Screw "Tax The Poor" Capitalism.

[The Derp]

Nope. Never did. Because I actually understand markets, bubbles and history.

You say that, but you never take any of that into account. It's all "magical" for you...things happen for no reason, "invisible hand", woo-wap-da-bam. Unfortunately, just like physics, nothing happens for no reason. Everything that happens in our economy does so because of specific actions taken. Nothing is by chance, it's all by design. You may as well say elves grow the economy because it's just as magical as thinking things happen for no reason. So the argument, like the tax cut argument, seems to shift and redefine its parameters as you find each position you argue less defensible as you make them. It's easier for lazy people to just throw up their hands and say "just because" or "the will of God" because they are accustomed to fantastical thinking, intellectual laziness, and sloppy work.

Nope. Never did. Partially responsible for the bubble? Hell yes!!!!

Not even a little bit. The "bubble" were the subprimes, not the GSE-backed loans because it was the subprimes that went delinquent first. You are ignoring GSE loan performance, why?

Which of my actual arguments do you feel is refuted by that chart?

That GSE's played any role in the bubble.

 

[Toddsterpatriot]

Raise MW from $9/hr to $12/hour and you end up with fewer jobs.

LOL! Sophism alert.

Sure, you end up with fewer MW jobs because the MW is higher, but you end up with more higher wage jobs. So raising the MW resulted in better paying jobs. OK, and your argument is....?

Why do you want to harm young, unskilled minority workers by pricing them out of the job market?

Who says they'd be priced out? Seattle's experience tells us that raising the MW trades MW jobs for better-paying jobs.

If what you're saying is true, the unemployment rate would have risen. But it didn't. So either the rate is false, or your argument is.

Sure, you end up with fewer MW jobs because the MW is higher

Welcome to reality. Thanks for admitting your previous error.

but you end up with more higher wage jobs.

I've always said that the MW workers who didn't lose their jobs benefit from their higher wages.

Who says they'd be priced out?

The market.

If what you're saying is true, the unemployment rate would have risen.

Among MW workers, the unemployment rate was higher than it would have been absent the MW increase.

 

[Toddsterpatriot]

It totally burst because the Fed raised rates.

This is the part where you prove it. The fact that we're XX posts deep in this thread and you haven't says all we need to know about your position. ARM rates rise absent of whatever the Fed does.

First of all, you're gonna need to prove this because it sounds to me like a bunch of made-up Conservative shit.
Fine. What was a typical teaser rate period on a mortgage back in 2005-2006?

12-18 months. Which means the mortgages issued beginning in 2004 (not 2005, because 2004 is when lending standards were "dramatically weakened"), would start defaulting in late 2005-mid 2006 which...wouldn't you know...is precisely when delinquencies start rising for ARMs in the chart:

So...thanks (?) for helping me prove my point. Teaser rates for ARMs lasted between 12-18 months. Subprimes had "dramatically weakened" lending standards beginning in 2004. Subprimes went from 110,000 issued a year in 2003, to 266,000 issued a year beginning in 2004. GSE-backed loans performed at the same rate until the recession started which led to job loss, which led to foreclosures. The recession was caused by the collapse of the housing market which started in Mid-2006, as we see in the chart above where delinquency rates for ARMs suddenly started shooting upwards. No other loans than the subprimes saw their default rates rise in 2006...they wouldn't start seeing their rates rise until late 2007 and into 2008. That's what the chart shows.

ARM rates rise absent of whatever the Fed does.

LOL! No they don't.

If you said, "Teaser rates rise absent of whatever the Fed does", you'd sound less ignorant.

Which means the mortgages issued beginning in 2004 (not 2005, because 2004 is when lending standards were "dramatically weakened"), would start defaulting in late 2005-mid 2006 which...wouldn't you know...is precisely when delinquencies start rising for ARMs in the chart:

ARMs issued when the FF rate was 1% had rising defaults after the FF rate hit 5%+?
Shocking!!!

 

[The Derp]

They were. The GSEs were forced, by Congress and HUD, to make 56% of their purchases from the subprime market in order to meet affordable housing goals.

A "crappy" mortgage would indicate that mortgage went into delinquency. That's what makes a "crappy" mortgage. The delinquency rates for GSE-backed loans remained consistent throughout the bubble and only grew along with all other mortgages once the recession started. Those delinquency rates were far, far below their private-label counterparts. That's undeniable.

So your problem is you cannot reconcile your argument that GSE loans were "crappy" since their delinquency rates weren't. That's where your argument runs straight into a wall.

The loans they bought were no better or worse than the ones prior to the bubble.
They were worse. They weren't conforming loans.

GSE loans weren't entering delinquency when the private-label ones did. So they weren't worse. They were the same as they were before. That's why their delinquency rate stays consistent as the delinquency rates for private-label loans increased.

