Zone1 Tax the Rich! Make them Pay their Fair Share!

The relative market share of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac dropped from a high of 57 percent of all new mortgage originations in 2003, down to 37 percent

Right. Which still increased their total holdings of subprime mortgages.

Tired of you running away.

View attachment 1243217

https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uplo...m-the-majority-report_154941211677.pdf?x97961 (page 23)

Holy shit!

Over 70% of total crappy mortgages and almost 59% of the principal.


OH goodie YOU finally brought in Ed Pinto's "math" lol



Faulty Conclusions Based on Shoddy Foundations–FCIC Commissioner Peter Wallison and Other Commentators Rely on Flawed Data from Edward Pinto to Misplace the Causes of the 2008 Financial Crisis​




Pinto’s work is based on a series of faulty assumptions and serious methodological flaws. Pinto’s controversial conclusion that federal housing policies were responsible for 19 million high-risk mortgages is based on radically revised definitions for the two main categories of high-risk mortgages, subprime loans and so-called Alt-A mortgages, which refer to loans with low documentation of income and wealth. Importantly, these revised definitions are not consistent with how the terms subprime and Alt-A are used for data collection, as this paper will demonstrate.




As a result of his dramatically expanded new definitions that are not used by other leading scholars, Pinto’s findings on the extent of subprime and Alt-A exposure are extreme outliers among mortgage market analysts. Pinto’s claim that there were 26.7 million subprime and Alt-A loans outstanding (out of roughly 55 million total) as of June 30, 2008, is exponentially higher than other estimates. In a 2010 report, the nonpartisan Government Accountability Office, the research arm of Congress, found there were only 4.58 million subprime and Alt-A mortgages outstanding at the end of 2009, less than one-fifth of Pinto’s estimate.



Similarly
, Pinto’s claim that 19 million, or 72 percent of all “subprime” and “Alt-A” mortgages were attributable to federal affordable housing policies is far afield of the conclusions of other analysts. The claim is also difficult to reconcile with the actual data, which indicate the entire federal government (including Fannie and Freddie) owned or guaranteed only 32 percent of seriously delinquent loans despite holding 67 percent of all mortgages. Pinto’s claim that Fannie and Freddie were the primary driver of high-risk mortgages does not stand when the evidence is weighed accurately.



Pinto makes numerous other serious errors in his analysis

OOPS


 
•Private lenders not subject to congressional regulations collapsed lending standards. Taking up that extra share were nonbanks selling mortgages elsewhere, not to the GSEs. Conforming mortgages had rules that were less profitable than the newfangled loans.

Considering the GSEs and private banks were mandated to buy crappy mortgages, the private lenders had
lots of demand to meet, eh?

Examining the big lie: How the facts of the economic crisis stack up​



The boom and bust was global. Proponents of the Big Lie ignore the worldwide nature of the housing boom and bust.


A McKinsey Global Institute report noted “from 2000 through 2007, a remarkable run-up in global home prices occurred.” It is highly unlikely that a simultaneous boom and bust everywhere else in the world was caused by one set of factors (ultra-low rates, securitized AAA-rated subprime, derivatives) but had a different set of causes in the United States.


Indeed, this might be the biggest obstacle to pushing the false narrative
. How did U.S. regulations against redlining in inner cities also cause a boom in Spain, Ireland and Australia? How can we explain the boom occurring in countries that do not have a tax deduction for mortgage interest or government-sponsored enterprises? And why, after nearly a century of mortgage interest deduction in the United States, did it suddenly cause a crisis?



Nonbank mortgage underwriting(WALL STREET, NO MANDATES, ALL 5 INVESTMENTS GONE TODAY) exploded from 2001 to 2007, along with the private label securitization market, which eclipsed Fannie and Freddie during the boom




•Private lenders not subject to congressional regulations collapsed lending standards




These firms had business models that could be called “Lend-in-order-to-sell-to-Wall-Street-securitizers.” They offered all manner of nontraditional mortgages — the 2/28 adjustable rate mortgages, piggy-back loans, negative amortization loans. These defaulted in huge numbers, far more than the regulated mortgage writers did.





 
The 2000 HUD affordable housing goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (GSEs) mandated purchasing loans for low- and moderate-income families, not high-risk subprime loans. While these goals pushed the GSEs to expand their credit criteria, they aimed at improving access to prime financing, distinct from the predatory, high-risk "B&C" loans commonly defined as subprime.




