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- Sep 14, 2004
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(edit: made a mistake; meant to put this in "Military" Forum.)
Too long for one post. Part1:
Too long for one post. Part1:
[...]City Journal
Postmodern War
Victor Davis Hanson
Winter 2005
http://www.city-journal.org/html/15_1_postmodern_war.html
It is still suicidal to meet the United States in a conventional warat least for any enemy that has not fully adopted Western arms, discipline, logistics, and military organization. The recent abrupt collapse of both the Taliban and Saddam Husseins regime amply proves the folly of fighting America in direct conflicts. The military dynamism that enables the United States to intervene militarily in the Middle Eastin a manner in which even the richest Middle Eastern countries could not intervene in North Americais not an accident of geography or a reflection of genes, but a result of culture. Our classical Western approaches to politics, religion, and economicsincluding consensual government, free markets, secularism, a strong middle class, and individual freedomeventually translate on the battlefield into better-equipped, motivated, disciplined, and supported soldiers.
To an American television audience, al-Qaida videos of pajama-clad killers in ski masks beheading captives look scary, of course. But a platoon of Rangers would slaughter hundreds of them in seconds if they ever approached Americans openly on the field of conventional battle or even for brief moments of clear firing. In Mogadishu, Somalia, everything boded ill for a few trapped Americansoutnumbered, far from home, facing local hostility in urban warfareand yet the real lesson was not that a few Americans were tragically killed, but that the modern successors to Xenophons Ten Thousand or the Redcoats at Rorkes Drift managed to shoot their way out and kill over 1,000 in the process.
Nevertheless, the numerous setbacks of Western armies from Thermopylae to Vietnam prove that there are several ways to nullify these military advantages, both on conventional and irregular battlefields. The question is: Are such historical precedents still relevant to the modern age?
From early times, enemies have obtained superficial parity by a sort of military parasitismby buying, stealing, or cloning Western weaponry. The galleys and guns of the Ottoman forces at Lepanto without exception were copies of Venetian designs, for example, as was the Turkish arsenal itself at Constantinople. In 1850, Japan had virtually no munitions industry, no oceanic fleet, and no organized naval corps; by 1905, its ships were among the best in the world and soundly defeated a Russian armada but only after tens of thousands of Japanese students for a half century had studied at European universities and military academies. From Europe, the Japanese had systematically imported everything from Western notions of command to advanced optics and metallurgy.
Today, China is a similar example. Like the Ottomans and the nineteenth-century Japanese, the Chinese military believes that it can either purchase or steal Western computer, aeronautical, and nuclear technologywhile skipping bothersome Western notions like democracy and free speechin order to obtain military parity with the United States. The Arab world too has sought to match Israel with MiGs, Scuds, SAMs, and RPGstechnology that it could neither design nor fabricate, but that it believed could give its autocracies the ability to destroy a democratic, highly sophisticated Jewish state all the same. Every rocket-propelled grenade that kills an American in the Sunni Triangle is either imported from the West or fabricated in the region according to Western blueprints and designs.
Yet in the long run, such imported technological expertise cannot be maintained, constantly improved, or used to its optimum potential without free citizens, secular universities, transparent government, and open inquiry. These intangible values and concrete institutions are the real engines that drive the modern Western ability to field high-tech arms and disciplined soldiers in the first place. For all the worry about weapons of mass destruction, neither Iran, nor North Korea, nor Libya, despite the purchased veneer of a sophisticated military, could ever defeat a militarily serious Western state of comparable size unless it underwent radical social and cultural democratic reformwhich ironically might then deprive it of any impulse to attack the West in the first place.
In an age of germs, gas, and nukes, however, the ultimate nightmare of present-day military parasitism is not that terrorists or autocrats could defeat or destroy the West in a sustained conventional or nuclear war. The concern, rather, is that enemies could inflict enough damage in a moment of complacency and laxity here at home to kill tens of thousands of U.S. civilians through a single strikeor at least blackmail us by offering proof of the ability to do precisely that.
Given the present lethality of modern weapons, a hostile state or terrorist clique can obtain an odd sort of parity with Western militaries, even though its aggregate arsenal is not equivalent to the Wests: al-Qaida or Iran cannot fabricate or purchase B-2 bombers but might nonetheless obtain a nuclear weapon. And because these extremists profess to be willing to lose thousands or even an entire country to take out the center of New York, negotiations and concessions would follow that did not reflect the actual relative military strength of the two belligerents. No civilization can exist for long with a series of 9/11-like attacks that destroy its icons of financial and military power, and in a few seconds inflict a trillion dollars of economic damage.
There are other ways to check Western advantage besides achieving such superficial arms parity. Western powers can be turned against one another through outside invitation or bribery, or by fanning rivalries over perceived self-interestand such conflicts could aid an otherwise weaker adversary. Thankfully, out-and-out fratricide is rarer these days, because the spread of Western democracy tends to discourage consensual governments from attacking one another in the way that Sparta fought Athens or Europe tore itself apart during the twentieth century. Should Syria or the Palestinians ever develop a full-fledged democracy analogous to Israels, problems over borders more likely would be adjudicated peacefully rather than through conventional wars or terrorism.