You have this inherent belief that GSE loans were crappy. They weren't.
56% of their purchases were subprime, crappy mortgages, compared to the high quality conforming loans they used to buy.

A mortgage is only "crappy" if it enters delinquency. And GSE-backed loans didn't see a rise in their delinquency rates until after the private label loans started defaulting, which led to a drop in housing prices, which led to a cooling of the housing market, which led to job loss as housing was the only thing keeping Bush's economy afloat from 2004-7. You're trying to apply the standard for GSE-backed loans to their performance. But you're ignoring their performance. GSE-backed loans perform better than all other kinds of loans. Period.

Clearly, the chart above proves they weren't.
The chart doesn't show that their crappy mortgages were good.

So they're not "crappy" then, they're good. You can't be both. A "crappy" loan (re: a loan responsible for the collapse) is only crappy if the borrower can't repay it. The chart shows that the GSE-backed loans were definitely not "crappy" because the borrowers repaid them at rates far better than all other types of loans. Including non-prime loans.

In fact, the chart above shows GSE-backed loans performed the best
Sure, 44%-50% of their loans were high-quality, conforming mortgages.

See! Here's another instance of goalpost moving! Like clockwork! Why is it that GSE loans didn't see an increase in delinquency at the same time as private-label subprimes? If what you're saying is true, the line on that chart for the GSE's would have increased earlier, and at much sharper rates.

 

[The Derp]

Sure, you end up with fewer MW jobs because the MW is higher
Welcome to reality. Thanks for admitting your previous error.

No, you're just being a sophist. The data from Seattle shows that MW workers moved to higher-paying employment. If you say that raising the MW kills MW jobs, then you must reconcile that statement with the rest of the sentence...that in killing MW jobs, it raised higher-paying employment. Otherwise, the unemployment rate would have risen. Did it? No.

but you end up with more higher wage jobs.
I've always said that the MW workers who didn't lose their jobs benefit from their higher wages.

You are saying someone "loses" a job if they go from a MW job to a higher-paying one. That is why I call you a sophist.

Who says they'd be priced out?
The market.

So here's more of that "magical thinking". Going from MW to higher-paying jobs is a bad thing, why?

If what you're saying is true, the unemployment rate would have risen.
Among MW workers, the unemployment rate was higher than it would have been absent the MW increase.

You sure about that? Let's see some facts. Use Seattle since that's the specific case we're talking about.

 

[Toddsterpatriot]

Nope. Never did. Because I actually understand markets, bubbles and history.

You say that, but you never take any of that into account. It's all "magical" for you...things happen for no reason, "invisible hand", woo-wap-da-bam. Unfortunately, just like physics, nothing happens for no reason. Everything that happens in our economy does so because of specific actions taken. Nothing is by chance, it's all by design. You may as well say elves grow the economy because it's just as magical as thinking things happen for no reason. So the argument, like the tax cut argument, seems to shift and redefine its parameters as you find each position you argue less defensible as you make them. It's easier for lazy people to just throw up their hands and say "just because" or "the will of God" because they are accustomed to fantastical thinking, intellectual laziness, and sloppy work.

Nope. Never did. Partially responsible for the bubble? Hell yes!!!!

Not even a little bit. The "bubble" were the subprimes, not the GSE-backed loans because it was the subprimes that went delinquent first. You are ignoring GSE loan performance, why?

Which of my actual arguments do you feel is refuted by that chart?

That GSE's played any role in the bubble.

You say that, but you never take any of that into account. It's all "magical" for you...things happen for no reason,

Never said anything was magical. There is always a reason. A big one is human nature.

Nothing is by chance, it's all by design.

Design? That's funny.

Not even a little bit.

For Wall Street, high profits could be made from securities backed by subprime loans. Fannie and Freddie targeted the least-risky loans. Still, their purchases provided more cash for a larger subprime market.

"That was a huge, huge mistake," said Patricia McCoy, who teaches securities law at the University of Connecticut. "That just pumped more capital into a very unregulated market that has turned out to be a disaster."

In 2003, the two bought $81 billion in subprime securities. In 2004, they purchased $175 billion -- 44 percent of the market. In 2005, they bought $169 billion, or 33 percent. In 2006, they cut back to $90 billion, or 20 percent. Generally, Freddie purchased more than Fannie and relied more heavily on the securities to meet goals.

"The market knew we needed those loans," said Sharon McHale, a spokeswoman for Freddie Mac. The higher goals "forced us to go into that market to serve the targeted populations that HUD wanted us to serve," she said.

How HUD Mortgage Policy Fed The Crisis

In 2004, the year you said standards declined, the GSEs bought 44% of the subprime mortgages written that year. In 2005, standards still weak, right? They bought 33% of all new subprimes.

