Ampad moved its hanging-folder manufacturing operation out of Marion, Indiana, to a plant in another state.
By now, Ampad had pads and folders to put them in. Next on the list: an envelope company.
Bain went back to the bank and borrowed a couple hundred million dollars. Most of the money went to buy the envelope company, but about $70 million went to pay Bain and its investors.
Not long after that, Ampad went public. Bain used the money from the IPO to pay off a chunk of debt. In 1996, American Pad and Paper had its best year.
In 1997, Ampad made another purchase: A printer-paper company called Shade Allied.
The company made continuous-form printer paper, for dot-matrix printers — that old kind of computer paper, with the little holes running down the side.
That purchase didn't turn out so well. And Ampad started having other troubles.
Asian companies came on the scene with cheaper products. The price of pulp jumped. Ampad's revenues started to fall. And they have to keep paying interest on all that debt.
In 2000 — four years after the IPO— Ampad declared bankruptcy. Stockholders were wiped out (including Bain, which still owned about a third of the company). Lenders got back a fraction of what they were owed.
"You can't continue to leverage companies up," says Russell Gard. "At some point, there's going to be a breaking point."
Clearly, the story doesn't always end this way. If it did, the banks wouldn't keep lending private equity companies like Bain massive amounts of money.
And Ampad itself? The pad company?
You can still get an Ampad pad today. The company is now being run by another private equity firm. A firm that saw an undervalued company, and bought it at a good price.