Research indicates the rise in subprime loans was driven by private, non-agency market players, rather than the GSE goals themselves, with one study indicating the goals had only a minor 0-5% effect on boosting high-risk lending.




Target Definitions: HUD goals focused on borrower income (low- and moderate-income) and location ("underserved areas"), while subprime loans were defined by high risk and higher interest rates.



Shift to Risk: By the mid-2000s,(DUBYA) to meet the increasing targets, the GSEs were buying more of these "goal-eligible" loans, which eventually included higher-risk "A-minus" loans, though they generally avoided the highest-risk (B&C) subprime products.







The 2000 HUD affordable housing goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (GSEs) mandated purchasing loans for low- and moderate-income families, not high-risk subprime loans.


Low- and moderate-income families aren't high risk?
Especially when they have lower credit scores and the down payments are in the low single digits.

DURR

Research indicates the rise in subprime loans was driven by private, non-agency market players, rather than the GSE goals themselves,

Private non-agency market players who sold their crappy mortgages to the GSEs
and other private banks that had government mandated goals to buy crappy mortgages.
 
The 2000 HUD affordable housing goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (GSEs) mandated purchasing loans for low- and moderate-income families, not high-risk subprime loans.

Low- and moderate-income families aren't high risk?
Especially when they have lower credit scores and the down payments are in the low single digits.

DURR

Research indicates the rise in subprime loans was driven by private, non-agency market players, rather than the GSE goals themselves,

Private non-agency market players who sold their crappy mortgages to the GSEs
and other private banks that had government mandated goals to buy crappy mortgages.
Sub prime lending was predicated on the debt being repackaged and sold on, putting the lender at no risk. Moneymaking scams which erupted from private sector lenders.
 
Sub prime lending was predicated on the debt being repackaged and sold on, putting the lender at no risk. Moneymaking scams which erupted from private sector lenders.

Exactly. They had no risk because Fannie and Freddie had a massive, mandated demand.
 
You were done days ago. LOL!
Bush Mortgage Bubble' and 'Great Bush Recession' meets all applicable conservative standards: it happened on Bush’s watch. It also meets all honest and intelligent standards because they were Bush’s policies that caused them. Please post the facts that show it didn’t start late 2004 exactly as stated by the Bush working group.




“The Presidents Working Group’s March policy statement acknowledged that turmoil in financial markets clearly was triggered by a dramatic weakening of underwriting standards for U.S. subprime mortgages, beginning in late 2004 and extending into 2007.”




BONUS FACT




"Subprime loans originated in late 2005 and 2006 are playing a major role in recent defaults and foreclosures."





 
Bush Mortgage Bubble' and 'Great Bush Recession' meets all applicable conservative standards: it happened on Bush’s watch. It also meets all honest and intelligent standards because they were Bush’s policies that caused them. Please post the facts that show it didn’t start late 2004 exactly as stated by the Bush working group.




“The Presidents Working Group’s March policy statement acknowledged that turmoil in financial markets clearly was triggered by a dramatic weakening of underwriting standards for U.S. subprime mortgages, beginning in late 2004 and extending into 2007.”




BONUS FACT




"Subprime loans originated in late 2005 and 2006 are playing a major role in recent defaults and foreclosures."






The newer subprime loans were weaker than the old ones. Obviously.
 
Exactly. They had no risk because Fannie and Freddie had a massive, mandated demand.


Yep, Clinton 2000 affordable housing goals and Dubya pushing it up 6% in 2004, caused this


The Presidents Working Group’s March policy statement acknowledged that turmoil in financial markets clearly was triggered by a dramatic weakening of underwriting standards for U.S. subprime mortgages, beginning in late 2004 and extending into 2007


LMAORG
 
Yep, Clinton 2000 affordable housing goals and Dubya pushing it up 6% in 2004, caused this


The Presidents Working Group’s March policy statement acknowledged that turmoil in financial markets clearly was triggered by a dramatic weakening of underwriting standards for U.S. subprime mortgages, beginning in late 2004 and extending into 2007


LMAORG

Right, 50% is perfectly safe, 56% is a disaster.

DURR
 
The newer subprime loans were weaker than the old ones. Obviously.


