drag America into WWII, played right into the hands of the militarists and sabotaged the non-militarists by imposing draconian sanctions on Japan and rejecting all of Japan's peace offers. It is a matter of historical fact that FDR viewed provoking Japan to war as the best means to get the U.S. into WWII.

Bullshit, the Government was controlled by the military and had been for quite a while. We were opposed to the Japanese in China and rightly so. Japan increased their attacks on China and did nothing to bring it to a stop. Stopping trade was the ONLY viable tool we had, to continue to supply Japan was a defacto support of their China policy.

 

[Unkotare]

Another "scholar" who thinks we entered the war in the Pacific on behalf of China.

The Chinese Exclusion Act was just a sign of affection and respect.

 

[0311]

Another "scholar" who thinks we entered the war in the Pacific on behalf of China.

The Chinese Exclusion Act was just a sign of affection and respect.

China was pretty much a back water for a very time. An amazing but unknown fact is that WWII really started when Japan Invaded Manchuria in 1931. In fact Japanese Fighters attacked and sank the U.S.S. Panay, a U.S. Navy Gunboat on 12 December 1937, almost four years to the day of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

 

[RetiredGySgt]

China was pretty much a back water for a very time. An amazing but unknown fact is that WWII really started when Japan Invaded Manchuria in 1931. In fact Japanese Fighters attacked and sank the U.S.S. Panay, a U.S. Navy Gunboat on 12 December 1937, almost four years to the day of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Unk loves Japan and claims all kind of crap in support of their murderous ww2 campaign

 

[Unkotare]

China was pretty much a back water for a very time. ...

No it wasn't.

 

[Unkotare]

... An amazing but unknown fact is that WWII really started when Japan Invaded Manchuria in 1931. ...

"Unknown"?

???

 

[Unkotare]

Unk loves Japan and claims all kind of crap in support of their murderous ww2 campaign

Butthurt liar. ^^^

 

[0311]

"Unknown"?

???

The Japanese Invasion of Manchuria was largely ignore by the U.S. Press. The European Press only covered as a back water. My late Father told that a several men in his hometown (Brinkley Arkansas) would eventually join the A.V.G (Amercian Volunteer Group....The Flying Tigers). One never made it back and two went on to the Army Air Corps. The Rape of Nanking was one of the worst artocities of WWII, but it was China. In fact one of the reason the Panay sunk by Japaese airplanes is that it was part of evacuation force at Nanking at the time.