Not even a little bit? Your ignorance astounds me more, every time you post.

 

[Toddsterpatriot]

They were. The GSEs were forced, by Congress and HUD, to make 56% of their purchases from the subprime market in order to meet affordable housing goals.

A "crappy" mortgage would indicate that mortgage went into delinquency. That's what makes a "crappy" mortgage. The delinquency rates for GSE-backed loans remained consistent throughout the bubble and only grew along with all other mortgages once the recession started. Those delinquency rates were far, far below their private-label counterparts. That's undeniable.

So your problem is you cannot reconcile your argument that GSE loans were "crappy" since their delinquency rates weren't. That's where your argument runs straight into a wall.

The loans they bought were no better or worse than the ones prior to the bubble.
They were worse. They weren't conforming loans.

GSE loans weren't entering delinquency when the private-label ones did. So they weren't worse. They were the same as they were before. That's why their delinquency rate stays consistent as the delinquency rates for private-label loans increased.

You have this inherent belief that GSE loans were crappy. They weren't.
56% of their purchases were subprime, crappy mortgages, compared to the high quality conforming loans they used to buy.

A mortgage is only "crappy" if it enters delinquency. And GSE-backed loans didn't see a rise in their delinquency rates until after the private label loans started defaulting, which led to a drop in housing prices, which led to a cooling of the housing market, which led to job loss as housing was the only thing keeping Bush's economy afloat from 2004-7. You're trying to apply the standard for GSE-backed loans to their performance. But you're ignoring their performance. GSE-backed loans perform better than all other kinds of loans. Period.

Clearly, the chart above proves they weren't.
The chart doesn't show that their crappy mortgages were good.

So they're not "crappy" then, they're good. You can't be both. A "crappy" loan (re: a loan responsible for the collapse) is only crappy if the borrower can't repay it. The chart shows that the GSE-backed loans were definitely not "crappy" because the borrowers repaid them at rates far better than all other types of loans. Including non-prime loans.

In fact, the chart above shows GSE-backed loans performed the best
Sure, 44%-50% of their loans were high-quality, conforming mortgages.

See! Here's another instance of goalpost moving! Like clockwork! Why is it that GSE loans didn't see an increase in delinquency at the same time as private-label subprimes? If what you're saying is true, the line on that chart for the GSE's would have increased earlier, and at much sharper rates.

A "crappy" mortgage would indicate that mortgage went into delinquency.

Nope. A crappy mortgage would be one, for instance, that was given to someone with a low credit score with a very low, or no, downpayment. The technical term for a crappy mortgage is subprime.

Not all crappy mortgages defaulted. Not all conforming mortgages escaped default.

Those delinquency rates were far, far below their private-label counterparts. That's undeniable.

Again, that's not surprising considering they bought better mortgages.

your problem is you cannot reconcile your argument that GSE loans were "crappy"

Your own source showed the government forced them to buy 50% subprime loans, rising to 56% subprime loans. This isn't a claim I manufactured.

GSE loans weren't entering delinquency when the private-label ones did. So they weren't worse.

They were worse than the ones they bought pre-bubble, obviously.

And GSE-backed loans didn't see a rise in their delinquency rates until after the private label loans started defaulting

Yeah, their crappy loans took longer to default. And?

So they're not "crappy" then, they're good.

A few hundred billion dollars in government bailout funds disprove your claim.

See! Here's another instance of goalpost moving!

The goalpost has always been, the GSEs were forced to buy 50%-56% crappy loans.

Why is it that GSE loans didn't see an increase in delinquency at the same time as private-label subprimes?

They bought the cream of the crap.

 

[Toddsterpatriot]

Sure, you end up with fewer MW jobs because the MW is higher
Welcome to reality. Thanks for admitting your previous error.

No, you're just being a sophist. The data from Seattle shows that MW workers moved to higher-paying employment. If you say that raising the MW kills MW jobs, then you must reconcile that statement with the rest of the sentence...that in killing MW jobs, it raised higher-paying employment. Otherwise, the unemployment rate would have risen. Did it? No.

but you end up with more higher wage jobs.
I've always said that the MW workers who didn't lose their jobs benefit from their higher wages.

You are saying someone "loses" a job if they go from a MW job to a higher-paying one. That is why I call you a sophist.

Who says they'd be priced out?
The market.

So here's more of that "magical thinking". Going from MW to higher-paying jobs is a bad thing, why?

If what you're saying is true, the unemployment rate would have risen.
Among MW workers, the unemployment rate was higher than it would have been absent the MW increase.

You sure about that? Let's see some facts. Use Seattle since that's the specific case we're talking about.

The data from Seattle shows that MW workers moved to higher-paying employment.

MW workers who didn't lose their jobs make more under a higher MW.
Look up "tautology".

