Zone1 Tax the Rich! Make them Pay their Fair Share!

[Toddsterpatriot]

Only to idiotic MAGATards


“The idea that they were leading this charge is just absurd,” says Guy Cecala, publisher of Inside Mortgage Finance, an authoritative trade publication. “Fannie and Freddie have always had the tightest underwriting on earth. … They were opposite of subprime.”





The evidence indicates Fannie and Freddie contributed to the mortgage meltdown, but they played a secondary role to Wall Street. Wall Street firms and the mortgage lenders they bankrolled led the growth of the market for subprime loans and other risky mortgages.

FactWatch: Fannie and Freddie were followers, not leaders, in mortgage frenzy – Center for Public Integrity

Ask many Americans who’s to blame for the nation’s economic mess, and two names come to mind: Fannie and Freddie. They see Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as the villains of the financial crisis. GOP.gov, the official website for Republicans in the House of Representatives, says flatly: “Fannie Mae...

publicintegrity.org

Fannie and Freddie have always had the tightest underwriting on earth. … They were opposite of subprime.”
Right. Until HUD forced them to buy ever larger amounts of subprime mortgages.
Lower quality borrowers and lower down payments really screwed them.

Wall Street firms and the mortgage lenders they bankrolled led the growth of the market for subprime loans and other risky mortgages.

How much of that subprime paper ended up on Fannie, Freddie and the government's books?
Was it a lot?

 

[JonKoch]

I agree, lowering the standards for Fannie and Freddie was an awful idea!
It was awful under Clinton and it was awful under Bush.

Nah, once MORE, BJ BILL DIDN'T ALLOW THE AFFORDABLE HOUSING GOALS OF 50% TO USE IT REMEMBER? THIS IS THE 4TH TIME I'M SHOWING YOU CUPCAKE, KEEP UP


In 2000 (BJ BILL) , as HUD revisited its affordable-housing goals, the housing market had shifted. With escalating home prices, subprime loans were more popular. Consumer advocates warned that lenders were trapping borrowers with low "teaser" interest rates and ignoring borrowers' qualifications.


HUD restricted Freddie and Fannie, saying it would not credit them for loans they purchased that had abusively high costs or that were granted without regard to the borrower's ability to repay. Freddie and Fannie adopted policies not to buy some high-cost loans.




BUT THAT DIDN'T STOP DUBYA DID IT?

 

[JonKoch]

Yes, they pay all those awful taxes.

But how do they pay 44%?

VAT

 

[Toddsterpatriot]

I'll help YOU Cupcake, I know you need it


By 2008, these GSEs held or guaranteed over $1.8 trillion in risky loans, roughly 40% of newly issued private-label subprime securities.


Key details:

• Accumulation: In a push to increase affordable homeownership, Fannie and Freddie heavily acquired subprime-like loans (including high percentages of interest-only and negative amortization loans) between 2004 and 2007, often to regain market share lost to private lenders. (WAS THAT BJ BILL'S FAULT? OR WAS THAT DUBYA WHO WAS THE REGULATOR AT THE TIME?)

Subprime Mortgage Crisis

The expansion of mortgages to high-risk borrowers, coupled with rising house prices, contributed to a period of turmoil in financial markets that lasted from 2007 to 2010.

www.federalreservehistory.org

By 2008, these GSEs held or guaranteed over $1.8 trillion in risky loans,

That's a lot! A lot more than any of the Wall Street banks.

 

[JonKoch]

Fannie and Freddie have always had the tightest underwriting on earth. … They were opposite of subprime.”
Right. Until HUD forced them to buy ever larger amounts of subprime mortgages.
Lower quality borrowers and lower down payments really screwed them.

Wall Street firms and the mortgage lenders they bankrolled led the growth of the market for subprime loans and other risky mortgages.

How much of that subprime paper ended up on Fannie, Freddie and the government's books?
Was it a lot?

True, I wish Dubya didn't do that

Nah, once MORE, BJ BILL DIDN'T ALLOW THE AFFORDABLE HOUSING GOALS OF 50% TO USE IT REMEMBER? THIS IS THE 4TH TIME I'M SHOWING YOU CUPCAKE, KEEP UP


In 2000 (BJ BILL) , as HUD revisited its affordable-housing goals, the housing market had shifted. With escalating home prices, subprime loans were more popular. Consumer advocates warned that lenders were trapping borrowers with low "teaser" interest rates and ignoring borrowers' qualifications.


HUD restricted Freddie and Fannie, saying it would not credit them for loans they purchased that had abusively high costs or that were granted without regard to the borrower's ability to repay. Freddie and Fannie adopted policies not to buy some high-cost loans.