But while it is highly unlikely that the full array of Western military advantages could be turned against itself, what is far more plausible is something like the lead-up to the 2003 Iraqi war. Saddam expended ill-gotten billions to encourage France, Germany, and Russia to restrain the U.S. through a UN vetohoping to achieve a diplomatic triangulation similar to the United Statess forcing the cancellation of the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Suez in 1956.
More usual, however, than this state-to-state check on Western military operations is the hindrance that comes from internal dissent. Given that Westerners are usually more liberal, consensual, and affluent than their adversaries, they are sometimes slow to risk peace and prosperity to prepare for, much less preempt, distant dangers on the horizon. Civilian audit brings military dividends in the long run by forcing officers to render constant accounts of their decisions and face consequences for their blunders. Nevertheless, these same democratic citizenries often hesitate in peacetime to make needed sacrificesthink of the classical Athenians acrimony over Themistocles peacetime diversion of income from the Athenian silver mines to craft an Athenian fleet that would later destroy Xerxes armada, or the narrow approval of an American draft by a single vote on the eve of World War II. Much of the American weaponry used today in the war against terror was authorized only by narrow margins and subject to great acrimony during the senatorial debates over the controversial Reagan-era buildup in hopes of reestablishing credible deterrence against the Soviet Union.
Thus a weaker enemy can hope to persuade or frighten a majority of its adversarys citizens to reject the war party, and to come to its terms or simply quit, by such means as the rather crude Soviet Union propaganda efforts in the cold war or by appealing to deep-seated Western pacifism. More recently, terrorists have grasped that the enormous wealth and privilege of Western society in the postwar half century have convinced many Americans and Europeans that avoiding war altogether, rather than preparedness and deterrence, is critical to maintaining their present tranquillity. Usama bin Ladins own fatwas invoke Americas purported inability to take casualties, while Saddam Hussein stockpiled morale-boosting DVD copies of Black Hawk Down, on the logic that the movie showed how irregulars in block-to-block fighting might force conventional American troops to go home by shattering their leaders morale.
Precisely because terrorists believe that life is awfully good in the West (and relatively less so in their own environs), they compute success by a different, asymmetrical arithmetic: killing a few of us, even if it means losing a lot of their own, is what brings victorywithdrawal of American forces under waves of media carping and popular outcry. Bin Ladin, Saddams remnants, and the like all believe that there is a magical and relatively small number of fatalities600? 1,000? 4,000?in any one campaign beyond which Americans will conclude that fights like those in Afghanistan and Iraq simply are not worth the effort and anguish. And they may well be right. Who, after all, wants to raise a son in the San Jose suburbs, with a B.A. from UCLA, to die in the filthy streets of Sadr City seeking to bring democracy to tribal fundamentalists?
Thus many Americans conclude that the short-term and daily televised costs of pacifying Iraq add up to a grave moral and political mistake. They resent the immediate suffering involved in the long-term goal of changing the landscape of the Middle East to end terrorism sponsored or tolerated by petroleum-funded Arab autocrats who, at least in public, blame the Americans for their own glaring political and economic failures. Such aims might make long-term moral and political sense, but when CNN or NPR interviews an amputee maimed by an improvised explosive device, it is hard for 300 million other Americans not to think that his misery was preventableor might just as easily have befallen their own children or spouses. Like the British and Israeli public who tired of war when hundreds of innocents were blown apart in Belfast and Jerusalem, the American citizenry feels that it cannot withdraw and yet cannot quite stay either. In the terrorists logic, each explosion is intended not to destroy incrementally the U.S. militarythat task is impossiblebut to lower its morale and, more important, to convince the suburbanite back home that the carnage on his screen is his to stop.
So besides military parasitism and the checks and balances inherent in a consensual society, there is yet another means of countering Western military advantage: what we might loosely call the perceptions of asymmetrical conflict, also called irregular or fourth-dimensional warfare. Such militarily inferior forcesoften not nation-states, as al-Qaida and the Iraqi terrorists demonstrateprefer terrorism, assassination, and bombings to nullify Western military power. What we see as uncontestable strengthplentiful hardware, massive firepowerthey seek to turn into weakness. Perceived underdogs in the shadow of this overwhelming military superiority, they also enjoy the satisfaction of besting their betters, as well as of hurting or killing someone to whom life has been immeasurably more kindand therefore perceived as more dear. Taking out an Abrams tank or an Apache helicopter, whatever the cost in insurgent lives, sends a message that the illiterate and ill-equipped can, like David, take down Goliath.
And because asymmetrical warfare is inherently political, victory often entails merely hurting rather than defeating a superior enemyto the applause of local civilian bystanders, who may cringe at their terrorist brethrens methods and aims but nonetheless still enjoy a little blood sport from time to time, especially if those dying are rich, haughty, and occupying Americans, restrained by the Geneva convention and their own scruples in their retaliation.
This one-sided fighting has one prerequisite: the terrorist avoids open identification with any conventional military target or supportive infrastructure subject to Western military reappraisal. Slobodan Miloević s fatal error was that the world finally concluded that his goons in Bosnia and Kosovo really were slaughtering on his orders. Thus the people of Belgrade could legitimately be held responsible for their rogue leaders sponsorship of genocide. And when they were held responsiblewhen precise GPS targeting, rather than random carpet bombing of civilians, took out vital infrastructure and sent the message that life will be more difficult until you hand over Miloević the killing stopped. If the West finds an easily identifiable target and its selection passes moral muster back home, then it can often attack with little constraint.