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- Jun 17, 2009
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Protests Are Not Enough To Topple the Islamic Republic
by Michael Rubin
Los Angeles Times
June 19, 2009
Protests aren't enough to topple the Islamic Republic - Middle East Forum
Michael Rubin, a senior editor of the Middle East Quarterly,
is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and
a senior lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School.
Street protests in Iran are important but are themselves not enough to
force change. The supreme leader will not be swayed because he considers
himself accountable to God, not to the people. Indeed, even the Islamic
Republic's clerical establishment is irrelevant in this calculus. President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad' s invocation of folk religion -- his appeals to the
messianic Hidden Imam, for example -- is a way to bypass senior religious
figures who, according to Shiite theology, will be among the greatest
obstacles to the Hidden Imam's return. Nor does the supreme leader,
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, pay too much heed to his fellow clerics in Qom.
They have always refused to bestow on Khamenei a level of religious
legitimacy to match his ambition. Today, the majority of Iran's grand
ayatollahs oppose the concept of theological rule. Not by coincidence,
the majority are now in prison or under house arrest.
Khamenei can weather the public's disdain so long as the Revolutionary
Guard serves as his Praetorian Guard. Khomeini, the Islamic Republic's
founder, formed the Revolutionary Guard to defend his revolutionary vision.
It is more powerful than the army and answers only to the supreme leader.
That the Islamic Republic has lost legitimacy in the eyes of the Iranian
public is now evident to the outside world, but it is not news to the regime.
In September 2007, Mohammad Ali Jafari, the new Revolutionary Guard chief,
reconfigured the force into 31 units -- one for each province and two for
Tehran -- on the theory that a velvet revolution posed a greater threat to
regime security than any external enemy. Guardsmen are not stationed in
their home cities so that they do not hesitate to fire on crowds that might
include family and friends.
In the public mind, the Islamic revolution 30 years ago looms large.
The regime is not aloof to this. It understands the shah's mistakes and is
determined not to repeat them. Next month marks the 10th anniversary of
the student uprising, which erupted after the security forces attacked a
student dormitory. Their brutality shocked the Iranian public, and
demonstrations spread throughout the country. For a few days, regime
survival was also subject to speculation.
In the aftermath of the protests, the Chinese government supplied security
consultants to Tehran. Rather than bash heads and risk protests and endless
cycles of mourning, Iranian security services began photographing
demonstrations, after which they would arrest participants over the course
of a month when they were alone and could not spark mob reaction.
With the assistance of European businessmen, the Iranian government
upgraded its surveillance of communication (and the Internet). >>>MORE>>>
by Michael Rubin
Los Angeles Times
June 19, 2009
Protests aren't enough to topple the Islamic Republic - Middle East Forum
Michael Rubin, a senior editor of the Middle East Quarterly,
is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and
a senior lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School.
Street protests in Iran are important but are themselves not enough to
force change. The supreme leader will not be swayed because he considers
himself accountable to God, not to the people. Indeed, even the Islamic
Republic's clerical establishment is irrelevant in this calculus. President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad' s invocation of folk religion -- his appeals to the
messianic Hidden Imam, for example -- is a way to bypass senior religious
figures who, according to Shiite theology, will be among the greatest
obstacles to the Hidden Imam's return. Nor does the supreme leader,
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, pay too much heed to his fellow clerics in Qom.
They have always refused to bestow on Khamenei a level of religious
legitimacy to match his ambition. Today, the majority of Iran's grand
ayatollahs oppose the concept of theological rule. Not by coincidence,
the majority are now in prison or under house arrest.
Khamenei can weather the public's disdain so long as the Revolutionary
Guard serves as his Praetorian Guard. Khomeini, the Islamic Republic's
founder, formed the Revolutionary Guard to defend his revolutionary vision.
It is more powerful than the army and answers only to the supreme leader.
That the Islamic Republic has lost legitimacy in the eyes of the Iranian
public is now evident to the outside world, but it is not news to the regime.
In September 2007, Mohammad Ali Jafari, the new Revolutionary Guard chief,
reconfigured the force into 31 units -- one for each province and two for
Tehran -- on the theory that a velvet revolution posed a greater threat to
regime security than any external enemy. Guardsmen are not stationed in
their home cities so that they do not hesitate to fire on crowds that might
include family and friends.
In the public mind, the Islamic revolution 30 years ago looms large.
The regime is not aloof to this. It understands the shah's mistakes and is
determined not to repeat them. Next month marks the 10th anniversary of
the student uprising, which erupted after the security forces attacked a
student dormitory. Their brutality shocked the Iranian public, and
demonstrations spread throughout the country. For a few days, regime
survival was also subject to speculation.
In the aftermath of the protests, the Chinese government supplied security
consultants to Tehran. Rather than bash heads and risk protests and endless
cycles of mourning, Iranian security services began photographing
demonstrations, after which they would arrest participants over the course
of a month when they were alone and could not spark mob reaction.
With the assistance of European businessmen, the Iranian government
upgraded its surveillance of communication (and the Internet). >>>MORE>>>
