I was a child when FDR was president. After he died, the Democrats ignored all the Racism he had. HE did not like blacks at all. His wife told him to form a black air group. So he dragged that out till the war end was very close. Blacks who changed to the Air Force felt better as time faded for them. As racist as FDR was, why blacks like him to this day shocks me.
I used this due to duplicates.
Day of Deceit lays it out. FDR had a Navy commander reporting to him. And the commander was then in Japan. McCollum laid out an 8 point plan to get into war with Japan. Roosevelt pretty much followed that plan.
'Day of Deceit': On Dec. 7, Did We Know We Knew?
By RICHARD BERNSTEIN
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DAY OF DECEIT
The Truth About F.D.R. and Pearl Harbor.
By Robert B. Stinnett.
Illustrated. 386 pages. Free Press. $26.
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or nearly 60 years it has been bruited about -- and for nearly 60 years unproved -- that President Franklin D. Roosevelt knew in advance of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941, but, because he wanted some national shock therapy to get the reluctant country into the war, he did nothing about it. Now Robert B. Stinnett, a Navy veteran of the war who subsequently made a career as a journalist for The Oakland Tribune, has produced the results of a 17-year search for documentary evidence on this important historical question.
The basic conclusion of his new book, "Day of Deceit: The Truth About F.D.R. and Pearl Harbor," is this: Not only was the "surprise attack" no surprise to Roosevelt, but also the effort to provoke Japan into military action was the principal policy of the Roosevelt administration for the entire preceding year.
Historians of World War II generally agree that Roosevelt believed war with Japan was inevitable and that he wanted Japan to fire the first shot. What Stinnett has done, taking off from that idea, is compile documentary evidence to the effect that Roosevelt, to ensure that the first shot would have a traumatic effect, intentionally left Americans defenseless. One of the most sensational of Stinnett's claims in this regard concerns Japan's most important spy on Hawaii, Tadashi Morimura, who, in the months before the attack, gave Tokyo grids of the harbor showing the location of American naval vessels.
Just before the assault took place he sent radio messages to Tokyo saying that a surprise attack remained feasible. Stinnett demonstrates that Morimura's dispatches were intercepted by American naval intelligence, which had cracked the Japanese code, and that translations of those intercepts were sent to Washington. But they were never given to Adm. Husband E. Kimmel, the United States Navy commander for the Pacific, or to his Army counterpart, Lt. Gen. Walter Short.
Peggy Stinnett/Free Press |
Robert Stinnett
Also Today in Books |
The implication here is that Roosevelt, by withholding critical information from commanders in the field, wanted, as Stinnett puts it, to "ensure an uncontested overt Japanese act of war." Given that 2,273 American soldiers and sailors died at Pearl Harbor, this basic conclusion, if it is correct, would require some drastic rethinking about Roosevelt and the American entry into the war. But while the volume of documentation provided by Stinnett is impressive, he hardly decides the issue once and for all.
Stinnett's strongest and most disturbing argument relates to one of the standard explanations for Japan's success in keeping the impending Pearl Harbor attack a secret: namely that the aircraft carrier task force that unleashed it maintained strict radio silence for the entire three weeks leading up to Dec. 7 and thus avoided detection. In truth, Stinnett writes, the Japanese continuously broke radio silence even as the Americans, using radio direction finding techniques, were able to follow the Japanese fleet as it made its way toward Hawaii.
Among the Japanese who made radio broadcasts were Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, commander of the Japanese Imperial Navy, and Vice Adm. Chuichi Nagumo, commander of the leading element in the Japanese Pearl Harbor strike force. Stinnett writes that their messages were intercepted, deciphered and provided to Washington by a coded transmission procedure known as TESTM. Roosevelt, Stinnett says, would have been provided the TESTM documents, but they were not given to Kimmel or Short.
It is possible that Stinnett might be right about this; certainly the material he has unearthed ought to be reviewed by other historians. Yet the mere existence of intelligence does not prove that that intelligence made its way into the proper hands or that it would have been speedily and correctly interpreted.