If you say that raising the MW kills MW jobs,

It does, obviously.
Look up "supply-demand curve"

You are saying someone "loses" a job if they go from a MW job to a higher-paying one.

No. I'm saying if you raise the MW some workers who made the old wage, and were employed, will be unemployed and won't benefit from the new, higher wage. Some workers who would have been hired, at the old wage, won't be hired under the higher wage.

Going from MW to higher-paying jobs is a bad thing, why?

That'd be a good thing.

Among MW workers, the unemployment rate was higher than it would have been absent the MW increase.

You sure about that? Let's see some facts.

Pretty sure.

So, our prediction is that underneath all of the national effects of the state of the economy and so on we would expect places with a higher minimum wage to have, at minimum, slower growth in minimum wage jobs if not no or even a shrinkage of the sector. And we would expect that process to start when the higher minimum wage is announced, not comes in. And finally we would go and look for that in the restaurant sector.

Which is exactly what Mark Perry is doing here:

Sadly our information is not perfect here. The details of restaurant employment in Seattle only are only published annually (I think, it might be once every two years). So, we are using the numbers for the Seattle MSA, which includes areas without the minimum wage rise. Not correct but the best we've got so far. And as those are the numbers that Sherman is using we're OK with that. And as one of the crew from Nick Hanauer's Civic Skunk Works points out, that is all we've got at present:

@worstall @Mark_J_Perry @AEI @Forbes Live by the MSA, die by the MSA. But no, that's a silly data set by which to judge Seattle.

— Goldy (@GoldyHA) January 8, 2016

So, with the best information we've got, we look at the difference in job growth in local payrolls, in national ones, in restaurant ones outside the higher minimum wage area and in restaurant jobs inside the (imperfectly measured) higher minimum wage area. And it really does have to be said that the evidence we've got supports our case. Because we are seeing a lower growth in minimum wage jobs, in that restaurant industry, inside the area with the higher minimum wage than we are seeing of general job growth in that area, in national job growth, in restaurant job growth in roughly that area than without the higher minimum wage. Most certainly, this best information we have does not contradict our basic claim.

Once More Into The Breach On This Seattle Minimum Wage And Jobs Theory

 

[danielpalos]

Don't make the poor poorer and the rich richer on an Institutional basis right wingers; y'all Only think You look fiscally tough.

 

[The Derp]

Never said anything was magical. There is always a reason. A big one is human nature.

You mean the human condition of greed, right? Yeah, Conservatives never take that into account. But no, it's not general "human nature". The spending done by those humans is the consequence of something else. In the case of the Bush Mortgage Bubble, it was using your home as an ATM because tax cuts didn't cause wages to rise or jobs to be created, and to afford things like college or health care, people took out second or third mortgages on their homes. Something they wouldn't have to do if, according to you, they got a tax cut. So....whoops!

Design? That's funny.

The Bush Mortgage Bubble was absolutely by design. Conservatives had promised that the Bush Tax Cuts would lead to all this growth and revenue and jobs, and that didn't happen. So in 2003-4, Bush and the Conservatives took several deliberate steps to create a mortgage bubble to make the economy look like it was growing in advance of the 2004 election when it really wasn't. That's why Bush tied his tax cuts to the growth of the housing market while campaigning in 2004. Without the growth of that housing bubble, the Bush economy was the weakest since the Great Depression:

For Wall Street, high profits could be made from securities backed by subprime loans. Fannie and Freddie targeted the least-risky loans. Still, their purchases provided more cash for a larger subprime market.

But again, their mortgages were good and didn't enter delinquency. So they weren't the cause.

In 2004, the year you said standards declined, the GSEs bought 44% of the subprime mortgages written that year. In 2005, standards still weak, right? They bought 33% of all new subprimes.

So you proved their market share was dwindling, and the delinquency numbers show that the GSE-backed loans remained steady and consistent. They only started entering delinquency once the recession started, but they didn't cause the recession to start. That was the fault of private label loans.

 

[The Derp]

Nope. A crappy mortgage would be one, for instance, that was given to someone with a low credit score with a very low, or no, downpayment. The technical term for a crappy mortgage is subprime.

But if the borrower can pay it, who cares? It's not crappy if the borrower can repay. A subprime may be riskier, but it's only crappy if it enters delinquency, which would turn the security it backed toxic, which is what caused the collapse of the secondary mortgage markets, which caused the credit freeze, which caused the recession.

Not all crappy mortgages defaulted. Not all conforming mortgages escaped default.

So I see what you're doing...you're applying your own standard to "crappy". You are interchanging "crappy" with "risky". Sure, those subprimes were riskier, but the risk paid off for the GSE's since their mortgages entered delinquency at rates far below that of private labels.