BUT THAT DIDN'T STOP DUBYA DID IT?

 

[JonKoch]

By 2008, these GSEs held or guaranteed over $1.8 trillion in risky loans,

That's a lot! A lot more than any of the Wall Street banks.

NAH

By early 2008, there were approximately 27 million higher-risk (subprime and Alt-A) mortgages outstanding, with a total value estimated at $4.6 trillion.

 

[Toddsterpatriot]

Nah, once MORE, BJ BILL DIDN'T ALLOW THE AFFORDABLE HOUSING GOALS OF 50% TO USE IT REMEMBER? THIS IS THE 4TH TIME I'M SHOWING YOU CUPCAKE, KEEP UP


In 2000 (BJ BILL) , as HUD revisited its affordable-housing goals, the housing market had shifted. With escalating home prices, subprime loans were more popular. Consumer advocates warned that lenders were trapping borrowers with low "teaser" interest rates and ignoring borrowers' qualifications.


HUD restricted Freddie and Fannie, saying it would not credit them for loans they purchased that had abusively high costs or that were granted without regard to the borrower's ability to repay. Freddie and Fannie adopted policies not to buy some high-cost loans.




BUT THAT DIDN'T STOP DUBYA DID IT?

https://archive.ph/ZhfIA#selection-543.0-543.161

Effective in January 1993, the 1992 housing bill required Fannie and Freddie to make 30% of their mortgage purchases affordable-housing loans. The quota was raised to 40% in 1996, 42% in 1997, and in 2000 the Department of Housing and Urban Development ordered the quota raised to 50%. The Bush administration continued to raise the affordable-housing goals. Freddie and Fannie dutifully met those goals each and every year until the subprime crisis erupted. By 2008, when both government-sponsored enterprises collapsed, the quota had reached 56%.

 

[Toddsterpatriot]

VAT

VAT is 20%. How do they pay 44%?

 

[Toddsterpatriot]

True, I wish Dubya didn't do that

Nah, once MORE, BJ BILL DIDN'T ALLOW THE AFFORDABLE HOUSING GOALS OF 50% TO USE IT REMEMBER? THIS IS THE 4TH TIME I'M SHOWING YOU CUPCAKE, KEEP UP


In 2000 (BJ BILL) , as HUD revisited its affordable-housing goals, the housing market had shifted. With escalating home prices, subprime loans were more popular. Consumer advocates warned that lenders were trapping borrowers with low "teaser" interest rates and ignoring borrowers' qualifications.


HUD restricted Freddie and Fannie, saying it would not credit them for loans they purchased that had abusively high costs or that were granted without regard to the borrower's ability to repay. Freddie and Fannie adopted policies not to buy some high-cost loans.




BUT THAT DIDN'T STOP DUBYA DID IT?

HUD restricted Freddie and Fannie, saying it would not credit them for loans they purchased that had abusively high costs or that were granted without regard to the borrower's ability to repay.

Right, 50%, not counting "abusively high costs or that were granted without regard to the borrower's ability to repay" is still
50% subprime mortgages.

 

[Toddsterpatriot]

NAH

By early 2008, there were approximately 27 million higher-risk (subprime and Alt-A) mortgages outstanding, with a total value estimated at $4.6 trillion.

How much was owned by the FHA, HUD and other government programs?

 

[JonKoch]

HUD restricted Freddie and Fannie, saying it would not credit them for loans they purchased that had abusively high costs or that were granted without regard to the borrower's ability to repay.

Right, 50%, not counting "abusively high costs or that were granted without regard to the borrower's ability to repay" is still
50% subprime mortgages.

I get it Cupcake, WILLFULLY ignorant

The 2000 HUD affordable housing goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Government-Sponsored Enterprises or GSEs) were not the same as subprime lending, and analysis indicates they did not drive the subsequent subprime crisis of 2002-2006.


While the goals increased the purchase of loans for low- and moderate-income families, these were distinct from the high-risk, "B&C" grade subprime loans that later defaulted in large numbers.




Although the goals may have spurred the GSEs to purchase more multi-family mortgages and REMICs than they otherwise would have, my analyses suggest that the GSEs' purchases of whole single-family mortgages to satisfy the goals did not drive the subprime lending boom of 2002-2006.

FRB: Finance and Economics Discussion Series: Screen Reader Version - The Government-Sponsored Enterprises and the Mortgage Crisis: The Role of the Affordable Housing Goals

The Government-Sponsored Enterprises and the Mortgage Crisis: The Role of the Affordable Housing Goals

www.federalreserve.gov

 

[JonKoch]

How much was owned by the FHA, HUD and other government programs?

