P F Tinmore, toastman,
et al,
Of course, the British White Paper of 1939, reflecting the opinion of the day, as did the Churchill White Paper of 1922 before it, was NOT the last word from the Mandatory.
(PREFACE)
I think one of the most interesting, and seldom discussed papers, was that of the Mandatory (A/AC.14/8 2 October 1947) which brought everything together from the Mandatory's perspective, and why some people think the UK failed in their obligations. It is a very long paper. It is ugly. It shows the black heart of both side and the dilemma faced by the Mandatory. It shows the concern that neither the Jew nor the Arab rule solely over Palestine. It is over 150 paragraphs and it is a lot to take-in on first exposure.
If you explore it, take a deep breath. It shows the evolution of the thinking that lead to the Partition Plan. It takes some time to go through, but it is an essential if you are to gain a perspective on how all the various concepts come together. And it shows a unique insight into the very questions that our friend P F Tinmore presents.
Anyone that has spent a career in the Intelligence Field or the Foreign Service (Diplomacy Arena) might find parts of it --- heartbreaking.
I open with, there are no clean hands in this mess. Just various shades of dirty.
I agree with the bold. I sometimes wonder how things would have turned out had the British stayed for a while longer.
Reading the 1939 British white paper might help.
(REFERENCE)
- The Political History of Palestine under British Administration ----- Memorandum by His Britannic Majesty's Government presented in 1947 to the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, Published at Jerusalem, 1947.
(COMMENT)
Early on in the process, it was recognized that at various times in the evolution of the situation on the ground, differing view and interpretations of facts dominated the day; depending on the perspective. One important view, still held by some today, is articulated in this passage:
By 1937, leading up to the White Paper of 1939, the interpretation of events on the ground were yet moving the Mandate obligation:
The impossible dilemma was taking shape for a no win situation. And the Mandatory, unable to change the course of events, was hoping in desperation, that time would heal the wounds and seal the breach between the Arab and Jewish community. Privately, no one really believed that would happen, but to publicly support that view was politically impractical. And to do so, would leave the Mandatory with no escape that would not lead to conflict as the inevitable outcome. And no one want to admit to that.
This set the stage for the White Paper that P F Tinmore cites, which is not the end statement, still containing latent pitfalls:
A/AC.14/8 of 2 October 1947 for the Time Frame of 1939 said:
102. The statement of policy issued by His Majesty’s government in May 1939, was intended to put an end to uncertainty as to the objectives of their policy in Palestine, and to prepare the way for the termination of the Mandate. The statement opened with a clear definition of the attitude of His Majesty’s government towards the maximum claims of both Arabs and Jews. Thus, after quoting the interpretation of the Balfour Declaration contained in the White Paper of 1922, they “now declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State.”
At the same time they maintained their rejection of the Arab contention that they were pledged, by undertakings given during the war of 1914-18, to grant independence to the Arab population of Palestine:-
“They cannot agree that the McMahon correspondence forms a just basis for the claim that Palestine should be converted into an Arab State.”
103. The objective of His MajestyÂ’s Government was then stated to be
“the establishment within ten years of an independent Palestine State….in which Arabs and Jews share in government in such a way as to ensure that the essential interests of each community are safeguarded.”
110. The MandatoryÂ’s new statement of policy was examined by the Permanent Mandates Commission at their thirty-sixth session in June, 1939. the commission reported that:
“the policy set out in the White Paper was not in accordance with the interpretation which, in agreement with the Mandatory Power and the Council, the Commission had always placed upon the Palestine Mandate.”
They went on to consider whether the Mandate was open to a new interpretation with which the White Paper would not be at variance. Four of the seven members
“did not feel able to state that the policy of the White Paper was in conformity with the Mandate, any contrary conclusion appearing to them to be ruled out by the very terms of the Mandate and by the fundamental intentions of its authors.”
As you can see, and I admit, it was a close call. Practically speaking, half the committee agreed that the implied intent was to form a state, while the other half opposed that interpretation as a implied promise to the Jewish people. In any event, they all realized that there was a problem of interpreting the intent of the original Allied Powers that wrote the Mandate. And that interpretational difference still lingers today.
Most heartbreaking is the finale:
London July 1947 said:
154. This decision was announced to the House of Commons by the Foreign Secretary on the 18th February 1947. In the course of his speech he said:-
“His Majesty’s Government have …been faced with an irreconcilable conflict of principles. There are in Palestine about 1,200,000 Arabs and 600,000 Jews. For the Jews the essential point of principle is the creation of sovereign Jewish State. For the Arabs, the essential point of principle is to resist to the last the establishment of Jewish sovereignty in any part of Palestine. The discussions of the last moth have quite clearly shown that there is no prospect of resolving this conflict by any settlement negotiated between the parties. But if the conflict has to be resolved by an arbitrary decision, that is not a decision which His Majesty'’ Government are empowered, as Mandatory, to take. His Majesty’s government have of themselves no power, under the terms of the Mandate, to award the country either to the Arabs or to the Jews, or even to partition it between them.
It is in these circumstances that we have decided that we are unable to accept the scheme put forward either by the Arabs or by the Jews, or to impose ourselves a solution or our own. We have, therefore, reached the conclusion that the only course now open to us is to submit the problem to the judgement of the United Nations. We intend to place before them an historical account of the way in which His majesty’s government have discharged their trust in Palestine over the last twenty-five years. We shall explain that the Mandate has proved to be unworkable in practice, and that the obligations undertaken to the two communities in Palestine have been shown to be irreconcilable. We shall describe the various proposals which have been put forward for dealing with the situation, namely, the Arab Plan, the Zionist’s aspirations, so far as we have been able to ascertain them, the proposals of the Anglo-American committee and the various proposals which we ourselves have put forward. We shall then ask the United Nations to consider our report, and to recommend a settlement of the problem. We do not intend ourselves to recommend any particular solution.”
That is really the decision to leave and the reason the General Assembly furthered Resolution 181(II).
While the White Paper is one of the most heavily cited documents in the overall discussion, it did not truly represent the most accurate view. The dilemma was unfolding and the Mandatory could see the trap closing on them. The "no win" situation was upon them.
Then, as today, the Jews and the Arabs are no closer to resolving their differences. Then as today, the Arab (Palestinian) is just as disadvantaged in terms of the ability to sustain self-governing institutions.
Most Respectfully,
R