Again, that's not surprising considering they bought better mortgages.

So did they buy "crappy" mortgages, or did they buy "risky" mortgages? There's a difference. Subprimes were risky, but private-label subprimes were crap. They were crap because they entered delinquency at rates far higher than their GSE counterparts. So you need to make up your mind; did the mortgages GSE's backed cause delinquencies or not?

Your own source showed the government forced them to buy 50% subprime loans, rising to 56% subprime loans. This isn't a claim I manufactured.

Rising to 56% when? After the private label subprime market had already popped. And what of the loan performance for the GSE-backed loans? Consistently better than that of private labels. Hence, GSE-backed loans were not responsible for the bubble or the pop of that bubble. Just like all mortgages, they were swept up in the aftermath of the private label mortgages defaulting and the recession.

They were worse than the ones they bought pre-bubble, obviously.

NO THEY ******* WEREN'T! That's why the line on the chart below for GSE's remains steady and consistent as the line on the chart for private label subprimes and subprime ARMS shot up:

Default rates for GSE's rose in the aftermath of private labels popping the bubble, along with all other kinds of mortgages. So GSE loans were no worse than they were prior to the collapse and bubble, as the chart shows.

eah, their crappy loans took longer to default. And?

No, they ******* didn't! Look at the goddamned chart! The defaulting of GSE-backed loans started the same time the defaulting of all other loans happened, as the ******* chart above shows. So just like all the other non-subprime mortgages, GSE-backed ones entered delinquency at the same time as other loans because there was a recession that caused job loss which caused borrowers to not be able to repay.

A few hundred billion dollars in government bailout funds disprove your claim.

They had to get the bailout because the private label subprime bubble popped mid-2006, and the resulting delinquencies and foreclosures led to a drop in home prices, which led to a cooling of the market, which led to job loss because the only growth that happened from 2004-7 was because of the housing bubble. Job loss means the borrowers weren't able to repay, which means their mortgages entered delinquency. Because GSE's are government-sponsored, they had to get bailed out. But they wouldn't have had to have been bailed out if private label subprimes hadn't created and popped a bubble. Again, that's why delinquency rates for all mortgages rose starting in 2008.

 

[The Derp]

MW workers who didn't lose their jobs make more under a higher MW.

Why would they lose their jobs? That didn't happen in Seattle.

It does, obviously.

Except that the unemployment rate for Seattle has declined since the MW was raised.

No. I'm saying if you raise the MW some workers who made the old wage, and were employed, will be unemployed and won't benefit from the new, higher wage.

But why would they be unemployed? This is the part you gloss over. Raising the MW didn't kill jobs in Seattle. In fact, it created jobs as the unemployment rate declined.

Some workers who would have been hired, at the old wage, won't be hired under the higher wage.

Why not? A business only hires a worker if there is demand. If revenues are increasing because people are spending more, because they have higher wages, you're saying a business wouldn't hire a new worker to meet the increased demand? What kind of business would do that? That's stupid.

That'd be a good thing.
Among MW workers, the unemployment rate was higher than it would have been absent the MW increase.

So here's the problem...you can't be unemployed and be a minimum wage worker. So your argument is an example of cognitive dissonance; you say that the unemployment rate is higher among MW workers, but you can't know that because if someone is unemployed, then they're not a MW worker!

So, our prediction is that underneath all of the national effects of the state of the economy and so on we would expect places with a higher minimum wage to have, at minimum, slower growth in minimum wage jobs if not no or even a shrinkage of the sector. And we would expect that process to start when the higher minimum wage is announced, not comes in. And finally we would go and look for that in the restaurant sector.

Key word in your cut-and-paste: "prediction". And again, you are using numbers from 2016. Why not use numbers from 2017? Oh right, because doing so would undermine your argument.

So I'm wondering why you feel the need to use outdated information? Is it because there's nothing from the current numbers that supports your argument? So you use something that is nearly 18 months old and you thought, what, that you could slip it by me? Try again and this time, use numbers from 2017. In fact, the BLS has April 2017 numbers for the city of Seattle. Why not use those? Oh right, because that would mean you'd have to actually do work and couldn't do the typical, rushed, sloppy work you're accustomed to doing.

 

[danielpalos]

How about more, cogency and conciseness. If the right wing doesn't believe, walls of text;

it will be easier to debunk their custom and habit until it is indistinguishable from morals, of having nothing but the fallacy of nothing but repeal.

 

[Toddsterpatriot]

Never said anything was magical. There is always a reason. A big one is human nature.

You mean the human condition of greed, right? Yeah, Conservatives never take that into account. But no, it's not general "human nature". The spending done by those humans is the consequence of something else. In the case of the Bush Mortgage Bubble, it was using your home as an ATM because tax cuts didn't cause wages to rise or jobs to be created, and to afford things like college or health care, people took out second or third mortgages on their homes. Something they wouldn't have to do if, according to you, they got a tax cut. So....whoops!