OK STOP PLAYING THE FUKN GAMES

Examining the big lie: How the facts of the economic crisis stack up​

...Nonbank mortgage underwriting exploded from 2001 to 2007, along with the private label securitization market, which eclipsed Fannie and Freddie during the boom. Check the mortgage origination data: The vast majority of subprime mortgages — the loans at the heart of the global crisis — were underwritten by unregulated private firms. These were lenders who sold the bulk of their mortgages to Wall Street, not to Fannie or Freddie. Indeed, these firms had no deposits, so they were not under the jurisdiction of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp or the Office of Thrift Supervision. The relative market share of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac dropped from a high of 57 percent of all new mortgage originations in 2003, down to 37 percent as the bubble was developing in 2005-06.



•Private lenders not subject to congressional regulations collapsed lending standards. Taking up that extra share were nonbanks selling mortgages elsewhere, not to the GSEs. Conforming mortgages had rules that were less profitable than the newfangled loans. Private securitizers — competitors of Fannie and Freddie — grew from 10 percent of the market in 2002 to nearly 40 percent in 2006. As a percentage of all mortgage-backed securities, private securitization grew from 23 percent in 2003 to 56 percent in 2006

https://archive.ph/20200215001736/https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/examining-the-big-lie-how-the-facts-of-the-economic-crisis-stack-up/2011/11/16/gIQA7G23cN_story.html#selection-987.1-1004.0

 

[JonKoch]

VAT is 20%. How do they pay 44%?

READ THE DAMN REPORT IF YOU ARE INTERESTED, YOU'RE NOT TROLL

 

[JonKoch]

Effective in January 1993, the 1992 housing bill required Fannie and Freddie to make 30% of their mortgage purchases affordable-housing loans. The quota was raised to 40% in 1996, 42% in 1997, and in 2000 the Department of Housing and Urban Development ordered the quota raised to 50%. The Bush administration continued to raise the affordable-housing goals. Freddie and Fannie dutifully met those goals each and every year until the subprime crisis erupted. By 2008, when both government-sponsored enterprises collapsed, the quota had reached 56%.

Now read this part real slow. This is why Bush preempted all state laws against predatory lending

 

[Toddsterpatriot]

I get it Cupcake, WILLFULLY ignorant

The 2000 HUD affordable housing goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Government-Sponsored Enterprises or GSEs) were not the same as subprime lending, and analysis indicates they did not drive the subsequent subprime crisis of 2002-2006.


While the goals increased the purchase of loans for low- and moderate-income families, these were distinct from the high-risk, "B&C" grade subprime loans that later defaulted in large numbers.




Although the goals may have spurred the GSEs to purchase more multi-family mortgages and REMICs than they otherwise would have, my analyses suggest that the GSEs' purchases of whole single-family mortgages to satisfy the goals did not drive the subprime lending boom of 2002-2006.

FRB: Finance and Economics Discussion Series: Screen Reader Version - The Government-Sponsored Enterprises and the Mortgage Crisis: The Role of the Affordable Housing Goals

The Government-Sponsored Enterprises and the Mortgage Crisis: The Role of the Affordable Housing Goals

www.federalreserve.gov

The 2000 HUD affordable housing goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Government-Sponsored Enterprises or GSEs) were not the same as subprime lending,

The 2000 HUD goals required Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to buy subprime mortgages.

these were distinct from the high-risk, "B&C" grade subprime loans that later defaulted in large numbers.

As the bubble expanded, and the percentages increased, they had to make lower quality loans, obviously.

 

[Toddsterpatriot]

OK STOP PLAYING THE FUKN GAMES

Examining the big lie: How the facts of the economic crisis stack up​

...Nonbank mortgage underwriting exploded from 2001 to 2007, along with the private label securitization market, which eclipsed Fannie and Freddie during the boom. Check the mortgage origination data: The vast majority of subprime mortgages — the loans at the heart of the global crisis — were underwritten by unregulated private firms. These were lenders who sold the bulk of their mortgages to Wall Street, not to Fannie or Freddie. Indeed, these firms had no deposits, so they were not under the jurisdiction of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp or the Office of Thrift Supervision. The relative market share of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac dropped from a high of 57 percent of all new mortgage originations in 2003, down to 37 percent as the bubble was developing in 2005-06.



