I'm sure some folks here have heard of the eminent historian John Dower, who specializes in the Asian and Pacific theaters of World War II. No one who has read Dower's works would accuse him of being a Japanese apologist. Yet, in his award-winning book Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Illustrated Edition, 2000), Dower documents Japan's prostate condition at the end of the war:
Of course, the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) also concluded that Japan would have surrendered by no later than the end of December, and probably before November, even if we had not dropped nukes, even if the Soviets had not attacked, and even if we had not planned or contemplated an invasion:
In another section of his book, Dower gives further details about the conditions in Japan in the last months of the war, noting, among other things, that starvation became a major cause of death in the Japanese army by mid-1945:
And let there be no mistake: We knew that Japan was prostrate and starving. In a post-war effort to justify the nuking of Japan, Truman and his apologists vastly exaggerated Japan's August 1945 fighting ability. However, there is ample evidence that internally the White House and the War Department were well aware of Japan's desperate condition--and they also knew about Japan's several peace feelers, including one authorized by the emperor himself, weeks before the nukes were dropped.
The imperial navy had long since ceased to exist. Apart from a few thousand rickety planes held in reserve for suicide attacks, Japan’s air force—not only its aircraft but its skilled pilots as well—had virtually ceased to exist. Its merchant marine lay at the bottom of the ocean. Almost all of the country’s major cities had been fire-bombed, and millions of the emperor’s loyal subjects were homeless. The defeated imperial army was scattered throughout Asia and the islands of the Pacific Ocean, its millions of surviving soldiers starving, wounded, sick, and demoralized. . . .
In mid-October, in a memorandum to President Truman summarizing conversations with MacArthur and his aides, the special presidential envoy Edwin Locke, Jr., reported that “the American officers now in Tokyo are amazed by the fact that resistance continued as long as it did.” Indeed, so great was the economic disarray, he added, that in the opinion of some Americans, the atomic bombs, “while seized upon by the Japanese as an excuse for getting out of the war, actually speeded surrender by only a few days.” Locke went on to note that “the entire economic structure of Japan’s greatest cities has been wrecked. Five millions of Tokyo’s seven million population have left ruined city.”
Later investigative missions from Washington, led by the analysts for the prestigious U.S Strategic Bombing Survey, similarly concluded that pre-surrender estimates of Japan’s capacity for continuing the war had been greatly exaggerated. (pp. 43-44)
Of course, the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) also concluded that Japan would have surrendered by no later than the end of December, and probably before November, even if we had not dropped nukes, even if the Soviets had not attacked, and even if we had not planned or contemplated an invasion:
Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated. (USSBS, p. 26)
In another section of his book, Dower gives further details about the conditions in Japan in the last months of the war, noting, among other things, that starvation became a major cause of death in the Japanese army by mid-1945:
Factory absenteeism rose nationwide, in large part because workers took time off to bargain and barter for food in the countryside. By July, absentee rates in major cities stood at 40 percent or more, with the food problem being cited as a major contributing factor.
The Allied policy of “economic strangulation” had sent most of the navy and merchant marine to the bottom of the ocean by mid-1945, choking off supplies to the home front as well as to the war front. In the Southeast Asian and Pacific theaters, starvation became a major cause of death among fighting men.
The home islands themselves were heavily dependent on Korea, Formosa [Taiwan], and China for basic foodstuffs. Before Pearl Harbor, imports from these areas accounted for 31 percent of Japan’s rice consumption, 92 percent of its sugar, 58 percent of its soy beans, and 45 percent of its salt. . . .
As the war neared its end, it was a rare family anywhere that regularly ate white rice as a staple. The most common household diet consisted of barley and potatoes, but even these had fallen into short supply. It was in such circumstances that authorities in Osaka recommended an emergency diet that suggested how precarious daily subsistence had become. Based on a research report by local army officials, the emperor’s loyal subjects were encouraged to supplement their starch intake by introducing such as items as acorns, grain husks, peanut shells, and sawdust to their household larder. . . . For minerals, people were encouraged to introduced used tea leaves and the seeds, blossoms, and leaves of roses to their diet. Protein deficiencies could be remedied by eating silkworm cocoons, worms, grasshoppers, mice, rats, moles, snakes, or a powder made by drying the blood of cows, horses, and pigs. . . .
The average calorie intake per person had by this time declined to far less than deemed necessary even for an individual engaged in light work. Elementary school children were on the average physically smaller in 1946 than they had been in 1937. Births had dropped precipitously. Infant mortality rose. (pp. 91-92)
And let there be no mistake: We knew that Japan was prostrate and starving. In a post-war effort to justify the nuking of Japan, Truman and his apologists vastly exaggerated Japan's August 1945 fighting ability. However, there is ample evidence that internally the White House and the War Department were well aware of Japan's desperate condition--and they also knew about Japan's several peace feelers, including one authorized by the emperor himself, weeks before the nukes were dropped.