Design? That's funny.

The Bush Mortgage Bubble was absolutely by design. Conservatives had promised that the Bush Tax Cuts would lead to all this growth and revenue and jobs, and that didn't happen. So in 2003-4, Bush and the Conservatives took several deliberate steps to create a mortgage bubble to make the economy look like it was growing in advance of the 2004 election when it really wasn't. That's why Bush tied his tax cuts to the growth of the housing market while campaigning in 2004. Without the growth of that housing bubble, the Bush economy was the weakest since the Great Depression:

For Wall Street, high profits could be made from securities backed by subprime loans. Fannie and Freddie targeted the least-risky loans. Still, their purchases provided more cash for a larger subprime market.

But again, their mortgages were good and didn't enter delinquency. So they weren't the cause.

In 2004, the year you said standards declined, the GSEs bought 44% of the subprime mortgages written that year. In 2005, standards still weak, right? They bought 33% of all new subprimes.

So you proved their market share was dwindling, and the delinquency numbers show that the GSE-backed loans remained steady and consistent. They only started entering delinquency once the recession started, but they didn't cause the recession to start. That was the fault of private label loans.

You mean the human condition of greed, right?

Greed, fads, trend following and more.

So they weren't the cause.

Their purchases of crappy mortgages helped feed the bubble.

 

[Toddsterpatriot]

Nope. A crappy mortgage would be one, for instance, that was given to someone with a low credit score with a very low, or no, downpayment. The technical term for a crappy mortgage is subprime.

But if the borrower can pay it, who cares? It's not crappy if the borrower can repay. A subprime may be riskier, but it's only crappy if it enters delinquency, which would turn the security it backed toxic, which is what caused the collapse of the secondary mortgage markets, which caused the credit freeze, which caused the recession.

Not all crappy mortgages defaulted. Not all conforming mortgages escaped default.

So I see what you're doing...you're applying your own standard to "crappy". You are interchanging "crappy" with "risky". Sure, those subprimes were riskier, but the risk paid off for the GSE's since their mortgages entered delinquency at rates far below that of private labels.

Again, that's not surprising considering they bought better mortgages.

So did they buy "crappy" mortgages, or did they buy "risky" mortgages? There's a difference. Subprimes were risky, but private-label subprimes were crap. They were crap because they entered delinquency at rates far higher than their GSE counterparts. So you need to make up your mind; did the mortgages GSE's backed cause delinquencies or not?

Your own source showed the government forced them to buy 50% subprime loans, rising to 56% subprime loans. This isn't a claim I manufactured.

Rising to 56% when? After the private label subprime market had already popped. And what of the loan performance for the GSE-backed loans? Consistently better than that of private labels. Hence, GSE-backed loans were not responsible for the bubble or the pop of that bubble. Just like all mortgages, they were swept up in the aftermath of the private label mortgages defaulting and the recession.

They were worse than the ones they bought pre-bubble, obviously.

NO THEY ******* WEREN'T! That's why the line on the chart below for GSE's remains steady and consistent as the line on the chart for private label subprimes and subprime ARMS shot up:

Default rates for GSE's rose in the aftermath of private labels popping the bubble, along with all other kinds of mortgages. So GSE loans were no worse than they were prior to the collapse and bubble, as the chart shows.

eah, their crappy loans took longer to default. And?

No, they ******* didn't! Look at the goddamned chart! The defaulting of GSE-backed loans started the same time the defaulting of all other loans happened, as the ******* chart above shows. So just like all the other non-subprime mortgages, GSE-backed ones entered delinquency at the same time as other loans because there was a recession that caused job loss which caused borrowers to not be able to repay.

A few hundred billion dollars in government bailout funds disprove your claim.

They had to get the bailout because the private label subprime bubble popped mid-2006, and the resulting delinquencies and foreclosures led to a drop in home prices, which led to a cooling of the market, which led to job loss because the only growth that happened from 2004-7 was because of the housing bubble. Job loss means the borrowers weren't able to repay, which means their mortgages entered delinquency. Because GSE's are government-sponsored, they had to get bailed out. But they wouldn't have had to have been bailed out if private label subprimes hadn't created and popped a bubble. Again, that's why delinquency rates for all mortgages rose starting in 2008.

But if the borrower can pay it, who cares?

Exactly.

It's not crappy if the borrower can repay.

I already said, not all subprime loans default.

A subprime may be riskier, but it's only crappy if it enters delinquency,

Subprime loans are subprime, whether they default or not.

Sure, those subprimes were riskier, but the risk paid off for the GSE's

Hundreds of billions in government funds point out your error.