COOL YOU AGREE



Private lenders not subject to congressional regulations collapsed lending standards.
Taking up that extra share were nonbanks selling mortgages elsewhere, not to the GSEs. Conforming mortgages had rules that were less profitable than the newfangled loans. Private securitizers — competitors of Fannie and Freddie — grew from 10 percent of the market in 2002 to nearly 40 percent in 2006. As a percentage of all mortgage-backed securities, private securitization grew from 23 percent in 2003 to 56 percent in 2006
...A 2008 analysis found that the nonbank underwriters made more than 12 million subprime mortgages with a value of nearly $2 trillion. The lenders who made these were exempt from federal regulations.




A study by the Federal Reserve shows that more than 84 percent of the subprime mortgages in 2006 were issued by private lending institutions. The study found that the government-sponsored enterprises were concerned with the loss of market share to these private lenders — Fannie and Freddie were chasing profits, not trying to meet low-income lending goals.




Beyond the overwhelming data that private lenders made the bulk of the subprime loans to low-income borrowers, we still have the proximate cause issue.





 
Exactly. They had no risk because Fannie and Freddie had a massive, mandated demand.
Consider a study by McClatchy: It found that more than 84 percent of the subprime mortgages in 2006 were issued by private lending. These private firms made nearly 83 percent of the subprime loans to low- and moderate-income borrowers that year. And McClatchy found that out of the top 25 subprime lenders in 2006, only one was subject to the usual mortgage laws and regulations.




 
COOL YOU AGREE



Private lenders not subject to congressional regulations collapsed lending standards.
Taking up that extra share were nonbanks selling mortgages elsewhere, not to the GSEs. Conforming mortgages had rules that were less profitable than the newfangled loans. Private securitizers — competitors of Fannie and Freddie — grew from 10 percent of the market in 2002 to nearly 40 percent in 2006. As a percentage of all mortgage-backed securities, private securitization grew from 23 percent in 2003 to 56 percent in 2006
...A 2008 analysis found that the nonbank underwriters made more than 12 million subprime mortgages with a value of nearly $2 trillion. The lenders who made these were exempt from federal regulations.

A study by the Federal Reserve shows that more than 84 percent of the subprime mortgages in 2006 were issued by private lending institutions. The study found that the government-sponsored enterprises were concerned with the loss of market share to these private lenders — Fannie and Freddie were chasing profits, not trying to meet low-income lending goals.
Beyond the overwhelming data that private lenders made the bulk of the subprime loans to low-income borrowers, we still have the proximate cause issue.






COOL YOU AGREE

It's common sense, the longer a bubble goes on the more dangerous the situation gets.

Private lenders not subject to congressional regulations collapsed lending standards.

And their customers were subject to congressional regulations.
 
15th post
COOL YOU AGREE

It's common sense, the longer a bubble goes on the more dangerous the situation gets.

Private lenders not subject to congressional regulations collapsed lending standards.

And their customers were subject to congressional regulations.


Sure they were, SHOW ME THE BROKERS THAT WERE? LOL
 
Consider a study by McClatchy: It found that more than 84 percent of the subprime mortgages in 2006 were issued by private lending. These private firms made nearly 83 percent of the subprime loans to low- and moderate-income borrowers that year. And McClatchy found that out of the top 25 subprime lenders in 2006, only one was subject to the usual mortgage laws and regulations.





It found that more than 84 percent of the subprime mortgages in 2006 were issued by private lending.

And who bought this bad paper?
 
COOL YOU AGREE

It's common sense, the longer a bubble goes on the more dangerous the situation gets.

Private lenders not subject to congressional regulations collapsed lending standards.

And their customers were subject to congressional regulations.
Key factors and data points regarding these loans include:



  • Higher Default Rates: While default rates for subprime loans were around 10% in 2004 and 2005, they increased to 13% by the end of 2006 and surpassed 17% by the end of 2007.


  • "Risk Layering": Loans in 2005 and 2006 often featured "risk layering," where high cumulative loan-to-value (CLTV) ratios were combined with low FICO scores and incomplete income documentation, making them highly vulnerable to default.


  • "Teaser Rate" Resets: Around 80% of subprime loans originated in 2005 were short-term hybrid adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) with "teaser" rates that expired in 2007 and 2008. As interest rates rose and housing prices began to drop starting in 2006, borrowers were unable to refinance out of these rising payments.
 

New Topics

Back
Top Bottom