•Private lenders not subject to congressional regulations collapsed lending standards. Taking up that extra share were nonbanks selling mortgages elsewhere, not to the GSEs. Conforming mortgages had rules that were less profitable than the newfangled loans. Private securitizers — competitors of Fannie and Freddie — grew from 10 percent of the market in 2002 to nearly 40 percent in 2006. As a percentage of all mortgage-backed securities, private securitization grew from 23 percent in 2003 to 56 percent in 2006

https://archive.ph/20200215001736/https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/examining-the-big-lie-how-the-facts-of-the-economic-crisis-stack-up/2011/11/16/gIQA7G23cN_story.html#selection-987.1-1004.0

The relative market share of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac dropped from a high of 57 percent of all new mortgage originations in 2003, down to 37 percent

Right. Which still increased their total holdings of subprime mortgages.

Tired of you running away.

https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uplo...m-the-majority-report_154941211677.pdf?x97961 (page 23)

Holy shit!

Over 70% of total crappy mortgages and almost 59% of the principal.

 

[Toddsterpatriot]

READ THE DAMN REPORT IF YOU ARE INTERESTED, YOU'RE NOT TROLL

Your silly link didn't have any details, just the 44% claim.

 

[Toddsterpatriot]

OK STOP PLAYING THE FUKN GAMES

Examining the big lie: How the facts of the economic crisis stack up​

...Nonbank mortgage underwriting exploded from 2001 to 2007, along with the private label securitization market, which eclipsed Fannie and Freddie during the boom. Check the mortgage origination data: The vast majority of subprime mortgages — the loans at the heart of the global crisis — were underwritten by unregulated private firms. These were lenders who sold the bulk of their mortgages to Wall Street, not to Fannie or Freddie. Indeed, these firms had no deposits, so they were not under the jurisdiction of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp or the Office of Thrift Supervision. The relative market share of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac dropped from a high of 57 percent of all new mortgage originations in 2003, down to 37 percent as the bubble was developing in 2005-06.



•Private lenders not subject to congressional regulations collapsed lending standards. Taking up that extra share were nonbanks selling mortgages elsewhere, not to the GSEs. Conforming mortgages had rules that were less profitable than the newfangled loans. Private securitizers — competitors of Fannie and Freddie — grew from 10 percent of the market in 2002 to nearly 40 percent in 2006. As a percentage of all mortgage-backed securities, private securitization grew from 23 percent in 2003 to 56 percent in 2006

https://archive.ph/20200215001736/https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/examining-the-big-lie-how-the-facts-of-the-economic-crisis-stack-up/2011/11/16/gIQA7G23cN_story.html#selection-987.1-1004.0

•Private lenders not subject to congressional regulations collapsed lending standards. Taking up that extra share were nonbanks selling mortgages elsewhere, not to the GSEs. Conforming mortgages had rules that were less profitable than the newfangled loans.

Considering the GSEs and private banks were mandated to buy crappy mortgages, the private lenders had
lots of demand to meet, eh?

 

[JonKoch]

The 2000 HUD affordable housing goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Government-Sponsored Enterprises or GSEs) were not the same as subprime lending,

The 2000 HUD goals required Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to buy subprime mortgages.

these were distinct from the high-risk, "B&C" grade subprime loans that later defaulted in large numbers.

As the bubble expanded, and the percentages increased, they had to make lower quality loans, obviously.

The 2000 HUD affordable housing goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (GSEs) mandated purchasing loans for low- and moderate-income families, not high-risk subprime loans. While these goals pushed the GSEs to expand their credit criteria, they aimed at improving access to prime financing, distinct from the predatory, high-risk "B&C" loans commonly defined as subprime.




Research indicates the rise in subprime loans was driven by private, non-agency market players, rather than the GSE goals themselves, with one study indicating the goals had only a minor 0-5% effect on boosting high-risk lending.



Target Definitions: HUD goals focused on borrower income (low- and moderate-income) and location ("underserved areas"), while subprime loans were defined by high risk and higher interest rates.



Shift to Risk: By the mid-2000s,(DUBYA) to meet the increasing targets, the GSEs were buying more of these "goal-eligible" loans, which eventually included higher-risk "A-minus" loans, though they generally avoided the highest-risk (B&C) subprime products.

FRB: Finance and Economics Discussion Series: Screen Reader Version - The Government-Sponsored Enterprises and the Mortgage Crisis: The Role of the Affordable Housing Goals

The Government-Sponsored Enterprises and the Mortgage Crisis: The Role of the Affordable Housing Goals

www.federalreserve.gov

 

[JonKoch]

•Private lenders not subject to congressional regulations collapsed lending standards. Taking up that extra share were nonbanks selling mortgages elsewhere, not to the GSEs. Conforming mortgages had rules that were less profitable than the newfangled loans.

Considering the GSEs and private banks were mandated to buy crappy mortgages, the private lenders had
lots of demand to meet, eh?

OK IGNORANT TOOL. I'm done