So did they buy "crappy" mortgages, or did they buy "risky" mortgages?

They bought crappy mortgages. Up to 56% of their total purchases.

did the mortgages GSE's backed cause delinquencies or not?

Mortgages, good or bad, do not "cause delinquencies".

Rising to 56% when?

From 50% in 2004 to 56% in 2008.

And what of the loan performance for the GSE-backed loans?

What of it? Half of them or more, from 2004 and earlier, were conforming loans.

Consistently better than that of private labels.

Conforming loans. Duh.

Hence, GSE-backed loans were not responsible for the bubble or the pop of that bubble.

In 2003, the two bought $81 billion in subprime securities. In 2004, they purchased $175 billion -- 44 percent of the market. In 2005, they bought $169 billion, or 33 percent. In 2006, they cut back to $90 billion, or 20 percent.

In four years, they bought over half a trillion in subprime loans. Adding to the bubble.

NO THEY ******* WEREN'T!

Mortgages bought during the bubble, with skyrocketing home prices, lower down payments and weaker borrowers were most certainly worse than mortgages bought pre-bubble.

Without a doubt.

That's why the line on the chart below for GSE's remains steady and consistent

Yes, your ignorance of what the chart says is obvious to me.

 

[The Derp]

Their purchases of crappy mortgages helped feed the bubble.

No, it didn't because the bubble were private-label subprimes. They're the thing that popped mid-2006 that ended up having a downstream effect on all other mortgages.

 

[Toddsterpatriot]

MW workers who didn't lose their jobs make more under a higher MW.

Why would they lose their jobs? That didn't happen in Seattle.

It does, obviously.

Except that the unemployment rate for Seattle has declined since the MW was raised.

No. I'm saying if you raise the MW some workers who made the old wage, and were employed, will be unemployed and won't benefit from the new, higher wage.

But why would they be unemployed? This is the part you gloss over. Raising the MW didn't kill jobs in Seattle. In fact, it created jobs as the unemployment rate declined.

Some workers who would have been hired, at the old wage, won't be hired under the higher wage.

Why not? A business only hires a worker if there is demand. If revenues are increasing because people are spending more, because they have higher wages, you're saying a business wouldn't hire a new worker to meet the increased demand? What kind of business would do that? That's stupid.

That'd be a good thing.
Among MW workers, the unemployment rate was higher than it would have been absent the MW increase.

So here's the problem...you can't be unemployed and be a minimum wage worker. So your argument is an example of cognitive dissonance; you say that the unemployment rate is higher among MW workers, but you can't know that because if someone is unemployed, then they're not a MW worker!

So, our prediction is that underneath all of the national effects of the state of the economy and so on we would expect places with a higher minimum wage to have, at minimum, slower growth in minimum wage jobs if not no or even a shrinkage of the sector. And we would expect that process to start when the higher minimum wage is announced, not comes in. And finally we would go and look for that in the restaurant sector.

Key word in your cut-and-paste: "prediction". And again, you are using numbers from 2016. Why not use numbers from 2017? Oh right, because doing so would undermine your argument.

So I'm wondering why you feel the need to use outdated information? Is it because there's nothing from the current numbers that supports your argument? So you use something that is nearly 18 months old and you thought, what, that you could slip it by me? Try again and this time, use numbers from 2017. In fact, the BLS has April 2017 numbers for the city of Seattle. Why not use those? Oh right, because that would mean you'd have to actually do work and couldn't do the typical, rushed, sloppy work you're accustomed to doing.

Why would they lose their jobs?

If you're paid $9/hr but produce $11/hr in added value, you keep your job.
If you're paid $12/hr but produce $11/hr in added value, not so much.

Raising the MW didn't kill jobs in Seattle.

It appears to have slowed the growth of low-end jobs.

Raising the MW didn't kill jobs in Seattle. In fact, it created jobs as the unemployment rate declined.

I'd love for you to show me how making something more expensive increases the demand for it.

A business only hires a worker if there is demand.

A business only hires a worker if they produce more value than their expense to the business.

If revenues are increasing because people are spending more,

Do you feel revenues increase less than expenses, as much as expenses or more than expenses?
Feel free to use a hypothetical.
Let me know if I need to define hypothetical for you.

So here's the problem...you can't be unemployed and be a minimum wage worker.

Which is why workers who are priced out of the job market by the MW hike aren't helped by the hike.

Key word in your cut-and-paste: "prediction".

Yes. They predicted what the hike would do to jobs/job creation and examined data after the hike was announced and implemented.

And again, you are using numbers from 2016. Why not use numbers from 2017?

Find 2017 numbers that refute the numbers thru 2016. Post them. Prove your claim. Or don't.

So I'm wondering why you feel the need to use outdated information?

I posted what I found. Feel free to do the same.

