DGS49
Diamond Member
Going back a ways in history, General Grant became Lincoln's standard-bearer when he (in effect) accepted the reality of a war of attrition. To state it callously, if Grant went into a battle with 20,000 troops knowing that he would lose 5,000 and the Rebs would lose an equal number, or even fewer, that was an acceptable battle for him. Because be knew that he could replace those five thousand bodies with five thousand new recruits. The Rebs could not. And that was his plan, which ultimately "won" the Civil War.
Similar attitudes prevailed by the Top Brass in The Great War and in WWII. It was less manifest in Korea and Vietnam, but there WERE engagements in all of these wars where the American commander ordered his troops into a situation where he KNEW that some of them would be killed (e.g., D-Day). That was the price of victory in that battle.
Starting in Iraq and even more markedly in Afghanistan, this did not happen. All of the casualties of those wars were the result of defensive engagements and offensive engagements gone wrong. "We" were never sent into battle where a tangible number of casualties were expected and accepted by the Brass. This is why the casualty numbers (fatalities per year, for example) dropped so dramatically between Vietnam and Iraq.
The "heroes" in Iraq and Afghanistan were soldiers (and sailors?) risking their lives to save or recover their fellow soldiers, and almost never risking their lives to achieve the military objective (take out an entrenched machine-gun). It is a whole different mentality, is it not? And yet it is never mentioned.
And parenthetically, it is obvious (to me) that Putin expected to win a war of attrition in Ukraine, accepting the likelihood of massive Russian casualties, but presuming that he would be able to replace the casualties - and then some - with new conscripts. This strategy may be imploding as Russian soldiers are able to communicate back with their families to tell them what's going on. The conscripts may be fighting back on the Homefront.
Similar attitudes prevailed by the Top Brass in The Great War and in WWII. It was less manifest in Korea and Vietnam, but there WERE engagements in all of these wars where the American commander ordered his troops into a situation where he KNEW that some of them would be killed (e.g., D-Day). That was the price of victory in that battle.
Starting in Iraq and even more markedly in Afghanistan, this did not happen. All of the casualties of those wars were the result of defensive engagements and offensive engagements gone wrong. "We" were never sent into battle where a tangible number of casualties were expected and accepted by the Brass. This is why the casualty numbers (fatalities per year, for example) dropped so dramatically between Vietnam and Iraq.
The "heroes" in Iraq and Afghanistan were soldiers (and sailors?) risking their lives to save or recover their fellow soldiers, and almost never risking their lives to achieve the military objective (take out an entrenched machine-gun). It is a whole different mentality, is it not? And yet it is never mentioned.
And parenthetically, it is obvious (to me) that Putin expected to win a war of attrition in Ukraine, accepting the likelihood of massive Russian casualties, but presuming that he would be able to replace the casualties - and then some - with new conscripts. This strategy may be imploding as Russian soldiers are able to communicate back with their families to tell them what's going on. The conscripts may be fighting back on the Homefront.