The End of Alliances

[onedomino]

There was an interesting panel discussion on C-Span this past weekend concerning the viability of Cold War Alliances in the post Cold War era. Although Russia's recent behavior may seem like the Cold War could revive, NATO is in trouble. It is an alliance in search of a mission. All it does now is cost America billions of dollars. The old enemy, the Warsaw Pact, no longer exists. Why should America defend the rich countries of Western Europe when they do not chose to defend themselves? NATO does inhibit the growth of an EU Defense Force. But the development of an EDF may eventually occur regardless of NATO.

What good is NATO in Afghanistan? Do we think that the British, Canadians, Australians, and Danes would not fight the Taliban in southern Afghanistan if not politically shielded by NATO? Canada probably, but the others? No. Australia is not even a member of NATO. What is the significant Afghanistan contribution of Germany and France when they remain in northern Afghanistan on guard duty refusing to engage the enemy in the south? What is the meaning of NATO when members pick and choose the missions in which they are willing to participate? The anti Soviet glue that held NATO together is gone. But perhaps is will revive behind Putin’s new Soviet rhetoric.

The American alliances in the Pacific seem more relevant: the Japanese - American Security Treaty, the US - ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, the SE Asian Treaty Organization, the Australian - NZ -US Defense Treaty (although NZ is not a functioning partner and has effectively dropped out), and the emerging US -India Alliance (as seen in the US - India Nuclear Cooperation Pact). The common threat is the anticipated ascendance of totalitarian and mercantile Chinese military and economic power. What if Japan was no longer defended by the US? Would not it immediately develop its own nuclear arsenal to balance the Chinese? Would not ROK and Australian do the same? One benefit of US military alliances is to slow nuclear proliferation.

The End of Alliances
By Rajan Menon
New America Foundation
Oxford University Press

http://www.newamerica.net/publications/books/the_end_of_alliances

Why should the United States cling to military alliances established during the Cold War when the circumstances are now fundamentally different? In The End of Alliances, Rajan Menon makes the bold claim that our alliances in Europe and Asia have become irrelevant to the challenges the United States faces today and are slowly dissolving as a result.

The dissolution of our alliances will not, Menon emphasizes, culminate in isolationism. The United States will, and must, be actively involved beyond its borders, but by relying on contingent alignments and on coalitions whose membership will vary depending on the issue at hand. America, he reminds us, engaged the world in a variety of ways for more than 150 years before entering into formal military alliances after World War II. While a strategy that ceases to rely on alliances will mark a dramatic shift in American foreign policy, states routinely reassess and reorient their strategies. The United States, which studiously avoided alliances for much of its history only to embrace them during the Cold War, is no exception.

The End of Alliances predicts that the coming change in American strategy will force our traditional allies to rethink their choices and create new patterns in world politics. The controversial argument advanced by Menon will provoke debate among foreign policy specialists and the general public.

For the other side of this argument see:

The Case for Goliath
How America Acts as the World's Government in the 21st Century
Michael Mandelbaum

http://www.publicaffairsbooks.com/publicaffairsbooks-cgi-bin/display?book=9781586483609

How does the United States use its enormous power in the world? In The Case for Goliath, Michael Mandelbaum offers a surprising answer: The United States furnishes to other countries the services that governments provide within the countries they govern.

Mandelbaum explains how this role came about despite the fact that neither the United States nor any other country sought to establish it. He describes the contributions that American power makes to global security and prosperity, the shortcomings of American foreign policy, and how other countries have come to accept, resent, and exert influence on America's global role. And he assesses the prospects for the continuation of this role, which depends most importantly on whether the American public is willing to pay for it.