 

[Toddsterpatriot]

Their purchases of crappy mortgages helped feed the bubble.

No, it didn't because the bubble were private-label subprimes. They're the thing that popped mid-2006 that ended up having a downstream effect on all other mortgages.

No, it didn't

Making $515 billion available to make more subprime loans doesn't increase the number of subprime loans?

How many times did you fail Econ 101 before you gave up?

 

[The Derp]

But if the borrower can pay it, who cares?
Exactly.
It's not crappy if the borrower can repay.
I already said, not all subprime loans default.
A subprime may be riskier, but it's only crappy if it enters delinquency,
Subprime loans are subprime, whether they default or not.

So, not "crappy", just risky. A crappy loan would be a loan that a borrower couldn't or didn't repay. Risky and crappy are not interchangeable. GSE's may have bought risky loans, but the risk paid off. Delinquency rates for GSE-backed loans remained the same (or were slightly better) during the bubble as before it. The bubble was in the private-label subprimes, which popped in mid-2006 (again, we know that because that's what the delinquency data tells us). You are trying to say GSE-backed loans contributed to the private-label subprime bubble, but by their very nature of being GSE-backed loans, they weren't a part of that bubble, nor did they contribute to it. That's why they are separated out from private-label subprimes in this chart:

Sure, those subprimes were riskier, but the risk paid off for the GSE's
Hundreds of billions in government funds point out your error.

The bailout of the GSE's was the aftermath of the recession caused by the popping of the private-label subprime bubble. The mortgages that had to be "rescued" from the GSE's were a consequence not of their inherent risk, but of the cooling of the housing market, which precipitated a credit freeze, which precipitated a recession, which precipitated job loss, which precipitated foreclosures. But again, the "original sin" was the explosion in private-label subprime lending, something GSE's were not a part of.

So did they buy "crappy" mortgages, or did they buy "risky" mortgages?
They bought crappy mortgages. Up to 56% of their total purchases.

Not crappy, risky. There's a difference. But GSE loan performance was unchanged during the bubble, and only rose along with all other mortgages as the recession started and caused all the job loss.

did the mortgages GSE's backed cause delinquencies or not?
Mortgages, good or bad, do not "cause delinquencies".

What causes a delinquency? The borrower not repaying. And which borrowers were not repaying first? The ones who got the subprime ARMs from private labels. When those homes went into foreclosure, it drove down the prices for all the other, non-subprime ARMs. That left many "underwater" on their mortgage. Those foreclosures also had the added effect of cooling the housing market, which was Bush's only growth in his entire presidency. So when the housing market cools, all the economic activity from that housing market cools, which leads to job loss, which leads to more foreclosures, and the community enters a death spiral of foreclosures, job loss, foreclosures, job loss...all non-prime, GSE-backed, and FHA loans entering delinquency was a consequence of the subprime ARM bubble popping. So that's why the "bubble" wasn't a general or generic housing bubble, it was specifically a subprime bubble and it was specifically a private-label subprime bubble. Otherwise, all other types of mortgages would have entered delinquency at the same time as the private-label subprimes. But they didn't. So all those other loans entered delinquency because the subprime bubble popped. And the subprime bubble was grown by private labels, not the GSE's. Because if it were the GSE's, then their loans would have entered delinquency the same time the private label subprimes did. But they didn't.

Rising to 56% when?
From 50% in 2004 to 56% in 2008.

So what was it in 2003? And what was it in 2005? And 2006? And 2007? Wait, you know what? We already know because we have these facts: So you just exercised sophism again because you are a natural-born liar and cheat. So yes, it did go up to 56% by 2008, but it dropped down to 40% for 2005 and 2006, and was previously 70% in 2003. So you deliberately and pourposefully left out the numbers that put your numbers into perspective. So why do you do that? Why do you purposefully and deliberately leave information out of your argument? The answer is, of course, because you are a sophist.

And what of the loan performance for the GSE-backed loans?
What of it? Half of them or more, from 2004 and earlier, were conforming loans.

But if they were even partially responsible for the subprime bubble, then they would have seen their delinquency rate rise at the same time private-label subprime delinquency rates were rising. But they didn't. So what does that mean for your argument? That it's bullshit.

Hence, GSE-backed loans were not responsible for the bubble or the pop of that bubble.
In 2003, the two bought $81 billion in subprime securities. In 2004, they purchased $175 billion -- 44 percent of the market. In 2005, they bought $169 billion, or 33 percent. In 2006, they cut back to $90 billion, or 20 percent.

Did those loans default in greater rates? No. You see delinquencies rising amid private label subprimes, but not GSE-backed subprimes. So there's a disconnect in your argument.

 

[danielpalos]

Walls of text don't deter the right wing; why should any other walls deter persons with more of a work ethic than that.